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authormarkm <markm@FreeBSD.org>1995-12-27 11:22:05 +0000
committermarkm <markm@FreeBSD.org>1995-12-27 11:22:05 +0000
commitc5d5c6d2374acd86b24112bff797c4fad83462d0 (patch)
tree51461c666665e1d85d90c51849397534fff56de3 /sys/kern/kern_random.c
parent74527dd12845a2d0c6244ce3103891e01e17aa3c (diff)
downloadFreeBSD-src-c5d5c6d2374acd86b24112bff797c4fad83462d0.zip
FreeBSD-src-c5d5c6d2374acd86b24112bff797c4fad83462d0.tar.gz
random_machdep.c: New version, also includes revectored interrupts, rather
than hooking permanently. vector.s: : Remove the interrupt hook. This is done dynamically, now.
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/kern/kern_random.c')
-rw-r--r--sys/kern/kern_random.c449
1 files changed, 245 insertions, 204 deletions
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_random.c b/sys/kern/kern_random.c
index 8d10533..3616585 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_random.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_random.c
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
/*
- * random_machdep.c -- A strong random number generator
+ * random.c -- A strong random number generator
*
* $Id$
*
- * Version 0.92, last modified 21-Sep-95
+ * Version 0.95, last modified 18-Oct-95
*
* Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -37,88 +37,226 @@
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
*/
+#define MAX_BLKDEV 4
+
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <i386/isa/isa.h>
-#include <i386/isa/icu.h>
#include <i386/isa/timerreg.h>
#include <i386/isa/isa_device.h>
#include <machine/random.h>
-#define RANDPOOL 512
+/*
+ * The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of degree 128
+ * over GF(2), namely x^128 + x^99 + x^59 + x^31 + x^9 + x^7 + 1.
+ * For a pool of size 64, try x^64+x^62+x^38+x^10+x^6+x+1.
+ */
+#define POOLWORDS 128 /* Power of 2 - note that this is 32-bit words */
+#define POOLBITS (POOLWORDS*32)
+
+#if POOLWORDS == 128
+#define TAP1 99 /* The polynomial taps */
+#define TAP2 59
+#define TAP3 31
+#define TAP4 9
+#define TAP5 7
+#elif POOLWORDS == 64
+#define TAP1 62 /* The polynomial taps */
+#define TAP2 38
+#define TAP3 10
+#define TAP4 6
+#define TAP5 1
+#else
+#error No primitive polynomial available for chosen POOLWORDS
+#endif
+#define WRITEBUFFER 512 /* size in bytes */
+
+/* There is actually only one of these, globally. */
struct random_bucket {
- int add_ptr;
- int entropy_count;
- int length;
- int bit_length;
- int delay_mix:1;
- u_int8_t *pool;
+ u_int add_ptr;
+ u_int entropy_count;
+ int input_rotate;
+ u_int32_t *pool;
};
+/* There is one of these per entropy source */
struct timer_rand_state {
- u_int32_t last_time;
- int last_delta;
- int nbits;
+ u_long last_time;
+ int last_delta;
+ int nbits;
};
static struct random_bucket random_state;
-static u_int32_t rand_pool_key[16];
-static u_int8_t random_pool[RANDPOOL];
-static u_int32_t random_counter[16];
+static u_int32_t random_pool[POOLWORDS];
static struct timer_rand_state keyboard_timer_state;
+static struct timer_rand_state extract_timer_state;
static struct timer_rand_state irq_timer_state[ICU_LEN];
+static struct timer_rand_state blkdev_timer_state[MAX_BLKDEV];
+static struct wait_queue *random_wait;
+
+inthand2_t *sec_intr_handler[ICU_LEN];
+int sec_intr_unit[ICU_LEN];
-inthand2_t add_interrupt_randomness;
-u_int16_t interrupt_allowed = 0;
-
#ifndef MIN
#define MIN(a,b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
#endif
-static void
-flush_random(struct random_bucket *random_state)
+void
+rand_initialize(void)
{
- random_state->add_ptr = 0;
- random_state->bit_length = random_state->length * 8;
- random_state->entropy_count = 0;
- random_state->delay_mix = 0;
+ random_state.add_ptr = 0;
+ random_state.entropy_count = 0;
+ random_state.pool = random_pool;
+ random_wait = NULL;
}
-void
-rand_initialize(void)
+/*
+ * This function adds an int into the entropy "pool". It does not
+ * update the entropy estimate. The caller must do this if appropriate.
+ *
+ * The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of degree 128
+ * over GF(2), namely x^128 + x^99 + x^59 + x^31 + x^9 + x^7 + 1.
