MFC r304572 (by bz):

  Remove the kernel optoion for IPSEC_FILTERTUNNEL, which was deprecated
  more than 7 years ago in favour of a sysctl in r192648.

MFC r305122:
  Remove redundant sanity checks from ipsec[46]_common_input_cb().

  This check already has been done in the each protocol callback.

MFC r309144,309174,309201 (by fabient):
  IPsec RFC6479 support for replay window sizes up to 2^32 - 32 packets.

  Since the previous algorithm, based on bit shifting, does not scale
  with large replay windows, the algorithm used here is based on
  RFC 6479: IPsec Anti-Replay Algorithm without Bit Shifting.
  The replay window will be fast to be updated, but will cost as many bits
  in RAM as its size.

  The previous implementation did not provide a lock on the replay window,
  which may lead to replay issues.

  Obtained from:	emeric.poupon@stormshield.eu
  Sponsored by:	Stormshield
  Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8468

MFC r309143,309146 (by fabient):
  In a dual processor system (2*6 cores) during IPSec throughput tests,
  we see a lot of contention on the arc4 lock, used to generate the IV
  of the ESP output packets.

  The idea of this patch is to split this mutex in order to reduce the
  contention on this lock.

  Update r309143 to prevent false sharing.

  Reviewed by:	delphij, markm, ache
  Approved by:	so
  Obtained from: emeric.poupon@stormshield.eu
  Sponsored by:	Stormshield
  Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8130

MFC r313330:
  Merge projects/ipsec into head/.

   Small summary
   -------------

  o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec.
  o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel
    option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading
    and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules.
  o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by
    default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type
    support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for
    inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs.
    setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA.
  o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is
    build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel).
    It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs.
  o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special
    methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h>
    should be included to declare all the needed things to work
    with IPsec.
  o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed.
    Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods.
  o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC.
  o PF_KEY SADB was reworked:
    - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace,
      and all SAs MUST have unique SPI.
    - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB.
    - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads
      can do SA lookups in the same time.
    - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes
      in SADB.
    - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers:
      SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They
      can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses.
  o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to
    avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support
    only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported
    for both INET and INET6.
  o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches
    used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet.
  o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does
    check for full history of applied IPsec transforms.
  o References counting rules for security policies and security
    associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform
    code.
  o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms.
    tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in
    SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting.

  Obtained from:	Yandex LLC
  Relnotes:	yes
  Sponsored by:	Yandex LLC
  Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352

MFC r313331:
  Add removed headers into the ObsoleteFiles.inc.

MFC r313561 (by glebius):
  Move tcp_fields_to_net() static inline into tcp_var.h, just below its
  friend tcp_fields_to_host(). There is third party code that also uses
  this inline.

MFC r313697:
  Remove IPsec related PCB code from SCTP.

  The inpcb structure has inp_sp pointer that is initialized by
  ipsec_init_pcbpolicy() function. This pointer keeps strorage for IPsec
  security policies associated with a specific socket.
  An application can use IP_IPSEC_POLICY and IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY socket
  options to configure these security policies. Then ip[6]_output()
  uses inpcb pointer to specify that an outgoing packet is associated
  with some socket. And IPSEC_OUTPUT() method can use a security policy
  stored in the inp_sp. For inbound packet the protocol-specific input
  routine uses IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY() method to check that a packet conforms
  to inbound security policy configured in the inpcb.

  SCTP protocol doesn't specify inpcb for ip[6]_output() when it sends
  packets. Thus IPSEC_OUTPUT() method does not consider such packets as
  associated with some socket and can not apply security policies
  from inpcb, even if they are configured. Since IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY()
  method is called from protocol-specific input routine, it can specify
  inpcb pointer and associated with socket inbound policy will be
  checked. But there are two problems:
  1. Such check is asymmetric, becasue we can not apply security policy
  from inpcb for outgoing packet.
  2. IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY() expects that caller holds INPCB lock and
  access to inp_sp is protected. But for SCTP this is not correct,
  becasue SCTP uses own locks to protect inpcb.

  To fix these problems remove IPsec related PCB code from SCTP.
  This imply that IP_IPSEC_POLICY and IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY socket options
  will be not applicable to SCTP sockets. To be able correctly check
  inbound security policies for SCTP, mark its protocol header with
  the PR_LASTHDR flag.

  Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9538

MFC r313746:
  Add missing check to fix the build with IPSEC_SUPPORT and without MAC.

MFC r313805:
  Fix LINT build for powerpc.

  Build kernel modules support only when both IPSEC and TCP_SIGNATURE
  are not defined.

