Eliminate now-unused SUSER_ALLOWJAIL arguments to priv_check_cred(); in

some cases, move to priv_check() if it was an operation on a thread and
no other flags were present.

Eliminate caller-side jail exception checking (also now-unused); jail
privilege exception code now goes solely in kern_jail.c.

We can't yet eliminate suser() due to some cases in the KAME code where
a privilege check is performed and then used in many different deferred
paths.  Do, however, move those prototypes to priv.h.

Reviewed by:	csjp
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project

44 files changed, 144 insertions, 258 deletions

diff --git a/sys/cddl/compat/opensolaris/kern/opensolaris_policy.c b/sys/cddl/compat/opensolaris/kern/opensolaris_policy.c
index c109a4c..a09c9ec 100644
--- a/sys/cddl/compat/opensolaris/kern/opensolaris_policy.c
+++ b/sys/cddl/compat/opensolaris/kern/opensolaris_policy.c
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ secpolicy_basic_link(struct ucred *cred)
 
 	if (!hardlink_check_uid)
 		return (0);
-	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LINK, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL));
+	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LINK, 0));
 }
 
 int
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ int
 secpolicy_vnode_remove(struct ucred *cred)
 {
 
-	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL));
+	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, 0));
 }
 
 int
@@ -94,23 +94,20 @@ secpolicy_vnode_access(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, uint64_t owner,
     int mode)
 {
 
-	if ((mode & VREAD) &&
-	    priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0) {
+	if ((mode & VREAD) && priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ, 0) != 0) {
 		return (EACCES);
 	}
 	if ((mode & VWRITE) &&
-	    priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0) {
+	    priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE, 0) != 0) {
 		return (EACCES);
 	}
 	if (mode & VEXEC) {
 		if (vp->v_type == VDIR) {
-			if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0) {
+			if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP, 0) != 0) {
 				return (EACCES);
 			}
 		} else {
-			if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_EXEC,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0) {
+			if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_EXEC, 0) != 0) {
 				return (EACCES);
 			}
 		}
@@ -124,7 +121,7 @@ secpolicy_vnode_setdac(struct ucred *cred, uid_t owner)
 
 	if (owner == cred->cr_uid)
 		return (0);
-	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL));
+	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, 0));
 }
 
 int
@@ -173,8 +170,7 @@ secpolicy_vnode_setattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, struct vattr *vap,
 		if (((mask & AT_UID) && vap->va_uid != ovap->va_uid) ||
 		    ((mask & AT_GID) && vap->va_gid != ovap->va_gid &&
 		     !groupmember(vap->va_gid, cred))) {
-			error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_CHOWN,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_CHOWN, 0);
 			if (error)
 				return (error);
 		}
@@ -214,7 +210,7 @@ secpolicy_vnode_setids_setgids(struct ucred *cred, gid_t gid)
 {
 
 	if (!groupmember(gid, cred))
-		return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_SETGID, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL));
+		return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_SETGID, 0));
 	return (0);
 }
 
@@ -222,7 +218,7 @@ int
 secpolicy_vnode_setid_retain(struct ucred *cred, boolean_t issuidroot __unused)
 {
 
-	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL));
+	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID, 0));
 }
 
 void
@@ -230,8 +226,7 @@ secpolicy_setid_clear(struct vattr *vap, struct ucred *cred)
 {
 
 	if ((vap->va_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)) != 0) {
-		if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) {
+		if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID, 0)) {
 			vap->va_mask |= AT_MODE;
 			vap->va_mode &= ~(S_ISUID|S_ISGID);
 		}
@@ -250,7 +245,7 @@ secpolicy_setid_setsticky_clear(struct vnode *vp, struct vattr *vap,
 	 * is not a member of. Both of these are allowed in jail(8).
 	 */
 	if (vp->v_type != VDIR && (vap->va_mode & S_ISTXT)) {
-		if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_STICKYFILE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
+		if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_STICKYFILE, 0))
 			return (EFTYPE);
 	}
 	/*
diff --git a/sys/compat/linux/linux_misc.c b/sys/compat/linux/linux_misc.c
index 926efbc..9c066fc 100644
--- a/sys/compat/linux/linux_misc.c
+++ b/sys/compat/linux/linux_misc.c
@@ -1079,8 +1079,7 @@ linux_setgroups(struct thread *td, struct linux_setgroups_args *args)
 	 * Keep cr_groups[0] unchanged to prevent that.
 	 */
 
-	if ((error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGROUPS,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0) {
+	if ((error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGROUPS, 0)) != 0) {
 		PROC_UNLOCK(p);
 		crfree(newcred);
 		return (error);
diff --git a/sys/compat/linux/linux_uid16.c b/sys/compat/linux/linux_uid16.c
index a8a1f5d..c474382 100644
--- a/sys/compat/linux/linux_uid16.c
+++ b/sys/compat/linux/linux_uid16.c
@@ -124,8 +124,7 @@ linux_setgroups16(struct thread *td, struct linux_setgroups16_args *args)
 	 * Keep cr_groups[0] unchanged to prevent that.
 	 */
 
-	if ((error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGROUPS,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0) {
+	if ((error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGROUPS, 0)) != 0) {
 		PROC_UNLOCK(p);
 		crfree(newcred);
 		return (error);
diff --git a/sys/compat/opensolaris/kern/opensolaris_policy.c b/sys/compat/opensolaris/kern/opensolaris_policy.c
index c109a4c..a09c9ec 100644
--- a/sys/compat/opensolaris/kern/opensolaris_policy.c
+++ b/sys/compat/opensolaris/kern/opensolaris_policy.c
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ secpolicy_basic_link(struct ucred *cred)
 
 	if (!hardlink_check_uid)
 		return (0);
-	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LINK, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL));
+	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LINK, 0));
 }
 
 int
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ int
 secpolicy_vnode_remove(struct ucred *cred)
 {
 
-	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL));
+	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, 0));
 }
 
 int
@@ -94,23 +94,20 @@ secpolicy_vnode_access(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, uint64_t owner,
     int mode)
 {
 
-	if ((mode & VREAD) &&
-	    priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0) {
+	if ((mode & VREAD) && priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ, 0) != 0) {
 		return (EACCES);
 	}
 	if ((mode & VWRITE) &&
-	    priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0) {
+	    priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE, 0) != 0) {
 		return (EACCES);
 	}
 	if (mode & VEXEC) {
 		if (vp->v_type == VDIR) {
-			if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0) {
+			if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP, 0) != 0) {
 				return (EACCES);
 			}
 		} else {
-			if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_EXEC,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0) {
+			if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_EXEC, 0) != 0) {
 				return (EACCES);
 			}
 		}
@@ -124,7 +121,7 @@ secpolicy_vnode_setdac(struct ucred *cred, uid_t owner)
 
 	if (owner == cred->cr_uid)
 		return (0);
-	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL));
+	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, 0));
 }
 
 int
@@ -173,8 +170,7 @@ secpolicy_vnode_setattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, struct vattr *vap,
 		if (((mask & AT_UID) && vap->va_uid != ovap->va_uid) ||
 		    ((mask & AT_GID) && vap->va_gid != ovap->va_gid &&
 		     !groupmember(vap->va_gid, cred))) {
-			error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_CHOWN,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_CHOWN, 0);
 			if (error)
 				return (error);
 		}
@@ -214,7 +210,7 @@ secpolicy_vnode_setids_setgids(struct ucred *cred, gid_t gid)
 {
 
 	if (!groupmember(gid, cred))
-		return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_SETGID, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL));
+		return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_SETGID, 0));
 	return (0);
 }
 
