o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject

  credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison).
o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence.
o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and
  pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference
  management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code.
o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead
  of struct proc arguments.
o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed,
  rather than directly checking pointers all over the place.
o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function.
o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h.
o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the
  flag in the process flags field itself.
o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect
  mutex use.

Notes:

o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required.
o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs
  credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code.
o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is
  required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the
  structure.

Reviewed by:	freebsd-arch
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project

1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c b/sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c
index ce408ca..149bc4c 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
 #include <sys/ktrace.h>
 #include <sys/malloc.h>
 #include <sys/syslog.h>
+#include <sys/jail.h>
 
 static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_KTRACE, "KTRACE", "KTRACE");
 
@@ -519,6 +520,7 @@ ktrwrite(vp, kth, uio)
  * so, only root may further change it.
  *
  * XXX: These checks are stronger than for ptrace()
+ * XXX: This check should be p_can(... P_CAN_DEBUG ...);
  *
  * TODO: check groups.  use caller effective gid.
  */
@@ -529,7 +531,7 @@ ktrcanset(callp, targetp)
 	register struct pcred *caller = callp->p_cred;
 	register struct pcred *target = targetp->p_cred;
 
-	if (!PRISON_CHECK(callp, targetp))
+	if (prison_check(callp->p_ucred, targetp->p_ucred))
 		return (0);
 	if ((caller->pc_ucred->cr_uid == target->p_ruid &&
 	     target->p_ruid == target->p_svuid &&