diff options
author | rwatson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> | 2001-02-21 06:39:57 +0000 |
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committer | rwatson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> | 2001-02-21 06:39:57 +0000 |
commit | ab5676fc870d2d819cf41120313443182db079cf (patch) | |
tree | 3ed13007d645ee25bab52d52b6aba08f7f0bcf1e /sys/netinet/in_pcb.c | |
parent | 17bdecb1829f632354d48f743f10ff707edded9c (diff) | |
download | FreeBSD-src-ab5676fc870d2d819cf41120313443182db079cf.zip FreeBSD-src-ab5676fc870d2d819cf41120313443182db079cf.tar.gz |
o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject
credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison).
o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence.
o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and
pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference
management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code.
o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead
of struct proc arguments.
o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed,
rather than directly checking pointers all over the place.
o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function.
o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h.
o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the
flag in the process flags field itself.
o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect
mutex use.
Notes:
o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required.
o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs
credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code.
o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is
required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the
structure.
Reviewed by: freebsd-arch
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/netinet/in_pcb.c')
-rw-r--r-- | sys/netinet/in_pcb.c | 19 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/sys/netinet/in_pcb.c b/sys/netinet/in_pcb.c index 7195be9..c114eca 100644 --- a/sys/netinet/in_pcb.c +++ b/sys/netinet/in_pcb.c @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ in_pcbbind(inp, nam, p) return (EAFNOSUPPORT); #endif if (sin->sin_addr.s_addr != INADDR_ANY) - if (prison_ip(p, 0, &sin->sin_addr.s_addr)) + if (prison_ip(p->p_ucred, 0, &sin->sin_addr.s_addr)) return(EINVAL); lport = sin->sin_port; if (IN_MULTICAST(ntohl(sin->sin_addr.s_addr))) { @@ -219,12 +219,11 @@ in_pcbbind(inp, nam, p) } if (lport) { struct inpcb *t; - /* GROSS */ if (ntohs(lport) < IPPORT_RESERVED && p && suser_xxx(0, p, PRISON_ROOT)) return (EACCES); - if (p && p->p_prison) + if (p && jailed(p->p_ucred)) prison = 1; if (so->so_cred->cr_uid != 0 && !IN_MULTICAST(ntohl(sin->sin_addr.s_addr))) { @@ -274,7 +273,7 @@ in_pcbbind(inp, nam, p) int count; if (inp->inp_laddr.s_addr != INADDR_ANY) - if (prison_ip(p, 0, &inp->inp_laddr.s_addr )) + if (prison_ip(p->p_ucred, 0, &inp->inp_laddr.s_addr )) return (EINVAL); inp->inp_flags |= INP_ANONPORT; @@ -345,7 +344,7 @@ in_pcbbind(inp, nam, p) } } inp->inp_lport = lport; - if (prison_ip(p, 0, &inp->inp_laddr.s_addr)) + if (prison_ip(p->p_ucred, 0, &inp->inp_laddr.s_addr)) return(EINVAL); if (in_pcbinshash(inp) != 0) { inp->inp_laddr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; @@ -492,11 +491,13 @@ in_pcbconnect(inp, nam, p) struct sockaddr_in *ifaddr; struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)nam; struct sockaddr_in sa; + struct ucred *cred; int error; - if (inp->inp_laddr.s_addr == INADDR_ANY && p->p_prison != NULL) { + cred = inp->inp_socket->so_cred; + if (inp->inp_laddr.s_addr == INADDR_ANY && jailed(cred)) { bzero(&sa, sizeof (sa)); - sa.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(p->p_prison->pr_ip); + sa.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(cred->cr_prison->pr_ip); sa.sin_len=sizeof (sa); sa.sin_family = AF_INET; error = in_pcbbind(inp, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, p); @@ -1068,9 +1069,9 @@ in_pcbremlists(inp) int prison_xinpcb(struct proc *p, struct inpcb *inp) { - if (!p->p_prison) + if (!jailed(p->p_ucred)) return (0); - if (ntohl(inp->inp_laddr.s_addr) == p->p_prison->pr_ip) + if (ntohl(inp->inp_laddr.s_addr) == p->p_ucred->cr_prison->pr_ip) return (0); return (1); } |