MFC r313922:
  For translated packets do not adjust UDP checksum if it is zero.

  In case when decrypted and decapsulated packet is an UDP datagram,
  check that its checksum is not zero before doing incremental checksum
  adjustment.

MFC r314339:
  Document that the size of AH ICV for HMAC-SHA2-NNN should be half of
  NNN bits as described in RFC4868.

  PR:		215978

MFC r314812:
  Introduce the concept of IPsec security policies scope.

  Currently are defined three scopes: global, ifnet, and pcb.
  Generic security policies that IKE daemon can add via PF_KEY interface
  or an administrator creates with setkey(8) utility have GLOBAL scope.
  Such policies can be applied by the kernel to outgoing packets and checked
  agains inbound packets after IPsec processing.
  Security policies created by if_ipsec(4) interfaces have IFNET scope.
  Such policies are applied to packets that are passed through if_ipsec(4)
  interface.
  And security policies created by application using setsockopt()
  IP_IPSEC_POLICY option have PCB scope. Such policies are applied to
  packets related to specific socket. Currently there is no way to list
  PCB policies via setkey(8) utility.

  Modify setkey(8) and libipsec(3) to be able distinguish the scope of
  security policies in the `setkey -DP` listing. Add two optional flags:
  '-t' to list only policies related to virtual *tunneling* interfaces,
  i.e. policies with IFNET scope, and '-g' to list only policies with GLOBAL
  scope. By default policies from all scopes are listed.

  To implement this PF_KEY's sadb_x_policy structure was modified.
  sadb_x_policy_reserved field is used to pass the policy scope from the
  kernel to userland. SADB_SPDDUMP message extended to support filtering
  by scope: sadb_msg_satype field is used to specify bit mask of requested
  scopes.

  For IFNET policies the sadb_x_policy_priority field of struct sadb_x_policy
  is used to pass if_ipsec's interface if_index to the userland. For GLOBAL
  policies sadb_x_policy_priority is used only to manage order of security
  policies in the SPDB. For IFNET policies it is not used, so it can be used
  to keep if_index.

  After this change the output of `setkey -DP` now looks like:
  # setkey -DPt
  0.0.0.0/0[any] 0.0.0.0/0[any] any
  	in ipsec
  	esp/tunnel/87.250.242.144-87.250.242.145/unique:145
  	spid=7 seq=3 pid=58025 scope=ifnet ifname=ipsec0
  	refcnt=1
  # setkey -DPg
  ::/0 ::/0 icmp6 135,0
  	out none
  	spid=5 seq=1 pid=872 scope=global
  	refcnt=1

  Obtained from:	Yandex LLC
  Sponsored by:	Yandex LLC
  Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9805

PR:		212018
Relnotes:	yes
Sponsored by:	Yandex LLC

1 files changed, 151 insertions, 395 deletions

diff --git a/sys/netipsec/ipsec_input.c b/sys/netipsec/ipsec_input.c
index 063096f..c4acafe 100644
--- a/sys/netipsec/ipsec_input.c
+++ b/sys/netipsec/ipsec_input.c
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-/*	$FreeBSD$	*/
 /*	$OpenBSD: ipsec_input.c,v 1.63 2003/02/20 18:35:43 deraadt Exp $	*/
 /*-
  * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org),
@@ -19,6 +18,7 @@
  * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis,
  * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos.
  * Copyright (c) 2001, Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrey V. Elsukov <ae@FreeBSD.org>
  *
  * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee
  * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in
@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@
  * IPsec input processing.
  */
 
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
+
 #include "opt_inet.h"
 #include "opt_inet6.h"
 #include "opt_ipsec.h"
@@ -87,6 +90,7 @@
 
 #include <netipsec/key.h>
 #include <netipsec/keydb.h>
+#include <netipsec/key_debug.h>
 
 #include <netipsec/xform.h>
 #include <netinet6/ip6protosw.h>
@@ -104,29 +108,20 @@
 		IPCOMPSTAT_INC(ipcomps_##name);	\
 } while (0)
 
-#ifdef INET
-static void ipsec4_common_ctlinput(int, struct sockaddr *, void *, int);
-#endif
-
 /*
  * ipsec_common_input gets called when an IPsec-protected packet
  * is received by IPv4 or IPv6.  Its job is to find the right SA
  * and call the appropriate transform.  The transform callback
  * takes care of further processing (like ingress filtering).
  */
-int
+static int
 ipsec_common_input(struct mbuf *m, int skip, int protoff, int af, int sproto)
 {
-	char buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+	char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN];
 	union sockaddr_union dst_address;
 	struct secasvar *sav;
-	u_int32_t spi;
+	uint32_t spi;
 	int error;
-#ifdef INET
-#ifdef IPSEC_NAT_T
-	struct m_tag *tag;
-#endif
-#endif
 
