o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject

  credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison).
o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence.
o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and
  pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference
  management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code.
o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead
  of struct proc arguments.
o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed,
  rather than directly checking pointers all over the place.
o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function.
o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h.
o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the
  flag in the process flags field itself.
o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect
  mutex use.

Notes:

o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required.
o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs
  credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code.
o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is
  required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the
  structure.

Reviewed by:	freebsd-arch
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project

1 files changed, 4 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/sys/netinet/tcp_usrreq.c b/sys/netinet/tcp_usrreq.c
index ac1eee9..1d64581 100644
--- a/sys/netinet/tcp_usrreq.c
+++ b/sys/netinet/tcp_usrreq.c
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <sys/socketvar.h>
 #include <sys/protosw.h>
+#include <sys/proc.h>
+#include <sys/jail.h>
 
 #include <net/if.h>
 #include <net/route.h>
@@ -328,7 +330,8 @@ tcp_usr_connect(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *nam, struct proc *p)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	prison_remote_ip(p, 0, &sinp->sin_addr.s_addr);
+	if (p && jailed(p->p_ucred))
+		prison_remote_ip(p->p_ucred, 0, &sinp->sin_addr.s_addr);
 
 	if ((error = tcp_connect(tp, nam, p)) != 0)
 		goto out;