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author | uqs <uqs@FreeBSD.org> | 2010-05-13 12:07:55 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | uqs <uqs@FreeBSD.org> | 2010-05-13 12:07:55 +0000 |
commit | 1ab3783e1a2e5231321a0fc5399736ddc70407f0 (patch) | |
tree | c699822393a0ad4134098c013ca4b4ea4e2f3108 /lib/libc/stdio | |
parent | 43b7e87f4317ace45532f012cea993a4d9d418f0 (diff) | |
download | FreeBSD-src-1ab3783e1a2e5231321a0fc5399736ddc70407f0.zip FreeBSD-src-1ab3783e1a2e5231321a0fc5399736ddc70407f0.tar.gz |
mdoc: move CAVEATS, BUGS and SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS sections to the
bottom of the manpages and order them consistently.
GNU groff doesn't care about the ordering, and doesn't even mention
CAVEATS and SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS as common sections and where to put
them.
Found by: mdocml lint run
Reviewed by: ru
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/libc/stdio')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libc/stdio/fgets.3 | 26 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libc/stdio/printf.3 | 142 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libc/stdio/tmpnam.3 | 22 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libc/stdio/wprintf.3 | 6 |
4 files changed, 98 insertions, 98 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libc/stdio/fgets.3 b/lib/libc/stdio/fgets.3 index aa8e2ac..fba7353 100644 --- a/lib/libc/stdio/fgets.3 +++ b/lib/libc/stdio/fgets.3 @@ -128,6 +128,19 @@ may also fail and set .Va errno for any of the errors specified for the routine .Xr getchar 3 . +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr feof 3 , +.Xr ferror 3 , +.Xr fgetln 3 , +.Xr fgetws 3 , +.Xr getline 3 +.Sh STANDARDS +The functions +.Fn fgets +and +.Fn gets +conform to +.St -isoC-99 . .Sh SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS The .Fn gets @@ -143,16 +156,3 @@ It is strongly suggested that the function be used in all cases. (See the FSA.) -.Sh SEE ALSO -.Xr feof 3 , -.Xr ferror 3 , -.Xr fgetln 3 , -.Xr fgetws 3 , -.Xr getline 3 -.Sh STANDARDS -The functions -.Fn fgets -and -.Fn gets -conform to -.St -isoC-99 . diff --git a/lib/libc/stdio/printf.3 b/lib/libc/stdio/printf.3 index 2c031f7..90a8ed8 100644 --- a/lib/libc/stdio/printf.3 +++ b/lib/libc/stdio/printf.3 @@ -709,77 +709,6 @@ char *newfmt(const char *fmt, ...) return (p); } .Ed -.Sh SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS -The -.Fn sprintf -and -.Fn vsprintf -functions are easily misused in a manner which enables malicious users -to arbitrarily change a running program's functionality through -a buffer overflow attack. -Because -.Fn sprintf -and -.Fn vsprintf -assume an infinitely long string, -callers must be careful not to overflow the actual space; -this is often hard to assure. -For safety, programmers should use the -.Fn snprintf -interface instead. -For example: -.Bd -literal -void -foo(const char *arbitrary_string, const char *and_another) -{ - char onstack[8]; - -#ifdef BAD - /* - * This first sprintf is bad behavior. Do not use sprintf! - */ - sprintf(onstack, "%s, %s", arbitrary_string, and_another); -#else - /* - * The following two lines demonstrate better use of - * snprintf(). - */ - snprintf(onstack, sizeof(onstack), "%s, %s", arbitrary_string, - and_another); -#endif -} -.Ed -.Pp -The -.Fn printf -and -.Fn sprintf -family of functions are also easily misused in a manner -allowing malicious users to arbitrarily change a running program's -functionality by either causing the program -to print potentially sensitive data -.Dq "left on the stack" , -or causing it to generate a memory fault or bus error -by dereferencing an invalid pointer. -.Pp -.Cm %n -can be used to write arbitrary data to potentially carefully-selected -addresses. -Programmers are therefore strongly advised to never pass untrusted strings -as the -.Fa format -argument, as an attacker can put format specifiers in the string -to mangle your