+ * For a pool of size 64, try x^64+x^62+x^38+x^10+x^6+x+1.
+ *
+ * We rotate the input word by a changing number of bits, to help
+ * assure that all bits in the entropy get toggled. Otherwise, if we
+ * consistently feed the entropy pool small numbers (like ticks and
+ * scancodes, for example), the upper bits of the entropy pool don't
+ * get affected. --- TYT, 10/11/95
+ */
+static inline void
+add_entropy_word(struct random_bucket *r, const u_int32_t input)
{
+ u_int i;
+ u_int32_t w;
+
+ w = (input << r->input_rotate) | (input >> (32 - r->input_rotate));
+ i = r->add_ptr = (r->add_ptr - 1) & (POOLWORDS-1);
+ if (i)
+ r->input_rotate = (r->input_rotate + 7) & 31;
+ else
+ /*
+ * At the beginning of the pool, add an extra 7 bits
+ * rotation, so that successive passes spread the
+ * input bits across the pool evenly.
+ */
+ r->input_rotate = (r->input_rotate + 14) & 31;
+
+ /* XOR in the various taps */
+ w ^= r->pool[(i+TAP1)&(POOLWORDS-1)];
+ w ^= r->pool[(i+TAP2)&(POOLWORDS-1)];
+ w ^= r->pool[(i+TAP3)&(POOLWORDS-1)];
+ w ^= r->pool[(i+TAP4)&(POOLWORDS-1)];
+ w ^= r->pool[(i+TAP5)&(POOLWORDS-1)];
+ w ^= r->pool[i];
+ /* Rotate w left 1 bit (stolen from SHA) and store */
+ r->pool[i] = (w << 1) | (w >> 31);
+}
- random_state.length = RANDPOOL;
- random_state.pool = random_pool;
- flush_random(&random_state);
-
-#if 0
- {
- int irq;
- long interrupts;
- /* XXX Dreadful hack - should be replaced by something more elegant */
- interrupts = RANDOM_INTERRUPTS;
-
- for (irq = 0; irq < ICU_LEN; irq++) {
- interrupt_allowed[irq] = interrupts & 0x0001;
- interrupts >>= 1;
- printf("Randomising irq %d %s\n", irq, interrupt_allowed[irq] ?
- "on" : "off");
- }
+/*
+ * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
+ * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
+ * of how any bits of entropy this call has added to the pool.
+ *
+ * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe
+ * the type of event which just happened. This is currently 0-255 for
+ * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
+ * On the i386, this is assumed to be at most 16 bits, and the high bits
+ * are used for a high-resolution timer.
+ *
+ * TODO: Read the time stamp register on the Pentium.
+ */
+static void
+add_timer_randomness(struct random_bucket *r, struct timer_rand_state *state,
+ u_int num)
+{
+ int delta, delta2;
+ u_int nbits;
+ u_int32_t time;
+
+#if defined(I586_CPU)
+ if (cpu_class == CPUCLASS_586) {
+ u_long low, high;
+
+ __asm__(".byte 0x0f,0x31" :"=a" (low), "=d" (high)); /* RDTSC */
+ time = (u_int32_t) low;
+ num ^= (u_int32_t) high;
+ r->entropy_count += 2;
}
+ else {
+#endif
+ outb(TIMER_LATCH|TIMER_SEL0, TIMER_MODE); /* latch ASAP */
+ num ^= inb(TIMER_CNTR0) << 16;
+ num ^= inb(TIMER_CNTR0) << 24;
+ r->entropy_count += 2;
+#if defined(I586_CPU)
+ } /* cpu_class == CPUCLASS_586 */
#endif
+
+ time = ticks;
+
+ add_entropy_word(r, (u_int32_t) num);
+ add_entropy_word(r, time);
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably
+ * added. We take into account the first and second order
+ * deltas in order to make our estimate.
+ */
+ delta = time - state->last_time;
+ state->last_time = time;
+
+ delta2 = delta - state->last_delta;
+ state->last_delta = delta;
+
+ if (delta < 0) delta = -delta;
+ if (delta2 < 0) delta2 = -delta2;
+ delta = MIN(delta, delta2) >> 1;
+ for (nbits = 0; delta; nbits++)
+ delta >>= 1;
+
+ r->entropy_count += nbits;
+
+ /* Prevent overflow */
+ if (r->entropy_count > POOLBITS)
+ r->entropy_count = POOLBITS;
+}
+
+void
+add_keyboard_randomness(u_char scancode)
+{
+ add_timer_randomness(&random_state, &keyboard_timer_state, scancode);
+}
+
+void
+add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
+{
+ (sec_intr_handler[irq])(sec_intr_unit[irq]);
+ add_timer_randomness(&random_state, &irq_timer_state[irq], irq);
+}
+
+void
+add_blkdev_randomness(int major)
+{
+ if (major >= MAX_BLKDEV)
+ return;
+
+ add_timer_randomness(&random_state, &blkdev_timer_state[major],
+ 0x200+major);
}
/*
* MD5 transform algorithm, taken from code written by Colin Plumb,
* and put into the public domain
+ *
+ * QUESTION: Replace this with SHA, which as generally received better
+ * reviews from the cryptographic community?