 	IPSEC_ISTAT(sproto, input);
 
@@ -178,12 +173,6 @@ ipsec_common_input(struct mbuf *m, int skip, int protoff, int af, int sproto)
 		m_copydata(m, offsetof(struct ip, ip_dst),
 		    sizeof(struct in_addr),
 		    (caddr_t) &dst_address.sin.sin_addr);
-#ifdef IPSEC_NAT_T
-		/* Find the source port for NAT-T; see udp*_espdecap. */
-		tag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_NAT_T_PORTS, NULL);
-		if (tag != NULL)
-			dst_address.sin.sin_port = ((u_int16_t *)(tag + 1))[1];
-#endif /* IPSEC_NAT_T */
 		break;
 #endif /* INET */
 #ifdef INET6
@@ -209,7 +198,7 @@ ipsec_common_input(struct mbuf *m, int skip, int protoff, int af, int sproto)
 	}
 
 	/* NB: only pass dst since key_allocsa follows RFC2401 */
-	sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&dst_address, sproto, spi);
+	sav = key_allocsa(&dst_address, sproto, spi);
 	if (sav == NULL) {
 		DPRINTF(("%s: no key association found for SA %s/%08lx/%u\n",
 		    __func__, ipsec_address(&dst_address, buf, sizeof(buf)),
@@ -224,7 +213,7 @@ ipsec_common_input(struct mbuf *m, int skip, int protoff, int af, int sproto)
 		    __func__, ipsec_address(&dst_address, buf, sizeof(buf)),
 		    (u_long) ntohl(spi), sproto));
 		IPSEC_ISTAT(sproto, noxform);
-		KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
+		key_freesav(&sav);
 		m_freem(m);
 		return ENXIO;
 	}
@@ -234,69 +223,50 @@ ipsec_common_input(struct mbuf *m, int skip, int protoff, int af, int sproto)
 	 * everything else.
 	 */
 	error = (*sav->tdb_xform->xf_input)(m, sav, skip, protoff);
-	KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
-	return error;
+	if (error != 0)
+		key_freesav(&sav);
+	return (error);
 }
 
 #ifdef INET
-int
-ah4_input(struct mbuf **mp, int *offp, int proto)
-{
-	struct mbuf *m;
-	int off;
-
-	m = *mp;
-	off = *offp;
-	*mp = NULL;
-
-	ipsec_common_input(m, off, offsetof(struct ip, ip_p),
-				AF_INET, IPPROTO_AH);
-	return (IPPROTO_DONE);
-}
-void
-ah4_ctlinput(int cmd, struct sockaddr *sa, void *v)
-{
-	if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET &&
-	    sa->sa_len == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
-		ipsec4_common_ctlinput(cmd, sa, v, IPPROTO_AH);
-}
-
-int
-esp4_input(struct mbuf **mp, int *offp, int proto)
-{
-	struct mbuf *m;
-	int off;
-
-	m = *mp;
-	off = *offp;
-	mp = NULL;
-
-	ipsec_common_input(m, off, offsetof(struct ip, ip_p),
-				AF_INET, IPPROTO_ESP);
-	return (IPPROTO_DONE);
-}
-
-void
-esp4_ctlinput(int cmd, struct sockaddr *sa, void *v)
-{
-	if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET &&
-	    sa->sa_len == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
-		ipsec4_common_ctlinput(cmd, sa, v, IPPROTO_ESP);
-}
+extern struct protosw inetsw[];
 
+/*
+ * IPSEC_INPUT() method implementation for IPv4.
+ *  0 - Permitted by inbound security policy for further processing.
+ *  EACCES - Forbidden by inbound security policy.
+ *  EINPROGRESS - consumed by IPsec.
+ */
 int
-ipcomp4_input(struct mbuf **mp, int *offp, int proto)
+ipsec4_input(struct mbuf *m, int offset, int proto)
 {
-	struct mbuf *m;
-	int off;
-
-	m = *mp;
-	off = *offp;
-	mp = NULL;
 
