Resolve conflicts and remove obsolete files.

Sponsored by:	registrar.no

97 files changed, 3388 insertions, 5970 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/openssh/LICENCE b/crypto/openssh/LICENCE
index 19d4c74..b47556d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/LICENCE
+++ b/crypto/openssh/LICENCE
@@ -76,14 +76,6 @@ OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
     POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
 
 2)
-    The 32-bit CRC implementation in crc32.c is due to Gary S. Brown.
-    Comments in the file indicate it may be used for any purpose without
-    restrictions:
-
-     * COPYRIGHT (C) 1986 Gary S. Brown.  You may use this program, or
-     * code or tables extracted from it, as desired without restriction.
-
-3)
     The 32-bit CRC compensation attack detector in deattack.c was
     contributed by CORE SDI S.A. under a BSD-style license.
 
@@ -104,7 +96,7 @@ OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
      * Ariel Futoransky <futo@core-sdi.com>
      * <http://www.core-sdi.com>
 
-4)
+3)
     ssh-keygen was contributed by David Mazieres under a BSD-style
     license.
 
@@ -114,7 +106,7 @@ OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
      * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
      * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
 
-5)
+4)
     The Rijndael implementation by Vincent Rijmen, Antoon Bosselaers
     and Paulo Barreto is in the public domain and distributed
     with the following license:
@@ -141,12 +133,10 @@ OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
      * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
      * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 
-6)
-    One component of the ssh source code is under a 4-clause BSD license,
+5)
+    One component of the ssh source code is under a 3-clause BSD license,
     held by the University of California, since we pulled these parts from
-    original Berkeley code.  The Regents of the University of California
-    have declared that term 3 is no longer enforceable on their source code,
-    but we retain that license as is.
+    original Berkeley code.
 
      * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995
      *      The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
@@ -159,11 +149,7 @@ OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
      * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
      *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
      *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-     * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
-     *    must display the following acknowledgement:
-     *      This product includes software developed by the University of
-     *      California, Berkeley and its contributors.
-     * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+     * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
      *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
      *    without specific prior written permission.
      *
@@ -179,7 +165,7 @@ OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
      * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
      * SUCH DAMAGE.
 
-7)
+6)
     Remaining components of the software are provided under a standard
     2-term BSD licence with the following names as copyright holders:
 
@@ -192,6 +178,31 @@ OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
 	Kevin Steves
 	Daniel Kouril
 	Per Allansson
+	Wesley Griffin
+	Per Allansson
+	Nils Nordman
+	Simon Wilkinson
+
+    Portable OpenSSH additionally includes code from the following copyright 
+    holders, also under the 2-term BSD license:
+
+	Ben Lindstrom
+	Tim Rice
+	Andre Lucas
+	Chris Adams
+	Corinna Vinschen
+	Cray Inc.
+	Denis Parker
+	Gert Doering
+	Jakob Schlyter
+	Jason Downs
+	Juha Yrjölä
+	Michael Stone
+	Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+	Solar Designer
+	Todd C. Miller
+	Wayne Schroeder
+	William Jones
 
      * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
      * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -212,3 +223,110 @@ OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
      * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
      * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
      * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+8) Portable OpenSSH contains the following additional licenses:
+
+    a) md5crypt.c, md5crypt.h
+
+	 * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42):
+	 * <phk@login.dknet.dk> wrote this file.  As long as you retain this 
+	 * notice you can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet 
+	 * some day, and you think this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a 
+	 * beer in return.   Poul-Henning Kamp
+
+    b) snprintf replacement
+
+	* Copyright Patrick Powell 1995
+	* This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell 
+	* (papowell@astart.com) It may be used for any purpose as long as this 
+	* notice remains intact on all source code distributions
+
+    c) Compatibility code (openbsd-compat)
+
+       Apart from the previously mentioned licenses, various pieces of code 
+       in the openbsd-compat/ subdirectory are licensed as follows:
+
+       Some code is licensed under a 3-term BSD license, to the following 
+       copyright holders:
+
+	Todd C. Miller
+	Theo de Raadt
+	Damien Miller
+	Eric P. Allman
+	The Regents of the University of California
+
+	* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+	* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+	* are met:
+	* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+	*    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+	* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+	*    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+	*    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+	* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+	*    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+	*    without specific prior written permission.
+	*
+	* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+	* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+	* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+	* ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+	* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+	* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+	* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+	* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+	* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+	* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+	* SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+       Some code is licensed under an ISC-style license, to the following 
+       copyright holders:
+
+	Internet Software Consortium.
+	Todd C. Miller
+
+	* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+	* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+	* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+	*
+	* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND TODD C. MILLER DISCLAIMS ALL
+	* WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+	* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL TODD C. MILLER BE LIABLE
+	* FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+	* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+	* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+	* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+
+       Some code is licensed under a MIT-style license to the following 
+       copyright holders:
+
+	Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+	* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a  *
+	* copy of this software and associated documentation files (the            *
+	* "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including      *
+	* without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,      *
+	* distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell       *
+	* copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is    *
+	* furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:                 *
+	*                                                                          *
+	* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included  *
+	* in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.                   *
+	*                                                                          *
+	* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS  *
+	* OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF               *
+	* MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.   *
+	* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,   *
+	* DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR    *
+	* OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR    *
+	* THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.                               *
+	*                                                                          *
+	* Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright   *
+	* holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the     *
+	* sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written       *
+	* authorization.                                                           *
+	****************************************************************************/
+
+
+------
+$OpenBSD: LICENCE,v 1.17 2003/08/22 20:55:06 markus Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/acconfig.h b/crypto/openssh/acconfig.h
index be18366..7a4d844 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/acconfig.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/acconfig.h
@@ -1,6 +1,30 @@
-/* $Id: acconfig.h,v 1.149 2003/03/10 00:38:10 djm Exp $ */
+/* $Id: acconfig.h,v 1.166 2003/09/16 01:52:19 dtucker Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
 #ifndef _CONFIG_H
 #define _CONFIG_H
 
