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authorrwatson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>2001-02-21 06:39:57 +0000
committerrwatson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>2001-02-21 06:39:57 +0000
commitab5676fc870d2d819cf41120313443182db079cf (patch)
tree3ed13007d645ee25bab52d52b6aba08f7f0bcf1e /sys/kern/sysv_msg.c
parent17bdecb1829f632354d48f743f10ff707edded9c (diff)
downloadFreeBSD-src-ab5676fc870d2d819cf41120313443182db079cf.zip
FreeBSD-src-ab5676fc870d2d819cf41120313443182db079cf.tar.gz
o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject
credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison). o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence. o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code. o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead of struct proc arguments. o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed, rather than directly checking pointers all over the place. o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function. o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h. o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the flag in the process flags field itself. o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect mutex use. Notes: o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required. o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code. o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the structure. Reviewed by: freebsd-arch Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/kern/sysv_msg.c')
-rw-r--r--sys/kern/sysv_msg.c10
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/sys/kern/sysv_msg.c b/sys/kern/sysv_msg.c
index db4a90a..f2b3ba7 100644
--- a/sys/kern/sysv_msg.c
+++ b/sys/kern/sysv_msg.c
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ msgsys(p, uap)
} */ *uap;
{
- if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && p->p_prison != NULL)
+ if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && jailed(p->p_ucred))
return (ENOSYS);
if (uap->which >= sizeof(msgcalls)/sizeof(msgcalls[0]))
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ msgctl(p, uap)
printf("call to msgctl(%d, %d, 0x%x)\n", msqid, cmd, user_msqptr);
#endif
- if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && p->p_prison != NULL)
+ if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && jailed(p->p_ucred))
return (ENOSYS);
msqid = IPCID_TO_IX(msqid);
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ msgget(p, uap)
printf("msgget(0x%x, 0%o)\n", key, msgflg);
#endif
- if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && p->p_prison != NULL)
+ if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && jailed(p->p_ucred))
return (ENOSYS);
if (key != IPC_PRIVATE) {
@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ msgsnd(p, uap)
msgflg);
#endif
- if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && p->p_prison != NULL)
+ if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && jailed(p->p_ucred))
return (ENOSYS);
msqid = IPCID_TO_IX(msqid);
@@ -915,7 +915,7 @@ msgrcv(p, uap)
msgsz, msgtyp, msgflg);
#endif
- if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && p->p_prison != NULL)
+ if (!jail_sysvipc_allowed && jailed(p->p_ucred))
return (ENOSYS);
msqid = IPCID_TO_IX(msqid);
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