diff options
author | rwatson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> | 2001-02-21 06:39:57 +0000 |
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committer | rwatson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> | 2001-02-21 06:39:57 +0000 |
commit | ab5676fc870d2d819cf41120313443182db079cf (patch) | |
tree | 3ed13007d645ee25bab52d52b6aba08f7f0bcf1e /sys/kern/sysv_msg.c | |
parent | 17bdecb1829f632354d48f743f10ff707edded9c (diff) | |
download | FreeBSD-src-ab5676fc870d2d819cf41120313443182db079cf.zip FreeBSD-src-ab5676fc870d2d819cf41120313443182db079cf.tar.gz |
o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject
credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison).
o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence.
o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and
pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference
management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code.
o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead
of struct proc arguments.
o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed,
rather than directly checking pointers all over the place.
o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function.
o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h.
o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the
flag in the process flags field itself.
o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect
mutex use.
Notes:
o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required.
o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs
credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code.
o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is
required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the
structure.
Reviewed by: freebsd-arch
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/kern/sysv_msg.c')
-rw-r--r-- | sys/kern/sysv_msg.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/sys/kern/sysv_msg.c b/sys/kern/sysv_msg.c index db4a90a..f2b3ba7 100644 --- a/sys/kern/sysv_msg.c +++ b/sys/kern/sysv_msg.c @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ msgsys(p, uap) } */ *uap; { - if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && p->p_prison != NULL) + if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && jailed(p->p_ucred)) return (ENOSYS); if (uap->which >= sizeof(msgcalls)/sizeof(msgcalls[0])) @@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ msgctl(p, uap) printf("call to msgctl(%d, %d, 0x%x)\n", msqid, cmd, user_msqptr); #endif - if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && p->p_prison != NULL) + if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && jailed(p->p_ucred)) return (ENOSYS); msqid = IPCID_TO_IX(msqid); @@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ msgget(p, uap) printf("msgget(0x%x, 0%o)\n", key, msgflg); #endif - if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && p->p_prison != NULL) + if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && jailed(p->p_ucred)) return (ENOSYS); if (key != IPC_PRIVATE) { @@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ msgsnd(p, uap) msgflg); #endif - if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && p->p_prison != NULL) + if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && jailed(p->p_ucred)) return (ENOSYS); msqid = IPCID_TO_IX(msqid); @@ -915,7 +915,7 @@ msgrcv(p, uap) msgsz, msgtyp, msgflg); #endif - if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && p->p_prison != NULL) + if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && jailed(p->p_ucred)) return (ENOSYS); msqid = IPCID_TO_IX(msqid); |