@@ -222,7 +218,7 @@ int
 secpolicy_vnode_setid_retain(struct ucred *cred, boolean_t issuidroot __unused)
 {
 
-	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL));
+	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID, 0));
 }
 
 void
@@ -230,8 +226,7 @@ secpolicy_setid_clear(struct vattr *vap, struct ucred *cred)
 {
 
 	if ((vap->va_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)) != 0) {
-		if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) {
+		if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID, 0)) {
 			vap->va_mask |= AT_MODE;
 			vap->va_mode &= ~(S_ISUID|S_ISGID);
 		}
@@ -250,7 +245,7 @@ secpolicy_setid_setsticky_clear(struct vnode *vp, struct vattr *vap,
 	 * is not a member of. Both of these are allowed in jail(8).
 	 */
 	if (vp->v_type != VDIR && (vap->va_mode & S_ISTXT)) {
-		if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_STICKYFILE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
+		if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_STICKYFILE, 0))
 			return (EFTYPE);
 	}
 	/*
diff --git a/sys/compat/svr4/svr4_fcntl.c b/sys/compat/svr4/svr4_fcntl.c
index 6073e0d..8735abb 100644
--- a/sys/compat/svr4/svr4_fcntl.c
+++ b/sys/compat/svr4/svr4_fcntl.c
@@ -281,8 +281,7 @@ fd_revoke(td, fd)
 		goto out;
 
 	if (td->td_ucred->cr_uid != vattr.va_uid &&
-	    (error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+	    (error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 
 	if ((error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0)
diff --git a/sys/compat/svr4/svr4_misc.c b/sys/compat/svr4/svr4_misc.c
index a158fd7..e4c48c0 100644
--- a/sys/compat/svr4/svr4_misc.c
+++ b/sys/compat/svr4/svr4_misc.c
@@ -612,8 +612,7 @@ svr4_sys_fchroot(td, uap)
 	struct file	*fp;
 	int		 error, vfslocked;
 
-	if ((error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_VFS_FCHROOT,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+	if ((error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_FCHROOT)) != 0)
 		return error;
 	if ((error = getvnode(fdp, uap->fd, &fp)) != 0)
 		return error;
diff --git a/sys/fs/devfs/devfs_vnops.c b/sys/fs/devfs/devfs_vnops.c
index d6c3232..0acf99b 100644
--- a/sys/fs/devfs/devfs_vnops.c
+++ b/sys/fs/devfs/devfs_vnops.c
@@ -1160,8 +1160,7 @@ devfs_setattr(struct vop_setattr_args *ap)
 	if (uid != de->de_uid || gid != de->de_gid) {
 		if ((ap->a_cred->cr_uid != de->de_uid) || uid != de->de_uid ||
 		    (gid != de->de_gid && !groupmember(gid, ap->a_cred))) {
-			error = priv_check_cred(ap->a_td->td_ucred,
-			    PRIV_VFS_CHOWN, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			error = priv_check(ap->a_td, PRIV_VFS_CHOWN);
 			if (error)
 				return (error);
 		}
@@ -1172,8 +1171,7 @@ devfs_setattr(struct vop_setattr_args *ap)
 
 	if (vap->va_mode != (mode_t)VNOVAL) {
 		if (ap->a_cred->cr_uid != de->de_uid) {
-			error = priv_check_cred(ap->a_td->td_ucred,
-			    PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			error = priv_check(ap->a_td, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN);
 			if (error)
 				return (error);
 		}
diff --git a/sys/fs/msdosfs/msdosfs_vnops.c b/sys/fs/msdosfs/msdosfs_vnops.c
index 33e5292..3231267 100644
--- a/sys/fs/msdosfs/msdosfs_vnops.c
+++ b/sys/fs/msdosfs/msdosfs_vnops.c
@@ -408,8 +408,7 @@ msdosfs_setattr(ap)
 		if (vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_RDONLY)
 			return (EROFS);
 		if (cred->cr_uid != pmp->pm_uid) {
-			error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, 0);
 			if (error)
 				return (error);
 		}
@@ -426,8 +425,7 @@ msdosfs_setattr(ap)
 		 * sensible filesystem attempts it a lot.
 		 */
 		if (vap->va_flags & SF_SETTABLE) {
-			error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_SYSFLAGS,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_SYSFLAGS, 0);
 			if (error)
 				return (error);
 		}
@@ -454,8 +452,7 @@ msdosfs_setattr(ap)
 			gid = pmp->pm_gid;
 		if (cred->cr_uid != pmp->pm_uid || uid != pmp->pm_uid ||
 		    (gid != pmp->pm_gid && !groupmember(gid, cred))) {
-			error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_CHOWN,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_CHOWN, 0);
 			if (error)
 				return (error);
 		}
@@ -520,8 +517,7 @@ msdosfs_setattr(ap)
 		if (vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_RDONLY)
 			return (EROFS);
 		if (cred->cr_uid != pmp->pm_uid) {
-			error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, 0);
 			if (error)
 				return (error);
 		}
diff --git a/sys/fs/procfs/procfs_ioctl.c b/sys/fs/procfs/procfs_ioctl.c
index bd003e0..ccff555 100644
--- a/sys/fs/procfs/procfs_ioctl.c
+++ b/sys/fs/procfs/procfs_ioctl.c
@@ -114,8 +114,7 @@ procfs_ioctl(PFS_IOCTL_ARGS)
 			 * p_candebug() should implement it, or other checks
 			 * are missing.
 			 */
-			error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred,
-			    PRIV_DEBUG_SUGID, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			error = priv_check(td, PRIV_DEBUG_SUGID);
 			if (error)
 				break;
 		}
diff --git a/sys/gnu/fs/ext2fs/ext2_vnops.c b/sys/gnu/fs/ext2fs/ext2_vnops.c
index a1167e1..04afdeb 100644
--- a/sys/gnu/fs/ext2fs/ext2_vnops.c
+++ b/sys/gnu/fs/ext2fs/ext2_vnops.c
@@ -415,8 +415,7 @@ ext2_setattr(ap)
 		 * Privileged non-jail processes may not modify system flags
 		 * if securelevel > 0 and any existing system flags are set.
 		 */
-		if (!priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_SYSFLAGS,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) {
+		if (!priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_SYSFLAGS, 0)) {
 			if (ip->i_flags
 			    & (SF_NOUNLINK | SF_IMMUTABLE | SF_APPEND)) {
 				error = securelevel_gt(cred, 0);
@@ -535,14 +534,12 @@ ext2_chmod(vp, mode, cred, td)
 	 * process is not a member of.
 	 */
 	if (vp->v_type != VDIR && (mode & S_ISTXT)) {
-		error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_STICKYFILE,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+		error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_STICKYFILE, 0);
 		if (error)
 			return (EFTYPE);
 	}
 	if (!groupmember(ip->i_gid, cred) && (mode & ISGID)) {
-		error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_SETGID,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+		error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_SETGID, 0);
 		if (error)
 			return (error);
 	}
@@ -586,8 +583,7 @@ ext2_chown(vp, uid, gid, cred, td)
 	 */
 	if (uid != ip->i_uid || (gid != ip->i_gid &&
 	    !groupmember(gid, cred))) {
-		error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_CHOWN,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+		error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_CHOWN, 0);
 		if (error)
 			return (error);
 	}
@@ -597,8 +593,7 @@ ext2_chown(vp, uid, gid, cred, td)
 	ip->i_uid = uid;
 	ip->i_flag |= IN_CHANGE;
 	if ((ip->i_mode & (ISUID | ISGID)) && (ouid != uid || ogid != gid)) {
-		if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0)
+		if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID, 0) != 0)
 			ip->i_mode &= ~(ISUID | ISGID);
 	}
 	return (0);
@@ -1648,8 +1643,7 @@ ext2_makeinode(mode, dvp, vpp, cnp)
 	tvp->v_type = IFTOVT(mode);	/* Rest init'd in getnewvnode(). */
 	ip->i_nlink = 1;
 	if ((ip->i_mode & ISGID) && !groupmember(ip->i_gid, cnp->cn_cred)) {
-		if (priv_check_cred(cnp->cn_cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
+		if (priv_check_cred(cnp->cn_cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID, 0))
 			ip->i_mode &= ~ISGID;
 	}
 
