Rename several audit functions in the global kernel symbol namespace to

have audit_ on the front:

- canon_path -> audit_canon_path
- msgctl_to_event -> audit_msgctl_to_event
- semctl_to_event -> audit_semctl_to_event

MFC after:	1 month

5 files changed, 11 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit.c b/sys/security/audit/audit.c
index 34de1d0..00b753e 100644
--- a/sys/security/audit/audit.c
+++ b/sys/security/audit/audit.c
@@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ audit_proc_coredump(struct thread *td, char *path, int errcode)
 	if (path != NULL) {
 		pathp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath1;
 		*pathp = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_AUDITPATH, M_WAITOK);
-		canon_path(td, path, *pathp);
+		audit_canon_path(td, path, *pathp);
 		ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_UPATH1);
 	}
 	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_signum = td->td_proc->p_sig;
diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c b/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c
index 199aa47..9e1c0f3 100644
--- a/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c
+++ b/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ audit_arg_upath(struct thread *td, char *upath, u_int64_t flag)
 	if (*pathp == NULL)
 		*pathp = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_AUDITPATH, M_WAITOK);
 
-	canon_path(td, upath, *pathp);
+	audit_canon_path(td, upath, *pathp);
 
 	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, flag);
 }
diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm.c b/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm.c
index 7d29634..be63446 100644
--- a/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm.c
+++ b/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm.c
@@ -989,7 +989,7 @@ kaudit_to_bsm(struct kaudit_record *kar, struct au_record **pau)
 		break;
 
 	case AUE_MSGCTL:
-		ar->ar_event = msgctl_to_event(ar->ar_arg_svipc_cmd);
+		ar->ar_event = audit_msgctl_to_event(ar->ar_arg_svipc_cmd);
 		/* Fall through */
 
 	case AUE_MSGRCV:
@@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@ kaudit_to_bsm(struct kaudit_record *kar, struct au_record **pau)
 		break;
 
 	case AUE_SEMCTL:
-		ar->ar_event = semctl_to_event(ar->ar_arg_svipc_cmd);
+		ar->ar_event = audit_semctl_to_event(ar->ar_arg_svipc_cmd);
 		/* Fall through */
 
 	case AUE_SEMOP:
diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm_klib.c b/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm_klib.c
index 5361ad3..f4d28dd 100644
--- a/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm_klib.c
+++ b/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm_klib.c
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ flags_and_error_to_openevent(int oflags, int error)
  * Convert a MSGCTL command to a specific event.
  */
 int
-msgctl_to_event(int cmd)
+audit_msgctl_to_event(int cmd)
 {
 
 	switch (cmd) {
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ msgctl_to_event(int cmd)
  * Convert a SEMCTL command to a specific event.
  */
 int
-semctl_to_event(int cmd)
+audit_semctl_to_event(int cmd)
 {
 
 	switch (cmd) {
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ auditon_command_event(int cmd)
  * MAXPATHLEN * 2 would be passed in.
  */
 void
-canon_path(struct thread *td, char *path, char *cpath)
+audit_canon_path(struct thread *td, char *path, char *cpath)
 {
 	char *bufp;
 	char *retbuf, *freebuf;
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ canon_path(struct thread *td, char *path, char *cpath)
 	int cisr, error, vfslocked;
 
 	WITNESS_WARN(WARN_GIANTOK | WARN_SLEEPOK, NULL,
-	    "canon_path() at %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
+	    "audit_canon_path() at %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
 
 	fdp = td->td_proc->p_fd;
 	bufp = path;
diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit_private.h b/sys/security/audit/audit_private.h
index 1e5aa83..27a19ba 100644
--- a/sys/security/audit/audit_private.h
+++ b/sys/security/audit/audit_private.h
@@ -306,9 +306,9 @@ void		 au_evclassmap_insert(au_event_t event, au_class_t class);
 au_class_t	 au_event_class(au_event_t event);
 au_event_t	 ctlname_to_sysctlevent(int name[], uint64_t valid_arg);
 int		 auditon_command_event(int cmd);
-int		 msgctl_to_event(int cmd);
-int		 semctl_to_event(int cmr);
-void		 canon_path(struct thread *td, char *path, char *cpath);
+int		 audit_msgctl_to_event(int cmd);
+int		 audit_semctl_to_event(int cmr);
+void		 audit_canon_path(struct thread *td, char *path, char *cpath);
 
 /*
  * Audit trigger events notify user space of kernel audit conditions