Fix the handling of IPv6 addresses for subject and process BSM audit

tokens. Currently, we do not support the set{get}audit_addr(2) system
calls which allows processes like sshd to set extended or ip6
information for subject tokens.

The approach that was taken was to change the process audit state
slightly to use an extended terminal ID in the kernel. This allows
us to store both IPv4 IPv6 addresses. In the case that an IPv4 address
is in use, we convert the terminal ID from an struct auditinfo_addr to
a struct auditinfo.

If getaudit(2) is called when the subject is bound to an ip6 address,
we return E2BIG.

- Change the internal audit record to store an extended terminal ID
- Introduce ARG_TERMID_ADDR
- Change the kaudit <-> BSM conversion process so that we are using
  the appropriate subject token. If the address associated with the
  subject is IPv4, we use the standard subject32 token. If the subject
  has an IPv6 address associated with them, we use an extended subject32
  token.
- Fix a couple of endian issues where we do a couple of byte swaps when
  we shouldn't be. IP addresses are already in the correct byte order,
  so reading the ip6 address 4 bytes at a time and swapping them results
  in in-correct address data. It should be noted that the same issue was
  found in the openbsm library and it has been changed there too on the
  vendor branch
- Change A_GETPINFO to use the appropriate structures
- Implement A_GETPINFO_ADDR which basically does what A_GETPINFO does,
  but can also handle ip6 addresses
- Adjust get{set}audit(2) syscalls to convert the data
  auditinfo <-> auditinfo_addr
- Fully implement set{get}audit_addr(2)

NOTE: This adds the ability for processes to correctly set extended subject
information. The appropriate userspace utilities still need to be updated.

MFC after:	1 month
Reviewed by:	rwatson
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD

7 files changed, 104 insertions, 33 deletions

diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit.c b/sys/security/audit/audit.c
index 44494e8..c6e17ca 100644
--- a/sys/security/audit/audit.c
+++ b/sys/security/audit/audit.c
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ audit_record_ctor(void *mem, int size, void *arg, int flags)
 	ar->k_ar.ar_subj_asid = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_asid;
 	ar->k_ar.ar_subj_pid = td->td_proc->p_pid;
 	ar->k_ar.ar_subj_amask = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_mask;
-	ar->k_ar.ar_subj_term = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_termid;
+	ar->k_ar.ar_subj_term_addr = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_termid;
 	bcopy(td->td_proc->p_comm, ar->k_ar.ar_subj_comm, MAXCOMLEN);
 	PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
 
diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit.h b/sys/security/audit/audit.h
index a0af122..f0eef65 100644
--- a/sys/security/audit/audit.h
+++ b/sys/security/audit/audit.h
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ extern int	audit_suspended;
 #define	ARG_SADDRINET		0x0000000000100000ULL
 #define	ARG_SADDRINET6		0x0000000000200000ULL
 #define	ARG_SADDRUNIX		0x0000000000400000ULL
-#define	ARG_UNUSED1		0x0000000000800000ULL
+#define	ARG_TERMID_ADDR		0x0000000000400000ULL
 #define	ARG_UNUSED2		0x0000000001000000ULL
 #define	ARG_UPATH1		0x0000000002000000ULL
 #define	ARG_UPATH2		0x0000000004000000ULL
diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c b/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c
index 5147e29d..9d2e241 100644
--- a/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c
+++ b/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c
@@ -371,10 +371,10 @@ audit_arg_process(struct proc *p)
 	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ruid = p->p_ucred->cr_ruid;
 	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_rgid = p->p_ucred->cr_rgid;
 	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_asid = p->p_au->ai_asid;
-	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid = p->p_au->ai_termid;
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr = p->p_au->ai_termid;
 	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pid = p->p_pid;
 	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID | ARG_EUID | ARG_EGID | ARG_RUID |
-	    ARG_RGID | ARG_ASID | ARG_TERMID | ARG_PID | ARG_PROCESS);
+	    ARG_RGID | ARG_ASID | ARG_TERMID_ADDR | ARG_PID | ARG_PROCESS);
 }
 
 void
diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm.c b/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm.c
index c47bd99..5019dd7 100644
--- a/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm.c
+++ b/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm.c
@@ -390,16 +390,40 @@ kaudit_to_bsm(struct kaudit_record *kar, struct au_record **pau)
 	rec = kau_open();
 
