diff options
author | ae <ae@FreeBSD.org> | 2017-03-18 22:04:20 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | ae <ae@FreeBSD.org> | 2017-03-18 22:04:20 +0000 |
commit | e6fbe68844bdd64b17c07bde1f7367c92c0ec9d9 (patch) | |
tree | 7a64df52f03594cf57022c25bab5cbf6ec29d162 /sys/netipsec/ipsec_output.c | |
parent | 7aecbe85bebfa92d4148511a0fd803ff742a5fee (diff) | |
download | FreeBSD-src-e6fbe68844bdd64b17c07bde1f7367c92c0ec9d9.zip FreeBSD-src-e6fbe68844bdd64b17c07bde1f7367c92c0ec9d9.tar.gz |
MFC r304572 (by bz):
Remove the kernel optoion for IPSEC_FILTERTUNNEL, which was deprecated
more than 7 years ago in favour of a sysctl in r192648.
MFC r305122:
Remove redundant sanity checks from ipsec[46]_common_input_cb().
This check already has been done in the each protocol callback.
MFC r309144,309174,309201 (by fabient):
IPsec RFC6479 support for replay window sizes up to 2^32 - 32 packets.
Since the previous algorithm, based on bit shifting, does not scale
with large replay windows, the algorithm used here is based on
RFC 6479: IPsec Anti-Replay Algorithm without Bit Shifting.
The replay window will be fast to be updated, but will cost as many bits
in RAM as its size.
The previous implementation did not provide a lock on the replay window,
which may lead to replay issues.
Obtained from: emeric.poupon@stormshield.eu
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8468
MFC r309143,309146 (by fabient):
In a dual processor system (2*6 cores) during IPSec throughput tests,
we see a lot of contention on the arc4 lock, used to generate the IV
of the ESP output packets.
The idea of this patch is to split this mutex in order to reduce the
contention on this lock.
Update r309143 to prevent false sharing.
Reviewed by: delphij, markm, ache
Approved by: so
Obtained from: emeric.poupon@stormshield.eu
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8130
MFC r313330:
Merge projects/ipsec into head/.
Small summary
-------------
o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec.
o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel
option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading
and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules.
o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by
default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type
support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for
inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs.
setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA.
o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is
build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel).
It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs.
o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special
methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h>
should be included to declare all the needed things to work
with IPsec.
o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed.
Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods.
o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC.
o PF_KEY SADB was reworked:
- now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace,
and all SAs MUST have unique SPI.
- several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB.
- SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads
can do SA lookups in the same time.
- many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes
in SADB.
- SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers:
SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They
can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses.
o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to
avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support
only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported
for both INET and INET6.
o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches
used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet.
o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does
check for full history of applied IPsec transforms.
o References counting rules for security policies and security
associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform
code.
o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms.
tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in
SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting.
Obtained from: Yandex LLC
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
MFC r313331:
Add removed headers into the ObsoleteFiles.inc.
MFC r313561 (by glebius):
Move tcp_fields_to_net() static inline into tcp_var.h, just below its
friend tcp_fields_to_host(). There is third party code that also uses
this inline.
MFC r313697:
Remove IPsec related PCB code from SCTP.
The inpcb structure has inp_sp pointer that is initialized by
ipsec_init_pcbpolicy() function. This pointer keeps strorage for IPsec
security policies associated with a specific socket.
An application can use IP_IPSEC_POLICY and IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY socket
options to configure these security policies. Then ip[6]_output()
uses inpcb pointer to specify that an outgoing packet is associated
with some socket. And IPSEC_OUTPUT() method can use a security policy
stored in the inp_sp. For inbound packet the protocol-specific input
routine uses IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY() method to check that a packet conforms
to inbound security policy configured in the inpcb.
SCTP protocol doesn't specify inpcb for ip[6]_output() when it sends
packets. Thus IPSEC_OUTPUT() method does not consider such packets as
associated with some socket and can not apply security policies
from inpcb, even if they are configured. Since IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY()
method is called from protocol-specific input routine, it can specify
inpcb pointer and associated with socket inbound policy will be
checked. But there are two problems:
1. Such check is asymmetric, becasue we can not apply security policy
from inpcb for outgoing packet.
2. IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY() expects that caller holds INPCB lock and
access to inp_sp is protected. But for SCTP this is not correct,
becasue SCTP uses own locks to protect inpcb.
To fix these problems remove IPsec related PCB code from SCTP.
This imply that IP_IPSEC_POLICY and IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY socket options
will be not applicable to SCTP sockets. To be able correctly check
inbound security policies for SCTP, mark its protocol header with
the PR_LASTHDR flag.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9538
MFC r313746:
Add missing check to fix the build with IPSEC_SUPPORT and without MAC.
MFC r313805:
Fix LINT build for powerpc.
Build kernel modules support only when both IPSEC and TCP_SIGNATURE
are not defined.
MFC r313922:
For translated packets do not adjust UDP checksum if it is zero.
In case when decrypted and decapsulated packet is an UDP datagram,
check that its checksum is not zero before doing incremental checksum
adjustment.
MFC r314339:
Document that the size of AH ICV for HMAC-SHA2-NNN should be half of
NNN bits as described in RFC4868.
PR: 215978
MFC r314812:
Introduce the concept of IPsec security policies scope.
Currently are defined three scopes: global, ifnet, and pcb.
Generic security policies that IKE daemon can add via PF_KEY interface
or an administrator creates with setkey(8) utility have GLOBAL scope.
Such policies can be applied by the kernel to outgoing packets and checked
agains inbound packets after IPsec processing.
Security policies created by if_ipsec(4) interfaces have IFNET scope.
Such policies are applied to packets that are passed through if_ipsec(4)
interface.
And security policies created by application using setsockopt()
IP_IPSEC_POLICY option have PCB scope. Such policies are applied to
packets related to specific socket. Currently there is no way to list
PCB policies via setkey(8) utility.