@@ -9,9 +33,19 @@
 
 @TOP@
 
+/* Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid */
+#undef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID
+
+/* Define if your setreuid() is broken */
+#undef BROKEN_SETREUID
+
+/* Define if your setregid() is broken */
+#undef BROKEN_SETREGID
+
 /* Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is */
 /* supported by bsd-setproctitle.c */
 #undef SPT_TYPE
+#undef SPT_PADCHAR
 
 /* setgroups() NOOP allowed */
 #undef SETGROUPS_NOOP
@@ -83,6 +117,9 @@
 /* Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function */
 #undef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
 
+/* Define if your AIX loginfailed() function takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) */
+#undef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG
+
 /* Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session managment, not C arrays) */
 #undef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY
 
@@ -202,18 +239,15 @@
 /* Define if compiler implements __func__ */
 #undef HAVE___func__
 
+/* Define this is you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol */
+#undef GSSAPI
+
 /* Define if you want Kerberos 5 support */
 #undef KRB5
 
 /* Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5 */
 #undef HEIMDAL
 
-/* Define if you want Kerberos 4 support */
-#undef KRB4
-
-/* Define if you want AFS support */
-#undef AFS
-
 /* Define if you want S/Key support */
 #undef SKEY
 
@@ -299,9 +333,6 @@
 /* Specify location of ssh.pid */
 #undef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR
 
-/* Use IPv4 for connection by default, IPv6 can still if explicity asked */
-#undef IPV4_DEFAULT
-
 /* getaddrinfo is broken (if present) */
 #undef BROKEN_GETADDRINFO
 
@@ -332,6 +363,9 @@
 /* Define in your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name */
 #undef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME
 
+/* Define if your system has /etc/default/login */
+#undef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
+
 /* Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset */
 #undef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET
 
@@ -371,15 +405,28 @@
 /* Silly mkstemp() */
 #undef HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP
 
-/* Setproctitle emulation */
-#undef SETPROCTITLE_STRATEGY
-#undef SETPROCTITLE_PS_PADDING
-
 /* Some systems put this outside of libc */
 #undef HAVE_NANOSLEEP
 
-/* Pushing STREAMS modules incorrectly acquires a controlling TTY */
-#undef STREAMS_PUSH_ACQUIRES_CTTY
+/* Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY after setsid() */
+#undef SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY
+
+/* Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly */
+#undef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE
+
+/* Strings used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */
+#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
+#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
+#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
+
+/* Define if DNS support is to be activated */
+#undef DNS
+
+/* Define if getrrsetbyname() exists */
+#undef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
+
+/* Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h */
+#undef HAVE_HEADER_AD
 
