Break out strictly credential-related portions of mac_process.c into a

new file, mac_cred.c.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project

2 files changed, 213 insertions, 141 deletions

diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_cred.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_cred.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d46f9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_cred.c
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2002, 2008 Robert N. M. Watson
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Samy Al Bahra
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 SPARTA, Inc.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Apple Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the
+ * TrustedBSD Project.
+ *
+ * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
+ * Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
+ * Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
+ * as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
+ *
+ * This software was enhanced by SPARTA ISSO under SPAWAR contract
+ * N66001-04-C-6019 ("SEFOS").
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#include "opt_mac.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/condvar.h>
+#include <sys/imgact.h>
+#include <sys/kernel.h>
+#include <sys/lock.h>
+#include <sys/malloc.h>
+#include <sys/mutex.h>
+#include <sys/mac.h>
+#include <sys/proc.h>
+#include <sys/sbuf.h>
+#include <sys/systm.h>
+#include <sys/vnode.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/file.h>
+#include <sys/namei.h>
+#include <sys/sysctl.h>
+
+#include <vm/vm.h>
+#include <vm/pmap.h>
+#include <vm/vm_map.h>
+#include <vm/vm_object.h>
+
+#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
+#include <security/mac/mac_internal.h>
+#include <security/mac/mac_policy.h>
+
+struct label *
+mac_cred_label_alloc(void)
+{
+	struct label *label;
+
+	label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK);
+	MAC_PERFORM(cred_init_label, label);
+	return (label);
+}
+
+void
+mac_cred_init(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+
+	if (mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_CRED)
+		cred->cr_label = mac_cred_label_alloc();
+	else
+		cred->cr_label = NULL;
+}
+
+void
+mac_cred_label_free(struct label *label)
+{
+
+	MAC_PERFORM(cred_destroy_label, label);
+	mac_labelzone_free(label);
+}
+
+void
+mac_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+
+	if (cred->cr_label != NULL) {
+		mac_cred_label_free(cred->cr_label);
+		cred->cr_label = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * When a thread becomes an NFS server daemon, its credential may need to be
+ * updated to reflect this so that policies can recognize when file system
+ * operations originate from the network.
+ *
+ * At some point, it would be desirable if the credential used for each NFS
+ * RPC could be set based on the RPC context (i.e., source system, etc) to
+ * provide more fine-grained access control.
+ */
+void
+mac_cred_associate_nfsd(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+
+	MAC_PERFORM(cred_associate_nfsd, cred);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other kernel
+ * processes and threads are spawned.
+ */
+void
+mac_cred_create_swapper(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+
+	MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_swapper, cred);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize MAC label for the first userland process, from which other
+ * userland processes and threads are spawned.
+ */
+void
+mac_cred_create_init(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+
+	MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_init, cred);
+}
+
+int
+mac_cred_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *elements,
+    char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_cred_internalize_label(struct label *label, char *string)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred, label, string);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * When a new process is created, its label must be initialized.  Generally,
+ * this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible deltas.
+ * This function allows that processing to take place.
+ */
+void
+mac_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest)
+{
+
+	MAC_PERFORM(cred_copy_label, src->cr_label, dest->cr_label);
+}
+
+/*
+ * When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege
+ * to mapped objects.  This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified
+ * buffer cache.
+ */
+void
+mac_cred_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
+{
+
+	MAC_PERFORM(cred_relabel, cred, newlabel);
+}
+
+int
+mac_cred_check_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	MAC_CHECK(cred_check_relabel, cred, newlabel);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_cred_check_visible(struct ucred *cr1, struct ucred *cr2)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	MAC_CHECK(cred_check_visible, cr1, cr2);
+
+	return (error);
+}
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c
index bb29aaa..dba4769 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c
@@ -84,26 +84,6 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation_via_cow, CTLFLAG_RW,
 static void	mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(struct thread *td,
 		    struct ucred *cred, struct vm_map *map);
 
-struct label *
-mac_cred_label_alloc(void)
-{
-	struct label *label;
-
-	label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK);
-	MAC_PERFORM(cred_init_label, label);
-	return (label);
-}
-
-void
-mac_cred_init(struct ucred *cred)
-{
-
-	if (mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_CRED)
-		cred->cr_label = mac_cred_label_alloc();
-	else
-		cred->cr_label = NULL;
-}
-
 static struct label *
 mac_proc_label_alloc(void)
 {
@@ -124,24 +104,6 @@ mac_proc_init(struct proc *p)
 		p->p_label = NULL;
 }
 
-void
-mac_cred_label_free(struct label *label)
-{
-
-	MAC_PERFORM(cred_destroy_label, label);
-	mac_labelzone_free(label);
-}
-
-void
-mac_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred)
-{
-
-	if (cred->cr_label != NULL) {
-		mac_cred_label_free(cred->cr_label);
-		cred->cr_label = NULL;
-	}
-}
-
 static void
 mac_proc_label_free(struct label *label)
 {
@@ -160,65 +122,6 @@ mac_proc_destroy(struct proc *p)
 	}
 }
 
-/*
- * When a thread becomes an NFS server daemon, its credential may need to be
- * updated to reflect this so that policies can recognize when file system
- * operations originate from the network.
- *
- * At some point, it would be desirable if the credential used for each NFS
- * RPC could be set based on the RPC context (i.e., source system, etc) to
- * provide more fine-grained access control.
- */
-void
-mac_cred_associate_nfsd(struct ucred *cred)
-{
-
-	MAC_PERFORM(cred_associate_nfsd, cred);
-}
-
-/*
- * Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other kernel
- * processes and threads are spawned.
- */
-void
-mac_cred_create_swapper(struct ucred *cred)
-{
-
-	MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_swapper, cred);
-}
-
-/*
- * Initialize MAC label for the first userland process, from which other
- * userland processes and threads are spawned.
- */
-void
-mac_cred_create_init(struct ucred *cred)
-{
-
-	MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_init, cred);
-}
-
-int
-mac_cred_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *elements,
-    char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_cred_internalize_label(struct label *label, char *string)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred, label, string);
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
 void
 mac_thread_userret(struct thread *td)
 {
@@ -226,18 +129,6 @@ mac_thread_userret(struct thread *td)
 	MAC_PERFORM(thread_userret, td);
 }
 
-/*
- * When a new process is created, its label must be initialized.  Generally,
- * this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible deltas.
- * This function allows that processing to take place.
- */
-void
-mac_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest)
-{
-
-	MAC_PERFORM(cred_copy_label, src->cr_label, dest->cr_label);
-}
-
 int
 mac_execve_enter(struct image_params *imgp, struct mac *mac_p)
 {
@@ -484,38 +375,6 @@ mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(struct thread *td, struct ucred *cred,
 	vm_map_unlock_read(map);
 }
 
-/*
- * When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege
- * to mapped objects.  This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified
- * buffer cache.
- */
-void
-mac_cred_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
-{
-
-	MAC_PERFORM(cred_relabel, cred, newlabel);
-}
-
-int
-mac_cred_check_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	MAC_CHECK(cred_check_relabel, cred, newlabel);
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_cred_check_visible(struct ucred *cr1, struct ucred *cr2)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	MAC_CHECK(cred_check_visible, cr1, cr2);
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
 int
 mac_proc_check_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p)
 {