-	ipsec_common_input(m, off, offsetof(struct ip, ip_p),
-				AF_INET, IPPROTO_IPCOMP);
-	return (IPPROTO_DONE);
+	switch (proto) {
+	case IPPROTO_AH:
+	case IPPROTO_ESP:
+	case IPPROTO_IPCOMP:
+		/* Do inbound IPsec processing for AH/ESP/IPCOMP */
+		ipsec_common_input(m, offset,
+		    offsetof(struct ip, ip_p), AF_INET, proto);
+		return (EINPROGRESS); /* mbuf consumed by IPsec */
+	default:
+		/*
+		 * Protocols with further headers get their IPsec treatment
+		 * within the protocol specific processing.
+		 */
+		if ((inetsw[ip_protox[proto]].pr_flags & PR_LASTHDR) == 0)
+			return (0);
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	};
+	/*
+	 * Enforce IPsec policy checking if we are seeing last header.
+	 */
+	if (ipsec4_in_reject(m, NULL) != 0) {
+		/* Forbidden by inbound security policy */
+		m_freem(m);
+		return (EACCES);
+	}
+	return (0);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -309,21 +279,14 @@ int
 ipsec4_common_input_cb(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip,
     int protoff)
 {
-	char buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+	char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN];
 	struct ipsec_ctx_data ctx;
-	int prot, af, sproto, isr_prot;
-	struct ip *ip;
-	struct m_tag *mtag;
-	struct tdb_ident *tdbi;
+	struct xform_history *xh;
 	struct secasindex *saidx;
-	int error;
-#ifdef INET6
-#ifdef notyet
-	char ip6buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
-#endif
-#endif
+	struct m_tag *mtag;
+	struct ip *ip;
+	int error, prot, af, sproto, isr_prot;
 
-	IPSEC_ASSERT(m != NULL, ("null mbuf"));
 	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
 	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->sah != NULL, ("null SAH"));
 	saidx = &sav->sah->saidx;
@@ -334,18 +297,9 @@ ipsec4_common_input_cb(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip,
 		sproto == IPPROTO_IPCOMP,
 		("unexpected security protocol %u", sproto));
 
-	/* Sanity check */
-	if (m == NULL) {
-		DPRINTF(("%s: null mbuf", __func__));
-		IPSEC_ISTAT(sproto, badkcr);
-		KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
-		return EINVAL;
-	}
-
 	if (skip != 0) {
 		/*
 		 * Fix IPv4 header
-		 * XXXGL: do we need this entire block?
 		 */
 		if (m->m_len < skip && (m = m_pullup(m, skip)) == NULL) {
 			DPRINTF(("%s: processing failed for SA %s/%08lx\n",
@@ -364,16 +318,23 @@ ipsec4_common_input_cb(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip,
 		ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
 	}
 	prot = ip->ip_p;
+	/*
+	 * Check that we have NAT-T enabled and apply transport mode
+	 * decapsulation NAT procedure (RFC3948).
+	 * Do this before invoking into the PFIL.
+	 */
+	if (sav->natt != NULL &&
+	    (prot == IPPROTO_UDP || prot == IPPROTO_TCP))
+		udp_ipsec_adjust_cksum(m, sav, prot, skip);
 
 	IPSEC_INIT_CTX(&ctx, &m, sav, AF_INET, IPSEC_ENC_BEFORE);
 	if ((error = ipsec_run_hhooks(&ctx, HHOOK_TYPE_IPSEC_IN)) != 0)
 		goto bad;
-	ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
+	ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);	/* update pointer */
 
