MFC r304572 (by bz):

  Remove the kernel optoion for IPSEC_FILTERTUNNEL, which was deprecated
  more than 7 years ago in favour of a sysctl in r192648.

MFC r305122:
  Remove redundant sanity checks from ipsec[46]_common_input_cb().

  This check already has been done in the each protocol callback.

MFC r309144,309174,309201 (by fabient):
  IPsec RFC6479 support for replay window sizes up to 2^32 - 32 packets.

  Since the previous algorithm, based on bit shifting, does not scale
  with large replay windows, the algorithm used here is based on
  RFC 6479: IPsec Anti-Replay Algorithm without Bit Shifting.
  The replay window will be fast to be updated, but will cost as many bits
  in RAM as its size.

  The previous implementation did not provide a lock on the replay window,
  which may lead to replay issues.

  Obtained from:	emeric.poupon@stormshield.eu
  Sponsored by:	Stormshield
  Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8468

MFC r309143,309146 (by fabient):
  In a dual processor system (2*6 cores) during IPSec throughput tests,
  we see a lot of contention on the arc4 lock, used to generate the IV
  of the ESP output packets.

  The idea of this patch is to split this mutex in order to reduce the
  contention on this lock.

  Update r309143 to prevent false sharing.

  Reviewed by:	delphij, markm, ache
  Approved by:	so
  Obtained from: emeric.poupon@stormshield.eu
  Sponsored by:	Stormshield
  Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8130

MFC r313330:
  Merge projects/ipsec into head/.

   Small summary
   -------------

  o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec.
  o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel
    option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading
    and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules.
  o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by
    default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type
    support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for
    inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs.
    setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA.
  o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is
    build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel).
    It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs.
  o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special
    methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h>
    should be included to declare all the needed things to work
    with IPsec.
  o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed.
    Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods.
  o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC.
  o PF_KEY SADB was reworked:
    - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace,
      and all SAs MUST have unique SPI.
    - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB.
    - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads
      can do SA lookups in the same time.
    - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes
      in SADB.
    - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers:
      SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They
      can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses.
  o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to
    avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support
    only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported
    for both INET and INET6.
  o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches
    used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet.
  o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does
    check for full history of applied IPsec transforms.
  o References counting rules for security policies and security
    associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform
    code.
  o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms.
    tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in
    SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting.

  Obtained from:	Yandex LLC
  Relnotes:	yes
  Sponsored by:	Yandex LLC
  Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352

MFC r313331:
  Add removed headers into the ObsoleteFiles.inc.

MFC r313561 (by glebius):
  Move tcp_fields_to_net() static inline into tcp_var.h, just below its
  friend tcp_fields_to_host(). There is third party code that also uses
  this inline.

MFC r313697:
  Remove IPsec related PCB code from SCTP.

  The inpcb structure has inp_sp pointer that is initialized by
  ipsec_init_pcbpolicy() function. This pointer keeps strorage for IPsec
  security policies associated with a specific socket.
  An application can use IP_IPSEC_POLICY and IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY socket
  options to configure these security policies. Then ip[6]_output()
  uses inpcb pointer to specify that an outgoing packet is associated
  with some socket. And IPSEC_OUTPUT() method can use a security policy
  stored in the inp_sp. For inbound packet the protocol-specific input
  routine uses IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY() method to check that a packet conforms
  to inbound security policy configured in the inpcb.

  SCTP protocol doesn't specify inpcb for ip[6]_output() when it sends
  packets. Thus IPSEC_OUTPUT() method does not consider such packets as
  associated with some socket and can not apply security policies
  from inpcb, even if they are configured. Since IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY()
  method is called from protocol-specific input routine, it can specify
  inpcb pointer and associated with socket inbound policy will be
  checked. But there are two problems:
  1. Such check is asymmetric, becasue we can not apply security policy
  from inpcb for outgoing packet.
  2. IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY() expects that caller holds INPCB lock and
  access to inp_sp is protected. But for SCTP this is not correct,
  becasue SCTP uses own locks to protect inpcb.

  To fix these problems remove IPsec related PCB code from SCTP.
  This imply that IP_IPSEC_POLICY and IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY socket options
  will be not applicable to SCTP sockets. To be able correctly check
  inbound security policies for SCTP, mark its protocol header with
  the PR_LASTHDR flag.

  Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9538

MFC r313746:
  Add missing check to fix the build with IPSEC_SUPPORT and without MAC.

MFC r313805:
  Fix LINT build for powerpc.

  Build kernel modules support only when both IPSEC and TCP_SIGNATURE
  are not defined.