 @BOTTOM@
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-krb4.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-krb4.c
deleted file mode 100644
index b28df46..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-krb4.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,368 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb4.c,v 1.29 2003/02/21 10:34:48 mpech Exp $");
-
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-
-#ifdef AFS
-#include "radix.h"
-#endif
-
-#ifdef KRB4
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-static int
-krb4_init(void *context)
-{
-	static int cleanup_registered = 0;
-	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context;
-	const char *tkt_root = TKT_ROOT;
-	struct stat st;
-	int fd;
-
-	if (!authctxt->krb4_ticket_file) {
-		/* Set unique ticket string manually since we're still root. */
-		authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
-#ifdef AFS
-		if (lstat("/ticket", &st) != -1)
-			tkt_root = "/ticket/";
-#endif /* AFS */
-		snprintf(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s%u_%ld",
-		    tkt_root, authctxt->pw->pw_uid, (long)getpid());
-		krb_set_tkt_string(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
-	}
-	/* Register ticket cleanup in case of fatal error. */
-	if (!cleanup_registered) {
-		fatal_add_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, authctxt);
-		cleanup_registered = 1;
-	}
-	/* Try to create our ticket file. */
-	if ((fd = mkstemp(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file)) != -1) {
-		close(fd);
-		return (1);
-	}
-	/* Ticket file exists - make sure user owns it (just passed ticket). */
-	if (lstat(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file, &st) != -1) {
-		if (st.st_mode == (S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) &&
-		    st.st_uid == authctxt->pw->pw_uid)
-			return (1);
-	}
-	/* Failure - cancel cleanup function, leaving ticket for inspection. */
-	log("WARNING: bad ticket file %s", authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
-
-	fatal_remove_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, authctxt);
-	cleanup_registered = 0;
-
-	xfree(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
-	authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = NULL;
-
-	return (0);
-}
-
-/*
- * try krb4 authentication,
- * return 1 on success, 0 on failure, -1 if krb4 is not available
- */
-int
-auth_krb4_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
-{
-	AUTH_DAT adata;
-	KTEXT_ST tkt;
-	struct hostent *hp;
-	struct passwd *pw;
-	char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN], phost[INST_SZ], realm[REALM_SZ];
-	u_int32_t faddr;
-	int r;
-
-	if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL)
-		return (0);
-
-	/*
-	 * Try Kerberos password authentication only for non-root
-	 * users and only if Kerberos is installed.
-	 */
-	if (pw->pw_uid != 0 && krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) == KSUCCESS) {
-		/* Set up our ticket file. */
-		if (!krb4_init(authctxt)) {
-			log("Couldn't initialize Kerberos ticket file for %s!",
-			    pw->pw_name);
-			goto failure;
-		}
-		/* Try to get TGT using our password. */
-		r = krb_get_pw_in_tkt((char *) pw->pw_name, "", realm,
-		    "krbtgt", realm, DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, (char *)password);
-		if (r != INTK_OK) {
-			debug("Kerberos v4 password authentication for %s "
-			    "failed: %s", pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
-			goto failure;
-		}
-		/* Successful authentication. */
-		chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
-
-		/*
-		 * Now that we have a TGT, try to get a local
-		 * "rcmd" ticket to ensure that we are not talking
-		 * to a bogus Kerberos server.
-		 */
-		gethostname(localhost, sizeof(localhost));
-		strlcpy(phost, (char *)krb_get_phost(localhost),
-		    sizeof(phost));
-		r = krb_mk_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost, realm, 33);
-
-		if (r == KSUCCESS) {
-			if ((hp = gethostbyname(localhost)) == NULL) {
-				log("Couldn't get local host address!");
-				goto failure;
-			}
-			memmove((void *)&faddr, (void *)hp->h_addr,
-			    sizeof(faddr));
-
-			/* Verify our "rcmd" ticket. */
-			r = krb_rd_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost,
-			    faddr, &adata, "");
-			if (r == RD_AP_UNDEC) {
-				/*
-				 * Probably didn't have a srvtab on
-				 * localhost. Disallow login.
-				 */
-				log("Kerberos v4 TGT for %s unverifiable, "
-				    "no srvtab installed? krb_rd_req: %s",
-				    pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
-				goto failure;
-			} else if (r != KSUCCESS) {
-				log("Kerberos v4 %s ticket unverifiable: %s",
-				    KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, krb_err_txt[r]);
-				goto failure;
-			}
-		} else if (r == KDC_PR_UNKNOWN) {
-			/*
-			 * Disallow login if no rcmd service exists, and
-			 * log the error.
-			 */
-			log("Kerberos v4 TGT for %s unverifiable: %s; %s.%s "
-			    "not registered, or srvtab is wrong?", pw->pw_name,
-			    krb_err_txt[r], KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost);
-			goto failure;
-		} else {
-			/*
-			 * TGT is bad, forget it. Possibly spoofed!
-			 */
-			debug("WARNING: Kerberos v4 TGT possibly spoofed "
-			    "for %s: %s", pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
-			goto failure;
-		}
-		/* Authentication succeeded. */
-		return (1);
-	} else
-		/* Logging in as root or no local Kerberos realm. */
-		debug("Unable to authenticate to Kerberos.");
-
- failure:
-	krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
-