 	/* IP-in-IP encapsulation */
 	if (prot == IPPROTO_IPIP &&
 	    saidx->mode != IPSEC_MODE_TRANSPORT) {
-
 		if (m->m_pkthdr.len - skip < sizeof(struct ip)) {
 			IPSEC_ISTAT(sproto, hdrops);
 			error = EINVAL;
@@ -381,40 +342,11 @@ ipsec4_common_input_cb(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip,
 		}
 		/* enc0: strip outer IPv4 header */
 		m_striphdr(m, 0, ip->ip_hl << 2);
-
-#ifdef notyet
-		/* XXX PROXY address isn't recorded in SAH */
-		/*
-		 * Check that the inner source address is the same as
-		 * the proxy address, if available.
-		 */
-		if ((saidx->proxy.sa.sa_family == AF_INET &&
-		    saidx->proxy.sin.sin_addr.s_addr !=
-		    INADDR_ANY &&
-		    ipn.ip_src.s_addr !=
-		    saidx->proxy.sin.sin_addr.s_addr) ||
-		    (saidx->proxy.sa.sa_family != AF_INET &&
-			saidx->proxy.sa.sa_family != 0)) {
-
-			DPRINTF(("%s: inner source address %s doesn't "
-			    "correspond to expected proxy source %s, "
-			    "SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
-			    inet_ntoa4(ipn.ip_src),
-			    ipsp_address(saidx->proxy),
-			    ipsp_address(saidx->dst),
-			    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
-
-			IPSEC_ISTAT(sproto, pdrops);
-			error = EACCES;
-			goto bad;
-		}
-#endif /* notyet */
 	}
 #ifdef INET6
 	/* IPv6-in-IP encapsulation. */
 	else if (prot == IPPROTO_IPV6 &&
 	    saidx->mode != IPSEC_MODE_TRANSPORT) {
-
 		if (m->m_pkthdr.len - skip < sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) {
 			IPSEC_ISTAT(sproto, hdrops);
 			error = EINVAL;
@@ -422,39 +354,14 @@ ipsec4_common_input_cb(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip,
 		}
 		/* enc0: strip IPv4 header, keep IPv6 header only */
 		m_striphdr(m, 0, ip->ip_hl << 2);
-#ifdef notyet 
-		/*
-		 * Check that the inner source address is the same as
-		 * the proxy address, if available.
-		 */
-		if ((saidx->proxy.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6 &&
-		    !IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&saidx->proxy.sin6.sin6_addr) &&
-		    !IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ip6n.ip6_src,
-			&saidx->proxy.sin6.sin6_addr)) ||
-		    (saidx->proxy.sa.sa_family != AF_INET6 &&
-			saidx->proxy.sa.sa_family != 0)) {
-
-			DPRINTF(("%s: inner source address %s doesn't "
-			    "correspond to expected proxy source %s, "
-			    "SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
-			    ip6_sprintf(ip6buf, &ip6n.ip6_src),
-			    ipsec_address(&saidx->proxy),
-			    ipsec_address(&saidx->dst),
-			    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
-
-			IPSEC_ISTAT(sproto, pdrops);
-			error = EACCES;
-			goto bad;
-		}
-#endif /* notyet */
 	}
 #endif /* INET6 */
 	else if (prot != IPPROTO_IPV6 && saidx->mode == IPSEC_MODE_ANY) {
 		/*
 		 * When mode is wildcard, inner protocol is IPv6 and
 		 * we have no INET6 support - drop this packet a bit later.
-		 * In other cases we assume transport mode and outer
-		 * header was already stripped in xform_xxx_cb.
+		 * In other cases we assume transport mode. Set prot to
+		 * correctly choose netisr.
 		 */
 		prot = IPPROTO_IPIP;
 	}
@@ -465,7 +372,7 @@ ipsec4_common_input_cb(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip,
 	 */
 	if (sproto != IPPROTO_IPCOMP) {
 		mtag = m_tag_get(PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_DONE,
-		    sizeof(struct tdb_ident), M_NOWAIT);
+		    sizeof(struct xform_history), M_NOWAIT);
 		if (mtag == NULL) {
 			DPRINTF(("%s: failed to get tag\n", __func__));
 			IPSEC_ISTAT(sproto, hdrops);
@@ -473,14 +380,11 @@ ipsec4_common_input_cb(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip,
 			goto bad;
 		}
 
-		tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *)(mtag + 1);
-		bcopy(&saidx->dst, &tdbi->dst, saidx->dst.sa.sa_len);
-		tdbi->proto = sproto;
-		tdbi->spi = sav->spi;
-		/* Cache those two for enc(4) in xform_ipip. */
-		tdbi->alg_auth = sav->alg_auth;
-		tdbi->alg_enc = sav->alg_enc;
-
+		xh = (struct xform_history *)(mtag + 1);
+		bcopy(&saidx->dst, &xh->dst, saidx->dst.sa.sa_len);
+		xh->spi = sav->spi;
+		xh->proto = sproto;
+		xh->mode = saidx->mode;
 		m_tag_prepend(m, mtag);
 	}
 
@@ -517,69 +421,65 @@ ipsec4_common_input_cb(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip,
 	IPSEC_INIT_CTX(&ctx, &m, sav, af, IPSEC_ENC_AFTER);
 	if ((error = ipsec_run_hhooks(&ctx, HHOOK_TYPE_IPSEC_IN)) != 0)
 		goto bad;
-	error = netisr_queue_src(isr_prot, (uintptr_t)sav->spi, m);
-	if (error) {
-		IPSEC_ISTAT(sproto, qfull);
-		DPRINTF(("%s: queue full; proto %u packet dropped\n",
-			__func__, sproto));
-		return error;
+
+	/* Handle virtual tunneling interfaces */
+	if (saidx->mode == IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL)
+		error = ipsec_if_input(m, sav, af);
+	if (error == 0) {
+		error = netisr_queue_src(isr_prot, (uintptr_t)sav->spi, m);
+		if (error) {
+			IPSEC_ISTAT(sproto, qfull);
+			DPRINTF(("%s: queue full; proto %u packet dropped\n",
+			    __func__, sproto));
+		}
 	}
-	return 0;
+	key_freesav(&sav);
+	return (error);
 bad:
-	m_freem(m);
-	return error;
-}
-
-void
-ipsec4_common_ctlinput(int cmd, struct sockaddr *sa, void *v, int proto)
-{
-	/* XXX nothing just yet */
+	key_freesav(&sav);
+	if (m != NULL)
+		m_freem(m);
+	return (error);
 }
 #endif /* INET */
 