Modify setkey(8) and libipsec(3) to be able distinguish the scope of
security policies in the `setkey -DP` listing. Add two optional flags:
'-t' to list only policies related to virtual *tunneling* interfaces,
i.e. policies with IFNET scope, and '-g' to list only policies with GLOBAL
scope. By default policies from all scopes are listed.
To implement this PF_KEY's sadb_x_policy structure was modified.
sadb_x_policy_reserved field is used to pass the policy scope from the
kernel to userland. SADB_SPDDUMP message extended to support filtering
by scope: sadb_msg_satype field is used to specify bit mask of requested
scopes.
For IFNET policies the sadb_x_policy_priority field of struct sadb_x_policy
is used to pass if_ipsec's interface if_index to the userland. For GLOBAL
policies sadb_x_policy_priority is used only to manage order of security
policies in the SPDB. For IFNET policies it is not used, so it can be used
to keep if_index.
After this change the output of `setkey -DP` now looks like:
# setkey -DPt
0.0.0.0/0[any] 0.0.0.0/0[any] any
in ipsec
esp/tunnel/87.250.242.144-87.250.242.145/unique:145
spid=7 seq=3 pid=58025 scope=ifnet ifname=ipsec0
refcnt=1
# setkey -DPg
::/0 ::/0 icmp6 135,0
out none
spid=5 seq=1 pid=872 scope=global
refcnt=1
Obtained from: Yandex LLC
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9805
PR: 212018
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/netipsec/ipsec_output.c')
-rw-r--r-- | sys/netipsec/ipsec_output.c | 1132 |
1 files changed, 684 insertions, 448 deletions
diff --git a/sys/netipsec/ipsec_output.c b/sys/netipsec/ipsec_output.c index 24d8f4e..392008e 100644 --- a/sys/netipsec/ipsec_output.c +++ b/sys/netipsec/ipsec_output.c @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ /*- * Copyright (c) 2002, 2003 Sam Leffler, Errno Consulting + * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrey V. Elsukov <ae@FreeBSD.org> * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without @@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ #include "opt_inet.h" #include "opt_inet6.h" #include "opt_ipsec.h" +#include "opt_sctp.h" #include <sys/param.h> #include <sys/systm.h> @@ -67,7 +69,13 @@ #ifdef INET6 #include <netinet/icmp6.h> #endif +#ifdef SCTP +#include <netinet/sctp_crc32.h> +#endif +#include <netinet/udp.h> +#include <netipsec/ah.h> +#include <netipsec/esp.h> #include <netipsec/ipsec.h> #ifdef INET6 #include <netipsec/ipsec6.h> @@ -84,25 +92,616 @@ #include <machine/in_cksum.h> -#ifdef IPSEC_NAT_T -#include <netinet/udp.h> +#define IPSEC_OSTAT_INC(proto, name) do { \ + if ((proto) == IPPROTO_ESP) \ + ESPSTAT_INC(esps_##name); \ + else if ((proto) == IPPROTO_AH)\ + AHSTAT_INC(ahs_##name); \ + else \ + IPCOMPSTAT_INC(ipcomps_##name); \ +} while (0) + +static int ipsec_encap(struct mbuf **mp, struct secasindex *saidx); + +#ifdef INET +static struct secasvar * +ipsec4_allocsa(struct mbuf *m, struct secpolicy *sp, u_int *pidx, int *error) +{ + struct secasindex *saidx, tmpsaidx; + struct ipsecrequest *isr; + struct sockaddr_in *sin; + struct secasvar *sav; + struct ip *ip; + + /* + * Check system global policy controls. + */ +next: + isr = sp->req[*pidx]; + if ((isr->saidx.proto == IPPROTO_ESP && !V_esp_enable) || + (isr->saidx.proto == IPPROTO_AH && !V_ah_enable) || + (isr->saidx.proto == IPPROTO_IPCOMP && !V_ipcomp_enable)) { + DPRINTF(("%s: IPsec outbound packet dropped due" + " to policy (check your sysctls)\n", __func__)); + IPSEC_OSTAT_INC(isr->saidx.proto, pdrops); + *error = EHOSTUNREACH; + return (NULL); + } + /* + * Craft SA index to search for proper SA. Note that + * we only initialize unspecified SA peers for transport + * mode; for tunnel mode they must already be filled in. + */ + if (isr->saidx.mode == IPSEC_MODE_TRANSPORT) { + saidx = &tmpsaidx; + *saidx = isr->saidx; + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + if (saidx->src.sa.sa_len == 0) { + sin = &saidx->src.sin; + sin->sin_len = sizeof(*sin); + sin->sin_family = AF_INET; + sin->sin_port = IPSEC_PORT_ANY; + sin->sin_addr = ip->ip_src; + } + if (saidx->dst.sa.sa_len == 0) { + sin = &saidx->dst.sin; + sin->sin_len = sizeof(*sin); + sin->sin_family = AF_INET; + sin->sin_port = IPSEC_PORT_ANY; + sin->sin_addr = ip->ip_dst; + } + } else + saidx = &sp->req[*pidx]->saidx; + /* + * Lookup SA and validate it. + */ + sav = key_allocsa_policy(sp, saidx, error); + if (sav == NULL) { + IPSECSTAT_INC(ips_out_nosa); + if (*error != 0) + return (NULL); + if (ipsec_get_reqlevel(sp, *pidx) != IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE) { + /* + * We have no SA and policy that doesn't require + * this IPsec transform, thus we can continue w/o + * IPsec processing, i.e. return EJUSTRETURN. + * But first check if there is some bundled transform. + */ + if (sp->tcount > ++(*pidx)) + goto next; + *error = EJUSTRETURN; + } + return (NULL); + } + IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_xform != NULL, ("SA with NULL tdb_xform")); + return (sav); +} + +/* + * IPsec output logic for IPv4. + */ +static int +ipsec4_perform_request(struct mbuf *m, struct secpolicy *sp, u_int idx) +{ + char sbuf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN], dbuf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN]; + struct ipsec_ctx_data ctx; + union sockaddr_union *dst; + struct secasvar *sav; + struct ip *ip; + int error, i, off; + + IPSEC_ASSERT(idx < sp->tcount, ("Wrong IPsec request index %d", idx)); + + /* + * We hold the reference to SP. Content of SP couldn't be changed. + * Craft secasindex and do lookup for suitable SA. + * Then do encapsulation if needed and