MFC r313922:
  For translated packets do not adjust UDP checksum if it is zero.

  In case when decrypted and decapsulated packet is an UDP datagram,
  check that its checksum is not zero before doing incremental checksum
  adjustment.

MFC r314339:
  Document that the size of AH ICV for HMAC-SHA2-NNN should be half of
  NNN bits as described in RFC4868.

  PR:		215978

MFC r314812:
  Introduce the concept of IPsec security policies scope.

  Currently are defined three scopes: global, ifnet, and pcb.
  Generic security policies that IKE daemon can add via PF_KEY interface
  or an administrator creates with setkey(8) utility have GLOBAL scope.
  Such policies can be applied by the kernel to outgoing packets and checked
  agains inbound packets after IPsec processing.
  Security policies created by if_ipsec(4) interfaces have IFNET scope.
  Such policies are applied to packets that are passed through if_ipsec(4)
  interface.
  And security policies created by application using setsockopt()
  IP_IPSEC_POLICY option have PCB scope. Such policies are applied to
  packets related to specific socket. Currently there is no way to list
  PCB policies via setkey(8) utility.

  Modify setkey(8) and libipsec(3) to be able distinguish the scope of
  security policies in the `setkey -DP` listing. Add two optional flags:
  '-t' to list only policies related to virtual *tunneling* interfaces,
  i.e. policies with IFNET scope, and '-g' to list only policies with GLOBAL
  scope. By default policies from all scopes are listed.

  To implement this PF_KEY's sadb_x_policy structure was modified.
  sadb_x_policy_reserved field is used to pass the policy scope from the
  kernel to userland. SADB_SPDDUMP message extended to support filtering
  by scope: sadb_msg_satype field is used to specify bit mask of requested
  scopes.

  For IFNET policies the sadb_x_policy_priority field of struct sadb_x_policy
  is used to pass if_ipsec's interface if_index to the userland. For GLOBAL
  policies sadb_x_policy_priority is used only to manage order of security
  policies in the SPDB. For IFNET policies it is not used, so it can be used
  to keep if_index.

  After this change the output of `setkey -DP` now looks like:
  # setkey -DPt
  0.0.0.0/0[any] 0.0.0.0/0[any] any
  	in ipsec
  	esp/tunnel/87.250.242.144-87.250.242.145/unique:145
  	spid=7 seq=3 pid=58025 scope=ifnet ifname=ipsec0
  	refcnt=1
  # setkey -DPg
  ::/0 ::/0 icmp6 135,0
  	out none
  	spid=5 seq=1 pid=872 scope=global
  	refcnt=1

  Obtained from:	Yandex LLC
  Sponsored by:	Yandex LLC
  Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9805

PR:		212018
Relnotes:	yes
Sponsored by:	Yandex LLC

1 files changed, 91 insertions, 62 deletions

diff --git a/sys/netipsec/keydb.h b/sys/netipsec/keydb.h
index 3fe28eb..ffbbe33 100644
--- a/sys/netipsec/keydb.h
+++ b/sys/netipsec/keydb.h
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
 #define _NETIPSEC_KEYDB_H_
 
 #ifdef _KERNEL
+#include <sys/counter.h>
+#include <sys/lock.h>
+#include <sys/mutex.h>
 
 #include <netipsec/key_var.h>
 
@@ -54,9 +57,9 @@ union sockaddr_union {
 struct secasindex {
 	union sockaddr_union src;	/* source address for SA */
 	union sockaddr_union dst;	/* destination address for SA */
-	u_int16_t proto;		/* IPPROTO_ESP or IPPROTO_AH */
-	u_int8_t mode;			/* mode of protocol, see ipsec.h */
-	u_int32_t reqid;		/* reqid id who owned this SA */
+	uint8_t proto;			/* IPPROTO_ESP or IPPROTO_AH */
+	uint8_t mode;			/* mode of protocol, see ipsec.h */
+	uint32_t reqid;			/* reqid id who owned this SA */
 					/* see IPSEC_MANUAL_REQID_MAX. */
 };
 
@@ -85,9 +88,23 @@ struct seclifetime {
 	u_int64_t usetime;
 };
 
+struct secnatt {
+	union sockaddr_union oai;	/* original addresses of initiator */
+	union sockaddr_union oar;	/* original address of responder */
+	uint16_t sport;			/* source port */
+	uint16_t dport;			/* destination port */
+	uint16_t cksum;			/* checksum delta */
+	uint16_t flags;
+#define	IPSEC_NATT_F_OAI	0x0001
+#define	IPSEC_NATT_F_OAR	0x0002
+};
+
 /* Security Association Data Base */
+TAILQ_HEAD(secasvar_queue, secasvar);
 struct secashead {
-	LIST_ENTRY(secashead) chain;
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(secashead) chain;
+	LIST_ENTRY(secashead) addrhash;	/* hash by sproto+src+dst addresses */
+	LIST_ENTRY(secashead) drainq;	/* used ONLY by flush callout */
 
 	struct secasindex saidx;
 
