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authorjonathan <jonathan@FreeBSD.org>2011-08-12 10:52:46 +0000
committerjonathan <jonathan@FreeBSD.org>2011-08-12 10:52:46 +0000
commit97065ea0f1363e7ecf922db28e6cf20680a970f6 (patch)
tree35b4004b80896f011eee01daac7539af3378d5b8 /tools/regression/security/cap_test
parent1d8972b3f353f986eb5b85bc108b1c0d946d3218 (diff)
downloadFreeBSD-src-97065ea0f1363e7ecf922db28e6cf20680a970f6.zip
FreeBSD-src-97065ea0f1363e7ecf922db28e6cf20680a970f6.tar.gz
Test *at(2) calls with capability-mode lookup.
This commit adds regression testing for openat(), fstatat(), etc. with capability scoping ("strict relative" lookup), which applies: - in capability mode - when performing any *at() lookup relative to a capability These tests will fail until the *at() code is committed; on my local instance, with the *at() changes, they all pass. Approved by: re (kib), mentor (rwatson) Sponsored by: Google Inc
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/regression/security/cap_test')
-rw-r--r--tools/regression/security/cap_test/Makefile4
-rw-r--r--tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.c1
-rw-r--r--tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.h4
-rw-r--r--tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test_relative.c151
4 files changed, 157 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/tools/regression/security/cap_test/Makefile b/tools/regression/security/cap_test/Makefile
index 49e308e..4bbb548 100644
--- a/tools/regression/security/cap_test/Makefile
+++ b/tools/regression/security/cap_test/Makefile
@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ SRCS= cap_test.c \
cap_test_capmode.c \
cap_test_capabilities.c \
cap_test_fcntl.c \
- cap_test_sysctl.c
+ cap_test_relative.c \
+ cap_test_sysctl.c \
+
WARNS= 3
NO_MAN=
diff --git a/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.c b/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.c
index dfda4d6..c583454 100644
--- a/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.c
+++ b/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.c
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ struct test all_tests[] = {
TEST_INIT(capmode),
TEST_INIT(capabilities),
TEST_INIT(fcntl),
+ TEST_INIT(relative),
TEST_INIT(sysctl),
};
int test_count = sizeof(all_tests) / sizeof(struct test);
diff --git a/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.h b/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.h
index 1839e01..23435d6 100644
--- a/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.h
+++ b/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test.h
@@ -148,8 +148,8 @@ int execute(int id, struct test*);
int test_capmode(void);
int test_capabilities(void);
-int test_syscalls(void);
-int test_sysctl(void);
int test_fcntl(void);
+int test_relative(void);
+int test_sysctl(void);
#endif /* CAP_TEST_H */
diff --git a/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test_relative.c b/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test_relative.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f62e84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/regression/security/cap_test/cap_test_relative.c
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2009-2011 Robert N. M. Watson
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Jonathan Anderson
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $FreeBSD$
+ */
+
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/capability.h>
+#include <sys/errno.h>
+
+#include <err.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "cap_test.h"
+
+/*
+ * Test openat(2) in a variety of sitations to ensure that it obeys Capsicum
+ * "strict relative" rules:
+ *
+ * 1. Use strict relative lookups in capability mode or when operating
+ * relative to a capability.
+ * 2. When performing strict relative lookups, absolute paths (including
+ * symlinks to absolute paths) are not allowed, nor are paths containing
+ * '..' components.
+ */
+int
+test_relative(void)
+{
+ int success = PASSED;
+ int fd, etc, etc_cap, etc_cap_ro, etc_cap_base, etc_cap_all;
+ cap_rights_t baserights = CAP_READ | CAP_WRITE | CAP_SEEK | CAP_LOOKUP;
+ cap_rights_t rights;
+
+ REQUIRE(etc = open("/etc/", O_RDONLY));
+ CHECK_SYSCALL_FAILS(EINVAL, cap_getrights, etc, &rights);
+
+ MAKE_CAPABILITY(etc_cap, etc, CAP_READ);
+ MAKE_CAPABILITY(etc_cap_ro, etc, CAP_READ | CAP_LOOKUP);
+ MAKE_CAPABILITY(etc_cap_base, etc, baserights);
+ MAKE_CAPABILITY(etc_cap_all, etc, CAP_MASK_VALID);
+
+ /*
+ * openat(2) with regular file descriptors in non-capability mode
+ * should Just Work (tm).
+ */
+ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc, "/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
+ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, AT_FDCWD, "/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
+ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc, "passwd", O_RDONLY);
+ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
+
+ /*
+ * Lookups relative to capabilities should be strictly relative.
+ *
+ * When not in capability mode, we don't actually require CAP_LOOKUP.
+ */
+ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_ro, "passwd", O_RDONLY);
+ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_base, "passwd", O_RDONLY);
+ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_all, "passwd", O_RDONLY);
+
+ CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc_cap_ro, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
+ CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc_cap_base, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
+
+ /*
+ * This requires discussion: do we treat a capability with
+ * CAP_MASK_VALID *exactly* like a non-capability file descriptor
+ * (currently, the implementation says yes)?
+ */
+ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_all, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
+
+ /*
+ * A file opened relative to a capability should itself be a capability.
+ */
+ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(cap_getrights, etc_cap_base, &rights);
+
+ REQUIRE(fd = openat(etc_cap_base, "passwd", O_RDONLY));
+ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(cap_getrights, fd, &rights);
+ CHECK_RIGHTS(rights, baserights);
+
+ /*
+ * Enter capability mode; now ALL lookups are strictly relative.
+ */
+ REQUIRE(cap_enter());
+
+ /*
+ * Relative lookups on regular files or capabilities with CAP_LOOKUP
+ * ought to succeed.
+ */
+ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc, "passwd", O_RDONLY);
+ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_ro, "passwd", O_RDONLY);
+ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_base, "passwd", O_RDONLY);
+ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_all, "passwd", O_RDONLY);
+
+ /*
+ * Lookup relative to capabilities without CAP_LOOKUP should fail.
+ */
+ CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc_cap, "passwd", O_RDONLY);
+
+ /*
+ * Absolute lookups should fail.
+ */
+ CHECK_CAPMODE(openat, AT_FDCWD, "/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
+ CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc, "/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
+
+ /*
+ * Lookups containing '..' should fail in capability mode.
+ */
+ CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
+ CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc_cap_ro, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
+ CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc_cap_base, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
+
+ REQUIRE(fd = openat(etc, "passwd", O_RDONLY));
+ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(cap_getrights, fd, &rights);
+
+ /*
+ * A file opened relative to a capability should itself be a capability.
+ */
+ REQUIRE(fd = openat(etc_cap_base, "passwd", O_RDONLY));
+ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(cap_getrights, fd, &rights);
+ CHECK_RIGHTS(rights, baserights);
+
+ return success;
+}
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