*/
/* The four core functions - F1 is optimized somewhat */
@@ -139,7 +277,8 @@ rand_initialize(void)
* the data and converts bytes into longwords for this routine.
*/
static void
-MD5Transform(u_int32_t buf[4], u_int32_t const in[16])
+MD5Transform(u_int32_t buf[4],
+ u_int32_t const in[16])
{
u_int32_t a, b, c, d;
@@ -228,183 +367,67 @@ MD5Transform(u_int32_t buf[4], u_int32_t const in[16])
#undef F4
#undef MD5STEP
-static void
-mix_bucket(struct random_bucket *v)
-{
- struct random_bucket *r = v;
- int i, num_passes;
- u_int32_t *p;
- u_int32_t iv[4];
-
- r->delay_mix = 0;
-
- /* Start IV from last block of the random pool */
- memcpy(iv, r->pool + r->length - sizeof(iv), sizeof(iv));
-
- num_passes = r->length / 16;
- for (i = 0, p = (u_int32_t *) r->pool; i < num_passes; i++) {
- MD5Transform(iv, rand_pool_key);
- iv[0] = (*p++ ^= iv[0]);
- iv[1] = (*p++ ^= iv[1]);
- iv[2] = (*p++ ^= iv[2]);
- iv[3] = (*p++ ^= iv[3]);
- }
- memcpy(rand_pool_key, r->pool, sizeof(rand_pool_key));
-
- /* Wipe iv from memory */
- bzero(iv, sizeof(iv));
-
- r->add_ptr = 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * This function adds a byte into the entropy "pool". It does not
- * update the entropy estimate. The caller must do this if appropriate.
- */
-static inline void
-add_entropy_byte(struct random_bucket *r, const u_int8_t ch, int delay)
-{
- if (!delay && r->delay_mix)
- mix_bucket(r);
- r->pool[r->add_ptr++] ^= ch;
- if (r->add_ptr >= r->length) {
- if (delay) {
- r->delay_mix = 1;
- r->add_ptr = 0;
- } else
- mix_bucket(r);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * This function adds some number of bytes into the entropy pool and
- * updates the entropy count as appropriate.
- */
-static void
-add_entropy(struct random_bucket *r, const u_int8_t *ptr, int length,
- int entropy_level, int delay)
-{
- while (length-- > 0)
- add_entropy_byte(r, *ptr++, delay);
-
- r->entropy_count += entropy_level;
- if (r->entropy_count > r->length*8)
- r->entropy_count = r->length * 8;
-}
-
-/*
- * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
- * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
- * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool.
- */
-static void
-add_timer_randomness(struct random_bucket *r, struct timer_rand_state *state,
- int delay)
-{
- int delta, delta2;
- int nbits;
- u_int8_t timer_high, timer_low;
-
- /*
- * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably
- * added. We take into account the first and second order
- * delta's in order to make our estimate.
- */
- delta = ticks - state->last_time;
- delta2 = delta - state->last_delta;
- state->last_time = ticks;
- state->last_delta = delta;
- if (delta < 0) delta = -delta;
- if (delta2 < 0) delta2 = -delta2;
- delta = MIN(delta, delta2) >> 1;
- for (nbits = 0; delta; nbits++)
- delta >>= 1;
-
- add_entropy(r, (u_int8_t *) &ticks, sizeof(ticks), nbits, delay);
-
- /*
- * On a 386, read the high resolution timer. We assume that
- * this gives us 2 bits of randomness. XXX This needs
- * investigation.
