a) macro-ization of all mbuf and random number

   access plus timers. This makes the code
   more portable and able to change out the
   mbuf or timer system used more easily ;-)
b) removal of all use of pkt-hdr's until only
   the places we need them (before ip_output routines).
c) remove a bunch of code not needed due to <b> aka
   worrying about pkthdr's :-)
d) There was one last reorder problem it looks where
   if a restart occur's and we release and relock (at
   the point where we setup our alias vtag) we would
   end up possibly getting the wrong TSN in place. The
   code that fixed the TSN's just needed to be shifted
   around BEFORE the release of the lock.. also code that
   set the state (since this also could contribute).
Approved by:	gnn

1 files changed, 25 insertions, 25 deletions

diff --git a/sys/netinet/sctp_auth.c b/sys/netinet/sctp_auth.c
index a87f47f..d5fe70a 100644
--- a/sys/netinet/sctp_auth.c
+++ b/sys/netinet/sctp_auth.c
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ sctp_generate_random_key(uint32_t keylen)
 		/* out of memory */
 		return (NULL);
 	}
-	sctp_read_random(new_key->key, keylen);
+	SCTP_READ_RANDOM(new_key->key, keylen);
 	new_key->keylen = keylen;
 	return (new_key);
 }
@@ -1110,17 +1110,18 @@ sctp_hmac_m(uint16_t hmac_algo, uint8_t * key, uint32_t keylen,
 	sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, ipad, blocklen);
 	/* find the correct starting mbuf and offset (get start of text) */
 	m_tmp = m;
-	while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (m_offset >= (uint32_t) m_tmp->m_len)) {
-		m_offset -= m_tmp->m_len;
-		m_tmp = m_tmp->m_next;
+	while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (m_offset >= (uint32_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp))) {
+		m_offset -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp);
+		m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
 	}
 	/* now use the rest of the mbuf chain for the text */
 	while (m_tmp != NULL) {
 		sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset,
-		    m_tmp->m_len - m_offset);
+		    SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp) - m_offset);
+
 		/* clear the offset since it's only for the first mbuf */
 		m_offset = 0;
-		m_tmp = m_tmp->m_next;
+		m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
 	}
 	sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
 
@@ -1618,23 +1619,23 @@ sctp_bzero_m(struct mbuf *m, uint32_t m_offset, uint32_t size)
 
 	/* find the correct starting mbuf and offset (get start position) */
 	m_tmp = m;
-	while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (m_offset >= (uint32_t) m_tmp->m_len)) {
-		m_offset -= m_tmp->m_len;
-		m_tmp = m_tmp->m_next;
+	while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (m_offset >= (uint32_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp))) {
+		m_offset -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp);
+		m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
 	}
 	/* now use the rest of the mbuf chain */
 	while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (size > 0)) {
 		data = mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset;
-		if (size > (uint32_t) m_tmp->m_len) {
-			bzero(data, m_tmp->m_len);
-			size -= m_tmp->m_len;
+		if (size > (uint32_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp)) {
+			bzero(data, SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp));
+			size -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp);
 		} else {
 			bzero(data, size);
 			size = 0;
 		}
 		/* clear the offset since it's only for the first mbuf */
 		m_offset = 0;
-		m_tmp = m_tmp->m_next;
+		m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -1685,17 +1686,17 @@ sctp_handle_auth(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, struct sctp_auth_chunk *auth,
 		 * report this in an Error Chunk: Unsupported HMAC
 		 * Identifier
 		 */
-		m_err = sctp_get_mbuf_for_msg(sizeof(*err), 1, M_DONTWAIT, 1, MT_HEADER);
+		m_err = sctp_get_mbuf_for_msg(sizeof(*err), 0, M_DONTWAIT, 1, MT_HEADER);
 		if (m_err != NULL) {
 			/* pre-reserve some space */
-			m_err->m_data += sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr);
+			SCTP_BUF_RESV_UF(m_err, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
 			/* fill in the error */
 			err = mtod(m_err, struct sctp_auth_invalid_hmac *);
 			bzero(err, sizeof(*err));
 			err->ph.param_type = htons(SCTP_CAUSE_UNSUPPORTED_HMACID);
 			err->ph.param_length = htons(sizeof(*err));
 			err->hmac_id = ntohs(hmac_id);
-			m_err->m_pkthdr.len = m_err->m_len = sizeof(*err);
+			SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_err) = sizeof(*err);
 			/* queue it */
 			sctp_queue_op_err(stcb, m_err);
 		}
@@ -1787,11 +1788,12 @@ sctp_notify_authentication(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint32_t indication,
 		return;
 
 	m_notify = sctp_get_mbuf_for_msg(sizeof(struct sctp_authkey_event),
-	    1, M_DONTWAIT, 1, MT_HEADER);
+	    0, M_DONTWAIT, 1, MT_HEADER);
 	if (m_notify == NULL)
 		/* no space left */
 		return;
-	m_notify->m_len = 0;
+
+	SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify) = 0;
 	auth = mtod(m_notify, struct sctp_authkey_event *);
 	auth->auth_type = SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT;
 	auth->auth_flags = 0;
@@ -1801,11 +1803,8 @@ sctp_notify_authentication(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint32_t indication,
 	auth->auth_indication = indication;
 	auth->auth_assoc_id = sctp_get_associd(stcb);
 
-	m_notify->m_flags |= M_EOR | M_NOTIFICATION;
-	m_notify->m_pkthdr.len = sizeof(*auth);
-	m_notify->m_pkthdr.rcvif = 0;
-	m_notify->m_len = sizeof(*auth);
-	m_notify->m_next = NULL;
+	SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify) = sizeof(*auth);
+	SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_notify) = NULL;
 
 	/* append to socket */
 	control = sctp_build_readq_entry(stcb, stcb->asoc.primary_destination,
@@ -1815,7 +1814,8 @@ sctp_notify_authentication(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint32_t indication,
 		sctp_m_freem(m_notify);
 		return;
 	}
-	control->length = m_notify->m_len;
+	control->spec_flags = M_NOTIFICATION;
+	control->length = SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify);
 	/* not that we need this */
 	control->tail_mbuf = m_notify;
 	sctp_add_to_readq(stcb->sctp_ep, stcb, control,
@@ -1969,7 +1969,7 @@ sctp_initialize_auth_params(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, struct sctp_tcb *stcb)
 	new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
 	if (new_key != NULL) {
 		/* generate and copy in the RANDOM */
-		sctp_read_random(new_key->key, random_len);
+		SCTP_READ_RANDOM(new_key->key, random_len);
 		keylen = random_len;
 		/* append in the AUTH chunks */
 		if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks) {