 	/* Create the subject token */
-	tid.port = ar->ar_subj_term.port;
-	tid.machine = ar->ar_subj_term.machine;
-	subj_tok = au_to_subject32(ar->ar_subj_auid,  /* audit ID */
-		ar->ar_subj_cred.cr_uid, /* eff uid */
-		ar->ar_subj_egid,	/* eff group id */
-		ar->ar_subj_ruid, 	/* real uid */
-		ar->ar_subj_rgid, 	/* real group id */
-		ar->ar_subj_pid,	/* process id */
-		ar->ar_subj_asid,	/* session ID */
-		&tid);
+	switch (ar->ar_subj_term_addr.at_type) {
+	case AU_IPv4:
+		tid.port = ar->ar_subj_term_addr.at_port;
+		tid.machine = ar->ar_subj_term_addr.at_addr[0];
+		subj_tok = au_to_subject32(ar->ar_subj_auid,  /* audit ID */
+		    ar->ar_subj_cred.cr_uid, /* eff uid */
+		    ar->ar_subj_egid,	/* eff group id */
+		    ar->ar_subj_ruid, 	/* real uid */
+		    ar->ar_subj_rgid, 	/* real group id */
+		    ar->ar_subj_pid,	/* process id */
+		    ar->ar_subj_asid,	/* session ID */
+		    &tid);
+		break;
+	case AU_IPv6:
+		subj_tok = au_to_subject32_ex(ar->ar_subj_auid,
+		    ar->ar_subj_cred.cr_uid,
+		    ar->ar_subj_egid,
+		    ar->ar_subj_ruid,
+		    ar->ar_subj_rgid,
+		    ar->ar_subj_pid,
+		    ar->ar_subj_asid,
+		    &ar->ar_subj_term_addr);
+		break;
+	default:
+		bzero(&tid, sizeof(tid));
+		subj_tok = au_to_subject32(ar->ar_subj_auid,
+		    ar->ar_subj_cred.cr_uid,
+		    ar->ar_subj_egid,
+		    ar->ar_subj_ruid,
+		    ar->ar_subj_rgid,
+		    ar->ar_subj_pid,
+		    ar->ar_subj_asid,
+		    &tid);
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * The logic inside each case fills in the tokens required for the
diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm_token.c b/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm_token.c
index d5af2df..f09cc84 100644
--- a/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm_token.c
+++ b/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm_token.c
@@ -617,6 +617,8 @@ au_to_process32_ex(au_id_t auid, uid_t euid, gid_t egid, uid_t ruid,
 	token_t *t;
 	u_char *dptr = NULL;
 
+	KASSERT((tid->at_type == AU_IPv4) || (tid->at_type == AU_IPv6),
+	    ("au_to_process32_ex: type %u", (unsigned int)tid->at_type));
 	if (tid->at_type == AU_IPv6)
 		GET_TOKEN_AREA(t, dptr, sizeof(u_char) + 13 *
 		    sizeof(u_int32_t));
@@ -634,12 +636,10 @@ au_to_process32_ex(au_id_t auid, uid_t euid, gid_t egid, uid_t ruid,
 	ADD_U_INT32(dptr, sid);
 	ADD_U_INT32(dptr, tid->at_port);
 	ADD_U_INT32(dptr, tid->at_type);
-	ADD_U_INT32(dptr, tid->at_addr[0]);
-	if (tid->at_type == AU_IPv6) {
-		ADD_U_INT32(dptr, tid->at_addr[1]);
-		ADD_U_INT32(dptr, tid->at_addr[2]);
-		ADD_U_INT32(dptr, tid->at_addr[3]);
-	}
+        if (tid->at_type == AU_IPv6)
+                ADD_MEM(dptr, &tid->at_addr[0], 4 * sizeof(u_int32_t));
+        else
+                ADD_MEM(dptr, &tid->at_addr[0], sizeof(u_int32_t));
 	return (t);
 }
 