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_exec.c b/sys/kern/kern_exec.c
index 78534ad..0e1b696 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_exec.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_exec.c
@@ -567,8 +567,7 @@ interpret:
 
 #ifdef KTRACE
 		if (p->p_tracevp != NULL &&
-		    priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFCRED,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) {
+		    priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFCRED, 0)) {
 			mtx_lock(&ktrace_mtx);
 			p->p_traceflag = 0;
 			tracevp = p->p_tracevp;
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_fork.c b/sys/kern/kern_fork.c
index ae69afe..f20cefe 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_fork.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_fork.c
@@ -306,8 +306,7 @@ fork1(td, flags, pages, procp)
 	 *
 	 * XXXRW: Can we avoid privilege here if it's not needed?
 	 */
-	error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_PROC_LIMIT, SUSER_RUID |
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+	error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_PROC_LIMIT, SUSER_RUID);
 	if (error == 0)
 		ok = chgproccnt(td->td_ucred->cr_ruidinfo, 1, 0);
 	else {
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c b/sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c
index 5ff62fe..2b7ee33 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c
@@ -793,8 +793,7 @@ ktrops(td, p, ops, facs, vp)
 			p->p_tracecred = crhold(td->td_ucred);
 		}
 		p->p_traceflag |= facs;
-		if (priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_KTRACE,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) == 0)
+		if (priv_check(td, PRIV_KTRACE) == 0)
 			p->p_traceflag |= KTRFAC_ROOT;
 	} else {
 		/* KTROP_CLEAR */
@@ -1000,7 +999,7 @@ ktrcanset(td, targetp)
 
 	PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(targetp, MA_OWNED);
 	if (targetp->p_traceflag & KTRFAC_ROOT &&
-	    priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_KTRACE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
+	    priv_check(td, PRIV_KTRACE))
 		return (0);
 
 	if (p_candebug(td, targetp) != 0)
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_priv.c b/sys/kern/kern_priv.c
index 6d2d692..ebf01ba 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_priv.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_priv.c
@@ -77,18 +77,8 @@ priv_check_cred(struct ucred *cred, int priv, int flags)
 	/*
 	 * Jail policy will restrict certain privileges that may otherwise be
 	 * be granted.
-	 *
-	 * While debugging the transition from SUSER_ALLOWJAIL to Jail being
-	 * aware of specific privileges, perform run-time checking that the
-	 * two versions of the policy align.  This assertion will go away
-	 * once the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag has gone away.
 	 */
 	error = prison_priv_check(cred, priv);
-#ifdef NOTYET
-	KASSERT(!jailed(cred) || error == ((flags & SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) ? 0 :
-	    EPERM), ("priv_check_cred: prison_priv_check %d but flags %s",
-	    error, flags & SUSER_ALLOWJAIL ? "allowjail" : "!allowjail"));
-#endif
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
 
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_prot.c b/sys/kern/kern_prot.c
index 36a5dc4..18d3b2a 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_prot.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_prot.c
@@ -511,8 +511,7 @@ setuid(struct thread *td, struct setuid_args *uap)
 #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2	/* Use BSD-compat clause from B.4.2.2 */
 	    uid != oldcred->cr_uid &&		/* allow setuid(geteuid()) */
 #endif
-	    (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETUID,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+	    (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETUID, 0)) != 0)
 		goto fail;
 
 	/*
@@ -529,7 +528,7 @@ setuid(struct thread *td, struct setuid_args *uap)
 	    uid == oldcred->cr_uid ||
 #endif
 	    /* We are using privs. */
-	    priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETUID, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) == 0)
+	    priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETUID, 0) == 0)
 #endif
 	{
 		/*
@@ -602,8 +601,7 @@ seteuid(struct thread *td, struct seteuid_args *uap)
 
 	if (euid != oldcred->cr_ruid &&		/* allow seteuid(getuid()) */
 	    euid != oldcred->cr_svuid &&	/* allow seteuid(saved uid) */
-	    (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETEUID,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+	    (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETEUID, 0)) != 0)
 		goto fail;
 
 	/*
@@ -672,8 +670,7 @@ setgid(struct thread *td, struct setgid_args *uap)
 #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2	/* Use BSD-compat clause from B.4.2.2 */
 	    gid != oldcred->cr_groups[0] && /* allow setgid(getegid()) */
 #endif
-	    (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGID,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+	    (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGID, 0)) != 0)
 		goto fail;
 
 	crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
@@ -687,7 +684,7 @@ setgid(struct thread *td, struct setgid_args *uap)
 	    gid == oldcred->cr_groups[0] ||
 #endif
 	    /* We are using privs. */
-	    priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGID, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) == 0)
+	    priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGID, 0) == 0)
 #endif
 	{
 		/*
@@ -756,8 +753,7 @@ setegid(struct thread *td, struct setegid_args *uap)
 
 	if (egid != oldcred->cr_rgid &&		/* allow setegid(getgid()) */
 	    egid != oldcred->cr_svgid &&	/* allow setegid(saved gid) */
-	    (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETEGID,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+	    (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETEGID, 0)) != 0)
 		goto fail;
 
 	crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
@@ -817,8 +813,7 @@ kern_setgroups(struct thread *td, u_int ngrp, gid_t *groups)
 		goto fail;
 #endif
 
-	error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGROUPS,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+	error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGROUPS, 0);
 	if (error)
 		goto fail;
 
