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authorrwatson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>2007-06-16 23:41:43 +0000
committerrwatson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>2007-06-16 23:41:43 +0000
commit5956b5bc21c96b25c05bcdb8b76e1fd590072f14 (patch)
tree787b92698a00798f7eef6093395ee57f1e6c2cf0 /sys/kern/kern_priv.c
parente3e21bd46ae0de1d4958f608c5a4a3016bec2dbd (diff)
downloadFreeBSD-src-5956b5bc21c96b25c05bcdb8b76e1fd590072f14.zip
FreeBSD-src-5956b5bc21c96b25c05bcdb8b76e1fd590072f14.tar.gz
Rather than passing SUSER_RUID into priv_check_cred() to specify when
a privilege is checked against the real uid rather than the effective uid, instead decide which uid to use in priv_check_cred() based on the privilege passed in. We use the real uid for PRIV_MAXFILES, PRIV_MAXPROC, and PRIV_PROC_LIMIT. Remove the definition of SUSER_RUID; there are now no flags defined for priv_check_cred(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/kern/kern_priv.c')
-rw-r--r--sys/kern/kern_priv.c25
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_priv.c b/sys/kern/kern_priv.c
index ebf01ba..307d134 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_priv.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_priv.c
@@ -68,6 +68,10 @@ priv_check_cred(struct ucred *cred, int priv, int flags)
KASSERT(PRIV_VALID(priv), ("priv_check_cred: invalid privilege %d",
priv));
+ /*
+ * We first evaluate policies that may deny the granting of
+ * privilege unilaterally.
+ */
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_priv_check(cred, priv);
if (error)
@@ -84,21 +88,28 @@ priv_check_cred(struct ucred *cred, int priv, int flags)
/*
* Having determined if privilege is restricted by various policies,
- * now determine if privilege is granted. For now, we allow
- * short-circuit boolean evaluation, so may not call all policies.
- * Perhaps we should.
+ * now determine if privilege is granted. At this point, any policy
+ * may grant privilege. For now, we allow short-circuit boolean
+ * evaluation, so may not call all policies. Perhaps we should.
*
* Superuser policy grants privilege based on the effective (or in
- * certain edge cases, real) uid being 0. We allow the policy to be
- * globally disabled, although this is currently of limited utility.
+ * the case of specific privileges, real) uid being 0. We allow the
+ * superuser policy to be globally disabled, although this is
+ * currenty of limited utility.
*/
if (suser_enabled) {
- if (flags & SUSER_RUID) {
+ switch (priv) {
+ case PRIV_MAXFILES:
+ case PRIV_MAXPROC:
+ case PRIV_PROC_LIMIT:
if (cred->cr_ruid == 0)
return (0);
- } else {
+ break;
+
+ default:
if (cred->cr_uid == 0)
return (0);
+ break;
}
}
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