Merge OpenSSL 1.0.2e.

1 files changed, 217 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/secure/lib/libssl/man/SSL_check_chain.3 b/secure/lib/libssl/man/SSL_check_chain.3
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+.\" ========================================================================
+.\"
+.IX Title "SSL_check_chain 3"
+.TH SSL_check_chain 3 "2015-12-03" "1.0.2e" "OpenSSL"
+.\" For nroff, turn off justification.  Always turn off hyphenation; it makes
+.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents.
+.if n .ad l
+.nh
+.SH "NAME"
+SSL_check_chain \- check certificate chain suitability
+.SH "SYNOPSIS"
+.IX Header "SYNOPSIS"
+.Vb 1
+\& #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+\&
+\& int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
+.Ve
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+.IX Header "DESCRIPTION"
+\&\fISSL_check_chain()\fR checks whether certificate \fBx\fR, private key \fBpk\fR and
+certificate chain \fBchain\fR is suitable for use with the current session
+\&\fBs\fR.
+.SH "RETURN VALUES"
+.IX Header "RETURN VALUES"
+\&\fISSL_check_chain()\fR returns a bitmap of flags indicating the validity of the
+chain.
+.PP
+\&\fB\s-1CERT_PKEY_VALID\s0\fR: the chain can be used with the current session.
+If this flag is \fBnot\fR set then the certificate will never be used even
+if the application tries to set it because it is inconsistent with the
+peer preferences.
+.PP
+\&\fB\s-1CERT_PKEY_SIGN\s0\fR: the \s-1EE\s0 key can be used for signing.
+.PP
+\&\fB\s-1CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE\s0\fR: the signature algorithm of the \s-1EE\s0 certificate is
+acceptable.
+.PP
+\&\fB\s-1CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE\s0\fR: the signature algorithms of all \s-1CA\s0 certificates
+are acceptable.
+.PP
+\&\fB\s-1CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM\s0\fR: the parameters of the end entity certificate are
+acceptable (e.g. it is a supported curve).
+.PP
+\&\fB\s-1CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM\s0\fR: the parameters of all \s-1CA\s0 certificates are acceptable.
+.PP
+\&\fB\s-1CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN\s0\fR: the end entity certificate algorithm
+can be used explicitly for signing (i.e. it is mentioned in the signature
+algorithms extension).
+.PP
+\&\fB\s-1CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME\s0\fR: the issuer name is acceptable. This is only
+meaningful for client authentication.
+.PP
+\&\fB\s-1CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE\s0\fR: the certificate type is acceptable. Only meaningful
+for client authentication.
+.PP
+\&\fB\s-1CERT_PKEY_SUITEB\s0\fR: chain is suitable for Suite B use.
+.SH "NOTES"
+.IX Header "NOTES"
+\&\fISSL_check_chain()\fR must be called in servers after a client hello message or in
+clients after a certificate request message. It will typically be called
+in the certificate callback.
+.PP
+An application wishing to support multiple certificate chains may call this
+function on each chain in turn: starting with the one it considers the
+most secure. It could then use the chain of the first set which returns
+suitable flags.
+.PP
+As a minimum the flag \fB\s-1CERT_PKEY_VALID\s0\fR must be set for a chain to be
+usable. An application supporting multiple chains with different \s-1CA\s0 signature
+algorithms may also wish to check \fB\s-1CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE\s0\fR too. If no
+chain is suitable a server should fall back to the most secure chain which
+sets \fB\s-1CERT_PKEY_VALID\s0\fR.
+.PP
+The validity of a chain is determined by checking if it matches a supported
+signature algorithm, supported curves and in the case of client authentication
+certificate types and issuer names.
+.PP
+Since the supported signature algorithms extension is only used in \s-1TLS 1.2\s0
+and \s-1DTLS 1.2\s0 the results for earlier versions of \s-1TLS\s0 and \s-1DTLS\s0 may not be
+very useful. Applications may wish to specify a different \*(L"legacy\*(R" chain
+for earlier versions of \s-1TLS\s0 or \s-1DTLS.\s0
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.IX Header "SEE ALSO"
+\&\fISSL_CTX_set_cert_cb\fR\|(3),
+\&\fIssl\fR\|(3)