@@ -887,8 +882,7 @@ setreuid(register struct thread *td, struct setreuid_args *uap)
 	      ruid != oldcred->cr_svuid) ||
 	     (euid != (uid_t)-1 && euid != oldcred->cr_uid &&
 	      euid != oldcred->cr_ruid && euid != oldcred->cr_svuid)) &&
-	    (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETREUID,
-	     SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+	    (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETREUID, 0)) != 0)
 		goto fail;
 
 	crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
@@ -953,8 +947,7 @@ setregid(register struct thread *td, struct setregid_args *uap)
 	    rgid != oldcred->cr_svgid) ||
 	     (egid != (gid_t)-1 && egid != oldcred->cr_groups[0] &&
 	     egid != oldcred->cr_rgid && egid != oldcred->cr_svgid)) &&
-	    (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETREGID,
-	     SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+	    (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETREGID, 0)) != 0)
 		goto fail;
 
 	crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
@@ -1030,8 +1023,7 @@ setresuid(register struct thread *td, struct setresuid_args *uap)
 	     (suid != (uid_t)-1 && suid != oldcred->cr_ruid &&
 	    suid != oldcred->cr_svuid &&
 	      suid != oldcred->cr_uid)) &&
-	    (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETRESUID,
-	     SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+	    (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETRESUID, 0)) != 0)
 		goto fail;
 
 	crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
@@ -1108,8 +1100,7 @@ setresgid(register struct thread *td, struct setresgid_args *uap)
 	     (sgid != (gid_t)-1 && sgid != oldcred->cr_rgid &&
 	      sgid != oldcred->cr_svgid &&
 	      sgid != oldcred->cr_groups[0])) &&
-	    (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETRESGID,
-	     SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+	    (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETRESGID, 0)) != 0)
 		goto fail;
 
 	crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
@@ -1317,8 +1308,7 @@ cr_seeotheruids(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2)
 {
 
 	if (!see_other_uids && u1->cr_ruid != u2->cr_ruid) {
-		if (priv_check_cred(u1, PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)
-		    != 0)
+		if (priv_check_cred(u1, PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS, 0) != 0)
 			return (ESRCH);
 	}
 	return (0);
@@ -1357,8 +1347,7 @@ cr_seeothergids(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2)
 				break;
 		}
 		if (!match) {
-			if (priv_check_cred(u1, PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0)
+			if (priv_check_cred(u1, PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS, 0) != 0)
 				return (ESRCH);
 		}
 	}
@@ -1475,8 +1464,7 @@ cr_cansignal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc, int signum)
 			break;
 		default:
 			/* Not permitted without privilege. */
-			error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_SIGNAL_SUGID,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_SIGNAL_SUGID, 0);
 			if (error)
 				return (error);
 		}
@@ -1490,9 +1478,7 @@ cr_cansignal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc, int signum)
 	    cred->cr_ruid != proc->p_ucred->cr_svuid &&
 	    cred->cr_uid != proc->p_ucred->cr_ruid &&
 	    cred->cr_uid != proc->p_ucred->cr_svuid) {
-		/* Not permitted without privilege. */
-		error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_SIGNAL_DIFFCRED,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+		error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_SIGNAL_DIFFCRED, 0);
 		if (error)
 			return (error);
 	}
@@ -1570,8 +1556,7 @@ p_cansched(struct thread *td, struct proc *p)
 		return (error);
 	if (td->td_ucred->cr_ruid != p->p_ucred->cr_ruid &&
 	    td->td_ucred->cr_uid != p->p_ucred->cr_ruid) {
-		error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_SCHED_DIFFCRED,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+		error = priv_check(td, PRIV_SCHED_DIFFCRED);
 		if (error)
 			return (error);
 	}
@@ -1610,8 +1595,7 @@ p_candebug(struct thread *td, struct proc *p)
 	KASSERT(td == curthread, ("%s: td not curthread", __func__));
 	PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
 	if (!unprivileged_proc_debug) {
-		error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_DEBUG_UNPRIV,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+		error = priv_check(td, PRIV_DEBUG_UNPRIV);
 		if (error)
 			return (error);
 	}
@@ -1662,15 +1646,13 @@ p_candebug(struct thread *td, struct proc *p)
 	 * for td to debug p.
 	 */
 	if (!grpsubset || !uidsubset) {
-		error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFCRED,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+		error = priv_check(td, PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFCRED);
 		if (error)
 			return (error);
 	}
 
 	if (credentialchanged) {
-		error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_DEBUG_SUGID,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+		error = priv_check(td, PRIV_DEBUG_SUGID);
 		if (error)
 			return (error);
 	}
@@ -1940,8 +1922,7 @@ setlogin(struct thread *td, struct setlogin_args *uap)
 	int error;
 	char logintmp[MAXLOGNAME];
 
-	error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_PROC_SETLOGIN,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+	error = priv_check(td, PRIV_PROC_SETLOGIN);
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
 	error = copyinstr(uap->namebuf, logintmp, sizeof(logintmp), NULL);
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_resource.c b/sys/kern/kern_resource.c
index 9f47402..847e9f4 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_resource.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_resource.c
@@ -688,8 +688,7 @@ kern_setrlimit(td, which, limp)
 	alimp = &oldlim->pl_rlimit[which];
 	if (limp->rlim_cur > alimp->rlim_max ||
 	    limp->rlim_max > alimp->rlim_max)
-		if ((error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred,
-		    PRIV_PROC_SETRLIMIT, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))) {
+		if ((error = priv_check(td, PRIV_PROC_SETRLIMIT))) {
 			PROC_UNLOCK(p);
 			lim_free(newlim);
 			return (error);
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_sysctl.c b/sys/kern/kern_sysctl.c
index 6100f41..893c54f 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_sysctl.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_sysctl.c
@@ -1280,8 +1280,7 @@ sysctl_root(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
 	/* Is this sysctl writable by only privileged users? */
 	if (req->newptr && !(oid->oid_kind & CTLFLAG_ANYBODY)) {
 		if (oid->oid_kind & CTLFLAG_PRISON)
-			error = priv_check_cred(req->td->td_ucred,
-			    PRIV_SYSCTL_WRITEJAIL, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			error = priv_check(req->td, PRIV_SYSCTL_WRITEJAIL);
 		else
 			error = priv_check(req->td, PRIV_SYSCTL_WRITE);
 		if (error)
diff --git a/sys/kern/subr_acl_posix1e.c b/sys/kern/subr_acl_posix1e.c
index 94c612f..d3f944d 100644
--- a/sys/kern/subr_acl_posix1e.c
+++ b/sys/kern/subr_acl_posix1e.c
@@ -82,24 +82,22 @@ vaccess_acl_posix1e(enum vtype type, uid_t file_uid, gid_t file_gid,
 
 	if (type == VDIR) {
 		if ((acc_mode & VEXEC) && !priv_check_cred(cred,
-		     PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
+		     PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP, 0))
 			priv_granted |= VEXEC;
 	} else {
 		if ((acc_mode & VEXEC) && !priv_check_cred(cred,
-		    PRIV_VFS_EXEC, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
+		    PRIV_VFS_EXEC, 0))
 			priv_granted |= VEXEC;
 	}
 