@@ -952,6 +952,8 @@ au_to_subject32_ex(au_id_t auid, uid_t euid, gid_t egid, uid_t ruid,
 	token_t *t;
 	u_char *dptr = NULL;
 
+	KASSERT((tid->at_type == AU_IPv4) || (tid->at_type == AU_IPv6),
+	    ("au_to_subject32_ex: type %u", (unsigned int)tid->at_type));
 	if (tid->at_type == AU_IPv6)
 		GET_TOKEN_AREA(t, dptr, sizeof(u_char) + 13 *
 		    sizeof(u_int32_t));
@@ -969,12 +971,10 @@ au_to_subject32_ex(au_id_t auid, uid_t euid, gid_t egid, uid_t ruid,
 	ADD_U_INT32(dptr, sid);
 	ADD_U_INT32(dptr, tid->at_port);
 	ADD_U_INT32(dptr, tid->at_type);
-	ADD_U_INT32(dptr, tid->at_addr[0]);
-	if (tid->at_type == AU_IPv6) {
-		ADD_U_INT32(dptr, tid->at_addr[1]);
-		ADD_U_INT32(dptr, tid->at_addr[2]);
-		ADD_U_INT32(dptr, tid->at_addr[3]);
-	}
+	if (tid->at_type == AU_IPv6)  
+		ADD_MEM(dptr, &tid->at_addr[0], 4 * sizeof(u_int32_t));
+	else    
+		ADD_MEM(dptr, &tid->at_addr[0], sizeof(u_int32_t));
 	return (t);
 }
 
diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit_private.h b/sys/security/audit/audit_private.h
index 660e7c2..fd8a4e9 100644
--- a/sys/security/audit/audit_private.h
+++ b/sys/security/audit/audit_private.h
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ struct audit_record {
 	pid_t			ar_subj_asid; /* Audit session ID */
 	pid_t			ar_subj_pid;
 	struct au_tid		ar_subj_term;
+	struct au_tid_addr	ar_subj_term_addr;
 	char			ar_subj_comm[MAXCOMLEN + 1];
 	struct au_mask		ar_subj_amask;
 
@@ -185,6 +186,7 @@ struct audit_record {
 	pid_t			ar_arg_pid;
 	pid_t			ar_arg_asid;
 	struct au_tid		ar_arg_termid;
+	struct au_tid_addr	ar_arg_termid_addr;
 	uid_t			ar_arg_uid;
 	uid_t			ar_arg_auid;
 	gid_t			ar_arg_gid;
diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit_syscalls.c b/sys/security/audit/audit_syscalls.c
index eb62bcf..d227334 100644
--- a/sys/security/audit/audit_syscalls.c
+++ b/sys/security/audit/audit_syscalls.c
@@ -304,14 +304,19 @@ auditon(struct thread *td, struct auditon_args *uap)
 			return (EINVAL);
 		}
 
