White space cleanup for netinet before branch:

- Trailing tab/space cleanup
- Remove spurious spaces between or before tabs

This change avoids touching files that Andre likely has in his working
set for PFIL hooks changes for IPFW/DUMMYNET.

Approved by:	re (scottl)
Submitted by:	Xin LI <delphij@frontfree.net>

1 files changed, 34 insertions, 34 deletions

diff --git a/sys/netinet/tcp_syncache.c b/sys/netinet/tcp_syncache.c
index 9c918a9..9125235 100644
--- a/sys/netinet/tcp_syncache.c
+++ b/sys/netinet/tcp_syncache.c
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@
 
 static int tcp_syncookies = 1;
 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_tcp, OID_AUTO, syncookies, CTLFLAG_RW,
-    &tcp_syncookies, 0, 
+    &tcp_syncookies, 0,
     "Use TCP SYN cookies if the syncache overflows");
 
 static void	 syncache_drop(struct syncache *, struct syncache_head *);
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static int	 syncache_respond(struct syncache *, struct mbuf *, struct socket *);
 #else
 static int	 syncache_respond(struct syncache *, struct mbuf *);
 #endif
-static struct 	 socket *syncache_socket(struct syncache *, struct socket *,
+static struct	 socket *syncache_socket(struct syncache *, struct socket *,
 		    struct mbuf *m);
 static void	 syncache_timer(void *);
 static u_int32_t syncookie_generate(struct syncache *, u_int32_t *);
@@ -169,16 +169,16 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_tcp_syncache, OID_AUTO, rexmtlimit, CTLFLAG_RW,
 
 static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_SYNCACHE, "syncache", "TCP syncache");
 
-#define SYNCACHE_HASH(inc, mask) 					\
+#define SYNCACHE_HASH(inc, mask)					\
 	((tcp_syncache.hash_secret ^					\
 	  (inc)->inc_faddr.s_addr ^					\
-	  ((inc)->inc_faddr.s_addr >> 16) ^ 				\
+	  ((inc)->inc_faddr.s_addr >> 16) ^				\
 	  (inc)->inc_fport ^ (inc)->inc_lport) & mask)
 
-#define SYNCACHE_HASH6(inc, mask) 					\
+#define SYNCACHE_HASH6(inc, mask)					\
 	((tcp_syncache.hash_secret ^					\
-	  (inc)->inc6_faddr.s6_addr32[0] ^ 				\
-	  (inc)->inc6_faddr.s6_addr32[3] ^ 				\
+	  (inc)->inc6_faddr.s6_addr32[0] ^				\
+	  (inc)->inc6_faddr.s6_addr32[3] ^				\
 	  (inc)->inc_fport ^ (inc)->inc_lport) & mask)
 
 #define ENDPTS_EQ(a, b) (						\
@@ -222,16 +222,16 @@ syncache_init(void)
 	tcp_syncache.rexmt_limit = SYNCACHE_MAXREXMTS;
 	tcp_syncache.hash_secret = arc4random();
 
-        TUNABLE_INT_FETCH("net.inet.tcp.syncache.hashsize",
+	TUNABLE_INT_FETCH("net.inet.tcp.syncache.hashsize",
 	    &tcp_syncache.hashsize);
-        TUNABLE_INT_FETCH("net.inet.tcp.syncache.cachelimit",
+	TUNABLE_INT_FETCH("net.inet.tcp.syncache.cachelimit",
 	    &tcp_syncache.cache_limit);
-        TUNABLE_INT_FETCH("net.inet.tcp.syncache.bucketlimit",
+	TUNABLE_INT_FETCH("net.inet.tcp.syncache.bucketlimit",
 	    &tcp_syncache.bucket_limit);
 	if (!powerof2(tcp_syncache.hashsize)) {
-                printf("WARNING: syncache hash size is not a power of 2.\n");
+		printf("WARNING: syncache hash size is not a power of 2.\n");
 		tcp_syncache.hashsize = 512;	/* safe default */
-        }
+	}
 	tcp_syncache.hashmask = tcp_syncache.hashsize - 1;
 
 	/* Allocate the hash table. */
@@ -356,15 +356,15 @@ syncache_timer(xslot)
 	struct inpcb *inp;
 
 	INP_INFO_WLOCK(&tcbinfo);
-        if (callout_pending(&tcp_syncache.tt_timerq[slot]) ||
-            !callout_active(&tcp_syncache.tt_timerq[slot])) {
+	if (callout_pending(&tcp_syncache.tt_timerq[slot]) ||
+	    !callout_active(&tcp_syncache.tt_timerq[slot])) {
 		/* XXX can this happen? */
 		INP_INFO_WUNLOCK(&tcbinfo);
-                return;
-        }
-        callout_deactivate(&tcp_syncache.tt_timerq[slot]);
+		return;
+	}
+	callout_deactivate(&tcp_syncache.tt_timerq[slot]);
 
-        nsc = TAILQ_FIRST(&tcp_syncache.timerq[slot]);
+	nsc = TAILQ_FIRST(&tcp_syncache.timerq[slot]);
 	while (nsc != NULL) {
 		if (ticks < nsc->sc_rxttime)
 			break;
@@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ syncache_socket(sc, lso, m)
 #ifdef INET6
 		if (sc->sc_inc.inc_isipv6)
 			inp->in6p_laddr = in6addr_any;
-       		else
+		else
 #endif
 			inp->inp_laddr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
 		inp->inp_lport = 0;
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ syncache_socket(sc, lso, m)
 		 * copied, since it stores previously received options and is
 		 * used to detect if each new option is different than the
 		 * previous one and hence should be passed to a user.
-                 * If we copied in6p_inputopts, a user would not be able to
+		 * If we copied in6p_inputopts, a user would not be able to
 		 * receive options just after calling the accept system call.
 		 */
 		inp->inp_flags |= oinp->inp_flags & INP_CONTROLOPTS;
@@ -722,7 +722,7 @@ syncache_socket(sc, lso, m)
 	 * If the SYN,ACK was retransmitted, reset cwnd to 1 segment.
 	 */
 	if (sc->sc_rxtslot != 0)
-                tp->snd_cwnd = tp->t_maxseg;
+		tp->snd_cwnd = tp->t_maxseg;
 	callout_reset(tp->tt_keep, tcp_keepinit, tcp_timer_keep, tp);
 
