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author | brian <brian@FreeBSD.org> | 2009-05-20 08:32:25 +0000 |
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committer | brian <brian@FreeBSD.org> | 2009-05-20 08:32:25 +0000 |
commit | 0c0feffc9571ecede7b49c13f5f0d5590c6a08df (patch) | |
tree | 827f95e98910e6a04226a6ea63499207df8b1bd5 /usr.sbin/pwd_mkdb | |
parent | 5b643b0ede28a9a6134496554e7a6ead6ceefb50 (diff) | |
download | FreeBSD-src-0c0feffc9571ecede7b49c13f5f0d5590c6a08df.zip FreeBSD-src-0c0feffc9571ecede7b49c13f5f0d5590c6a08df.tar.gz |
Verify that the username length is smaller than MAXLOGNAME when
asked to verify a passwd file (pwd_mkdb -C).
Entries with oversized usernames are still permitted when building
the passwd database.
When entries are >= MAXLOGNAME in length, they are correctly stored
in passwd, pwd.db and spwd.db but are only correctly retrieved by
getpwent*() and getpwuid*(). getpwnam*() truncates to MAXLOGNAME - 1
when reading from a file (breaking at least sh, tcsh and bash)
and utilities such as su(1) check, complain and fail if the
passed name is >= MAXLOGNAME in length.
MFC after: 3 weeks
Diffstat (limited to 'usr.sbin/pwd_mkdb')
-rw-r--r-- | usr.sbin/pwd_mkdb/pwd_mkdb.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/usr.sbin/pwd_mkdb/pwd_mkdb.c b/usr.sbin/pwd_mkdb/pwd_mkdb.c index 3c8ca25..2abbcdf 100644 --- a/usr.sbin/pwd_mkdb/pwd_mkdb.c +++ b/usr.sbin/pwd_mkdb/pwd_mkdb.c @@ -204,7 +204,11 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[]) /* check only if password database is valid */ if (Cflag) { - for (cnt = 1; scan(fp, &pwd); ++cnt); + while (scan(fp, &pwd)) + if (!is_comment && strlen(pwd.pw_name) >= MAXLOGNAME) { + warnx("%s: username too long", pwd.pw_name); + exit(1); + } exit(0); } |