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authorrwatson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>2011-08-11 12:30:23 +0000
committerrwatson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>2011-08-11 12:30:23 +0000
commit4af919b491560ff051b65cdf1ec730bdeb820b2e (patch)
tree4b691c0e209134040c3cf5ce75660b61282933d0 /sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c
parentb3f993efadd59e4731fbd8ece5b71425df684b2d (diff)
downloadFreeBSD-src-4af919b491560ff051b65cdf1ec730bdeb820b2e.zip
FreeBSD-src-4af919b491560ff051b65cdf1ec730bdeb820b2e.tar.gz
Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD
kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c')
-rw-r--r--sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c96
1 files changed, 61 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c b/sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c
index c434973..0e5efe6 100644
--- a/sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c
+++ b/sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c
@@ -120,33 +120,47 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_kern_ipc, OID_AUTO, nsfbufsused, CTLFLAG_RD, &nsfbufsused, 0,
"Number of sendfile(2) sf_bufs in use");
/*
- * Convert a user file descriptor to a kernel file entry. A reference on the
- * file entry is held upon returning. This is lighter weight than
- * fgetsock(), which bumps the socket reference drops the file reference
- * count instead, as this approach avoids several additional mutex operations
- * associated with the additional reference count. If requested, return the
- * open file flags.
+ * Convert a user file descriptor to a kernel file entry and check that, if
+ * it is a capability, the right rights are present. A reference on the file
+ * entry is held upon returning.
*/
static int
-getsock(struct filedesc *fdp, int fd, struct file **fpp, u_int *fflagp)
+getsock_cap(struct filedesc *fdp, int fd, cap_rights_t rights,
+ struct file **fpp, u_int *fflagp)
{
struct file *fp;
+#ifdef CAPABILITIES
+ struct file *fp_fromcap;
int error;
+#endif
fp = NULL;
- if (fdp == NULL || (fp = fget_unlocked(fdp, fd)) == NULL) {
- error = EBADF;
- } else if (fp->f_type != DTYPE_SOCKET) {
+ if ((fdp == NULL) || ((fp = fget_unlocked(fdp, fd)) == NULL))
+ return (EBADF);
+#ifdef CAPABILITIES
+ /*
+ * If the file descriptor is for a capability, test rights and use
+ * the file descriptor referenced by the capability.
+ */
+ error = cap_funwrap(fp, rights, &fp_fromcap);
+ if (error) {
fdrop(fp, curthread);
- fp = NULL;
- error = ENOTSOCK;
- } else {
- if (fflagp != NULL)
- *fflagp = fp->f_flag;
- error = 0;
+ return (error);
}
+ if (fp != fp_fromcap) {
+ fhold(fp_fromcap);
+ fdrop(fp, curthread);
+ fp = fp_fromcap;
+ }
+#endif /* CAPABILITIES */
+ if (fp->f_type != DTYPE_SOCKET) {
+ fdrop(fp, curthread);
+ return (ENOTSOCK);
+ }
+ if (fflagp != NULL)
+ *fflagp = fp->f_flag;
*fpp = fp;
- return (error);
+ return (0);
}
/*
@@ -226,7 +240,7 @@ kern_bind(td, fd, sa)
int error;
AUDIT_ARG_FD(fd);
- error = getsock(td->td_proc->p_fd, fd, &fp, NULL);
+ error = getsock_cap(td->td_proc->p_fd, fd, CAP_BIND, &fp, NULL);
if (error)
return (error);
so = fp->f_data;
@@ -257,7 +271,7 @@ listen(td, uap)
int error;
AUDIT_ARG_FD(uap->s);
- error = getsock(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->s, &fp, NULL);
+ error = getsock_cap(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->s, CAP_LISTEN, &fp, NULL);
if (error == 0) {
so = fp->f_data;
#ifdef MAC
@@ -347,7 +361,7 @@ kern_accept(struct thread *td, int s, struct sockaddr **name,
AUDIT_ARG_FD(s);
fdp = td->td_proc->p_fd;
- error = getsock(fdp, s, &headfp, &fflag);
+ error = getsock_cap(fdp, s, CAP_ACCEPT, &headfp, &fflag);
if (error)
return (error);
head = headfp->f_data;
@@ -535,7 +549,7 @@ kern_connect(td, fd, sa)
int interrupted = 0;
AUDIT_ARG_FD(fd);
- error = getsock(td->td_proc->p_fd, fd, &fp, NULL);
+ error = getsock_cap(td->td_proc->p_fd, fd, CAP_CONNECT, &fp, NULL);
if (error)
return (error);
so = fp->f_data;
@@ -744,12 +758,16 @@ kern_sendit(td, s, mp, flags, control, segflg)
struct socket *so;
int i;
int len, error;
+ cap_rights_t rights;
#ifdef KTRACE
struct uio *ktruio = NULL;
#endif
AUDIT_ARG_FD(s);
- error = getsock(td->td_proc->p_fd, s, &fp, NULL);
+ rights = CAP_WRITE;
+ if (mp->msg_name != NULL)
+ rights |= CAP_CONNECT;
+ error = getsock_cap(td->td_proc->p_fd, s, rights, &fp, NULL);
if (error)
return (error);
so = (struct socket *)fp->f_data;
@@ -953,7 +971,7 @@ kern_recvit(td, s, mp, fromseg, controlp)
*controlp = NULL;
AUDIT_ARG_FD(s);
- error = getsock(td->td_proc->p_fd, s, &fp, NULL);
