diff options
author | andre <andre@FreeBSD.org> | 2007-03-21 18:05:54 +0000 |
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committer | andre <andre@FreeBSD.org> | 2007-03-21 18:05:54 +0000 |
commit | 77fcda08c7d320fff27e99d3a46c16ead2b74187 (patch) | |
tree | a000d55d110721e45de1d87bbc0dd4551a416554 /sys/netinet/tcp_subr.c | |
parent | a78439a831c5853d2e9529e657c274d244af3ad5 (diff) | |
download | FreeBSD-src-77fcda08c7d320fff27e99d3a46c16ead2b74187.zip FreeBSD-src-77fcda08c7d320fff27e99d3a46c16ead2b74187.tar.gz |
Remove tcp_minmssoverload DoS detection logic. The problem it tried to
protect us from wasn't really there and it only bloats the code. Should
the problem surface in the future we can simply resurrect it from cvs
history.
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/netinet/tcp_subr.c')
-rw-r--r-- | sys/netinet/tcp_subr.c | 12 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/sys/netinet/tcp_subr.c b/sys/netinet/tcp_subr.c index de0cfee..2f1e385 100644 --- a/sys/netinet/tcp_subr.c +++ b/sys/netinet/tcp_subr.c @@ -137,18 +137,6 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_tcp, TCPCTL_V6MSSDFLT, v6mssdflt, int tcp_minmss = TCP_MINMSS; SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_tcp, OID_AUTO, minmss, CTLFLAG_RW, &tcp_minmss , 0, "Minmum TCP Maximum Segment Size"); -/* - * Number of TCP segments per second we accept from remote host - * before we start to calculate average segment size. If average - * segment size drops below the minimum TCP MSS we assume a DoS - * attack and reset+drop the connection. Care has to be taken not to - * set this value too small to not kill interactive type connections - * (telnet, SSH) which send many small packets. - */ -int tcp_minmssoverload = TCP_MINMSSOVERLOAD; -SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_tcp, OID_AUTO, minmssoverload, CTLFLAG_RW, - &tcp_minmssoverload , 0, - "Number of TCP Segments per Second allowed to be under the MINMSS Size"); int tcp_do_rfc1323 = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_tcp, TCPCTL_DO_RFC1323, rfc1323, CTLFLAG_RW, |