o Replace calls to p_can(..., P_CAN_xxx) with calls to p_canxxx().

  The p_can(...) construct was a premature (and, it turns out,
  awkward) abstraction.  The individual calls to p_canxxx() better
  reflect differences between the inter-process authorization checks,
  such as differing checks based on the type of signal.  This has
  a side effect of improving code readability.
o Replace direct credential authorization checks in ktrace() with
  invocation of p_candebug(), while maintaining the special case
  check of KTR_ROOT.  This allows ktrace() to "play more nicely"
  with new mandatory access control schemes, as well as making its
  authorization checks consistent with other "debugging class"
  checks.
o Eliminate "privused" construct for p_can*() calls which allowed the
  caller to determine if privilege was required for successful
  evaluation of the access control check.  This primitive is currently
  unused, and as such, serves only to complicate the API.

Approved by:	({procfs,linprocfs} changes) des
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project

1 files changed, 3 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/sys/sys/proc.h b/sys/sys/proc.h
index 277fbee..35b5ea4 100644
--- a/sys/sys/proc.h
+++ b/sys/sys/proc.h
@@ -518,8 +518,9 @@ void	fork_return __P((struct proc *, struct trapframe *));
 int	inferior __P((struct proc *p));
 int	leavepgrp __P((struct proc *p));
 void	mi_switch __P((void));
-int	p_can __P((struct proc *p1, struct proc *p2, int operation,
-	    int *privused));
+int	p_candebug __P((struct proc *p1, struct proc *p2));
+int	p_cansee __P((struct proc *p1, struct proc *p2));
+int	p_cansched __P((struct proc *p1, struct proc *p2));
 int	p_cansignal __P((struct proc *p1, struct proc *p2, int signum));
 int	p_trespass __P((struct proc *p1, struct proc *p2));
 void	procinit __P((void));