call xform's output. + * We need to store SP in the xform callback parameters. + * In xform callback we will extract SP and it can be used to + * determine next transform. At the end of transform we can + * release reference to SP. + */ + sav = ipsec4_allocsa(m, sp, &idx, &error); + if (sav == NULL) { + if (error == EJUSTRETURN) { /* No IPsec required */ + key_freesp(&sp); + return (error); + } + goto bad; + } + /* + * XXXAE: most likely ip_sum at this point is wrong. + */ + IPSEC_INIT_CTX(&ctx, &m, sav, AF_INET, IPSEC_ENC_BEFORE); + if ((error = ipsec_run_hhooks(&ctx, HHOOK_TYPE_IPSEC_OUT)) != 0) + goto bad; + + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + dst = &sav->sah->saidx.dst; + /* Do the appropriate encapsulation, if necessary */ + if (sp->req[idx]->saidx.mode == IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL || /* Tunnel requ'd */ + dst->sa.sa_family != AF_INET || /* PF mismatch */ + (dst->sa.sa_family == AF_INET && /* Proxy */ + dst->sin.sin_addr.s_addr != INADDR_ANY && + dst->sin.sin_addr.s_addr != ip->ip_dst.s_addr)) { + /* Fix IPv4 header checksum and length */ + ip->ip_len = htons(m->m_pkthdr.len); + ip->ip_sum = 0; + ip->ip_sum = in_cksum(m, ip->ip_hl << 2); + error = ipsec_encap(&m, &sav->sah->saidx); + if (error != 0) { + DPRINTF(("%s: encapsulation for SA %s->%s " + "SPI 0x%08x failed with error %d\n", __func__, + ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.src, sbuf, + sizeof(sbuf)), + ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, dbuf, + sizeof(dbuf)), ntohl(sav->spi), error)); + /* XXXAE: IPSEC_OSTAT_INC(tunnel); */ + goto bad; + } + } + + IPSEC_INIT_CTX(&ctx, &m, sav, dst->sa.sa_family, IPSEC_ENC_AFTER); + if ((error = ipsec_run_hhooks(&ctx, HHOOK_TYPE_IPSEC_OUT)) != 0) + goto bad; + + /* + * Dispatch to the appropriate IPsec transform logic. The + * packet will be returned for transmission after crypto + * processing, etc. are completed. + * + * NB: m & sav are ``passed to caller'' who's responsible for + * reclaiming their resources. + */ + switch(dst->sa.sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + i = ip->ip_hl << 2; + off = offsetof(struct ip, ip_p); + break; +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + i = sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); + off = offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_nxt); + break; +#endif /* INET6 */ + default: + DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported protocol family %u\n", + __func__, dst->sa.sa_family)); + error = EPFNOSUPPORT; + IPSEC_OSTAT_INC(sav->sah->saidx.proto, nopf); + goto bad; + } + error = (*sav->tdb_xform->xf_output)(m, sp, sav, idx, i, off); + if (error != 0) { + key_freesav(&sav); + key_freesp(&sp); + } + return (error); +bad: + IPSECSTAT_INC(ips_out_inval); + if (m != NULL) + m_freem(m); + if (sav != NULL) + key_freesav(&sav); + key_freesp(&sp); + return (error); +} + +int +ipsec4_process_packet(struct mbuf *m, struct secpolicy *sp, + struct inpcb *inp) +{ + + return (ipsec4_perform_request(m, sp, 0)); +} + +static int +ipsec4_common_output(struct mbuf *m, struct inpcb *inp, int forwarding) +{ + struct secpolicy *sp; + int error; + + /* Lookup for the corresponding outbound security policy */ + sp = ipsec4_checkpolicy(m, inp, &error); + if (sp == NULL) { + if (error == -EINVAL) { + /* Discarded by policy. */ + m_freem(m); + return (EACCES); + } + return (0); /* No IPsec required. */ + } + + /* + * Usually we have to have tunnel mode IPsec security policy + * when we are forwarding a packet. Otherwise we could not handle + * encrypted replies, because they are not destined for us. But + * some users are doing source address translation for forwarded + * packets, and thus, even if they are forwarded, the replies will + * return back to us. + */ + if (!forwarding) { + /* + * Do delayed checksums now because we send before + * this is done in the normal processing path. + */ + if (m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_DELAY_DATA) { + in_delayed_cksum(m); + m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags &= ~CSUM_DELAY_DATA; + } +#ifdef SCTP + if (m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_SCTP) { + struct ip *ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + + sctp_delayed_cksum(m, (uint32_t)(ip->ip_hl << 2)); + m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags &= ~CSUM_SCTP; + } #endif + } + /* NB: callee frees mbuf and releases reference to SP */ + error = ipsec4_process_packet(m, sp, inp); + if (error == EJUSTRETURN) { + /* + * We had a SP with a level of 'use' and no SA. We + * will just continue to process the packet without + * IPsec processing and return without error. + */ + return (0); + } + if (error == 0) + return (EINPROGRESS); /* consumed by IPsec */ + return (error); +} +/* + * IPSEC_OUTPUT() method implementation for IPv4. + * 0 - no IPsec handling needed + * other values - mbuf consumed by IPsec. + */ int -ipsec_process_done(struct mbuf *m, struct ipsecrequest *isr) +ipsec4_output(struct mbuf *m, struct inpcb *inp) { - struct tdb_ident *tdbi; - struct m_tag *mtag; + + /* + * If the packet is resubmitted to ip_output (e.g. after + * AH, ESP, etc. processing), there will be a tag to bypass + * the lookup and related policy checking. + */ + if (m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_OUT_DONE, NULL) != NULL) + return (0); + + return (ipsec4_common_output(m, inp, 0)); +} + +/* + * IPSEC_FORWARD() method implementation for IPv4. + * 0 - no IPsec handling needed + * other values - mbuf consumed by IPsec. + */ +int +ipsec4_forward(struct