@@ -95,10 +112,10 @@ struct secashead {
 	struct secident *identd;	/* destination identity */
 					/* XXX I don't know how to use them. */
 
-	u_int8_t state;			/* MATURE or DEAD. */
-	LIST_HEAD(_satree, secasvar) savtree[SADB_SASTATE_MAX+1];
-					/* SA chain */
-					/* The first of this list is newer SA */
+	volatile u_int refcnt;		/* reference count */
+	uint8_t state;			/* MATURE or DEAD. */
+	struct secasvar_queue savtree_alive;	/* MATURE and DYING SA */
+	struct secasvar_queue savtree_larval;	/* LARVAL SA */
 };
 
 struct xformsw;
@@ -106,63 +123,70 @@ struct enc_xform;
 struct auth_hash;
 struct comp_algo;
 
-/* Security Association */
+/*
+ * Security Association
+ *
+ * For INBOUND packets we do SA lookup using SPI, thus only SPIHASH is used.
+ * For OUTBOUND packets there may be several SA suitable for packet.
+ * We use key_preferred_oldsa variable to choose better SA. First of we do
+ * lookup for suitable SAH using packet's saidx. Then we use SAH's savtree
+ * to search better candidate. The newer SA (by created time) are placed
+ * in the beginning of the savtree list. There is no preference between
+ * DYING and MATURE.
+ *
+ * NB: Fields with a tdb_ prefix are part of the "glue" used
+ *     to interface to the OpenBSD crypto support.  This was done
+ *     to distinguish this code from the mainline KAME code.
+ * NB: Fields are sorted on the basis of the frequency of changes, i.e.
+ *     constants and unchangeable fields are going first.
+ * NB: if you want to change this structure, check that this will not break
+ *     key_updateaddresses().
+ */
 struct secasvar {
-	LIST_ENTRY(secasvar) chain;
-	struct mtx lock;		/* update/access lock */
-
-	u_int refcnt;			/* reference count */
-	u_int8_t state;			/* Status of this Association */
-
-	u_int8_t alg_auth;		/* Authentication Algorithm Identifier*/
-	u_int8_t alg_enc;		/* Cipher Algorithm Identifier */
-	u_int8_t alg_comp;		/* Compression Algorithm Identifier */
-	u_int32_t spi;			/* SPI Value, network byte order */
-	u_int32_t flags;		/* holder for SADB_KEY_FLAGS */
+	uint32_t spi;			/* SPI Value, network byte order */
+	uint32_t flags;			/* holder for SADB_KEY_FLAGS */
+	uint32_t seq;			/* sequence number */
+	pid_t pid;			/* message's pid */
+	u_int ivlen;			/* length of IV */
 
+	struct secashead *sah;		/* back pointer to the secashead */
 	struct seckey *key_auth;	/* Key for Authentication */
 	struct seckey *key_enc;	        /* Key for Encryption */
-	u_int ivlen;			/* length of IV */
-	void *sched;			/* intermediate encryption key */
-	size_t schedlen;
-	uint64_t cntr;			/* counter for GCM and CTR */
-
 	struct secreplay *replay;	/* replay prevention */
-	time_t created;			/* for lifetime */
-
-	struct seclifetime *lft_c;	/* CURRENT lifetime, it's constant. */
+	struct secnatt *natt;		/* NAT-T config */
+	struct mtx *lock;		/* update/access lock */
+
+	const struct xformsw *tdb_xform;	/* transform */
+	const struct enc_xform *tdb_encalgxform;/* encoding algorithm */
+	const struct auth_hash *tdb_authalgxform;/* authentication algorithm */
+	const struct comp_algo *tdb_compalgxform;/* compression algorithm */
+	uint64_t tdb_cryptoid;		/* crypto session id */
+
+	uint8_t alg_auth;		/* Authentication Algorithm Identifier*/
+	uint8_t alg_enc;		/* Cipher Algorithm Identifier */
+	uint8_t alg_comp;		/* Compression Algorithm Identifier */
+	uint8_t state;			/* Status of this SA (pfkeyv2.h) */
+
+	counter_u64_t lft_c;		/* CURRENT lifetime */
+#define	lft_c_allocations	lft_c
+#define	lft_c_bytes		lft_c + 1
 	struct seclifetime *lft_h;	/* HARD lifetime */
 	struct seclifetime *lft_s;	/* SOFT lifetime */
 