+ error = getsock_cap(td->td_proc->p_fd, s, CAP_READ, &fp, NULL);
if (error)
return (error);
so = fp->f_data;
@@ -1267,7 +1285,8 @@ shutdown(td, uap)
int error;
AUDIT_ARG_FD(uap->s);
- error = getsock(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->s, &fp, NULL);
+ error = getsock_cap(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->s, CAP_SHUTDOWN, &fp,
+ NULL);
if (error == 0) {
so = fp->f_data;
error = soshutdown(so, uap->how);
@@ -1330,7 +1349,7 @@ kern_setsockopt(td, s, level, name, val, valseg, valsize)
}
AUDIT_ARG_FD(s);
- error = getsock(td->td_proc->p_fd, s, &fp, NULL);
+ error = getsock_cap(td->td_proc->p_fd, s, CAP_SETSOCKOPT, &fp, NULL);
if (error == 0) {
so = fp->f_data;
error = sosetopt(so, &sopt);
@@ -1409,7 +1428,7 @@ kern_getsockopt(td, s, level, name, val, valseg, valsize)
}
AUDIT_ARG_FD(s);
- error = getsock(td->td_proc->p_fd, s, &fp, NULL);
+ error = getsock_cap(td->td_proc->p_fd, s, CAP_GETSOCKOPT, &fp, NULL);
if (error == 0) {
so = fp->f_data;
error = sogetopt(so, &sopt);
@@ -1471,7 +1490,7 @@ kern_getsockname(struct thread *td, int fd, struct sockaddr **sa,
return (EINVAL);
AUDIT_ARG_FD(fd);
- error = getsock(td->td_proc->p_fd, fd, &fp, NULL);
+ error = getsock_cap(td->td_proc->p_fd, fd, CAP_GETSOCKNAME, &fp, NULL);
if (error)
return (error);
so = fp->f_data;
@@ -1571,7 +1590,7 @@ kern_getpeername(struct thread *td, int fd, struct sockaddr **sa,
return (EINVAL);
AUDIT_ARG_FD(fd);
- error = getsock(td->td_proc->p_fd, fd, &fp, NULL);
+ error = getsock_cap(td->td_proc->p_fd, fd, CAP_GETPEERNAME, &fp, NULL);
if (error)
return (error);
so = fp->f_data;
@@ -1827,7 +1846,7 @@ kern_sendfile(struct thread *td, struct sendfile_args *uap,
* we send only the header/trailer and no payload data.
*/
AUDIT_ARG_FD(uap->fd);
- if ((error = fgetvp_read(td, uap->fd, &vp)) != 0)
+ if ((error = fgetvp_read(td, uap->fd, CAP_READ, &vp)) != 0)
goto out;
vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(vp->v_mount);
vn_lock(vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
@@ -1865,8 +1884,8 @@ kern_sendfile(struct thread *td, struct sendfile_args *uap,
* The socket must be a stream socket and connected.
* Remember if it a blocking or non-blocking socket.
*/
- if ((error = getsock(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->s, &sock_fp,
- NULL)) != 0)
+ if ((error = getsock_cap(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->s, CAP_WRITE,
+ &sock_fp, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
so = sock_fp->f_data;
if (so->so_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
@@ -2298,7 +2317,7 @@ sctp_peeloff(td, uap)
fdp = td->td_proc->p_fd;
AUDIT_ARG_FD(uap->sd);
- error = fgetsock(td, uap->sd, &head, &fflag);
+ error = fgetsock(td, uap->sd, CAP_PEELOFF, &head, &fflag);
if (error)
goto done2;
error = sctp_can_peel_off(head, (sctp_assoc_t)uap->name);
@@ -2391,6 +2410,7 @@ sctp_generic_sendmsg (td, uap)
#endif
struct uio auio;
struct iovec iov[1];
+ cap_rights_t rights;
if (uap->sinfo) {
error = copyin(uap->sinfo, &sinfo, sizeof (sinfo));
@@ -2398,16 +2418,19 @@ sctp_generic_sendmsg (td, uap)
return (error);
u_sinfo = &sinfo;
}
+
+ rights = CAP_WRITE;
if (uap->tolen) {
error = getsockaddr(&to, uap->to, uap->tolen);
if (error) {
to = NULL;
goto sctp_bad2;
}
+ rights |= CAP_CONNECT;
}
AUDIT_ARG_FD(uap->sd);
- error = getsock(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->sd, &fp, NULL);
+ error = getsock_cap(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->sd, rights, &fp, NULL);
if (error)
goto sctp_bad;
#ifdef KTRACE
@@ -2494,6 +2517,7 @@ sctp_generic_sendmsg_iov(td, uap)
#endif
struct uio auio;
struct iovec *iov, *tiov;
+ cap_rights_t rights;
if (uap->sinfo) {
error = copyin(uap->sinfo, &sinfo, sizeof (sinfo));
@@ -2501,16 +2525,18 @@ sctp_generic_sendmsg_iov(td, uap)
return (error);
u_sinfo = &sinfo;
}
+ rights = CAP_WRITE;
if (uap->tolen) {
error = getsockaddr(&to, uap->to, uap->tolen);
if (error) {
to = NULL;
goto sctp_bad2;
}
+ rights |= CAP_CONNECT;
}
AUDIT_ARG_FD(uap->sd);
- error = getsock(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->sd, &fp, NULL);
+ error = getsock_cap(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->sd, rights, &fp, NULL);
if (error)
goto sctp_bad1;
@@ -2618,7 +2644,7 @@ sctp_generic_recvmsg(td, uap)
#endif
AUDIT_ARG_FD(uap->sd);
- error = getsock(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->sd, &fp, NULL);
+ error = getsock_cap(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->sd, CAP_READ, &fp, NULL);
if (error) {
return (error);
}
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