stack, -leading to a possible security hole. -This holds true even if the string was built using a function like -.Fn snprintf , -as the resulting string may still contain user-supplied conversion specifiers -for later interpolation by -.Fn printf . -.Pp -Always use the proper secure idiom: -.Pp -.Dl "snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), \*q%s\*q, string);" .Sh COMPATIBILITY Many application writers used the name .Va dprintf @@ -906,3 +835,74 @@ The family of functions do not correctly handle multibyte characters in the .Fa format argument. +.Sh SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS +The +.Fn sprintf +and +.Fn vsprintf +functions are easily misused in a manner which enables malicious users +to arbitrarily change a running program's functionality through +a buffer overflow attack. +Because +.Fn sprintf +and +.Fn vsprintf +assume an infinitely long string, +callers must be careful not to overflow the actual space; +this is often hard to assure. +For safety, programmers should use the +.Fn snprintf +interface instead. +For example: +.Bd -literal +void +foo(const char *arbitrary_string, const char *and_another) +{ + char onstack[8]; + +#ifdef BAD + /* + * This first sprintf is bad behavior. Do not use sprintf! + */ + sprintf(onstack, "%s, %s", arbitrary_string, and_another); +#else + /* + * The following two lines demonstrate better use of + * snprintf(). + */ + snprintf(onstack, sizeof(onstack), "%s, %s", arbitrary_string, + and_another); +#endif +} +.Ed +.Pp +The +.Fn printf +and +.Fn sprintf +family of functions are also easily misused in a manner +allowing malicious users to arbitrarily change a running program's +functionality by either causing the program +to print potentially sensitive data +.Dq "left on the stack" , +or causing it to generate a memory fault or bus error +by dereferencing an invalid pointer. +.Pp +.Cm %n +can be used to write arbitrary data to potentially carefully-selected +addresses. +Programmers are therefore strongly advised to never pass untrusted strings +as the +.Fa format +argument, as an attacker can put format specifiers in the string +to mangle your stack, +leading to a possible security hole. +This holds true even if the string was built using a function like +.Fn snprintf , +as the resulting string may still contain user-supplied conversion specifiers +for later interpolation by +.Fn printf . +.Pp +Always use the proper secure idiom: +.Pp +.Dl "snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), \*q%s\*q, string);" diff --git a/lib/libc/stdio/tmpnam.3 b/lib/libc/stdio/tmpnam.3 index 66652b7..937068f 100644 --- a/lib/libc/stdio/tmpnam.3 +++ b/lib/libc/stdio/tmpnam.3 @@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ for any of the errors specified for the library functions .Xr malloc 3 or .Xr mktemp 3 . +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr mkstemp 3 , +.Xr mktemp 3 +.Sh STANDARDS +The +.Fn tmpfile +and +.Fn tmpnam +functions +conform to +.St -isoC . .Sh SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS The .Fn tmpnam @@ -235,14 +246,3 @@ It is strongly suggested that be used in place of these functions. (See the FSA.) -.Sh SEE ALSO -.Xr mkstemp 3 , -.Xr mktemp 3 -.Sh STANDARDS -The -.Fn tmpfile -and -.Fn tmpnam -functions -conform to -.St -isoC . diff --git a/lib/libc/stdio/wprintf.3 b/lib/libc/stdio/wprintf.3 index 3e91846..fecb586 100644 --- a/lib/libc/stdio/wprintf.3 +++ b/lib/libc/stdio/wprintf.3 @@ -588,9 +588,6 @@ In no case does a non-existent or small field width cause truncation of a numeric field; if the result of a conversion is wider than the field width, the field is expanded to contain the conversion result. -.Sh SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS -Refer to -.Xr printf 3 . .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr btowc 3 , .Xr fputws 3 , @@ -616,3 +613,6 @@ and functions conform to .St -isoC-99 . +.Sh SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS +Refer to +.Xr printf 3 . |