Rework the lifetime management of the kernel implementation of POSIX

semaphores.  Specifically, semaphores are now represented as new file
descriptor type that is set to close on exec.  This removes the need for
all of the manual process reference counting (and fork, exec, and exit
event handlers) as the normal file descriptor operations handle all of
that for us nicely.  It is also suggested as one possible implementation
in the spec and at least one other OS (OS X) uses this approach.

Some bugs that were fixed as a result include:
- References to a named semaphore whose name is removed still work after
  the sem_unlink() operation.  Prior to this patch, if a semaphore's name
  was removed, valid handles from sem_open() would get EINVAL errors from
  sem_getvalue(), sem_post(), etc.  This fixes that.
- Unnamed semaphores created with sem_init() were not cleaned up when a
  process exited or exec'd.  They were only cleaned up if the process
  did an explicit sem_destroy().  This could result in a leak of semaphore
  objects that could never be cleaned up.
- On the other hand, if another process guessed the id (kernel pointer to
  'struct ksem' of an unnamed semaphore (created via sem_init)) and had
  write access to the semaphore based on UID/GID checks, then that other
  process could manipulate the semaphore via sem_destroy(), sem_post(),
  sem_wait(), etc.
- As part of the permission check (UID/GID), the umask of the proces
  creating the semaphore was not honored.  Thus if your umask denied group
  read/write access but the explicit mode in the sem_init() call allowed
  it, the semaphore would be readable/writable by other users in the
  same group, for example.  This includes access via the previous bug.
- If the module refused to unload because there were active semaphores,
  then it might have deregistered one or more of the semaphore system
  calls before it noticed that there was a problem.  I'm not sure if
  this actually happened as the order that modules are discovered by the
  kernel linker depends on how the actual .ko file is linked.  One can
  make the order deterministic by using a single module with a mod_event
  handler that explicitly registers syscalls (and deregisters during
  unload after any checks).  This also fixes a race where even if the
  sem_module unloaded first it would have destroyed locks that the
  syscalls might be trying to access if they are still executing when
  they are unloaded.

  XXX: By the way, deregistering system calls doesn't do any blocking
  to drain any threads from the calls.
- Some minor fixes to errno values on error.  For example, sem_init()
  isn't documented to return ENFILE or EMFILE if we run out of semaphores
  the way that sem_open() can.  Instead, it should return ENOSPC in that
  case.

Other changes:
- Kernel semaphores now use a hash table to manage the namespace of
  named semaphores nearly in a similar fashion to the POSIX shared memory
  object file descriptors.  Kernel semaphores can now also have names
  longer than 14 chars (up to MAXPATHLEN) and can include subdirectories
  in their pathname.
- The UID/GID permission checks for access to a named semaphore are now
  done via vaccess() rather than a home-rolled set of checks.
- Now that kernel semaphores have an associated file object, the various
  MAC checks for POSIX semaphores accept both a file credential and an
  active credential.  There is also a new posixsem_check_stat() since it
  is possible to fstat() a semaphore file descriptor.
- A small set of regression tests (using the ksem API directly) is present
  in src/tools/regression/posixsem.

Reported by:	kris (1)
Tested by:	kris
Reviewed by:	rwatson (lightly)
MFC after:	1 month

1 files changed, 26 insertions, 9 deletions

diff --git a/sys/security/mac_test/mac_test.c b/sys/security/mac_test/mac_test.c
index c25e937..5e788b9 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac_test/mac_test.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac_test/mac_test.c
@@ -1012,11 +1012,12 @@ test_pipe_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct pipepair *pp,
 
 COUNTER_DECL(posixsem_check_getvalue);
 static int
-test_posixsem_check_getvalue(struct ucred *cred, struct ksem *ks,
-    struct label *kslabel)
+test_posixsem_check_getvalue(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
+    struct ksem *ks, struct label *kslabel)
 {
 
-	LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
+	LABEL_CHECK(active_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
+	LABEL_CHECK(file_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
 	LABEL_CHECK(kslabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SEM);
 	COUNTER_INC(posixsem_check_getvalue);
 
@@ -1038,17 +1039,31 @@ test_posixsem_check_open(struct ucred *cred, struct ksem *ks,
 
 COUNTER_DECL(posixsem_check_post);
 static int
-test_posixsem_check_post(struct ucred *cred, struct ksem *ks,
-    struct label *kslabel)
+test_posixsem_check_post(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
+    struct ksem *ks, struct label *kslabel)
 {
 
-	LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
+	LABEL_CHECK(active_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
+	LABEL_CHECK(file_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
 	LABEL_CHECK(kslabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SEM);
 	COUNTER_INC(posixsem_check_post);
 
 	return (0);
 }
 
+COUNTER_DECL(posixsem_check_stat);
+static int
+test_posixsem_check_stat(struct ucred *active_cred,
+    struct ucred *file_cred, struct ksem *ks, struct label *kslabel)
+{
+
+	LABEL_CHECK(active_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
+	LABEL_CHECK(file_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
+	LABEL_CHECK(kslabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SEM);
+	COUNTER_INC(posixsem_check_stat);
+	return (0);
+}
+
 COUNTER_DECL(posixsem_check_unlink);
 static int
 test_posixsem_check_unlink(struct ucred *cred, struct ksem *ks,
@@ -1064,11 +1079,12 @@ test_posixsem_check_unlink(struct ucred *cred, struct ksem *ks,
 
 COUNTER_DECL(posixsem_check_wait);
 static int
-test_posixsem_check_wait(struct ucred *cred, struct ksem *ks,
-    struct label *kslabel)
+test_posixsem_check_wait(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
+    struct ksem *ks, struct label *kslabel)
 {
 
-	LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
+	LABEL_CHECK(active_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
+	LABEL_CHECK(file_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
 	LABEL_CHECK(kslabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SEM);
 	COUNTER_INC(posixsem_check_wait);
 
@@ -2881,6 +2897,7 @@ static struct mac_policy_ops test_ops =
 	.mpo_posixsem_check_getvalue = test_posixsem_check_getvalue,
 	.mpo_posixsem_check_open = test_posixsem_check_open,
 	.mpo_posixsem_check_post = test_posixsem_check_post,
+	.mpo_posixsem_check_stat = test_posixsem_check_stat,
 	.mpo_posixsem_check_unlink = test_posixsem_check_unlink,
 	.mpo_posixsem_check_wait = test_posixsem_check_wait,
 	.mpo_posixsem_create = test_posixsem_create,