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authorpjd <pjd@FreeBSD.org>2004-02-22 12:31:44 +0000
committerpjd <pjd@FreeBSD.org>2004-02-22 12:31:44 +0000
commit01d59d6bbb5b5f5108b1f5454d11ff3b3be2dad6 (patch)
tree1c4d31f4b056d45cd39f0c68f6aad1b1af2ebd1c /sys/security
parentfb7918f5d7ebb7e391b17203a42b3a5a6d07af2b (diff)
downloadFreeBSD-src-01d59d6bbb5b5f5108b1f5454d11ff3b3be2dad6.zip
FreeBSD-src-01d59d6bbb5b5f5108b1f5454d11ff3b3be2dad6.tar.gz
Reimplement sysctls handling by MAC framework.
Now I believe it is done in the right way. Removed some XXMAC cases, we now assume 'high' integrity level for all sysctls, except those with CTLFLAG_ANYBODY flag set. No more magic. Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: rwatson, scottl (mentor) Tested with: LINT (compilation), mac_biba(4) (functionality)
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/security')
-rw-r--r--sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h7
-rw-r--r--sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h8
-rw-r--r--sys/security/mac/mac_system.c7
-rw-r--r--sys/security/mac_biba/mac_biba.c16
-rw-r--r--sys/security/mac_lomac/mac_lomac.c16
-rw-r--r--sys/security/mac_stub/mac_stub.c4
-rw-r--r--sys/security/mac_test/mac_test.c4
7 files changed, 26 insertions, 36 deletions
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h b/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
index 895c7e3..59c247a 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
+++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
@@ -120,6 +120,8 @@ struct mount;
struct proc;
struct sockaddr;
struct socket;
+struct sysctl_oid;
+struct sysctl_req;
struct pipepair;
struct thread;
struct timespec;
@@ -281,9 +283,8 @@ int mac_check_system_reboot(struct ucred *cred, int howto);
int mac_check_system_settime(struct ucred *cred);
int mac_check_system_swapon(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp);
int mac_check_system_swapoff(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp);
-int mac_check_system_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, int *name,
- u_int namelen, void *old, size_t *oldlenp, int inkernel,
- void *new, size_t newlen);
+int mac_check_system_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, struct sysctl_oid *oidp,
+ void *arg1, int arg2, struct sysctl_req *req);
int mac_check_vnode_access(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
int acc_mode);
int mac_check_vnode_chdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp);
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h b/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h
index f1d45b2..9060438 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h
+++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h
@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ struct mount;
struct pipepair;
struct sbuf;
struct socket;
+struct sysctl_oid;
+struct sysctl_req;
struct ucred;
struct uio;
struct vnode;
@@ -362,9 +364,9 @@ struct mac_policy_ops {
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label);
int (*mpo_check_system_swapoff)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label);
- int (*mpo_check_system_sysctl)(struct ucred *cred, int *name,
- u_int namelen, void *old, size_t *oldlenp, int inkernel,
- void *new, size_t newlen);
+ int (*mpo_check_system_sysctl)(struct ucred *cred,
+ struct sysctl_oid *oidp, void *arg1, int arg2,
+ struct sysctl_req *req);
int (*mpo_check_vnode_access)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, int acc_mode);
int (*mpo_check_vnode_chdir)(struct ucred *cred,
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_system.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_system.c
index 14755cf..128f2c5 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac/mac_system.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_system.c
@@ -249,8 +249,8 @@ mac_check_system_swapoff(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
}
int
-mac_check_system_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, int *name, u_int namelen,
- void *old, size_t *oldlenp, int inkernel, void *new, size_t newlen)
+mac_check_system_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, struct sysctl_oid *oidp, void *arg1,
+ int arg2, struct sysctl_req *req)
{
int error;
@@ -261,8 +261,7 @@ mac_check_system_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, int *name, u_int namelen,
if (!mac_enforce_system)
return (0);
- MAC_CHECK(check_system_sysctl, cred, name, namelen, old, oldlenp,
- inkernel, new, newlen);
+ MAC_CHECK(check_system_sysctl, cred, oidp, arg1, arg2, req);
return (error);
}
diff --git a/sys/security/mac_biba/mac_biba.c b/sys/security/mac_biba/mac_biba.c
index 63bea16..545ba43 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac_biba/mac_biba.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac_biba/mac_biba.c
@@ -1973,8 +1973,8 @@ mac_biba_check_system_swapoff(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
}
static int
-mac_biba_check_system_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, int *name, u_int namelen,
- void *old, size_t *oldlenp, int inkernel, void *new, size_t newlen)
+mac_biba_check_system_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, struct sysctl_oid *oidp,
+ void *arg1, int arg2, struct sysctl_req *req)
{
struct mac_biba *subj;
int error;
@@ -1985,16 +1985,10 @@ mac_biba_check_system_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, int *name, u_int namelen,
subj = SLOT(cred->cr_label);
/*
- * In general, treat sysctl variables as biba/high, but also
- * require privilege to change them, since they are a
- * communications channel between grades. Exempt MIB
- * queries from this due to undocmented sysctl magic.
