Remove MAC Framework access control check entry points made redundant with

the introduction of priv(9) and MAC Framework entry points for privilege
checking/granting.  These entry points exactly aligned with privileges and
provided no additional security context:

- mac_check_sysarch_ioperm()
- mac_check_kld_unload()
- mac_check_settime()
- mac_check_system_nfsd()

Add mpo_priv_check() implementations to Biba and LOMAC policies, which,
for each privilege, determine if they can be granted to processes
considered unprivileged by those two policies.  These mostly, but not
entirely, align with the set of privileges granted in jails.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 14 deletions

diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_time.c b/sys/kern/kern_time.c
index 2a3df94..c434b93 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_time.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_time.c
@@ -32,8 +32,6 @@
 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
 __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
 
-#include "opt_mac.h"
-
 #include <sys/param.h>
 #include <sys/systm.h>
 #include <sys/limits.h>
@@ -56,8 +54,6 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include <sys/timetc.h>
 #include <sys/vnode.h>
 
-#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
-
 #include <vm/vm.h>
 #include <vm/vm_extern.h>
 
@@ -272,11 +268,6 @@ kern_clock_settime(struct thread *td, clockid_t clock_id, struct timespec *ats)
 	struct timeval atv;
 	int error;
 
-#ifdef MAC
-	error = mac_check_system_settime(td->td_ucred);
-	if (error)
-		return (error);
-#endif
 	if ((error = priv_check(td, PRIV_CLOCK_SETTIME)) != 0)
 		return (error);
 	if (clock_id != CLOCK_REALTIME)
@@ -479,11 +470,6 @@ kern_settimeofday(struct thread *td, struct timeval *tv, struct timezone *tzp)
 {
 	int error;
 
-#ifdef MAC
-	error = mac_check_system_settime(td->td_ucred);
-	if (error)
-		return (error);
-#endif
 	error = priv_check(td, PRIV_SETTIMEOFDAY);
 	if (error)
 		return (error);