-	if ((acc_mode & VREAD) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
+	if ((acc_mode & VREAD) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ, 0))
 		priv_granted |= VREAD;
 
 	if (((acc_mode & VWRITE) || (acc_mode & VAPPEND)) &&
-	    !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
+	    !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE, 0))
 		priv_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
 
-	if ((acc_mode & VADMIN) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
+	if ((acc_mode & VADMIN) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, 0))
 		priv_granted |= VADMIN;
 
 	/*
diff --git a/sys/kern/sysv_ipc.c b/sys/kern/sysv_ipc.c
index 7503760..0cbb4bb 100644
--- a/sys/kern/sysv_ipc.c
+++ b/sys/kern/sysv_ipc.c
@@ -125,22 +125,19 @@ ipcperm(struct thread *td, struct ipc_perm *perm, int acc_mode)
 	 */
 	priv_granted = 0;
 	if ((acc_mode & IPC_M) && !(dac_granted & IPC_M)) {
-		error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_IPC_ADMIN,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+		error = priv_check(td, PRIV_IPC_ADMIN);
 		if (error == 0)
 			priv_granted |= IPC_M;
 	}
 
 	if ((acc_mode & IPC_R) && !(dac_granted & IPC_R)) {
-		error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_IPC_READ,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+		error = priv_check(td, PRIV_IPC_READ);
 		if (error == 0)
 			priv_granted |= IPC_R;
 	}
 
 	if ((acc_mode & IPC_W) && !(dac_granted & IPC_W)) {
-		error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_IPC_WRITE,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+		error = priv_check(td, PRIV_IPC_WRITE);
 		if (error == 0)
 			priv_granted |= IPC_W;
 	}
diff --git a/sys/kern/sysv_msg.c b/sys/kern/sysv_msg.c
index d9f3207..bd5ca90 100644
--- a/sys/kern/sysv_msg.c
+++ b/sys/kern/sysv_msg.c
@@ -502,8 +502,7 @@ kern_msgctl(td, msqid, cmd, msqbuf)
 		if ((error = ipcperm(td, &msqkptr->u.msg_perm, IPC_M)))
 			goto done2;
 		if (msqbuf->msg_qbytes > msqkptr->u.msg_qbytes) {
-			error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred,
-			    PRIV_IPC_MSGSIZE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			error = priv_check(td, PRIV_IPC_MSGSIZE);
 			if (error)
 				goto done2;
 		}
diff --git a/sys/kern/uipc_mqueue.c b/sys/kern/uipc_mqueue.c
index 82cd070..1c5cadb 100644
--- a/sys/kern/uipc_mqueue.c
+++ b/sys/kern/uipc_mqueue.c
@@ -961,8 +961,7 @@ int do_unlink(struct mqfs_node *pn, struct ucred *ucred)
 	sx_assert(&pn->mn_info->mi_lock, SX_LOCKED);
 
 	if (ucred->cr_uid != pn->mn_uid &&
-	    (error = priv_check_cred(ucred, PRIV_MQ_ADMIN,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+	    (error = priv_check_cred(ucred, PRIV_MQ_ADMIN, 0)) != 0)
 		error = EACCES;
 	else if (!pn->mn_deleted) {
 		parent = pn->mn_parent;
@@ -1221,8 +1220,7 @@ mqfs_setattr(struct vop_setattr_args *ap)
 		 */
 		if (((ap->a_cred->cr_uid != pn->mn_uid) || uid != pn->mn_uid ||
 		    (gid != pn->mn_gid && !groupmember(gid, ap->a_cred))) &&
-		    (error = priv_check_cred(ap->a_td->td_ucred,
-		    PRIV_MQ_ADMIN, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+		    (error = priv_check(ap->a_td, PRIV_MQ_ADMIN)) != 0)
 			return (error);
 		pn->mn_uid = uid;
 		pn->mn_gid = gid;
@@ -1231,8 +1229,7 @@ mqfs_setattr(struct vop_setattr_args *ap)
 
 	if (vap->va_mode != (mode_t)VNOVAL) {
 		if ((ap->a_cred->cr_uid != pn->mn_uid) &&
-		    (error = priv_check_cred(ap->a_td->td_ucred,
-		    PRIV_MQ_ADMIN, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)))
+		    (error = priv_check(ap->a_td, PRIV_MQ_ADMIN)))
 			return (error);
 		pn->mn_mode = vap->va_mode;
 		c = 1;
diff --git a/sys/kern/vfs_mount.c b/sys/kern/vfs_mount.c
index e545a25..82bb767 100644
--- a/sys/kern/vfs_mount.c
+++ b/sys/kern/vfs_mount.c
@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ vfs_domount(
 		}
 		if (va.va_uid != td->td_ucred->cr_uid) {
 			error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			    0);
 			if (error) {
 				vput(vp);
 				return (error);
diff --git a/sys/kern/vfs_subr.c b/sys/kern/vfs_subr.c
index 8e56b16..a45a8b7 100644
--- a/sys/kern/vfs_subr.c
+++ b/sys/kern/vfs_subr.c
@@ -3299,24 +3299,24 @@ privcheck:
 		 * requests, instead of PRIV_VFS_EXEC.
 		 */
 		if ((acc_mode & VEXEC) && ((dac_granted & VEXEC) == 0) &&
-		    !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
+		    !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP, 0))
 			priv_granted |= VEXEC;
 	} else {
 		if ((acc_mode & VEXEC) && ((dac_granted & VEXEC) == 0) &&
-		    !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_EXEC, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
+		    !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_EXEC, 0))
 			priv_granted |= VEXEC;
 	}
 
 	if ((acc_mode & VREAD) && ((dac_granted & VREAD) == 0) &&
-	    !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
+	    !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ, 0))
 		priv_granted |= VREAD;
 
 	if ((acc_mode & VWRITE) && ((dac_granted & VWRITE) == 0) &&
-	    !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
+	    !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE, 0))
 		priv_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
 
 	if ((acc_mode & VADMIN) && ((dac_granted & VADMIN) == 0) &&
-	    !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
+	    !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, 0))
 		priv_granted |= VADMIN;
 
 	if ((acc_mode & (priv_granted | dac_granted)) == acc_mode) {
diff --git a/sys/kern/vfs_syscalls.c b/sys/kern/vfs_syscalls.c
index ab10bfa..d73c4a2 100644
--- a/sys/kern/vfs_syscalls.c
+++ b/sys/kern/vfs_syscalls.c
@@ -837,8 +837,7 @@ chroot(td, uap)
 	struct nameidata nd;
 	int vfslocked;
 