-	if (!options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
-		return (0);
-
-	/* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
-	return (-1);
-}
-
-void
-krb4_cleanup_proc(void *context)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context;
-	debug("krb4_cleanup_proc called");
-	if (authctxt->krb4_ticket_file) {
-		(void) dest_tkt();
-		xfree(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
-		authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = NULL;
-	}
-}
-
-int
-auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, KTEXT auth, char **client, KTEXT reply)
-{
-	AUTH_DAT adat = {0};
-	Key_schedule schedule;
-	struct sockaddr_in local, foreign;
-	char instance[INST_SZ];
-	socklen_t slen;
-	u_int cksum;
-	int r, s;
-
-	s = packet_get_connection_in();
-
-	slen = sizeof(local);
-	memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local));
-	if (getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *) & local, &slen) < 0)
-		debug("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-	slen = sizeof(foreign);
-	memset(&foreign, 0, sizeof(foreign));
-	if (getpeername(s, (struct sockaddr *) & foreign, &slen) < 0) {
-		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-		fatal_cleanup();
-	}
-	instance[0] = '*';
-	instance[1] = 0;
-
-	/* Get the encrypted request, challenge, and session key. */
-	if ((r = krb_rd_req(auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, instance,
-	    0, &adat, ""))) {
-		debug("Kerberos v4 krb_rd_req: %.100s", krb_err_txt[r]);
-		return (0);
-	}
-	des_key_sched((des_cblock *) adat.session, schedule);
-
-	*client = xmalloc(MAX_K_NAME_SZ);
-	(void) snprintf(*client, MAX_K_NAME_SZ, "%s%s%s@%s", adat.pname,
-	    *adat.pinst ? "." : "", adat.pinst, adat.prealm);
-
-	/* Check ~/.klogin authorization now. */
-	if (kuserok(&adat, authctxt->user) != KSUCCESS) {
-		log("Kerberos v4 .klogin authorization failed for %s to "
-		    "account %s", *client, authctxt->user);
-		xfree(*client);
-		*client = NULL;
-		return (0);
-	}
-	/* Increment the checksum, and return it encrypted with the
-	   session key. */
-	cksum = adat.checksum + 1;
-	cksum = htonl(cksum);
-
-	/* If we can't successfully encrypt the checksum, we send back an
-	   empty message, admitting our failure. */
-	if ((r = krb_mk_priv((u_char *) & cksum, reply->dat, sizeof(cksum) + 1,
-	    schedule, &adat.session, &local, &foreign)) < 0) {
-		debug("Kerberos v4 mk_priv: (%d) %s", r, krb_err_txt[r]);
-		reply->dat[0] = 0;
-		reply->length = 0;
-	} else
-		reply->length = r;
-
-	/* Clear session key. */
-	memset(&adat.session, 0, sizeof(adat.session));
-	return (1);
-}
-#endif /* KRB4 */
-
-#ifdef AFS
-int
-auth_krb4_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *string)
-{
-	CREDENTIALS creds;
-	struct passwd *pw;
-
-	if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL)
-		goto failure;
-
-	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
-	if (!radix_to_creds(string, &creds)) {
-		log("Protocol error decoding Kerberos v4 TGT");
-		goto failure;
-	}
-	if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0)	/* backward compatibility */
-		strlcpy(creds.service, "krbtgt", sizeof creds.service);
-
-	if (strcmp(creds.service, "krbtgt")) {
-		log("Kerberos v4 TGT (%s%s%s@%s) rejected for %s",
-		    creds.pname, creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst,
-		    creds.realm, pw->pw_name);
-		goto failure;
-	}
-	if (!krb4_init(authctxt))
-		goto failure;
-
-	if (in_tkt(creds.pname, creds.pinst) != KSUCCESS)
-		goto failure;
-
-	if (save_credentials(creds.service, creds.instance, creds.realm,
-	    creds.session, creds.lifetime, creds.kvno, &creds.ticket_st,
-	    creds.issue_date) != KSUCCESS) {
-		debug("Kerberos v4 TGT refused: couldn't save credentials");
-		goto failure;
-	}
-	/* Successful authentication, passed all checks. */
-	chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
-
-	debug("Kerberos v4 TGT accepted (%s%s%s@%s)",
-	    creds.pname, creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst, creds.realm);
-	memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-
-	restore_uid();
-
-	return (1);
-
- failure:
-	krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
-	memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-	restore_uid();
-
-	return (0);
-}
-
-int
-auth_afs_token(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *token_string)
-{
-	CREDENTIALS creds;
-	struct passwd *pw;
-	uid_t uid;
-
-	if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL)
-		return (0);
-
-	if (!radix_to_creds(token_string, &creds)) {
-		log("Protocol error decoding AFS token");
-		return (0);
-	}
-	if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0)	/* backward compatibility */
-		strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof creds.service);
-
-	if (strncmp(creds.pname, "AFS ID ", 7) == 0)
-		uid = atoi(creds.pname + 7);
-	else
-		uid = pw->pw_uid;
-
-	if (kafs_settoken(creds.realm, uid, &creds)) {
-		log("AFS token (%s@%s) rejected for %s",
-		    creds.pname, creds.realm, pw->pw_name);
-		memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-		return (0);
-	}
-	debug("AFS token accepted (%s@%s)", creds.pname, creds.realm);
-	memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-
-	return (1);
-}
-#endif /* AFS */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c
index dbd4163..45d8293 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.10 2002/11/21 23:03:51 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.12 2003/08/28 12:54:34 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
@@ -41,10 +41,8 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "auth.h"
 
