o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject

  credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison).
o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence.
o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and
  pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference
  management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code.
o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead
  of struct proc arguments.
o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed,
  rather than directly checking pointers all over the place.
o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function.
o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h.
o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the
  flag in the process flags field itself.
o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect
  mutex use.

Notes:

o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required.
o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs
  credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code.
o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is
  required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the
  structure.

Reviewed by:	freebsd-arch
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/sys/kern/init_main.c b/sys/kern/init_main.c
index 7f9a3f9..8eca076 100644
--- a/sys/kern/init_main.c
+++ b/sys/kern/init_main.c
@@ -324,9 +324,7 @@ proc0_init(void *dummy __unused)
 	p->p_ucred = crget();
 	p->p_ucred->cr_ngroups = 1;	/* group 0 */
 	p->p_ucred->cr_uidinfo = uifind(0);
-
-	/* Don't jail it */
-	p->p_prison = 0;
+	p->p_ucred->cr_prison = NULL;	/* Don't jail it. */
 
 	/* Create procsig. */
 	p->p_procsig = &procsig0;