-	error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_VFS_CHROOT,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+	error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_CHROOT);
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
 	NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | MPSAFE | AUDITVNODE1,
@@ -1367,15 +1366,13 @@ can_hardlink(struct vnode *vp, struct thread *td, struct ucred *cred)
 		return (error);
 
 	if (hardlink_check_uid && cred->cr_uid != va.va_uid) {
-		error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LINK,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+		error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LINK, 0);
 		if (error)
 			return (error);
 	}
 
 	if (hardlink_check_gid && !groupmember(va.va_gid, cred)) {
-		error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LINK,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+		error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LINK, 0);
 		if (error)
 			return (error);
 	}
@@ -2337,8 +2334,7 @@ setfflags(td, vp, flags)
 	 * chown can't fail when done as root.
 	 */
 	if (vp->v_type == VCHR || vp->v_type == VBLK) {
-		error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_VFS_CHFLAGS_DEV,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+		error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_CHFLAGS_DEV);
 		if (error)
 			return (error);
 	}
@@ -3840,8 +3836,7 @@ revoke(td, uap)
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
 	if (td->td_ucred->cr_uid != vattr.va_uid) {
-		error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+		error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN);
 		if (error)
 			goto out;
 	}
diff --git a/sys/netinet/in_pcb.c b/sys/netinet/in_pcb.c
index d7d8290..61f2894 100644
--- a/sys/netinet/in_pcb.c
+++ b/sys/netinet/in_pcb.c
@@ -340,13 +340,13 @@ in_pcbbind_setup(struct inpcb *inp, struct sockaddr *nam, in_addr_t *laddrp,
 			if (ntohs(lport) <= ipport_reservedhigh &&
 			    ntohs(lport) >= ipport_reservedlow &&
 			    priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
+			    0))
 				return (EACCES);
 			if (jailed(cred))
 				prison = 1;
 			if (!IN_MULTICAST(ntohl(sin->sin_addr.s_addr)) &&
 			    priv_check_cred(so->so_cred,
-			    PRIV_NETINET_REUSEPORT, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0) {
+			    PRIV_NETINET_REUSEPORT, 0) != 0) {
 				t = in_pcblookup_local(inp->inp_pcbinfo,
 				    sin->sin_addr, lport,
 				    prison ? 0 :  INPLOOKUP_WILDCARD);
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ in_pcbbind_setup(struct inpcb *inp, struct sockaddr *nam, in_addr_t *laddrp,
 			lastport = &pcbinfo->ipi_lasthi;
 		} else if (inp->inp_flags & INP_LOWPORT) {
 			error = priv_check_cred(cred,
-			    PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			    PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT, 0);
 			if (error)
 				return error;
 			first = ipport_lowfirstauto;	/* 1023 */
diff --git a/sys/netinet/raw_ip.c b/sys/netinet/raw_ip.c
index 3eef187..5329c6c 100644
--- a/sys/netinet/raw_ip.c
+++ b/sys/netinet/raw_ip.c
@@ -607,13 +607,8 @@ rip_attach(struct socket *so, int proto, struct thread *td)
 
 	inp = sotoinpcb(so);
 	KASSERT(inp == NULL, ("rip_attach: inp != NULL"));
-	/*
-	 * XXXRW: Centralize privilege decision in kern_jail.c.
-	 */
-	if (jailed(td->td_ucred) && !jail_allow_raw_sockets)
-		return (EPERM);
-	error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_NETINET_RAW,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+
+	error = priv_check(td, PRIV_NETINET_RAW);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 	if (proto >= IPPROTO_MAX || proto < 0)
diff --git a/sys/netinet/sctp_pcb.c b/sys/netinet/sctp_pcb.c
index a803eca..5423208 100644
--- a/sys/netinet/sctp_pcb.c
+++ b/sys/netinet/sctp_pcb.c
@@ -2155,10 +2155,7 @@ sctp_inpcb_bind(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *addr, struct thread *p)
 		/* got to be root to get at low ports */
 		if (ntohs(lport) < IPPORT_RESERVED) {
 			if (p && (error =
-			    priv_check_cred(p->td_ucred,
-			    PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL
-			    )
+			    priv_check(p, PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT)
 			    )) {
 				SCTP_INP_DECR_REF(inp);
 				SCTP_INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
@@ -2228,10 +2225,7 @@ sctp_inpcb_bind(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *addr, struct thread *p)
 			last = ipport_hilastauto;
 		} else if (ip_inp->inp_flags & INP_LOWPORT) {
 			if (p && (error =
-			    priv_check_cred(p->td_ucred,
-			    PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL
-			    )
+			    priv_check(p, PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT)
 			    )) {
 				SCTP_INP_DECR_REF(inp);
 				SCTP_INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
diff --git a/sys/netinet/sctp_usrreq.c b/sys/netinet/sctp_usrreq.c
index cc69ba1..0bd92b3 100644
--- a/sys/netinet/sctp_usrreq.c
+++ b/sys/netinet/sctp_usrreq.c
@@ -386,13 +386,8 @@ sctp_getcred(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
 	/* FIX, for non-bsd is this right? */
 	vrf_id = SCTP_DEFAULT_VRFID;
 
-	/*
-	 * XXXRW: Other instances of getcred use SUSER_ALLOWJAIL, as socket
-	 * visibility is scoped using cr_canseesocket(), which it is not
-	 * here.
-	 */
-	error = priv_check_cred(req->td->td_ucred, PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+	error = priv_check(req->td, PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED);
+
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
 
@@ -3439,9 +3434,8 @@ sctp_setopt(struct socket *so, int optname, void *optval, size_t optsize,
 		{
 			union sctp_sockstore *ss;
 
-			error = priv_check_cred(curthread->td_ucred,
-			    PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			error = priv_check(curthread,
+			    PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT);
 			if (error)
 				break;
 
diff --git a/sys/netinet/tcp_subr.c b/sys/netinet/tcp_subr.c
index 2f300d5..64c5364 100644
--- a/sys/netinet/tcp_subr.c
+++ b/sys/netinet/tcp_subr.c
@@ -1019,8 +1019,7 @@ tcp_getcred(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
 	struct inpcb *inp;
 	int error;
 
-	error = priv_check_cred(req->td->td_ucred, PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+	error = priv_check(req->td, PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED);
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
 	error = SYSCTL_IN(req, addrs, sizeof(addrs));
@@ -1064,8 +1063,7 @@ tcp6_getcred(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
 	struct inpcb *inp;
 	int error, mapped = 0;
 
-	error = priv_check_cred(req->td->td_ucred, PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+	error = priv_check(req->td, PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED);
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
 	error = SYSCTL_IN(req, addrs, sizeof(addrs));
diff --git a/sys/netinet/udp_usrreq.c b/sys/netinet/udp_usrreq.c
index 96dc044..f6031d6 100644
--- a/sys/netinet/udp_usrreq.c
+++ b/sys/netinet/udp_usrreq.c
@@ -696,8 +696,7 @@ udp_getcred(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
 	struct inpcb *inp;
 	int error;
 
