Move MAC check_vnode_mmap entry point out from being exclusive to

MAP_SHARED so that the entry point gets executed un-conditionally.
This may be useful for security policies which want to perform access
control checks around run-time linking.

-add the mmap(2) flags argument to the check_vnode_mmap entry point
 so that we can make access control decisions based on the type of
 mapped object.
-update any dependent API around this parameter addition such as
 function prototype modifications, entry point parameter additions
 and the inclusion of sys/mman.h header file.
-Change the MLS, BIBA and LOMAC security policies so that subject
 domination routines are not executed unless the type of mapping is
 shared. This is done to maintain compatibility between the old
 vm_mmap_vnode(9) and these policies.

Reviewed by:	rwatson
MFC after:	1 month

1 files changed, 3 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_vfs.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_vfs.c
index 6bb9518..acf21a5 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac/mac_vfs.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_vfs.c
@@ -598,7 +598,8 @@ mac_check_vnode_lookup(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
 }
 
 int
-mac_check_vnode_mmap(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, int prot)
+mac_check_vnode_mmap(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
+    int prot, int flags)
 {
 	int error;
 
@@ -607,7 +608,7 @@ mac_check_vnode_mmap(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, int prot)
 	if (!mac_enforce_fs || !mac_enforce_vm)
 		return (0);
 
-	MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_mmap, cred, vp, vp->v_label, prot);
+	MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_mmap, cred, vp, vp->v_label, prot, flags);
 	return (error);
 }