mbuf *m) +{ + + /* + * Check if this packet has an active inbound SP and needs to be + * dropped instead of forwarded. + */ + if (ipsec4_in_reject(m, NULL) != 0) { + m_freem(m); + return (EACCES); + } + return (ipsec4_common_output(m, NULL, 1)); +} +#endif + +#ifdef INET6 +static int +in6_sa_equal_addrwithscope(const struct sockaddr_in6 *sa, + const struct in6_addr *ia) +{ + struct in6_addr ia2; + + if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&sa->sin6_addr)) { + memcpy(&ia2, &sa->sin6_addr, sizeof(ia2)); + ia2.s6_addr16[1] = htons(sa->sin6_scope_id); + return (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(ia, &ia2)); + } + return (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&sa->sin6_addr, ia)); +} + +static struct secasvar * +ipsec6_allocsa(struct mbuf *m, struct secpolicy *sp, u_int *pidx, int *error) +{ + struct secasindex *saidx, tmpsaidx; + struct ipsecrequest *isr; + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6; struct secasvar *sav; - struct secasindex *saidx; + struct ip6_hdr *ip6; + + /* + * Check system global policy controls. + */ +next: + isr = sp->req[*pidx]; + if ((isr->saidx.proto == IPPROTO_ESP && !V_esp_enable) || + (isr->saidx.proto == IPPROTO_AH && !V_ah_enable) || + (isr->saidx.proto == IPPROTO_IPCOMP && !V_ipcomp_enable)) { + DPRINTF(("%s: IPsec outbound packet dropped due" + " to policy (check your sysctls)\n", __func__)); + IPSEC_OSTAT_INC(isr->saidx.proto, pdrops); + *error = EHOSTUNREACH; + return (NULL); + } + /* + * Craft SA index to search for proper SA. Note that + * we only fillin unspecified SA peers for transport + * mode; for tunnel mode they must already be filled in. + */ + if (isr->saidx.mode == IPSEC_MODE_TRANSPORT) { + saidx = &tmpsaidx; + *saidx = isr->saidx; + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + if (saidx->src.sin6.sin6_len == 0) { + sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&saidx->src; + sin6->sin6_len = sizeof(*sin6); + sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6->sin6_port = IPSEC_PORT_ANY; + sin6->sin6_addr = ip6->ip6_src; + if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6->ip6_src)) { + /* fix scope id for comparing SPD */ + sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr16[1] = 0; + sin6->sin6_scope_id = + ntohs(ip6->ip6_src.s6_addr16[1]); + } + } + if (saidx->dst.sin6.sin6_len == 0) { + sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&saidx->dst; + sin6->sin6_len = sizeof(*sin6); + sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6->sin6_port = IPSEC_PORT_ANY; + sin6->sin6_addr = ip6->ip6_dst; + if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6->ip6_dst)) { + /* fix scope id for comparing SPD */ + sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr16[1] = 0; + sin6->sin6_scope_id = + ntohs(ip6->ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1]); + } + } + } else + saidx = &sp->req[*pidx]->saidx; + /* + * Lookup SA and validate it. + */ + sav = key_allocsa_policy(sp, saidx, error); + if (sav == NULL) { + IPSEC6STAT_INC(ips_out_nosa); + if (*error != 0) + return (NULL); + if (ipsec_get_reqlevel(sp, *pidx) != IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE) { + /* + * We have no SA and policy that doesn't require + * this IPsec transform, thus we can continue w/o + * IPsec processing, i.e. return EJUSTRETURN. + * But first check if there is some bundled transform. + */ + if (sp->tcount > ++(*pidx)) + goto next; + *error = EJUSTRETURN; + } + return (NULL); + } + IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_xform != NULL, ("SA with NULL tdb_xform")); + return (sav); +} + +/* + * IPsec output logic for IPv6. + */ +static int +ipsec6_perform_request(struct mbuf *m, struct secpolicy *sp, u_int idx) +{ + char sbuf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN], dbuf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN]; + struct ipsec_ctx_data ctx; + union sockaddr_union *dst; + struct secasvar *sav; + struct ip6_hdr *ip6; + int error, i, off; + + IPSEC_ASSERT(idx < sp->tcount, ("Wrong IPsec request index %d", idx)); + + sav = ipsec6_allocsa(m, sp, &idx, &error); + if (sav == NULL) { + if (error == EJUSTRETURN) { /* No IPsec required */ + key_freesp(&sp); + return (error); + } + goto bad; + } + + /* Fix IP length in case if it is not set yet. */ + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + ip6->ip6_plen = htons(m->m_pkthdr.len - sizeof(*ip6)); + + IPSEC_INIT_CTX(&ctx, &m, sav, AF_INET6, IPSEC_ENC_BEFORE); + if ((error = ipsec_run_hhooks(&ctx, HHOOK_TYPE_IPSEC_OUT)) != 0) + goto bad; + + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); /* pfil can change mbuf */ + dst = &sav->sah->saidx.dst; + + /* Do the appropriate encapsulation, if necessary */ + if (sp->req[idx]->saidx.mode == IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL || /* Tunnel requ'd */ + dst->sa.sa_family != AF_INET6 || /* PF mismatch */ + ((dst->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) && + (!IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&dst->sin6.sin6_addr)) && + (!in6_sa_equal_addrwithscope(&dst->sin6, &ip6->ip6_dst)))) { + if (m->m_pkthdr.len - sizeof(*ip6) > IPV6_MAXPACKET) { + /* No jumbogram support. */ + error = ENXIO; /*XXX*/ + goto bad; + } + error = ipsec_encap(&m, &sav->sah->saidx); + if (error != 0) { + DPRINTF(("%s: encapsulation for SA %s->%s " + "SPI 0x%08x failed with error %d\n", __func__, + ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.src, sbuf, + sizeof(sbuf)), + ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, dbuf, + sizeof(dbuf)), ntohl(sav->spi), error)); + /* XXXAE: IPSEC_OSTAT_INC(tunnel); */ + goto bad; + } + } + + IPSEC_INIT_CTX(&ctx, &m, sav, dst->sa.sa_family, IPSEC_ENC_AFTER); + if ((error = ipsec_run_hhooks(&ctx, HHOOK_TYPE_IPSEC_OUT)) != 0) + goto bad; + + switch(dst->sa.sa_family) { +#ifdef INET + case AF_INET: + { + struct ip *ip; + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + i = ip->ip_hl << 2; + off = offsetof(struct ip, ip_p); + } + break; +#endif /* AF_INET */ + case AF_INET6: + i = sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); + off = offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_nxt); + break; + default: + DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported protocol family %u\n", + __func__, dst->sa.sa_family)); + error = EPFNOSUPPORT; + IPSEC_OSTAT_INC(sav->sah->saidx.proto, nopf); + goto bad; + } + error = (*sav->tdb_xform->xf_output)(m, sp, sav, idx, i, off); + if (error != 0) { + key_freesav(&sav); + key_freesp(&sp); + } + return (error); +bad: + IPSEC6STAT_INC(ips_out_inval); + if (m != NULL) + m_freem(m); + if (sav != NULL) + key_freesav(&sav); + key_freesp(&sp); + return (error); +} + +int +ipsec6_process_packet(struct mbuf *m, struct secpolicy *sp, + struct inpcb *inp) +{ + + return (ipsec6_perform_request(m, sp, 0)); +} + +static int +ipsec6_common_output(struct mbuf *m, struct inpcb *inp, int forwarding) +{ + struct secpolicy *sp; int error; - IPSEC_ASSERT(m != NULL, ("null mbuf")); - IPSEC_ASSERT(isr != NULL, ("null ISR")); - IPSEC_ASSERT(isr->sp != NULL, ("NULL isr->sp")); - sav = isr->sav; - IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA")); - IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->sah != NULL, ("null SAH")); + /* Lookup for the corresponding outbound security policy */ + sp = ipsec6_checkpolicy(m, inp, &error); + if (sp == NULL) { + if (error == -EINVAL) { + /* Discarded by policy. */ + m_freem(m); + return (EACCES); + } + return (0); /* No IPsec required. */ + } + + if (!forwarding) { + /* + * Do delayed checksums now because we send before + * this is done in the normal processing path. + */ + if (m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_DELAY_DATA_IPV6) { + in6_delayed_cksum(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - + sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)); + m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags &= ~CSUM_DELAY_DATA_IPV6; + } +#ifdef SCTP + if (m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_SCTP_IPV6) { + sctp_delayed_cksum(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)); + m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags &= ~CSUM_SCTP_IPV6; + } +#endif + } + /* NB: callee frees mbuf and releases reference to SP */ + error = ipsec6_process_packet(m, sp, inp); + if (error == EJUSTRETURN) { + /* + * We had a SP with a level of 'use' and no SA. We + * will just continue to process the packet without + * IPsec processing and return without error. + */ + return (0); + } + if (error == 0) + return (EINPROGRESS); /* consumed by IPsec */ + return (error); +} + +/* + * IPSEC_OUTPUT() method implementation for IPv6. + * 0 - no IPsec handling needed + * other values - mbuf consumed by IPsec. + */ +int +ipsec6_output(struct mbuf *m, struct inpcb *inp) +{ + + /* + * If the packet is resubmitted to ip_output (e.g. after + * AH, ESP, etc. processing), there will be a tag to bypass + * the lookup and related policy checking. + */ + if (m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_OUT_DONE, NULL) != NULL) + return (0); + + return (ipsec6_common_output(m, inp, 0)); +} + +/* + * IPSEC_FORWARD() method implementation for IPv6. + * 0 - no IPsec handling needed + * other values - mbuf consumed by IPsec. + */ +int +ipsec6_forward(struct mbuf *m) +{ + + /* + * Check if this packet has an active inbound SP and needs to be + * dropped instead of forwarded. + */ + if (ipsec6_in_reject(m, NULL) != 0) { + m_freem(m); + return (EACCES); + } + return (ipsec6_common_output(m, NULL, 1)); +} +#endif /* INET6 */ + +int +ipsec_process_done(struct mbuf *m, struct secpolicy *sp, struct secasvar *sav, + u_int idx) +{ + struct xform_history *xh; + struct secasindex *saidx; + struct m_tag *mtag; + int error; saidx = &sav->sah->saidx; switch (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family) { @@ -136,21 +735,20 @@ ipsec_process_done(struct mbuf *m, struct ipsecrequest *isr) } /* - * Add a record of what we've done or what needs to be done to the - * packet. + * Add a record of what we've done to the packet. */ - mtag = m_tag_get(PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_OUT_DONE, - sizeof(struct tdb_ident), M_NOWAIT); + mtag = m_tag_get(PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_OUT_DONE, sizeof(*xh), M_NOWAIT); if (mtag == NULL) { DPRINTF(("%s: could not get packet tag\n", __func__)); error = ENOMEM; goto bad; } - tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *)(mtag + 1); - tdbi->dst = saidx->dst; - tdbi->proto = saidx->proto; - tdbi->spi = sav->spi; + xh = (struct xform_history *)(mtag + 1); + xh->dst = saidx->dst; + xh->proto = saidx->proto; + xh->mode = saidx->mode; + xh->spi = sav->spi; m_tag_prepend(m, mtag); key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); /* record data transfer */ @@ -162,32 +760,41 @@ ipsec_process_done(struct mbuf *m, struct ipsecrequest *isr) * to set the packet on so we can unwind the stack before * doing further processing. */ - if (isr->next) { - /* XXX-BZ currently only support same AF bundles. */ + if (++idx < sp->tcount) { switch (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family) { #ifdef INET case