-	error = priv_check_cred(req->td->td_ucred, PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+	error = priv_check(req->td, PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED);
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
 	error = SYSCTL_IN(req, addrs, sizeof(addrs));
diff --git a/sys/netinet6/in6_pcb.c b/sys/netinet6/in6_pcb.c
index d44e3e4..5ea647e 100644
--- a/sys/netinet6/in6_pcb.c
+++ b/sys/netinet6/in6_pcb.c
@@ -192,11 +192,11 @@ in6_pcbbind(inp, nam, cred)
 			if (ntohs(lport) <= ipport_reservedhigh &&
 			    ntohs(lport) >= ipport_reservedlow &&
 			    priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
+			    0))
 				return (EACCES);
 			if (!IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&sin6->sin6_addr) &&
 			    priv_check_cred(so->so_cred,
-			    PRIV_NETINET_REUSEPORT, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0) {
+			    PRIV_NETINET_REUSEPORT, 0) != 0) {
 				t = in6_pcblookup_local(pcbinfo,
 				    &sin6->sin6_addr, lport,
 				    INPLOOKUP_WILDCARD);
diff --git a/sys/netinet6/in6_src.c b/sys/netinet6/in6_src.c
index bee583c..91868e7 100644
--- a/sys/netinet6/in6_src.c
+++ b/sys/netinet6/in6_src.c
@@ -775,8 +775,7 @@ in6_pcbsetport(laddr, inp, cred)
 		last  = ipport_hilastauto;
 		lastport = &pcbinfo->ipi_lasthi;
 	} else if (inp->inp_flags & INP_LOWPORT) {
-		error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+		error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT, 0);
 		if (error)
 			return error;
 		first = ipport_lowfirstauto;	/* 1023 */
diff --git a/sys/netinet6/raw_ip6.c b/sys/netinet6/raw_ip6.c
index f06d1eb..3f93168 100644
--- a/sys/netinet6/raw_ip6.c
+++ b/sys/netinet6/raw_ip6.c
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ rip6_output(m, va_alist)
 	INP_LOCK(in6p);
 
 	priv = 0;
-	if (suser_cred(so->so_cred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) == 0)
+	if (suser_cred(so->so_cred, 0) == 0)
 		priv = 1;
 	dst = &dstsock->sin6_addr;
 	if (control) {
diff --git a/sys/netinet6/sctp6_usrreq.c b/sys/netinet6/sctp6_usrreq.c
index f7ad987..667184c 100644
--- a/sys/netinet6/sctp6_usrreq.c
+++ b/sys/netinet6/sctp6_usrreq.c
@@ -439,13 +439,7 @@ sctp6_getcred(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
 
 	vrf_id = SCTP_DEFAULT_VRFID;
 
-	/*
-	 * XXXRW: Other instances of getcred use SUSER_ALLOWJAIL, as socket
-	 * visibility is scoped using cr_canseesocket(), which it is not
-	 * here.
-	 */
-	error = priv_check_cred(req->td->td_ucred, PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT,
-	    0);
+	error = priv_check(req->td, PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED);
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
 
diff --git a/sys/netinet6/udp6_usrreq.c b/sys/netinet6/udp6_usrreq.c
index 41be3ca..ba17f39 100644
--- a/sys/netinet6/udp6_usrreq.c
+++ b/sys/netinet6/udp6_usrreq.c
@@ -437,8 +437,7 @@ udp6_getcred(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
 	struct inpcb *inp;
 	int error;
 
-	error = priv_check_cred(req->td->td_ucred, PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+	error = priv_check(req->td, PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED);
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
 
@@ -465,6 +464,9 @@ udp6_getcred(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
 	INP_LOCK(inp);
 	KASSERT(inp->inp_socket != NULL,
 	    ("udp6_getcred: inp_socket == NULL"));
+	/*
+	 * XXXRW: There should be a scoping access control check here.
+	 */
 	cru2x(inp->inp_socket->so_cred, &xuc);
 	INP_UNLOCK(inp);
 	INP_INFO_RUNLOCK(&udbinfo);
diff --git a/sys/netipsec/ipsec_osdep.h b/sys/netipsec/ipsec_osdep.h
index c1e11b49..992dd87 100644
--- a/sys/netipsec/ipsec_osdep.h
+++ b/sys/netipsec/ipsec_osdep.h
@@ -212,11 +212,9 @@ if_handoff(struct ifqueue *ifq, struct mbuf *m, struct ifnet *ifp, int adjust)
 /*
  * 8. Test for "privileged" socket opened by superuser.
  * FreeBSD tests  ((so)->so_cred != NULL && priv_check_cred((so)->so_cred,
- * PRIV_NETINET_IPSEC, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) == 0).
+ * PRIV_NETINET_IPSEC, 0) == 0).
  * NetBSD (1.6N) tests (so)->so_uid == 0).
  * This difference is wrapped inside  the IPSEC_PRIVILEGED_SO() macro.
- *
- * XXXRW: Why was this suser_allowjail?
  */
 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 
 #define IPSEC_IS_PRIVILEGED_SO(_so) \
diff --git a/sys/security/mac_portacl/mac_portacl.c b/sys/security/mac_portacl/mac_portacl.c
index 9adccba..633f606 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac_portacl/mac_portacl.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac_portacl/mac_portacl.c
@@ -419,8 +419,7 @@ rules_check(struct ucred *cred, int family, int type, u_int16_t port)
 	mtx_unlock(&rule_mtx);
 
 	if (error != 0 && mac_portacl_suser_exempt != 0)
-		error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+		error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT, 0);
 
 	return (error);
 }
diff --git a/sys/security/mac_seeotheruids/mac_seeotheruids.c b/sys/security/mac_seeotheruids/mac_seeotheruids.c
index c87c865..1e5e4df 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac_seeotheruids/mac_seeotheruids.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac_seeotheruids/mac_seeotheruids.c
@@ -114,8 +114,7 @@ mac_seeotheruids_check(struct ucred *cr1, struct ucred *cr2)
 		return (0);
 
 	if (suser_privileged) {
-		if (priv_check_cred(cr1, PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)
-		    == 0)
+		if (priv_check_cred(cr1, PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS, 0) == 0)
 			return (0);
 	}
 
diff --git a/sys/sys/priv.h b/sys/sys/priv.h
index 2b215c8..e79cc40 100644
--- a/sys/sys/priv.h
+++ b/sys/sys/priv.h
@@ -466,6 +466,18 @@ struct thread;
 struct ucred;
 int	priv_check(struct thread *td, int priv);
 int	priv_check_cred(struct ucred *cred, int priv, int flags);
+
+/*
+ * Continue to support external modules that rely on suser(9) -- for now.
+ */
+int	suser(struct thread *td);
+int	suser_cred(struct ucred *cred, int flags);
+
+/*
+ * For historical reasons, flags to priv_check_cred() retain the SUSER_
+ * prefix.
+ */
+#define	SUSER_RUID	2
 #endif
 
 #endif /* !_SYS_PRIV_H_ */
diff --git a/sys/sys/systm.h b/sys/sys/systm.h
index 817982c..c523378 100644
--- a/sys/sys/systm.h
+++ b/sys/sys/systm.h
@@ -234,12 +234,6 @@ void	stopprofclock(struct proc *);
 void	cpu_startprofclock(void);
 void	cpu_stopprofclock(void);
 