- * XXXMAC: This probably requires some more review.
+ * Treat sysctl variables without CTLFLAG_ANYBODY flag as
+ * biba/high, but also require privilege to change them.
*/
- if (new != NULL) {
- if (namelen > 0 && name[0] == 0)
- return (0);
-
+ if (req->newptr != NULL && (oidp->oid_kind & CTLFLAG_ANYBODY) == 0) {
if (!mac_biba_subject_dominate_high(subj))
return (EACCES);
diff --git a/sys/security/mac_lomac/mac_lomac.c b/sys/security/mac_lomac/mac_lomac.c
index f1e7a28..9502c05 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac_lomac/mac_lomac.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac_lomac/mac_lomac.c
@@ -2063,8 +2063,8 @@ mac_lomac_check_system_swapon(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
}
static int
-mac_lomac_check_system_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, int *name, u_int namelen,
- void *old, size_t *oldlenp, int inkernel, void *new, size_t newlen)
+mac_lomac_check_system_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, struct sysctl_oid *oidp,
+ void *arg1, int arg2, struct sysctl_req *req)
{
struct mac_lomac *subj;
@@ -2074,16 +2074,10 @@ mac_lomac_check_system_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, int *name, u_int namelen,
subj = SLOT(cred->cr_label);
/*
- * In general, treat sysctl variables as lomac/high, but also
- * require privilege to change them, since they are a
- * communications channel between grades. Exempt MIB
- * queries from this due to undocmented sysctl magic.
- * XXXMAC: This probably requires some more review.
+ * Treat sysctl variables without CTLFLAG_ANYBODY flag as
+ * lomac/high, but also require privilege to change them.
*/
- if (new != NULL) {
- if (namelen > 0 && name[0] == 0)
- return (0);
-
+ if (req->newptr != NULL && (oidp->oid_kind & CTLFLAG_ANYBODY) == 0) {
#ifdef notdef
if (!mac_lomac_subject_dominate_high(subj))
return (EACCES);
diff --git a/sys/security/mac_stub/mac_stub.c b/sys/security/mac_stub/mac_stub.c
index 1b573ed..ea113e1 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac_stub/mac_stub.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac_stub/mac_stub.c
@@ -757,8 +757,8 @@ stub_check_system_swapoff(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
}
static int
-stub_check_system_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, int *name, u_int namelen,
- void *old, size_t *oldlenp, int inkernel, void *new, size_t newlen)
+stub_check_system_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, struct sysctl_oid *oidp,
+ void *arg1, int arg2, struct sysctl_req *req)
{
return (0);
diff --git a/sys/security/mac_test/mac_test.c b/sys/security/mac_test/mac_test.c
index f329f8b..b02b36a 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac_test/mac_test.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac_test/mac_test.c
@@ -1470,8 +1470,8 @@ mac_test_check_system_swapoff(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
}
static int
-mac_test_check_system_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, int *name, u_int namelen,
- void *old, size_t *oldlenp, int inkernel, void *new, size_t newlen)
+mac_test_check_system_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, struct sysctl_oid *oidp,
+ void *arg1, int arg2, struct sysctl_req *req)
{
ASSERT_CRED_LABEL(cred->cr_label);
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