 #ifdef KRB5
+
 #include <krb5.h>
-#ifndef HEIMDAL
-#define krb5_get_err_text(context,code) error_message(code)
-#endif /* !HEIMDAL */
 
 extern ServerOptions	 options;
 
@@ -68,193 +66,6 @@ krb5_init(void *context)
 	return (0);
 }
 
-/*
- * Try krb5 authentication. server_user is passed for logging purposes
- * only, in auth is received ticket, in client is returned principal
- * from the ticket
- */
-int
-auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *reply)
-{
-	krb5_error_code problem;
-	krb5_principal server;
-	krb5_ticket *ticket;
-	int fd, ret;
-
-	ret = 0;
-	server = NULL;
-	ticket = NULL;
-	reply->length = 0;
-
-	problem = krb5_init(authctxt);
-	if (problem)
-		goto err;
-
-	problem = krb5_auth_con_init(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
-	    &authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx);
-	if (problem)
-		goto err;
-
-	fd = packet_get_connection_in();
-#ifdef HEIMDAL
-	problem = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
-	    authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx, &fd);
-#else
-	problem = krb5_auth_con_genaddrs(authctxt->krb5_ctx, 
-	    authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx,fd,
-	    KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_REMOTE_FULL_ADDR |
-	    KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_LOCAL_FULL_ADDR);
-#endif
-	if (problem)
-		goto err;
-
-	problem = krb5_sname_to_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, NULL, NULL,
-	    KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server);
-	if (problem)
-		goto err;
-
-	problem = krb5_rd_req(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx,
-	    auth, server, NULL, NULL, &ticket);
-	if (problem)
-		goto err;
-
-#ifdef HEIMDAL
-	problem = krb5_copy_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ticket->client,
-	    &authctxt->krb5_user);
-#else
-	problem = krb5_copy_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, 
-				      ticket->enc_part2->client,
-				      &authctxt->krb5_user);
-#endif
-	if (problem)
-		goto err;
-
-	/* if client wants mutual auth */
-	problem = krb5_mk_rep(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx,
-	    reply);
-	if (problem)
-		goto err;
-
-	/* Check .k5login authorization now. */
-	if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
-	    authctxt->pw->pw_name))
-		goto err;
-
-	if (client)
-		krb5_unparse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
-		    client);
-
-	ret = 1;
- err:
-	if (server)
-		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, server);
-	if (ticket)
-		krb5_free_ticket(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ticket);
-	if (!ret && reply->length) {
-		xfree(reply->data);
-		memset(reply, 0, sizeof(*reply));
-	}
-
-	if (problem) {
-		if (authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)
-			debug("Kerberos v5 authentication failed: %s",
-			    krb5_get_err_text(authctxt->krb5_ctx, problem));
-		else
-			debug("Kerberos v5 authentication failed: %d",
-			    problem);
-	}
-
-	return (ret);
-}
-
-int
-auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt)
-{
-	krb5_error_code problem;
-	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-	char *pname;
-	krb5_creds **creds;
-
-	if (authctxt->pw == NULL || authctxt->krb5_user == NULL)
-		return (0);
-
-	temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
-
-#ifdef HEIMDAL
-	problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_fcc_ops, &ccache);
-#else
-{
-	char ccname[40];
-	int tmpfd;
-	
-	snprintf(ccname,sizeof(ccname),"FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXX",geteuid());
-	
-	if ((tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname+strlen("FILE:")))==-1) {
-		log("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
-		problem = errno;
-		goto fail;
-	}
-	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
-		log("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
-		close(tmpfd);
-		problem = errno;
-		goto fail;
-	}
-	close(tmpfd);
-	problem = krb5_cc_resolve(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccname, &ccache);
-}
-#endif
-	if (problem)
-		goto fail;
-
-	problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache,
-	    authctxt->krb5_user);
-	if (problem)
-		goto fail;
-
-#ifdef HEIMDAL
-	problem = krb5_rd_cred2(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx,
-	    ccache, tgt);
-	if (problem)
-		goto fail;
-#else
-	problem = krb5_rd_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx,
-	    tgt, &creds, NULL);
-	if (problem)
-		goto fail;
-	problem = krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache, *creds);
-	if (problem)
-		goto fail;
-#endif
-
-	authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = ccache;
-	ccache = NULL;
-
-	authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
-
-	problem = krb5_unparse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
-	    &pname);
-	if (problem)
-		goto fail;
-
-	debug("Kerberos v5 TGT accepted (%s)", pname);
-
-	restore_uid();
-
-	return (1);
-
- fail:
-	if (problem)
-		debug("Kerberos v5 TGT passing failed: %s",
-		    krb5_get_err_text(authctxt->krb5_ctx, problem));
-	if (ccache)
-		krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache);
-
-	restore_uid();
-
-	return (0);
-}
-
 int
 auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 {
@@ -265,6 +76,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 	int tmpfd;
 #endif	
 	krb5_error_code problem;
+	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
 
 	if (authctxt->pw == NULL)
 		return (0);
@@ -281,23 +93,35 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 		goto out;
 