 #ifdef INET6
-/* IPv6 AH wrapper. */
+/*
+ * IPSEC_INPUT() method implementation for IPv6.
+ *  0 - Permitted by inbound security policy for further processing.
+ *  EACCES - Forbidden by inbound security policy.
+ *  EINPROGRESS - consumed by IPsec.
+ */
 int
-ipsec6_common_input(struct mbuf **mp, int *offp, int proto)
+ipsec6_input(struct mbuf *m, int offset, int proto)
 {
-	int l = 0;
-	int protoff;
-	struct ip6_ext ip6e;
-
-	if (*offp < sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) {
-		DPRINTF(("%s: bad offset %u\n", __func__, *offp));
-		return IPPROTO_DONE;
-	} else if (*offp == sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) {
-		protoff = offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_nxt);
-	} else {
-		/* Chase down the header chain... */
-		protoff = sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);
-
-		do {
-			protoff += l;
-			m_copydata(*mp, protoff, sizeof(ip6e),
-			    (caddr_t) &ip6e);
-
-			if (ip6e.ip6e_nxt == IPPROTO_AH)
-				l = (ip6e.ip6e_len + 2) << 2;
-			else
-				l = (ip6e.ip6e_len + 1) << 3;
-			IPSEC_ASSERT(l > 0, ("l went zero or negative"));
-		} while (protoff + l < *offp);
-
-		/* Malformed packet check */
-		if (protoff + l != *offp) {
-			DPRINTF(("%s: bad packet header chain, protoff %u, "
-				"l %u, off %u\n", __func__, protoff, l, *offp));
-			IPSEC_ISTAT(proto, hdrops);
-			m_freem(*mp);
-			*mp = NULL;
-			return IPPROTO_DONE;
-		}
-		protoff += offsetof(struct ip6_ext, ip6e_nxt);
+
+	switch (proto) {
+	case IPPROTO_AH:
+	case IPPROTO_ESP:
+	case IPPROTO_IPCOMP:
+		/* Do inbound IPsec processing for AH/ESP/IPCOMP */
+		ipsec_common_input(m, offset,
+		    offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_nxt), AF_INET6, proto);
+		return (EINPROGRESS); /* mbuf consumed by IPsec */
+	default:
+		/*
+		 * Protocols with further headers get their IPsec treatment
+		 * within the protocol specific processing.
+		 */
+		if ((inet6sw[ip6_protox[proto]].pr_flags & PR_LASTHDR) == 0)
+			return (0);
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	};
+	/*
+	 * Enforce IPsec policy checking if we are seeing last header.
+	 */
+	if (ipsec6_in_reject(m, NULL) != 0) {
+		/* Forbidden by inbound security policy */
+		m_freem(m);
+		return (EACCES);
 	}
-	(void) ipsec_common_input(*mp, *offp, protoff, AF_INET6, proto);
-	return IPPROTO_DONE;
+	return (0);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -590,21 +490,17 @@ int
 ipsec6_common_input_cb(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip,
     int protoff)
 {
-	char buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+	char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN];
 	struct ipsec_ctx_data ctx;
-	int prot, af, sproto;
+	struct xform_history *xh;
+	struct secasindex *saidx;
 	struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
 	struct m_tag *mtag;
-	struct tdb_ident *tdbi;
-	struct secasindex *saidx;
+	int prot, af, sproto;
 	int nxt, isr_prot;
-	u_int8_t nxt8;
 	int error, nest;
-#ifdef notyet
-	char ip6buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
-#endif
+	uint8_t nxt8;
 
-	IPSEC_ASSERT(m != NULL, ("null mbuf"));
 	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
 	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->sah != NULL, ("null SAH"));
 	saidx = &sav->sah->saidx;
@@ -615,14 +511,6 @@ ipsec6_common_input_cb(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip,
 		sproto == IPPROTO_IPCOMP,
 		("unexpected security protocol %u", sproto));
 
-	/* Sanity check */
-	if (m == NULL) {
-		DPRINTF(("%s: null mbuf", __func__));
-		IPSEC_ISTAT(sproto, badkcr);
-		error = EINVAL;
-		goto bad;
-	}
-
 	/* Fix IPv6 header */
 	if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) &&
 	    (m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr))) == NULL) {
@@ -636,12 +524,13 @@ ipsec6_common_input_cb(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip,
 		goto bad;
 	}
 