AF_INET: + key_freesav(&sav); IPSECSTAT_INC(ips_out_bundlesa); - return (ipsec4_process_packet(m, isr->next)); + return (ipsec4_perform_request(m, sp, idx)); /* NOTREACHED */ #endif -#ifdef notyet #ifdef INET6 case AF_INET6: - /* XXX */ + key_freesav(&sav); IPSEC6STAT_INC(ips_out_bundlesa); - return (ipsec6_process_packet(m, isr->next)); + return (ipsec6_perform_request(m, sp, idx)); /* NOTREACHED */ #endif /* INET6 */ -#endif default: DPRINTF(("%s: unknown protocol family %u\n", __func__, saidx->dst.sa.sa_family)); - error = ENXIO; + error = EPFNOSUPPORT; goto bad; } } + key_freesp(&sp), sp = NULL; /* Release reference to SP */ +#ifdef INET + /* + * Do UDP encapsulation if SA requires it. + */ + if (sav->natt != NULL) { + error = udp_ipsec_output(m, sav); + if (error != 0) + goto bad; + } +#endif /* INET */ /* * We're done with IPsec processing, transmit the packet using the * appropriate network protocol (IP or IPv6). @@ -195,225 +802,68 @@ ipsec_process_done(struct mbuf *m, struct ipsecrequest *isr) switch (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family) { #ifdef INET case AF_INET: -#ifdef IPSEC_NAT_T - /* - * If NAT-T is enabled, now that all IPsec processing is done - * insert UDP encapsulation header after IP header. - */ - if (sav->natt_type) { - struct ip *ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); - const int hlen = (ip->ip_hl << 2); - int size, off; - struct mbuf *mi; - struct udphdr *udp; - - size = sizeof(struct udphdr); - if (sav->natt_type == UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE) { - /* - * draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-0[01].txt and - * draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-(00/)01.txt, - * ignoring possible AH mode - * non-IKE marker + non-ESP marker - * from draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-00.txt. - */ - size += sizeof(u_int64_t); - } - mi = m_makespace(m, hlen, size, &off); - if (mi == NULL) { - DPRINTF(("%s: m_makespace for udphdr failed\n", - __func__)); - error = ENOBUFS; - goto bad; - } - - udp = (struct udphdr *)(mtod(mi, caddr_t) + off); - if (sav->natt_type == UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE) - udp->uh_sport = htons(UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_PORT); - else - udp->uh_sport = - KEY_PORTFROMSADDR(&sav->sah->saidx.src); - udp->uh_dport = KEY_PORTFROMSADDR(&sav->sah->saidx.dst); - udp->uh_sum = 0; - udp->uh_ulen = htons(m->m_pkthdr.len - hlen); - ip->ip_len = htons(m->m_pkthdr.len); - ip->ip_p = IPPROTO_UDP; - - if (sav->natt_type == UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE) - *(u_int64_t *)(udp + 1) = 0; - } -#endif /* IPSEC_NAT_T */ - + key_freesav(&sav); return ip_output(m, NULL, NULL, IP_RAWOUTPUT, NULL, NULL); #endif /* INET */ #ifdef INET6 case AF_INET6: - /* - * We don't need massage, IPv6 header fields are always in - * net endian. - */ + key_freesav(&sav); return ip6_output(m, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL); #endif /* INET6 */ } panic("ipsec_process_done"); bad: m_freem(m); + key_freesav(&sav); + if (sp != NULL) + key_freesp(&sp); return (error); } -static struct ipsecrequest * -ipsec_nextisr( - struct mbuf *m, - struct ipsecrequest *isr, - int af, - struct secasindex *saidx, - int *error -) +/* + * ipsec_prepend() is optimized version of M_PREPEND(). + * ipsec_encap() is called by IPsec output routine for tunnel mode SA. + * It is expected that after IP encapsulation some IPsec transform will + * be performed. Each IPsec transform inserts its variable length header + * just after outer IP header using m_makespace(). If given mbuf has not + * enough free space at the beginning, we allocate new mbuf and reserve + * some space at the beginning and at the end. + * This helps avoid allocating of new mbuf and data copying in m_makespace(), + * we place outer header in the middle of mbuf's data with reserved leading + * and trailing space: + * [ LEADINGSPACE ][ Outer IP header ][ TRAILINGSPACE ] + * LEADINGSPACE will be used to add ethernet header, TRAILINGSPACE will + * be used to inject AH/ESP/IPCOMP header. + */ +#define IPSEC_TRAILINGSPACE (sizeof(struct udphdr) +/* NAT-T */ \ + max(sizeof(struct newesp) + EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN, /* ESP + IV */ \ + sizeof(struct newah) + HASH_MAX_LEN /* AH + ICV */)) +static struct mbuf * +ipsec_prepend(struct mbuf *m, int len, int how) { -#define IPSEC_OSTAT(name) do { \ - if (isr->saidx.proto == IPPROTO_ESP) \ - ESPSTAT_INC(esps_##name); \ - else if (isr->saidx.proto == IPPROTO_AH)\ - AHSTAT_INC(ahs_##name); \ - else \ - IPCOMPSTAT_INC(ipcomps_##name); \ -} while (0) - struct secasvar *sav; - - IPSECREQUEST_LOCK_ASSERT(isr); - - IPSEC_ASSERT(af == AF_INET || af == AF_INET6, - ("invalid address family %u", af)); -again: - /* - * Craft SA index to search for proper SA. Note that - * we only fillin unspecified SA peers for transport - * mode; for tunnel mode they must already be filled in. - */ - *saidx = isr->saidx; - if (isr->saidx.mode == IPSEC_MODE_TRANSPORT) { - /* Fillin unspecified SA peers only for transport mode */ - if (af == AF_INET) { - struct sockaddr_in *sin; - struct ip *ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); - - if (saidx->src.sa.sa_len == 0) { - sin = &saidx->src.sin; - sin->sin_len = sizeof(*sin); - sin->sin_family = AF_INET; - sin->sin_port = IPSEC_PORT_ANY; - sin->sin_addr = ip->ip_src; - } - if (saidx->dst.sa.sa_len == 0) { - sin = &saidx->dst.sin; - sin->sin_len = sizeof(*sin); - sin->sin_family = AF_INET; - sin->sin_port = IPSEC_PORT_ANY; - sin->sin_addr = ip->ip_dst; - } - } else { - struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6; - struct ip6_hdr *ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); - - if (saidx->src.sin6.sin6_len == 0) { - sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&saidx->src; - sin6->sin6_len = sizeof(*sin6); - sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; - sin6->sin6_port = IPSEC_PORT_ANY; - sin6->sin6_addr = ip6->ip6_src; - if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6->ip6_src)) { - /* fix scope id for comparing SPD */ - sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr16[1] = 0; - sin6->sin6_scope_id = - ntohs(ip6->ip6_src.s6_addr16[1]); - } - } - if (saidx->dst.sin6.sin6_len == 0) { - sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&saidx->dst; - sin6->sin6_len = sizeof(*sin6); - sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; - sin6->sin6_port = IPSEC_PORT_ANY; - sin6->sin6_addr = ip6->ip6_dst; - if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6->ip6_dst)) { - /* fix scope id for comparing SPD */ - sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr16[1] = 0; - sin6->sin6_scope_id = - ntohs(ip6->ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1]); - } - } - } + struct mbuf *n; + + M_ASSERTPKTHDR(m); + IPSEC_ASSERT(len < MHLEN, ("wrong length")); + if (M_LEADINGSPACE(m) >= len) { + /* No need to allocate new mbuf. */ + m->m_data -= len; + m->m_len += len; + m->m_pkthdr.len += len; + return (m); } - - /* - * Lookup SA and validate it. - */ - *error = key_checkrequest(isr, saidx); - if (*error != 0) { - /* - * IPsec processing is required, but no SA found. - * I assume that key_acquire() had been called - * to get/establish the SA. Here I discard - * this packet because it is responsibility for - * upper layer to retransmit the packet. - */ - switch(af) { - case AF_INET: - IPSECSTAT_INC(ips_out_nosa); - break; -#ifdef INET6 - case AF_INET6: - IPSEC6STAT_INC(ips_out_nosa); - break; -#endif - } - goto bad; - } - sav = isr->sav; - if (sav == NULL) { - IPSEC_ASSERT(ipsec_get_reqlevel(isr) == IPSEC_LEVEL_USE, - ("no SA found, but required; level %u", - ipsec_get_reqlevel(isr))); - IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr); - isr = isr->next; - /* - * If isr is NULL, we found a 'use' policy w/o SA. - * Return w/o error and w/o isr so we can drop out - * and continue w/o IPsec processing. - */ - if (isr == NULL) - return isr; - IPSECREQUEST_LOCK(isr); - goto again; - } - - /* - * Check system global policy controls. - */ - if ((isr->saidx.proto == IPPROTO_ESP && !V_esp_enable) || - (isr->saidx.proto == IPPROTO_AH && !V_ah_enable) || - (isr->saidx.proto == IPPROTO_IPCOMP && !V_ipcomp_enable)) { - DPRINTF(("%s: IPsec outbound packet dropped due" - " to policy (check your sysctls)\n", __func__)); - IPSEC_OSTAT(pdrops); - *error = EHOSTUNREACH; - goto bad; - } - - /* - * Sanity check the SA contents for the caller - * before they invoke the xform output method. - */ - if (sav->tdb_xform == NULL) { - DPRINTF(("%s: no transform for SA\n", __func__)); - IPSEC_OSTAT(noxform); - *error = EHOSTUNREACH; - goto bad; + n = m_gethdr(how, m->m_type); + if (n == NULL) { + m_freem(m); + return (NULL); } - return isr; -bad: - IPSEC_ASSERT(*error != 0, ("error return w/ no error code")); - IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr); - return NULL; -#undef IPSEC_OSTAT + m_move_pkthdr(n, m); + n->m_next = m; + if (len + IPSEC_TRAILINGSPACE < M_SIZE(n)) + m_align(n, len + IPSEC_TRAILINGSPACE); + n->m_len = len; + n->m_pkthdr.len += len; + return (n); } static int @@ -467,7 +917,7 @@ ipsec_encap(struct mbuf **mp, struct secasindex *saidx) saidx->src.sin.sin_addr.s_addr == INADDR_ANY || saidx->dst.sin.sin_addr.s_addr == INADDR_ANY) return (EINVAL); - M_PREPEND(*mp, sizeof(struct ip), M_NOWAIT); + *mp = ipsec_prepend(*mp, sizeof(struct ip), M_NOWAIT); if (*mp == NULL) return (ENOBUFS); ip = mtod(*mp, struct ip *); @@ -490,7 +940,7 @@ ipsec_encap(struct mbuf **mp, struct secasindex *saidx) IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&saidx->src.sin6.sin6_addr) || IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&saidx->dst.sin6.sin6_addr)) return (EINVAL); - M_PREPEND(*mp, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), M_NOWAIT); + *mp = ipsec_prepend(*mp, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), M_NOWAIT); if (*mp == NULL) return (ENOBUFS); ip6 = mtod(*mp, struct ip6_hdr *); @@ -515,221 +965,7 @@ ipsec_encap(struct mbuf **mp, struct secasindex *saidx) default: return (EAFNOSUPPORT); } + (*mp)->m_flags &= ~(M_BCAST | M_MCAST); return (0); } -#ifdef INET -/* - * IPsec output logic for IPv4. - */ -int -ipsec4_process_packet(struct mbuf *m, struct ipsecrequest *isr) -{ - char sbuf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN], dbuf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN]; - struct ipsec_ctx_data ctx; - union sockaddr_union *dst; - struct secasindex saidx; - struct secasvar *sav; - struct ip *ip; - int error, i, off; - - IPSEC_ASSERT(m != NULL, ("null mbuf")); - IPSEC_ASSERT(isr != NULL, ("null isr")); - - IPSECREQUEST_LOCK(isr); /* insure SA contents don't change */ - - isr = ipsec_nextisr(m, isr, AF_INET, &saidx, &error); - if (isr == NULL) { - if (error != 0) - goto bad; - return EJUSTRETURN; - } - - sav = isr->sav; - if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct ip) && - (m = m_pullup(m, sizeof (struct ip))) == NULL) { - error = ENOBUFS; - goto bad; - } - - IPSEC_INIT_CTX(&ctx, &m, sav, AF_INET, IPSEC_ENC_BEFORE); - if ((error = ipsec_run_hhooks(&ctx, HHOOK_TYPE_IPSEC_OUT)) != 