 #ifdef HEIMDAL
-	problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_mcc_ops,
-	    &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+	problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_mcc_ops, &ccache);
 	if (problem)
 		goto out;
 
-	problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
-	    authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, authctxt->krb5_user);
+	problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache,
+		authctxt->krb5_user);
 	if (problem)
 		goto out;
 
 	restore_uid();
+	
 	problem = krb5_verify_user(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
-	    authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, password, 1, NULL);
+	    ccache, password, 1, NULL);
+	
 	temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
 
 	if (problem)
 		goto out;
+	problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_fcc_ops,
+	    &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	problem = krb5_cc_copy_cache(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache,
+	    authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+	krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache);
+	ccache = NULL;
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
 
 #else
 	problem = krb5_get_init_creds_password(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds,
@@ -327,13 +151,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 	snprintf(ccname,sizeof(ccname),"FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXX",geteuid());
 	
 	if ((tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname+strlen("FILE:")))==-1) {
-		log("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
 		problem = errno;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	
 	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
-		log("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
 		close(tmpfd);
 		problem = errno;
 		goto out;
@@ -361,6 +185,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 	restore_uid();
 
 	if (problem) {
+		if (ccache)
+			krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache);
+
 		if (authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL && problem!=-1)
 			debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %s",
 			    krb5_get_err_text(authctxt->krb5_ctx, problem));
@@ -392,11 +219,6 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(void *context)
 		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
 		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
 	}
-	if (authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx) {
-		krb5_auth_con_free(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
-		    authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx);
-		authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx = NULL;
-	}
 	if (authctxt->krb5_ctx) {
 		krb5_free_context(authctxt->krb5_ctx);
 		authctxt->krb5_ctx = NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c
index fe9570f..b83aabc 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c
@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
+ * NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc.
+ * under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
+ * DARPA CHATS research program.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -10,446 +16,733 @@
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 
+/* Based on $xFreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c,v 1.11 2003/03/31 13:48:18 des Exp $ */
 #include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$Id: auth-pam.c,v 1.72.2.2 2003/09/23 09:24:21 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+
 #include "auth.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
 #include "auth-pam.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "packet.h"
 #include "readpass.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
 
-extern char *__progname;
+extern ServerOptions options;
 
-extern int use_privsep;
+#ifndef __unused
+#define __unused
+#endif
 
-RCSID("$Id: auth-pam.c,v 1.55 2003/01/22 04:42:26 djm Exp $");
+#ifdef USE_POSIX_THREADS
+#include <pthread.h>
+/*
+ * Avoid namespace clash when *not* using pthreads for systems *with* 
+ * pthreads, which unconditionally define pthread_t via sys/types.h 
+ * (e.g. Linux)
+ */
+typedef pthread_t sp_pthread_t; 
+#else
+/*
+ * Simulate threads with processes.
+ */
+typedef pid_t sp_pthread_t;
 
-#define NEW_AUTHTOK_MSG \
-	"Warning: Your password has expired, please change it now."
-#define NEW_AUTHTOK_MSG_PRIVSEP \
-	"Your password has expired, the session cannot proceed."
+static void
+pthread_exit(void *value __unused)
+{
+	_exit(0);
+}
 
-static int do_pam_conversation(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg,
-	struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata_ptr);
+static int
+pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr __unused,
+    void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg)
+{
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	switch ((pid = fork())) {
+	case -1:
+		error("fork(): %s", strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	case 0:
+		thread_start(arg);
+		_exit(1);
+	default:
+		*thread = pid;
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
 
-/* module-local variables */
-static struct pam_conv conv = {
-	(int (*)())do_pam_conversation,
-	NULL
-};
-static char *__pam_msg = NULL;
-static pam_handle_t *__pamh = NULL;
-static const char *__pampasswd = NULL;
-
-/* states for do_pam_conversation() */
-enum { INITIAL_LOGIN, OTHER } pamstate = INITIAL_LOGIN;
-/* remember whether pam_acct_mgmt() returned PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD */
-static int password_change_required = 0;
-/* remember whether the last pam_authenticate() succeeded or not */
-static int was_authenticated = 0;
-
-/* Remember what has been initialised */
-static int session_opened = 0;
-static int creds_set = 0;
-
-/* accessor which allows us to switch conversation structs according to
- * the authentication method being used */
-void do_pam_set_conv(struct pam_conv *conv)
+static int
+pthread_cancel(sp_pthread_t thread)
 {
-	pam_set_item(__pamh, PAM_CONV, conv);
+	return (kill(thread, SIGTERM));
 }
 