+		if (tp->p_au->ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6) {
+			PROC_UNLOCK(tp);
+			return (EINVAL);
+		}
 		udata.au_aupinfo.ap_auid = tp->p_au->ai_auid;
 		udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_success =
 		    tp->p_au->ai_mask.am_success;
 		udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_failure =
 		    tp->p_au->ai_mask.am_failure;
 		udata.au_aupinfo.ap_termid.machine =
-		    tp->p_au->ai_termid.machine;
-		udata.au_aupinfo.ap_termid.port = tp->p_au->ai_termid.port;
+		    tp->p_au->ai_termid.at_addr[0];
+		udata.au_aupinfo.ap_termid.port =
+		    (dev_t)tp->p_au->ai_termid.at_port;
 		udata.au_aupinfo.ap_asid = tp->p_au->ai_asid;
 		PROC_UNLOCK(tp);
 		break;
@@ -347,7 +352,18 @@ auditon(struct thread *td, struct auditon_args *uap)
 		break;
 
 	case A_GETPINFO_ADDR:
-		return (ENOSYS);
+		if (udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_pid < 1)
+			return (EINVAL);
+		if ((tp = pfind(udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_pid)) == NULL)
+			return (EINVAL);
+		udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_auid = tp->p_au->ai_auid;
+		udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_mask.am_success =
+		    tp->p_au->ai_mask.am_success;
+		udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_mask.am_failure =
+		    tp->p_au->ai_mask.am_failure;
+		udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_termid = tp->p_au->ai_termid;
+		udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_asid = tp->p_au->ai_asid;
+		PROC_UNLOCK(tp);
 		break;
 
 	case A_GETKAUDIT:
@@ -469,7 +485,16 @@ getaudit(struct thread *td, struct getaudit_args *uap)
 		return (error);
 
 	PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc);
-	ai = *td->td_proc->p_au;
+	if (td->td_proc->p_au->ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6) {
+		PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
+		return (E2BIG);
+	}
+	bzero(&ai, sizeof(ai));
+	ai.ai_auid = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_auid;
+	ai.ai_mask = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_mask;
+	ai.ai_asid = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_asid;
+	ai.ai_termid.machine = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_termid.at_addr[0];
+	ai.ai_termid.port = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_termid.at_port;
 	PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
 
 	return (copyout(&ai, uap->auditinfo, sizeof(ai)));
@@ -498,7 +523,13 @@ setaudit(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_args *uap)
 	 * XXXRW: Test privilege while holding the proc lock?
 	*/
 	PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc);
-	*td->td_proc->p_au = ai;
+	bzero(td->td_proc->p_au, sizeof(struct auditinfo_addr));
+	td->td_proc->p_au->ai_auid = ai.ai_auid;
+	td->td_proc->p_au->ai_mask = ai.ai_mask;
+	td->td_proc->p_au->ai_asid = ai.ai_asid;
+	td->td_proc->p_au->ai_termid.at_addr[0] = ai.ai_termid.machine;
+	td->td_proc->p_au->ai_termid.at_port = ai.ai_termid.port;
+	td->td_proc->p_au->ai_termid.at_type = AU_IPv4;
 	PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
 
 	return (0);
@@ -508,6 +539,7 @@ setaudit(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_args *uap)
 int
 getaudit_addr(struct thread *td, struct getaudit_addr_args *uap)
 {
+	struct auditinfo_addr aia;
 	int error;
 
 	if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
@@ -515,13 +547,19 @@ getaudit_addr(struct thread *td, struct getaudit_addr_args *uap)
 	error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT);
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
-	return (ENOSYS);
+	if (uap->length < sizeof(aia))
+		return (EOVERFLOW);
+	PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc);
+	aia = *td->td_proc->p_au;
+	PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
+	return (copyout(&aia, uap->auditinfo_addr, sizeof(aia)));
 }
 
 /* ARGSUSED */
 int
 setaudit_addr(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_addr_args *uap)
 {
+	struct auditinfo_addr aia;
 	int error;
 
 	if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
@@ -529,7 +567,14 @@ setaudit_addr(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_addr_args *uap)
 	error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT);
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
-	return (ENOSYS);
+
+	error = copyin(uap->auditinfo_addr, &aia, sizeof(aia));
+	if (error)
+		return (error);
+	PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc);
+	*td->td_proc->p_au = aia;
+	PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
+	return (error);
 }
 
 /*