0) - goto bad; - - ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); - dst = &sav->sah->saidx.dst; - /* Do the appropriate encapsulation, if necessary */ - if (isr->saidx.mode == IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL || /* Tunnel requ'd */ - dst->sa.sa_family != AF_INET || /* PF mismatch */ - (dst->sa.sa_family == AF_INET && /* Proxy */ - dst->sin.sin_addr.s_addr != INADDR_ANY && - dst->sin.sin_addr.s_addr != ip->ip_dst.s_addr)) { - /* Fix IPv4 header checksum and length */ - ip->ip_len = htons(m->m_pkthdr.len); - ip->ip_sum = 0; - ip->ip_sum = in_cksum(m, ip->ip_hl << 2); - error = ipsec_encap(&m, &sav->sah->saidx); - if (error != 0) { - DPRINTF(("%s: encapsulation for SA %s->%s " - "SPI 0x%08x failed with error %d\n", __func__, - ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.src, sbuf, - sizeof(sbuf)), - ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, dbuf, - sizeof(dbuf)), ntohl(sav->spi), error)); - goto bad; - } - } - - IPSEC_INIT_CTX(&ctx, &m, sav, dst->sa.sa_family, IPSEC_ENC_AFTER); - if ((error = ipsec_run_hhooks(&ctx, HHOOK_TYPE_IPSEC_OUT)) != 0) - goto bad; - - /* - * Dispatch to the appropriate IPsec transform logic. The - * packet will be returned for transmission after crypto - * processing, etc. are completed. - * - * NB: m & sav are ``passed to caller'' who's responsible for - * for reclaiming their resources. - */ - switch(dst->sa.sa_family) { - case AF_INET: - ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); - i = ip->ip_hl << 2; - off = offsetof(struct ip, ip_p); - break; -#ifdef INET6 - case AF_INET6: - i = sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); - off = offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_nxt); - break; -#endif /* INET6 */ - default: - DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported protocol family %u\n", - __func__, dst->sa.sa_family)); - error = EPFNOSUPPORT; - IPSECSTAT_INC(ips_out_inval); - goto bad; - } - error = (*sav->tdb_xform->xf_output)(m, isr, NULL, i, off); - IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr); - return (error); -bad: - if (isr) - IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr); - if (m) - m_freem(m); - return error; -} -#endif - - -#ifdef INET6 -static int -in6_sa_equal_addrwithscope(const struct sockaddr_in6 *sa, const struct in6_addr *ia) -{ - struct in6_addr ia2; - - memcpy(&ia2, &sa->sin6_addr, sizeof(ia2)); - if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&sa->sin6_addr)) - ia2.s6_addr16[1] = htons(sa->sin6_scope_id); - - return IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(ia, &ia2); -} - -/* - * IPsec output logic for IPv6. - */ -int -ipsec6_process_packet(struct mbuf *m, struct ipsecrequest *isr) -{ - char sbuf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN], dbuf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN]; - struct ipsec_ctx_data ctx; - struct secasindex saidx; - struct secasvar *sav; - struct ip6_hdr *ip6; - int error, i, off; - union sockaddr_union *dst; - - IPSEC_ASSERT(m != NULL, ("ipsec6_process_packet: null mbuf")); - IPSEC_ASSERT(isr != NULL, ("ipsec6_process_packet: null isr")); - - IPSECREQUEST_LOCK(isr); /* insure SA contents don't change */ - - isr = ipsec_nextisr(m, isr, AF_INET6, &saidx, &error); - if (isr == NULL) { - if (error != 0) - goto bad; - return EJUSTRETURN; - } - sav = isr->sav; - dst = &sav->sah->saidx.dst; - - IPSEC_INIT_CTX(&ctx, &m, sav, AF_INET6, IPSEC_ENC_BEFORE); - if ((error = ipsec_run_hhooks(&ctx, HHOOK_TYPE_IPSEC_OUT)) != 0) - goto bad; - - ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); - ip6->ip6_plen = htons(m->m_pkthdr.len - sizeof(*ip6)); - - /* Do the appropriate encapsulation, if necessary */ - if (isr->saidx.mode == IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL || /* Tunnel requ'd */ - dst->sa.sa_family != AF_INET6 || /* PF mismatch */ - ((dst->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) && - (!IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&dst->sin6.sin6_addr)) && - (!in6_sa_equal_addrwithscope(&dst->sin6, - &ip6->ip6_dst)))) { - if (m->m_pkthdr.len - sizeof(*ip6) > IPV6_MAXPACKET) { - /* No jumbogram support. */ - error = ENXIO; /*XXX*/ - goto bad; - } - error = ipsec_encap(&m, &sav->sah->saidx); - if (error != 0) { - DPRINTF(("%s: encapsulation for SA %s->%s " - "SPI 0x%08x failed with error %d\n", __func__, - ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.src, sbuf, - sizeof(sbuf)), - ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, dbuf, - sizeof(dbuf)), ntohl(sav->spi), error)); - goto bad; - } - } - - IPSEC_INIT_CTX(&ctx, &m, sav, dst->sa.sa_family, IPSEC_ENC_AFTER); - if ((error = ipsec_run_hhooks(&ctx, HHOOK_TYPE_IPSEC_OUT)) != 0) - goto bad; - - switch(dst->sa.sa_family) { -#ifdef INET - case AF_INET: - { - struct ip *ip; - ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); - i = ip->ip_hl << 2; - off = offsetof(struct ip, ip_p); - } - break; -#endif /* AF_INET */ - case AF_INET6: - i = sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); - off = offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_nxt); - break; - default: - DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported protocol family %u\n", - __func__, dst->sa.sa_family)); - error = EPFNOSUPPORT; - goto bad; - } - error = (*sav->tdb_xform->xf_output)(m, isr, NULL, i, off); - IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr); - return error; -bad: - IPSEC6STAT_INC(ips_out_inval); - if (isr) - IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr); - if (m) - m_freem(m); - return error; -} -#endif /*INET6*/ |