o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject

  credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison).
o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence.
o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and
  pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference
  management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code.
o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead
  of struct proc arguments.
o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed,
  rather than directly checking pointers all over the place.
o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function.
o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h.
o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the
  flag in the process flags field itself.
o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect
  mutex use.

Notes:

o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required.
o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs
  credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code.
o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is
  required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the
  structure.

Reviewed by:	freebsd-arch
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project

1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_mib.c b/sys/kern/kern_mib.c
index 0826ea0..bb9f640 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_mib.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_mib.c
@@ -146,12 +146,12 @@ sysctl_hostname(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
 {
 	int error;
 
-	if (req->p->p_prison) {
+	if (jailed(req->p->p_ucred)) {
 		if (!jail_set_hostname_allowed && req->newptr)
 			return(EPERM);
 		error = sysctl_handle_string(oidp, 
-		    req->p->p_prison->pr_host,
-		    sizeof req->p->p_prison->pr_host, req);
+		    req->p->p_ucred->cr_prison->pr_host,
+		    sizeof req->p->p_ucred->cr_prison->pr_host, req);
 	} else
 		error = sysctl_handle_string(oidp, 
 		    hostname, sizeof hostname, req);