-/* flags for suser() and suser_cred() */
-#define SUSER_ALLOWJAIL	1
-#define SUSER_RUID	2
-
-int	suser(struct thread *td);
-int	suser_cred(struct ucred *cred, int flags);
 int	cr_cansee(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2);
 int	cr_canseesocket(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so);
 
diff --git a/sys/ufs/ffs/ffs_alloc.c b/sys/ufs/ffs/ffs_alloc.c
index 67c8fc3..00e0fbd 100644
--- a/sys/ufs/ffs/ffs_alloc.c
+++ b/sys/ufs/ffs/ffs_alloc.c
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ retry:
 #endif
 	if (size == fs->fs_bsize && fs->fs_cstotal.cs_nbfree == 0)
 		goto nospace;
-	if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_BLOCKRESERVE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) &&
+	if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_BLOCKRESERVE, 0) &&
 	    freespace(fs, fs->fs_minfree) - numfrags(fs, size) < 0)
 		goto nospace;
 	if (bpref >= fs->fs_size)
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ ffs_realloccg(ip, lbprev, bprev, bpref, osize, nsize, cred, bpp)
 #endif /* DIAGNOSTIC */
 	reclaimed = 0;
 retry:
-	if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_BLOCKRESERVE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) &&
+	if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_BLOCKRESERVE, 0) &&
 	    freespace(fs, fs->fs_minfree) -  numfrags(fs, nsize - osize) < 0) {
 		goto nospace;
 	}
diff --git a/sys/ufs/ffs/ffs_vnops.c b/sys/ufs/ffs/ffs_vnops.c
index 80892f3..b187ad7 100644
--- a/sys/ufs/ffs/ffs_vnops.c
+++ b/sys/ufs/ffs/ffs_vnops.c
@@ -790,8 +790,7 @@ ffs_write(ap)
 	 */
 	if ((ip->i_mode & (ISUID | ISGID)) && resid > uio->uio_resid &&
 	    ap->a_cred) {
-		if (priv_check_cred(ap->a_cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) {
+		if (priv_check_cred(ap->a_cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID, 0)) {
 			ip->i_mode &= ~(ISUID | ISGID);
 			DIP_SET(ip, i_mode, ip->i_mode);
 		}
@@ -1121,8 +1120,7 @@ ffs_extwrite(struct vnode *vp, struct uio *uio, int ioflag, struct ucred *ucred)
 	 * tampering.
 	 */
 	if ((ip->i_mode & (ISUID | ISGID)) && resid > uio->uio_resid && ucred) {
-		if (priv_check_cred(ucred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) {
+		if (priv_check_cred(ucred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID, 0)) {
 			ip->i_mode &= ~(ISUID | ISGID);
 			dp->di_mode = ip->i_mode;
 		}
diff --git a/sys/ufs/ufs/ufs_quota.c b/sys/ufs/ufs/ufs_quota.c
index c6d8795..49ee1c8 100644
--- a/sys/ufs/ufs/ufs_quota.c
+++ b/sys/ufs/ufs/ufs_quota.c
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ quotaon(td, mp, type, fname)
 	int error, flags, vfslocked;
 	struct nameidata nd;
 
-	error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_UFS_QUOTAON, 0);
+	error = priv_check(td, PRIV_UFS_QUOTAON);
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
 
@@ -747,10 +747,7 @@ quotaoff(td, mp, type)
 	struct ufsmount *ump;
 	int error;
 
-	/*
-	 * XXXRW: This also seems wrong to allow in a jail?
-	 */
-	error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_UFS_QUOTAOFF, 0);
+	error = priv_check(td, PRIV_UFS_QUOTAOFF);
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
 
@@ -783,8 +780,7 @@ getquota(td, mp, id, type, addr)
 	switch (type) {
 	case USRQUOTA:
 		if ((td->td_ucred->cr_uid != id) && !unprivileged_get_quota) {
-			error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred,
-			    PRIV_VFS_GETQUOTA, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_GETQUOTA);
 			if (error)
 				return (error);
 		}
@@ -793,8 +789,7 @@ getquota(td, mp, id, type, addr)
 	case GRPQUOTA:
 		if (!groupmember(id, td->td_ucred) &&
 		    !unprivileged_get_quota) {
-			error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred,
-			    PRIV_VFS_GETQUOTA, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_GETQUOTA);
 			if (error)
 				return (error);
 		}
@@ -830,8 +825,7 @@ setquota(td, mp, id, type, addr)
 	struct dqblk newlim;
 	int error;
 
-	error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_VFS_SETQUOTA,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+	error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_SETQUOTA);
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
 
@@ -901,7 +895,7 @@ setuse(td, mp, id, type, addr)
 	struct dqblk usage;
 	int error;
 
-	error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_UFS_SETUSE, 0);
+	error = priv_check(td, PRIV_UFS_SETUSE);
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
 
diff --git a/sys/ufs/ufs/ufs_vnops.c b/sys/ufs/ufs/ufs_vnops.c
index 45d2d04..ec28c2d 100644
--- a/sys/ufs/ufs/ufs_vnops.c
+++ b/sys/ufs/ufs/ufs_vnops.c
@@ -490,12 +490,8 @@ ufs_setattr(ap)
 		 * processes if the security.jail.chflags_allowed sysctl is
 		 * is non-zero; otherwise, they behave like unprivileged
 		 * processes.
-		 *
-		 * XXXRW: Move implementation of jail_chflags_allowed to
-		 * kern_jail.c.
 		 */
-		if (!priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_SYSFLAGS,
-		    jail_chflags_allowed ? SUSER_ALLOWJAIL : 0)) {
+		if (!priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_SYSFLAGS, 0)) {
 			if (ip->i_flags
 			    & (SF_NOUNLINK | SF_IMMUTABLE | SF_APPEND)) {
 				error = securelevel_gt(cred, 0);
@@ -663,13 +659,11 @@ ufs_chmod(vp, mode, cred, td)
 	 * jail(8).
 	 */
 	if (vp->v_type != VDIR && (mode & S_ISTXT)) {
-		if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_STICKYFILE,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
+		if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_STICKYFILE, 0))
 			return (EFTYPE);
 	}
 	if (!groupmember(ip->i_gid, cred) && (mode & ISGID)) {
-		error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_SETGID,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+		error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_SETGID, 0);
 		if (error)
 			return (error);
 	}
@@ -718,7 +712,7 @@ ufs_chown(vp, uid, gid, cred, td)
 	 */
 	if ((uid != ip->i_uid || 
 	    (gid != ip->i_gid && !groupmember(gid, cred))) &&
-	    (error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_CHOWN, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)))
+	    (error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_CHOWN, 0)))
 		return (error);
 	ogid = ip->i_gid;
 	ouid = ip->i_uid;
@@ -790,8 +784,7 @@ good:
 #endif /* QUOTA */
 	ip->i_flag |= IN_CHANGE;
 	if ((ip->i_mode & (ISUID | ISGID)) && (ouid != uid || ogid != gid)) {
-		if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID,
-		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) {
+		if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID, 0)) {
 			ip->i_mode &= ~(ISUID | ISGID);
 			DIP_SET(ip, i_mode, ip->i_mode);
 		}
@@ -2371,8 +2364,7 @@ ufs_makeinode(mode, dvp, vpp, cnp)
 	if (DOINGSOFTDEP(tvp))
 		softdep_change_linkcnt(ip);
 	if ((ip->i_mode & ISGID) && !groupmember(ip->i_gid, cnp->cn_cred) &&
-	    priv_check_cred(cnp->cn_cred, PRIV_VFS_SETGID,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) {
+	    priv_check_cred(cnp->cn_cred, PRIV_VFS_SETGID, 0)) {
 		ip->i_mode &= ~ISGID;
 		DIP_SET(ip, i_mode, ip->i_mode);
 	}