diff options
author | jonathan <jonathan@FreeBSD.org> | 2011-08-12 10:52:46 +0000 |
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committer | jonathan <jonathan@FreeBSD.org> | 2011-08-12 10:52:46 +0000 |
commit | 97065ea0f1363e7ecf922db28e6cf20680a970f6 (patch) | |
tree | 35b4004b80896f011eee01daac7539af3378d5b8 /tools/regression/security/cap_test | |
parent | 1d8972b3f353f986eb5b85bc108b1c0d946d3218 (diff) | |
download | FreeBSD-src-97065ea0f1363e7ecf922db28e6cf20680a970f6.zip FreeBSD-src-97065ea0f1363e7ecf922db28e6cf20680a970f6.tar.gz |
Test *at(2) calls with capability-mode lookup.
This commit adds regression testing for openat(), fstatat(), etc. with
capability scoping ("strict relative" lookup), which applies:
- in capability mode
- when performing any *at() lookup relative to a capability
These tests will fail until the *at() code is committed; on my local
instance, with the *at() changes, they all pass.
Approved by: re (kib), mentor (rwatson)
Sponsored by: Google Inc
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/regression/security/cap_test')
-rw-r--r-- | tools/regression/security/cap_test/Makefile | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.h | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test_relative.c | 151 |
4 files changed, 157 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/tools/regression/security/cap_test/Makefile b/tools/regression/security/cap_test/Makefile index 49e308e..4bbb548 100644 --- a/tools/regression/security/cap_test/Makefile +++ b/tools/regression/security/cap_test/Makefile @@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ SRCS= cap_test.c \ cap_test_capmode.c \ cap_test_capabilities.c \ cap_test_fcntl.c \ - cap_test_sysctl.c + cap_test_relative.c \ + cap_test_sysctl.c \ + WARNS= 3 NO_MAN= diff --git a/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.c b/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.c index dfda4d6..c583454 100644 --- a/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.c +++ b/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.c @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ struct test all_tests[] = { TEST_INIT(capmode), TEST_INIT(capabilities), TEST_INIT(fcntl), + TEST_INIT(relative), TEST_INIT(sysctl), }; int test_count = sizeof(all_tests) / sizeof(struct test); diff --git a/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.h b/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.h index 1839e01..23435d6 100644 --- a/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.h +++ b/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.h @@ -148,8 +148,8 @@ int execute(int id, struct test*); int test_capmode(void); int test_capabilities(void); -int test_syscalls(void); -int test_sysctl(void); int test_fcntl(void); +int test_relative(void); +int test_sysctl(void); #endif /* CAP_TEST_H */ diff --git a/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test_relative.c b/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test_relative.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1f62e84 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test_relative.c @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 2009-2011 Robert N. M. Watson + * Copyright (c) 2011 Jonathan Anderson + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * $FreeBSD$ + */ + +#include <sys/cdefs.h> +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/capability.h> +#include <sys/errno.h> + +#include <err.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#include "cap_test.h" + +/* + * Test openat(2) in a variety of sitations to ensure that it obeys Capsicum + * "strict relative" rules: + * + * 1. Use strict relative lookups in capability mode or when operating + * relative to a capability. + * 2. When performing strict relative lookups, absolute paths (including + * symlinks to absolute paths) are not allowed, nor are paths containing + * '..' components. + */ +int +test_relative(void) +{ + int success = PASSED; + int fd, etc, etc_cap, etc_cap_ro, etc_cap_base, etc_cap_all; + cap_rights_t baserights = CAP_READ | CAP_WRITE | CAP_SEEK | CAP_LOOKUP; + cap_rights_t rights; + + REQUIRE(etc = open("/etc/", O_RDONLY)); + CHECK_SYSCALL_FAILS(EINVAL, cap_getrights, etc, &rights); + + MAKE_CAPABILITY(etc_cap, etc, CAP_READ); + MAKE_CAPABILITY(etc_cap_ro, etc, CAP_READ | CAP_LOOKUP); + MAKE_CAPABILITY(etc_cap_base, etc, baserights); + MAKE_CAPABILITY(etc_cap_all, etc, CAP_MASK_VALID); + + /* + * openat(2) with regular file descriptors in non-capability mode + * should Just Work (tm). + */ + CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc, "/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); + CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, AT_FDCWD, "/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); + CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc, "passwd", O_RDONLY); + CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); + + /* + * Lookups relative to capabilities should be strictly relative. + * + * When not in capability mode, we don't actually require CAP_LOOKUP. + */ + CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_ro, "passwd", O_RDONLY); + CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_base, "passwd", O_RDONLY); + CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_all, "passwd", O_RDONLY); + + CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc_cap_ro, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); + CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc_cap_base, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); + + /* + * This requires discussion: do we treat a capability with + * CAP_MASK_VALID *exactly* like a non-capability file descriptor + * (currently, the implementation says yes)? + */ + CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_all, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); + + /* + * A file opened relative to a capability should itself be a capability. + */ + CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(cap_getrights, etc_cap_base, &rights); + + REQUIRE(fd = openat(etc_cap_base, "passwd", O_RDONLY)); + CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(cap_getrights, fd, &rights); + CHECK_RIGHTS(rights, baserights); + + /* + * Enter capability mode; now ALL lookups are strictly relative. + */ + REQUIRE(cap_enter()); + + /* + * Relative lookups on regular files or capabilities with CAP_LOOKUP + * ought to succeed. + */ + CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc, "passwd", O_RDONLY); + CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_ro, "passwd", O_RDONLY); + CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_base, "passwd", O_RDONLY); + CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_all, "passwd", O_RDONLY); + + /* + * Lookup relative to capabilities without CAP_LOOKUP should fail. + */ + CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc_cap, "passwd", O_RDONLY); + + /* + * Absolute lookups should fail. + */ + CHECK_CAPMODE(openat, AT_FDCWD, "/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); + CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc, "/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); + + /* + * Lookups containing '..' should fail in capability mode. + */ + CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); + CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc_cap_ro, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); + CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc_cap_base, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); + + REQUIRE(fd = openat(etc, "passwd", O_RDONLY)); + CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(cap_getrights, fd, &rights); + + /* + * A file opened relative to a capability should itself be a capability. + */ + REQUIRE(fd = openat(etc_cap_base, "passwd", O_RDONLY)); + CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(cap_getrights, fd, &rights); + CHECK_RIGHTS(rights, baserights); + + return success; +} |