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author | rrs <rrs@FreeBSD.org> | 2007-02-12 23:24:31 +0000 |
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committer | rrs <rrs@FreeBSD.org> | 2007-02-12 23:24:31 +0000 |
commit | e176cc33f53a2dee7896aec59f970825b57845b8 (patch) | |
tree | 6152741c43ebcb3fc304c4834897a4966cc8bdbd /sys/netinet/sctp_input.c | |
parent | 725b149c2db3f8bc35268426a9c1719420d722fa (diff) | |
download | FreeBSD-src-e176cc33f53a2dee7896aec59f970825b57845b8.zip FreeBSD-src-e176cc33f53a2dee7896aec59f970825b57845b8.tar.gz |
- Copyright updates (aka 2007)
- ZONE get now also take a type cast so it does the
cast like mtod does.
- New macro SCTP_LIST_EMPTY, which in bsd is just
LIST_EMPTY
- Removal of const in some of the static hmac functions
(not needed)
- Store length changes to allow for new fields in auth
- Auth code updated to current draft (this should be the
RFC version we think).
- use uint8_t instead of u_char in LOOPBACK address comparison
- Some u_int32_t converted to uint32_t (in crc code)
- A bug was found in the mib counts for ordered/unordered
count, this was fixed (was referencing a freed mbuf).
- SCTP_ASOCLOG_OF_TSNS added (code will probably disappear
after my testing completes. It allows us to keep a
small log on each assoc of the last 40 TSN's in/out and
stream assignment. It is NOT in options and so is only
good for private builds.
- Some CMT changes in prep for Jana fixing his problem
with reneging when CMT is enabled (Concurrent Multipath
Transfer = CMT).
- Some missing mib stats added.
- Correction to number of open assoc's count in mib
- Correction to os_bsd.h to get right sha2 macros
- Add of special AUTH_04 flags so you can compile the code
with the old format (in case the peer does not yet support
the latest auth code).
- Nonce sum was incorrectly being set in when ecn_nonce was
NOT on.
- LOR in listen with implicit bind found and fixed.
- Moved away from using mbuf's for socket options to using
just data pointers. The mbufs were used to harmonize
NetBSD code since both Net and Open used this method. We
have decided to move away from that and more conform to
FreeBSD style (which makes more sense).
- Very very nasty bug found in some of my "debug" code. The
cookie_how collision case tracking had an endless loop in
it if you got a second retransmission of a cookie collision
case. This would lock up a CPU .. ugly..
- auth function goes to using size_t instead of int which
conforms to socketapi better
- Found the nasty bug that happens after 9 days of testing.. you
get the data chunk, deliver it and due to the reference to a ch->
that every now and then has been deleted (depending on the postion
in the mbuf) you have an invalid ch->ch.flags.. and thus you don't
advance the stream sequence number.. so you block the stream
permanently. The fix is to make local variables of these guys
and set them up before you have any chance of trimming the
mbuf.
- style fix in sctp_util.h, not sure how this got bad maybe in
the last patch? (aka it may not be in the real source).
- Found interesting bug when using the extended snd/rcv info where
we would get an error on receiving with this. Thats because
it was NOT padded to the same size as the snd_rcv info. We
increase (add the pad) so the two structs are the same size
in sctp_uio.h
- In sctp_usrreq.c one of the most common things we did for
socket options was to cast the pointer and validate the size.
This as been macro-ized to help make the code more readable.
- in sctputil.c two things, the socketapi class found a missing
flag type (the next msg is a notification) and a missing
scope recovery was also fixed.