-	u_int32_t seq;			/* sequence number */
-	pid_t pid;			/* message's pid */
+	uint64_t created;		/* time when SA was created */
+	uint64_t firstused;		/* time when SA was first used */
 
-	struct secashead *sah;		/* back pointer to the secashead */
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(secasvar) chain;
+	LIST_ENTRY(secasvar) spihash;
+	LIST_ENTRY(secasvar) drainq;	/* used ONLY by flush callout */
 
-	/*
-	 * NB: Fields with a tdb_ prefix are part of the "glue" used
-	 *     to interface to the OpenBSD crypto support.  This was done
-	 *     to distinguish this code from the mainline KAME code.
-	 */
-	struct xformsw *tdb_xform;	/* transform */
-	struct enc_xform *tdb_encalgxform;	/* encoding algorithm */
-	struct auth_hash *tdb_authalgxform;	/* authentication algorithm */
-	struct comp_algo *tdb_compalgxform;	/* compression algorithm */
-	u_int64_t tdb_cryptoid;		/* crypto session id */
-
-	/*
-	 * NAT-Traversal.
-	 */
-	u_int16_t natt_type;		/* IKE/ESP-marker in output. */
-	u_int16_t natt_esp_frag_len;	/* MTU for payload fragmentation. */
+	uint64_t cntr;			/* counter for GCM and CTR */
+	volatile u_int refcnt;		/* reference count */
 };
 
-#define	SECASVAR_LOCK_INIT(_sav) \
-	mtx_init(&(_sav)->lock, "ipsec association", NULL, MTX_DEF)
-#define	SECASVAR_LOCK(_sav)		mtx_lock(&(_sav)->lock)
-#define	SECASVAR_UNLOCK(_sav)		mtx_unlock(&(_sav)->lock)
-#define	SECASVAR_LOCK_DESTROY(_sav)	mtx_destroy(&(_sav)->lock)
-#define	SECASVAR_LOCK_ASSERT(_sav)	mtx_assert(&(_sav)->lock, MA_OWNED)
+#define	SECASVAR_LOCK(_sav)		mtx_lock((_sav)->lock)
+#define	SECASVAR_UNLOCK(_sav)		mtx_unlock((_sav)->lock)
+#define	SECASVAR_LOCK_ASSERT(_sav)	mtx_assert((_sav)->lock, MA_OWNED)
 #define	SAV_ISGCM(_sav)							\
 			((_sav)->alg_enc == SADB_X_EALG_AESGCM8 ||	\
 			(_sav)->alg_enc == SADB_X_EALG_AESGCM12 ||	\
@@ -170,14 +194,18 @@ struct secasvar {
 #define	SAV_ISCTR(_sav) ((_sav)->alg_enc == SADB_X_EALG_AESCTR)
 #define SAV_ISCTRORGCM(_sav)	(SAV_ISCTR((_sav)) || SAV_ISGCM((_sav)))
 
-/* replay prevention */
+/* Replay prevention, protected by SECASVAR_LOCK:
+ *  (m) locked by mtx
+ *  (c) read only except during creation / free
+ */
 struct secreplay {
-	u_int32_t count;
-	u_int wsize;		/* window size, i.g. 4 bytes */
-	u_int32_t seq;		/* used by sender */
-	u_int32_t lastseq;	/* used by receiver */
-	caddr_t bitmap;		/* used by receiver */
-	int overflow;		/* overflow flag */
+	u_int32_t count;	/* (m) */
+	u_int wsize;		/* (c) window size, i.g. 4 bytes */
+	u_int32_t seq;		/* (m) used by sender */
+	u_int32_t lastseq;	/* (m) used by receiver */
+	u_int32_t *bitmap;	/* (m) used by receiver */
+	u_int bitmap_size;	/* (c) size of the bitmap array */
+	int overflow;		/* (m) overflow flag */
 };
 
 /* socket table due to send PF_KEY messages. */
@@ -190,10 +218,11 @@ struct secreg {
 /* acquiring list table. */
 struct secacq {
 	LIST_ENTRY(secacq) chain;
+	LIST_ENTRY(secacq) addrhash;
+	LIST_ENTRY(secacq) seqhash;
 
 	struct secasindex saidx;
-
-	u_int32_t seq;		/* sequence number */
+	uint32_t seq;		/* sequence number */
 	time_t created;		/* for lifetime */
 	int count;		/* for lifetime */
 };