- */
- disable_intr();
- outb(TIMER_MODE, TIMER_SEL0 | TIMER_LATCH);
- timer_low = inb(TIMER_CNTR0);
- timer_high = inb(TIMER_CNTR0);
- enable_intr();
- add_entropy_byte(r, timer_low, 1);
- add_entropy_byte(r, timer_high, 1);
- r->entropy_count += 2;
- if (r->entropy_count > r->bit_length)
- r->entropy_count = r->bit_length;
-}
-
-void
-add_keyboard_randomness(u_char scancode)
-{
- struct random_bucket *r = &random_state;
-
- add_timer_randomness(r, &keyboard_timer_state, 0);
- add_entropy_byte(r, scancode, 0);
- r->entropy_count += 6;
- if (r->entropy_count > r->bit_length)
- r->entropy_count = r->bit_length;
-}
-
-void
-add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
-{
- static struct random_bucket *r = &random_state;
- u_int16_t intbit = 1 << irq;
-
-/* printf("Trapping interrupt %d\n", irq); */
-
- if (interrupt_allowed & intbit)
- add_timer_randomness(r, &irq_timer_state[irq], 1);
-}
+#if POOLWORDS % 16
+#error extract_entropy() assumes that POOLWORDS is a multiple of 16 words.
+#endif
/*
* This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and
* returns it in a buffer. This function computes how many remaining
* bits of entropy are left in the pool, but it does not restrict the
* number of bytes that are actually obtained.
*/
-static inline u_int
-extract_entropy(struct random_bucket *r, char *buf, u_int nbytes)
+static inline int
+extract_entropy(struct random_bucket *r, char *buf, int nbytes)
{
- int passes, i;
- u_int length, ret;
+ int ret, i;
u_int32_t tmp[4];
- u_int8_t *cp;
- add_entropy(r, (u_int8_t *) &ticks, sizeof(ticks), 0, 0);
+ add_timer_randomness(r, &extract_timer_state, nbytes);
- if (r->entropy_count > r->bit_length)
- r->entropy_count = r->bit_length;
+ /* Redundant, but just in case... */
+ if (r->entropy_count > POOLBITS)
+ r->entropy_count = POOLBITS;
+ /* Why is this here? Left in from Ted Ts'o. Perhaps to limit time. */
if (nbytes > 32768)
nbytes = 32768;
+
ret = nbytes;
- r->entropy_count -= ret * 8;
- if (r->entropy_count < 0)
+ if (r->entropy_count / 8 >= nbytes)
+ r->entropy_count -= nbytes*8;
+ else
r->entropy_count = 0;
- passes = r->length / 64;
+
while (nbytes) {
- length = MIN(nbytes, 16);
- for (i=0; i < 16; i++) {
- if (++random_counter[i] != 0)
- break;
- }
+ /* Hash the pool to get the output */
tmp[0] = 0x67452301;
tmp[1] = 0xefcdab89;
tmp[2] = 0x98badcfe;
tmp[3] = 0x10325476;
- MD5Transform(tmp, random_counter);
- for (i = 0, cp = r->pool; i < passes; i++, cp+=64)
- MD5Transform(tmp, (u_int32_t *) cp);
- memcpy(buf, tmp, length);
- nbytes -= length;
- buf += length;
+ for (i = 0; i < POOLWORDS; i += 16)
+ MD5Transform(tmp, r->pool+i);
+ /* Modify pool so next hash will produce different results */
+ add_entropy_word(r, tmp[0]);
+ add_entropy_word(r, tmp[1]);
+ add_entropy_word(r, tmp[2]);
+ add_entropy_word(r, tmp[3]);
+ /*
+ * Run the MD5 Transform one more time, since we want
+ * to add at least minimal obscuring of the inputs to
+ * add_entropy_word(). --- TYT
+ */
+ MD5Transform(tmp, r->pool);
+
+ /* Copy data to destination buffer */
+ i = MIN(nbytes, 16);
+ memcpy(buf, (u_int8_t const *)tmp, i);
+ nbytes -= i;
+ buf += i;
}
+
+ /* Wipe data from memory */
+ bzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+
return ret;
}
@@ -420,7 +443,7 @@ get_random_bytes(void *buf, u_int nbytes)
}
u_int
-read_random(char * buf, u_int nbytes)
+read_random(char *buf, u_int nbytes)
{
if ((nbytes * 8) > random_state.entropy_count)
nbytes = random_state.entropy_count / 8;
@@ -429,7 +452,25 @@ read_random(char * buf, u_int nbytes)
}
u_int
-read_random_unlimited(char * buf, u_int nbytes)
+read_random_unlimited(char *buf, u_int nbytes)
{
return extract_entropy(&random_state, buf, nbytes);
}
+
+u_int
+write_random(const char *buf, u_int nbytes)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ u_int32_t word, *p;
+
+ for (i = nbytes, p = (u_int32_t *)buf;
+ i >= sizeof(u_int32_t);
+ i-= sizeof(u_int32_t), p++)
+ add_entropy_word(&random_state, *p);
+ if (i) {
+ word = 0;
+ memcpy(&word, p, i);
+ add_entropy_word(&random_state, word);
+ }
+ return nbytes;
+}
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