Reviewed by: gnn
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/netinet/sctp_input.c')
-rw-r--r-- | sys/netinet/sctp_input.c | 60 |
1 files changed, 41 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/sys/netinet/sctp_input.c b/sys/netinet/sctp_input.c index 0a6fdea..f227c8e 100644 --- a/sys/netinet/sctp_input.c +++ b/sys/netinet/sctp_input.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /*- - * Copyright (c) 2001-2006, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2007, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: @@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ extern uint32_t sctp_debug_on; - struct sctp_foo_stuff sctp_logoff[30000]; int sctp_logoff_stuff = 0; @@ -612,7 +611,8 @@ sctp_handle_shutdown(struct sctp_shutdown_chunk *cp, /* send SHUTDOWN-ACK */ sctp_send_shutdown_ack(stcb, stcb->asoc.primary_destination); /* move to SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state */ - if (asoc->state == SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_RECEIVED) { + if ((SCTP_GET_STATE(asoc) == SCTP_STATE_OPEN) || + (SCTP_GET_STATE(asoc) == SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_RECEIVED)) { SCTP_STAT_DECR_GAUGE32(sctps_currestab); } asoc->state = SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_ACK_SENT; @@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ sctp_process_cookie_existing(struct mbuf *m, int iphlen, int offset, /* I know that the TCB is non-NULL from the caller */ asoc = &stcb->asoc; - for (how_indx = 0; how_indx < sizeof(asoc->cookie_how); i++) { + for (how_indx = 0; how_indx < sizeof(asoc->cookie_how); how_indx++) { if (asoc->cookie_how[how_indx] == 0) break; } @@ -1160,16 +1160,20 @@ sctp_process_cookie_existing(struct mbuf *m, int iphlen, int offset, net, SCTP_FROM_SCTP_INPUT + SCTP_LOC_11); sctp_timer_stop(SCTP_TIMER_TYPE_INIT, inp, stcb, net, SCTP_FROM_SCTP_INPUT + SCTP_LOC_12); /* update current state */ + if (SCTP_GET_STATE(asoc) == SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED) + SCTP_STAT_INCR_COUNTER32(sctps_activeestab); + else + SCTP_STAT_INCR_COUNTER32(sctps_collisionestab); if (asoc->state & SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING) { - asoc->state = SCTP_STATE_OPEN | - SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING; + asoc->state = SCTP_STATE_OPEN | SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING; sctp_timer_start(SCTP_TIMER_TYPE_SHUTDOWNGUARD, stcb->sctp_ep, stcb, asoc->primary_destination); - } else if ((asoc->state & SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_SENT) == 0) { + } else { /* if ok, move to OPEN state */ asoc->state = SCTP_STATE_OPEN; } + SCTP_STAT_INCR_GAUGE32(sctps_currestab); sctp_stop_all_cookie_timers(stcb); if (((stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_flags & SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_TCPTYPE) || (stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_flags & SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_IN_TCPPOOL)) && @@ -1204,6 +1208,7 @@ sctp_process_cookie_existing(struct mbuf *m, int iphlen, int offset, * we're in the OPEN state (or beyond), so peer must * have simply lost the COOKIE-ACK */ + break; } /* end switch */ sctp_stop_all_cookie_timers(stcb); @@ -1331,10 +1336,19 @@ sctp_process_cookie_existing(struct mbuf *m, int iphlen, int offset, SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_CONNECTED; soisconnected(stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_socket); } + if (SCTP_GET_STATE(asoc) == SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED) + SCTP_STAT_INCR_COUNTER32(sctps_activeestab); + else + SCTP_STAT_INCR_COUNTER32(sctps_collisionestab); + SCTP_STAT_INCR_COUNTER32(sctps_activeestab); + SCTP_STAT_INCR_GAUGE32(sctps_currestab); + } else if (SCTP_GET_STATE(asoc) == SCTP_STATE_OPEN) { + SCTP_STAT_INCR_COUNTER32(sctps_restartestab); + } else { + SCTP_STAT_INCR_COUNTER32(sctps_collisionestab); } if (asoc->state & SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING) { - asoc->state = SCTP_STATE_OPEN | - SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING; + asoc->state = SCTP_STATE_OPEN | SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING; sctp_timer_start(SCTP_TIMER_TYPE_SHUTDOWNGUARD, stcb->sctp_ep, stcb, asoc->primary_destination); @@ -1379,6 +1393,16 @@ sctp_process_cookie_existing(struct mbuf *m, int iphlen, int offset, /* notify upper layer */ *notification = SCTP_NOTIFY_ASSOC_RESTART; atomic_add_int(&stcb->asoc.refcnt, 1); + if ((SCTP_GET_STATE(asoc) != SCTP_STATE_OPEN) && + (SCTP_GET_STATE(asoc) != SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_RECEIVED) && + (SCTP_GET_STATE(asoc) != SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_SENT)) { + SCTP_STAT_INCR_GAUGE32(sctps_currestab); + } + if (SCTP_GET_STATE(asoc) == SCTP_STATE_OPEN) { + SCTP_STAT_INCR_GAUGE32(sctps_restartestab); + } else if (SCTP_GET_STATE(asoc) != SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_SENT) { + SCTP_STAT_INCR_GAUGE32(sctps_collisionestab); + } if (asoc->state & SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING) { asoc->state = SCTP_STATE_OPEN | SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING; @@ -1509,7 +1533,7 @@ sctp_process_cookie_new(struct mbuf *m, int iphlen, int offset, int retval; int error = 0; uint32_t old_tag; - uint8_t chunk_buf[DEFAULT_CHUNK_BUFFER]; + uint8_t auth_chunk_buf[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE]; /* * find and validate the INIT chunk in the cookie (peer's info) the @@ -1647,7 +1671,7 @@ sctp_process_cookie_new(struct mbuf *m, int iphlen, int offset, struct sctp_auth_chunk *auth; auth = (struct sctp_auth_chunk *) - sctp_m_getptr(m, auth_offset, auth_len, chunk_buf); + sctp_m_getptr(m, auth_offset, auth_len, auth_chunk_buf); if (sctp_handle_auth(stcb, auth, m, auth_offset)) { /* auth HMAC failed, dump the assoc and packet */ #ifdef SCTP_DEBUG @@ -1812,7 +1836,6 @@ sctp_handle_cookie_echo(struct mbuf *m, int iphlen, int offset, sin->sin_port = sh->dest_port; sin->sin_addr.s_addr = iph->ip_dst.s_addr; size_of_pkt = SCTP_GET_IPV4_LENGTH(iph); - } else if (iph->ip_v == (IPV6_VERSION >> 4)) { /* its IPv6 */ struct ip6_hdr *ip6; @@ -1825,7 +1848,7 @@ sctp_handle_cookie_echo(struct mbuf *m, int iphlen, int offset, ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); sin6->sin6_port = sh->dest_port; sin6->sin6_addr = ip6->ip6_dst; - size_of_pkt = SCTP_GET_IPV6_LENGTH(ip6); + size_of_pkt = SCTP_GET_IPV6_LENGTH(ip6) + iphlen; } else { return (NULL); } @@ -2796,13 +2819,13 @@ static void sctp_clean_up_stream_reset(struct sctp_tcb *stcb) { struct sctp_association *asoc; - - asoc = &stcb->asoc; struct sctp_tmit_chunk *chk = stcb->asoc.str_reset; if (stcb->asoc.str_reset == NULL) { return; } + asoc = &stcb->asoc; + sctp_timer_stop(SCTP_TIMER_TYPE_STRRESET, stcb->sctp_ep, stcb, chk->whoTo, SCTP_FROM_SCTP_INPUT + SCTP_LOC_25); TAILQ_REMOVE(&asoc->control_send_queue, chk, @@ -3104,11 +3127,11 @@ sctp_handle_stream_reset(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, struct sctp_stream_reset_out_req struct sctp_tmit_chunk *chk; struct sctp_chunkhdr *ch; struct sctp_paramhdr *ph; + int ret_code = 0; + int num_param = 0; /* now it may be a reset or a reset-response */ chk_length = ntohs(sr_req->ch.chunk_length); - int ret_code = 0; - int num_param = 0; /* setup for adding the response */ sctp_alloc_a_chunk(stcb, chk); @@ -3144,7 +3167,6 @@ strres_nochunk: ch->chunk_length = htons(chk->send_size); SCTP_BUF_LEN(chk->data) = SCTP_SIZE32(chk->send_size); - ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)&sr_req->sr_req; while ((size_t)chk_length >= sizeof(struct sctp_stream_reset_tsn_request)) { param_len = ntohs(ph->param_length); @@ -3504,7 +3526,7 @@ sctp_process_control(struct mbuf *m, int iphlen, int *offset, int length, * d-mtu-ceiling for now (2k) and that should hopefully work ... * until we get into jumbo grams and such.. */ - uint8_t chunk_buf[DEFAULT_CHUNK_BUFFER]; + uint8_t chunk_buf[SCTP_CHUNK_BUFFER_SIZE]; struct sctp_tcb *locked_tcb = stcb; int got_auth = 0; uint32_t auth_offset = 0, auth_len = 0; |