-	ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
-	ip6->ip6_plen = htons(m->m_pkthdr.len - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr));
-
 	IPSEC_INIT_CTX(&ctx, &m, sav, af, IPSEC_ENC_BEFORE);
 	if ((error = ipsec_run_hhooks(&ctx, HHOOK_TYPE_IPSEC_IN)) != 0)
 		goto bad;
+
+	ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
+	ip6->ip6_plen = htons(m->m_pkthdr.len - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr));
+
 	/* Save protocol */
 	m_copydata(m, protoff, 1, &nxt8);
 	prot = nxt8;
@@ -657,31 +546,6 @@ ipsec6_common_input_cb(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip,
 		/* ip6n will now contain the inner IPv6 header. */
 		m_striphdr(m, 0, skip);
 		skip = 0;
-#ifdef notyet
-		/*
-		 * Check that the inner source address is the same as
-		 * the proxy address, if available.
-		 */
-		if ((saidx->proxy.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6 &&
-		    !IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&saidx->proxy.sin6.sin6_addr) &&
-		    !IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ip6n.ip6_src,
-			&saidx->proxy.sin6.sin6_addr)) ||
-		    (saidx->proxy.sa.sa_family != AF_INET6 &&
-			saidx->proxy.sa.sa_family != 0)) {
-
-			DPRINTF(("%s: inner source address %s doesn't "
-			    "correspond to expected proxy source %s, "
-			    "SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
-			    ip6_sprintf(ip6buf, &ip6n.ip6_src),
-			    ipsec_address(&saidx->proxy),
-			    ipsec_address(&saidx->dst),
-			    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
-
-			IPSEC_ISTAT(sproto, pdrops);
-			error = EACCES;
-			goto bad;
-		}
-#endif /* notyet */
 	}
 #ifdef INET
 	/* IP-in-IP encapsulation */
@@ -693,32 +557,8 @@ ipsec6_common_input_cb(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip,
 			goto bad;
 		}
 		/* ipn will now contain the inner IPv4 header */
-	 	m_striphdr(m, 0, skip);
+		m_striphdr(m, 0, skip);
 		skip = 0;
-#ifdef notyet
-		/*
-		 * Check that the inner source address is the same as
-		 * the proxy address, if available.
-		 */
-		if ((saidx->proxy.sa.sa_family == AF_INET &&
-		    saidx->proxy.sin.sin_addr.s_addr != INADDR_ANY &&
-		    ipn.ip_src.s_addr != saidx->proxy.sin.sin_addr.s_addr) ||
-		    (saidx->proxy.sa.sa_family != AF_INET &&
-			saidx->proxy.sa.sa_family != 0)) {
-
-			DPRINTF(("%s: inner source address %s doesn't "
-			    "correspond to expected proxy source %s, "
-			    "SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
-			    inet_ntoa4(ipn.ip_src),
-			    ipsec_address(&saidx->proxy),
-			    ipsec_address(&saidx->dst),
-			    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
-
-			IPSEC_ISTAT(sproto, pdrops);
-			error = EACCES;
-			goto bad;
-		}
-#endif /* notyet */
 	}
 #endif /* INET */
 	else {
@@ -731,7 +571,7 @@ ipsec6_common_input_cb(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip,
 	 */
 	if (sproto != IPPROTO_IPCOMP) {
 		mtag = m_tag_get(PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_DONE,
-		    sizeof(struct tdb_ident), M_NOWAIT);
+		    sizeof(struct xform_history), M_NOWAIT);
 		if (mtag == NULL) {
 			DPRINTF(("%s: failed to get tag\n", __func__));
 			IPSEC_ISTAT(sproto, hdrops);
@@ -739,20 +579,16 @@ ipsec6_common_input_cb(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip,
 			goto bad;
 		}
 
-		tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *)(mtag + 1);
-		bcopy(&saidx->dst, &tdbi->dst, sizeof(union sockaddr_union));
-		tdbi->proto = sproto;
-		tdbi->spi = sav->spi;
-		/* Cache those two for enc(4) in xform_ipip. */
-		tdbi->alg_auth = sav->alg_auth;
-		tdbi->alg_enc = sav->alg_enc;
-
+		xh = (struct xform_history *)(mtag + 1);
+		bcopy(&saidx->dst, &xh->dst, saidx->dst.sa.sa_len);
+		xh->spi = sav->spi;
+		xh->proto = sproto;
+		xh->mode = saidx->mode;
 		m_tag_prepend(m, mtag);
 	}
 
