Fix the length calculation for the final block of a sendfile(2)

transmission which could be tricked into rounding up to the nearest
page size, leaking up to a page of kernel memory.  [13:11]

In IPv6 and NetATM, stop SIOCSIFADDR, SIOCSIFBRDADDR, SIOCSIFDSTADDR
and SIOCSIFNETMASK at the socket layer rather than pass them on to the
link layer without validation or credential checks.  [SA-13:12]

Prevent cross-mount hardlinks between different nullfs mounts of the
same underlying filesystem.  [SA-13:13]

Security:	CVE-2013-5666
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-13:11.sendfile
Security:	CVE-2013-5691
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-13:12.ifioctl
Security:	CVE-2013-5710
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-13:13.nullfs
Approved by:	re

1 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/sys/netinet6/in6.c b/sys/netinet6/in6.c
index 9d99930..e5c62df 100644
--- a/sys/netinet6/in6.c
+++ b/sys/netinet6/in6.c
@@ -431,6 +431,18 @@ in6_control(struct socket *so, u_long cmd, caddr_t data,
 	case SIOCGIFSTAT_ICMP6:
 		sa6 = &ifr->ifr_addr;
 		break;
+	case SIOCSIFADDR:
+	case SIOCSIFBRDADDR:
+	case SIOCSIFDSTADDR:
+	case SIOCSIFNETMASK:
+		/*
+		 * Although we should pass any non-INET6 ioctl requests
+		 * down to driver, we filter some legacy INET requests.
+		 * Drivers trust SIOCSIFADDR et al to come from an already
+		 * privileged layer, and do not perform any credentials
+		 * checks or input validation.
+		 */
+		return (EINVAL);
 	default:
 		sa6 = NULL;
 		break;