-/* start an authentication run */
-int do_pam_authenticate(int flags)
+static int
+pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value __unused)
 {
-	int retval = pam_authenticate(__pamh, flags);
-	was_authenticated = (retval == PAM_SUCCESS);
-	return retval;
+	int status;
+
+	waitpid(thread, &status, 0);
+	return (status);
 }
+#endif
+
+
+static pam_handle_t *sshpam_handle = NULL;
+static int sshpam_err = 0;
+static int sshpam_authenticated = 0;
+static int sshpam_new_authtok_reqd = 0;
+static int sshpam_session_open = 0;
+static int sshpam_cred_established = 0;
+
+struct pam_ctxt {
+	sp_pthread_t	 pam_thread;
+	int		 pam_psock;
+	int		 pam_csock;
+	int		 pam_done;
+};
+
+static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
 
 /*
- * PAM conversation function.
- * There are two states this can run in.
- *
- * INITIAL_LOGIN mode simply feeds the password from the client into
- * PAM in response to PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF, and collects output
- * messages with into __pam_msg.  This is used during initial
- * authentication to bypass the normal PAM password prompt.
- *
- * OTHER mode handles PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF with read_passphrase()
- * and outputs messages to stderr. This mode is used if pam_chauthtok()
- * is called to update expired passwords.
+ * Conversation function for authentication thread.
  */
-static int do_pam_conversation(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg,
-	struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata_ptr)
+static int
+sshpam_thread_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
 {
+	Buffer buffer;
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
 	struct pam_response *reply;
-	int count;
-	char buf[1024];
-
-	/* PAM will free this later */
-	reply = xmalloc(num_msg * sizeof(*reply));
-
-	for (count = 0; count < num_msg; count++) {
-		if (pamstate == INITIAL_LOGIN) {
-			/*
-			 * We can't use stdio yet, queue messages for 
-			 * printing later
-			 */
-			switch(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg_style)) {
-			case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
-				xfree(reply);
-				return PAM_CONV_ERR;
-			case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
-				if (__pampasswd == NULL) {
-					xfree(reply);
-					return PAM_CONV_ERR;
-				}
-				reply[count].resp = xstrdup(__pampasswd);
-				reply[count].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
-				break;
-			case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
-			case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
-				if (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg) != NULL) {
-					message_cat(&__pam_msg, 
-					    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg));
-				}
-				reply[count].resp = xstrdup("");
-				reply[count].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
-				break;
-			default:
-				xfree(reply);
-				return PAM_CONV_ERR;
-			}
-		} else {
-			/*
-			 * stdio is connected, so interact directly
-			 */
-			switch(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg_style)) {
-			case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
-				fputs(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg), stderr);
-				fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin);
-				reply[count].resp = xstrdup(buf);
-				reply[count].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
-				break;
-			case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
-				reply[count].resp = 
-				    read_passphrase(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count,
-					msg), RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
-				reply[count].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
-				break;
-			case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
-			case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
-				if (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg) != NULL)
-					fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", 
-					    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg));
-				reply[count].resp = xstrdup("");
-				reply[count].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
-				break;
-			default:
-				xfree(reply);
-				return PAM_CONV_ERR;
-			}
+	int i;
+
+	*resp = NULL;
+
+	ctxt = data;
+	if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+	if ((reply = malloc(n * sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+	memset(reply, 0, n * sizeof(*reply));
+
+	buffer_init(&buffer);
+	for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+		switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+			buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, 
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+			ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, 
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer);
+			ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, &buffer);
+			if (buffer_get_char(&buffer) != PAM_AUTHTOK)
+				goto fail;
+			reply[i].resp = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL);
+			break;
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+			buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, 
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+			ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, 
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer);
+			ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, &buffer);
+			if (buffer_get_char(&buffer) != PAM_AUTHTOK)
+				goto fail;
+			reply[i].resp = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL);
+			break;
+		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+			buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, 
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+			ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, 
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer);
+			break;
+		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+			buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, 
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+			ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, 
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer);
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto fail;
 		}
+		buffer_clear(&buffer);
 	}
-
+	buffer_free(&buffer);
 	*resp = reply;
+	return (PAM_SUCCESS);
 
-	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+	for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		if (reply[i].resp != NULL)
+			xfree(reply[i].resp);
+	}
+	xfree(reply);
+	buffer_free(&buffer);
+	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
 }
 
-/* Called at exit to cleanly shutdown PAM */
-void do_pam_cleanup_proc(void *context)
+/*
+ * Authentication thread.
+ */
+static void *
+sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
 {
-	int pam_retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
+	Buffer buffer;
+	struct pam_conv sshpam_conv;
+#ifndef USE_POSIX_THREADS
+	const char *pam_user;
+
+	pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER, (const void **)&pam_user);
+	setproctitle("%s [pam]", pam_user);
+#endif
 
-	if (__pamh && session_opened) {
-		pam_retval = pam_close_session(__pamh, 0);
-		if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
-			log("Cannot close PAM session[%d]: %.200s",
-			    pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
-	}
+	sshpam_conv.conv = sshpam_thread_conv;
+	sshpam_conv.appdata_ptr = ctxt;
+
+	buffer_init(&buffer);
+	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+	    (const void *)&sshpam_conv);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		goto auth_fail;
+	sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, 0);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		goto auth_fail;
+	buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, "OK");
+	ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, &buffer);
+	buffer_free(&buffer);
+	pthread_exit(NULL);
+
+ auth_fail:
+	buffer_put_cstring(&buffer,
+	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+	ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, &buffer);
+	buffer_free(&buffer);
+	pthread_exit(NULL);
+	
+	return (NULL); /* Avoid warning for non-pthread case */
+}
 