 	INP_UNLOCK(inp);
@@ -761,11 +761,11 @@ syncache_expand(inc, th, sop, m)
 	sc = syncache_lookup(inc, &sch);
 	if (sc == NULL) {
 		/*
-		 * There is no syncache entry, so see if this ACK is 
+		 * There is no syncache entry, so see if this ACK is
 		 * a returning syncookie.  To do this, first:
 		 *  A. See if this socket has had a syncache entry dropped in
 		 *     the past.  We don't want to accept a bogus syncookie
- 		 *     if we've never received a SYN.
+		 *     if we've never received a SYN.
 		 *  B. check that the syncookie is valid.  If it is, then
 		 *     cobble up a fake syncache entry, and return.
 		 */
@@ -888,7 +888,7 @@ syncache_add(inc, to, th, sop, m)
 			TAILQ_REMOVE(&tcp_syncache.timerq[sc->sc_rxtslot],
 			    sc, sc_timerq);
 			SYNCACHE_TIMEOUT(sc, sc->sc_rxtslot);
-		 	tcpstat.tcps_sndacks++;
+			tcpstat.tcps_sndacks++;
 			tcpstat.tcps_sndtotal++;
 		}
 		*sop = NULL;
@@ -899,7 +899,7 @@ syncache_add(inc, to, th, sop, m)
 	if (sc == NULL) {
 		/*
 		 * The zone allocator couldn't provide more entries.
-		 * Treat this as if the cache was full; drop the oldest 
+		 * Treat this as if the cache was full; drop the oldest
 		 * entry and insert the new one.
 		 */
 		/* NB: guarded by INP_INFO_WLOCK(&tcbinfo) */
@@ -945,7 +945,7 @@ syncache_add(inc, to, th, sop, m)
 	sc->sc_flowlabel = 0;
 	if (tcp_syncookies) {
 		sc->sc_iss = syncookie_generate(sc, &flowtmp);
-#ifdef INET6   
+#ifdef INET6
 		if (inc->inc_isipv6 &&
 		    (sc->sc_tp->t_inpcb->in6p_flags & IN6P_AUTOFLOWLABEL)) {
 			sc->sc_flowlabel = flowtmp & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK;
@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ syncache_add(inc, to, th, sop, m)
 #endif
 	} else {
 		sc->sc_iss = arc4random();
-#ifdef INET6   
+#ifdef INET6
 		if (inc->inc_isipv6 &&
 		    (sc->sc_tp->t_inpcb->in6p_flags & IN6P_AUTOFLOWLABEL)) {
 			sc->sc_flowlabel =
@@ -1014,7 +1014,7 @@ syncache_add(inc, to, th, sop, m)
 		sc->sc_flags = SCF_SIGNATURE;
 #endif
 
-	if (to->to_flags & TOF_SACK)  
+	if (to->to_flags & TOF_SACK)
 		sc->sc_flags |= SCF_SACK;
 
 	/*
@@ -1112,7 +1112,7 @@ syncache_respond(sc, m)
 
 	hlen =
 #ifdef INET6
-	       (sc->sc_inc.inc_isipv6) ? sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) : 
+	       (sc->sc_inc.inc_isipv6) ? sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) :
 #endif
 		sizeof(struct ip);
 
@@ -1288,7 +1288,7 @@ syncache_respond(sc, m)
 	} else
 #endif
 	{
-        	th->th_sum = in_pseudo(ip->ip_src.s_addr, ip->ip_dst.s_addr,
+		th->th_sum = in_pseudo(ip->ip_src.s_addr, ip->ip_dst.s_addr,
 		    htons(tlen - hlen + IPPROTO_TCP));
 		m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags = CSUM_TCP;
 		m->m_pkthdr.csum_data = offsetof(struct tcphdr, th_sum);
@@ -1330,7 +1330,7 @@ syncache_respond(sc, m)
 #define SYNCOOKIE_NSECRETS	(1 << SYNCOOKIE_WNDBITS)
 #define SYNCOOKIE_TIMEOUT \
     (hz * (1 << SYNCOOKIE_WNDBITS) / (1 << SYNCOOKIE_TIMESHIFT))
-#define SYNCOOKIE_DATAMASK 	((3 << SYNCOOKIE_WNDBITS) | SYNCOOKIE_WNDMASK)
+#define SYNCOOKIE_DATAMASK	((3 << SYNCOOKIE_WNDBITS) | SYNCOOKIE_WNDMASK)
 
 static struct {
 	u_int32_t	ts_secbits[4];
@@ -1355,9 +1355,9 @@ CTASSERT(sizeof(struct md5_add) == 28);
 
 /*
  * Consider the problem of a recreated (and retransmitted) cookie.  If the
- * original SYN was accepted, the connection is established.  The second 
- * SYN is inflight, and if it arrives with an ISN that falls within the 
- * receive window, the connection is killed.  
+ * original SYN was accepted, the connection is established.  The second
+ * SYN is inflight, and if it arrives with an ISN that falls within the
+ * receive window, the connection is killed.
  *
  * However, since cookies have other problems, this may not be worth
  * worrying about.