 	key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
 
-
 #ifdef INET
 	if (prot == IPPROTO_IPIP)
 		af = AF_INET;
@@ -783,12 +619,19 @@ ipsec6_common_input_cb(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip,
 			error = EPFNOSUPPORT;
 			goto bad;
 		}
-		error = netisr_queue_src(isr_prot, (uintptr_t)sav->spi, m);
-		if (error) {
-			IPSEC_ISTAT(sproto, qfull);
-			DPRINTF(("%s: queue full; proto %u packet dropped\n",
-			    __func__, sproto));
+		/* Handle virtual tunneling interfaces */
+		if (saidx->mode == IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL)
+			error = ipsec_if_input(m, sav, af);
+		if (error == 0) {
+			error = netisr_queue_src(isr_prot,
+			    (uintptr_t)sav->spi, m);
+			if (error) {
+				IPSEC_ISTAT(sproto, qfull);
+				DPRINTF(("%s: queue full; proto %u packet"
+				    " dropped\n", __func__, sproto));
+			}
 		}
+		key_freesav(&sav);
 		return (error);
 	}
 	/*
@@ -826,99 +669,12 @@ ipsec6_common_input_cb(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip,
 		}
 		nxt = (*inet6sw[ip6_protox[nxt]].pr_input)(&m, &skip, nxt);
 	}
-	return 0;
+	key_freesav(&sav);
+	return (0);
 bad:
+	key_freesav(&sav);
 	if (m)
 		m_freem(m);
-	return error;
-}
-
-void
-esp6_ctlinput(int cmd, struct sockaddr *sa, void *d)
-{
-	struct ip6ctlparam *ip6cp = NULL;
-	struct mbuf *m = NULL;
-	struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
-	int off;
-
-	if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET6 ||
-	    sa->sa_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
-		return;
-	if ((unsigned)cmd >= PRC_NCMDS)
-		return;
-
-	/* if the parameter is from icmp6, decode it. */
-	if (d != NULL) {
-		ip6cp = (struct ip6ctlparam *)d;
-		m = ip6cp->ip6c_m;
-		ip6 = ip6cp->ip6c_ip6;
-		off = ip6cp->ip6c_off;
-	} else {
-		m = NULL;
-		ip6 = NULL;
-		off = 0;	/* calm gcc */
-	}
-
-	if (ip6 != NULL) {
-
-		struct ip6ctlparam ip6cp1;
-
-		/*
-		 * Notify the error to all possible sockets via pfctlinput2.
-		 * Since the upper layer information (such as protocol type,
-		 * source and destination ports) is embedded in the encrypted
-		 * data and might have been cut, we can't directly call
-		 * an upper layer ctlinput function. However, the pcbnotify
-		 * function will consider source and destination addresses
-		 * as well as the flow info value, and may be able to find
-		 * some PCB that should be notified.
-		 * Although pfctlinput2 will call esp6_ctlinput(), there is
-		 * no possibility of an infinite loop of function calls,
-		 * because we don't pass the inner IPv6 header.
-		 */
-		bzero(&ip6cp1, sizeof(ip6cp1));
-		ip6cp1.ip6c_src = ip6cp->ip6c_src;
-		pfctlinput2(cmd, sa, (void *)&ip6cp1);
-
-		/*
-		 * Then go to special cases that need ESP header information.
-		 * XXX: We assume that when ip6 is non NULL,
-		 * M and OFF are valid.
-		 */
-
-		if (cmd == PRC_MSGSIZE) {
-			struct secasvar *sav;
-			u_int32_t spi;
-			int valid;
-
-			/* check header length before using m_copydata */
-			if (m->m_pkthdr.len < off + sizeof (struct esp))
-				return;
-			m_copydata(m, off + offsetof(struct esp, esp_spi),
-				sizeof(u_int32_t), (caddr_t) &spi);
-			/*
-			 * Check to see if we have a valid SA corresponding to
-			 * the address in the ICMP message payload.
-			 */
-			sav = KEY_ALLOCSA((union sockaddr_union *)sa,
-					IPPROTO_ESP, spi);
-			valid = (sav != NULL);
-			if (sav)
-				KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
-
-			/* XXX Further validation? */
-
-			/*
-			 * Depending on whether the SA is "valid" and
-			 * routing table size (mtudisc_{hi,lo}wat), we will:
-			 * - recalcurate the new MTU and create the
-			 *   corresponding routing entry, or
-			 * - ignore the MTU change notification.
-			 */
-			icmp6_mtudisc_update(ip6cp, valid);
-		}
-	} else {
-		/* we normally notify any pcb here */
-	}
+	return (error);
 }
 #endif /* INET6 */