-	if (__pamh && creds_set) {
-		pam_retval = pam_setcred(__pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
-		if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
-			debug("Cannot delete credentials[%d]: %.200s", 
-			    pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
-	}
+static void
+sshpam_thread_cleanup(void *ctxtp)
+{
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
 
-	if (__pamh) {
-		pam_retval = pam_end(__pamh, pam_retval);
-		if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
-			log("Cannot release PAM authentication[%d]: %.200s",
-			    pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
-	}
+	pthread_cancel(ctxt->pam_thread);
+	pthread_join(ctxt->pam_thread, NULL);
+	close(ctxt->pam_psock);
+	close(ctxt->pam_csock);
 }
 
-/* Attempt password authentation using PAM */
-int auth_pam_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+static int
+sshpam_null_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
 {
-	extern ServerOptions options;
-	int pam_retval;
-	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
 
-	do_pam_set_conv(&conv);
+static struct pam_conv null_conv = { sshpam_null_conv, NULL };
 
-	__pampasswd = password;
+static void
+sshpam_cleanup(void *arg)
+{
+	(void)arg;
+	debug("PAM: cleanup");
+	if (sshpam_handle == NULL)
+		return;
+	pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv);
+	if (sshpam_cred_established) {
+		pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
+		sshpam_cred_established = 0;
+	}
+	if (sshpam_session_open) {
+		pam_close_session(sshpam_handle, PAM_SILENT);
+		sshpam_session_open = 0;
+	}
+	sshpam_authenticated = sshpam_new_authtok_reqd = 0;
+	pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+	sshpam_handle = NULL;
+}
 
-	pamstate = INITIAL_LOGIN;
-	pam_retval = do_pam_authenticate(
-	    options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ? PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
-	if (pam_retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
-		debug("PAM Password authentication accepted for "
-		    "user \"%.100s\"", pw->pw_name);
-		return 1;
-	} else {
-		debug("PAM Password authentication for \"%.100s\" "
-		    "failed[%d]: %s", pw->pw_name, pam_retval, 
-		    PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
-		return 0;
+static int
+sshpam_init(const char *user)
+{
+	extern u_int utmp_len;
+	extern char *__progname;
+	const char *pam_rhost, *pam_user;
+
+	if (sshpam_handle != NULL) {
+		/* We already have a PAM context; check if the user matches */
+		sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle,
+		    PAM_USER, (const void **)&pam_user);
+		if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && strcmp(user, pam_user) == 0)
+			return (0);
+		fatal_remove_cleanup(sshpam_cleanup, NULL);
+		pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+		sshpam_handle = NULL;
 	}
+	debug("PAM: initializing for \"%s\"", user);
+	sshpam_err =
+	    pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &null_conv, &sshpam_handle);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+		sshpam_handle = NULL;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	pam_rhost = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns);
+	debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", pam_rhost);
+	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST, pam_rhost);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+		sshpam_handle = NULL;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+#ifdef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE
+        /*
+         * Some silly PAM modules (e.g. pam_time) require a TTY to operate.
+         * sshd doesn't set the tty until too late in the auth process and 
+	 * may not even set one (for tty-less connections)
+         */
+	debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"ssh\"");
+	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, "ssh");
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+		sshpam_handle = NULL;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+#endif
+	fatal_add_cleanup(sshpam_cleanup, NULL);
+	return (0);
 }
 
-/* Do account management using PAM */
-int do_pam_account(char *username, char *remote_user)
+static void *
+sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
-	int pam_retval;
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
+	int socks[2];
 
-	do_pam_set_conv(&conv);
+	/* Refuse to start if we don't have PAM enabled */
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		return NULL;
 
-	if (remote_user) {
-		debug("PAM setting ruser to \"%.200s\"", remote_user);
-		pam_retval = pam_set_item(__pamh, PAM_RUSER, remote_user);
-		if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
-			fatal("PAM set ruser failed[%d]: %.200s", pam_retval, 
-			    PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
+	/* Initialize PAM */
+	if (sshpam_init(authctxt->user) == -1) {
+		error("PAM: initialization failed");
+		return (NULL);
 	}
 
-	pam_retval = pam_acct_mgmt(__pamh, 0);
-	debug2("pam_acct_mgmt() = %d", pam_retval);
-	switch (pam_retval) {
-		case PAM_SUCCESS:
-			/* This is what we want */
-			break;
-#if 0
-		case PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD:
-			message_cat(&__pam_msg, use_privsep ?
-			    NEW_AUTHTOK_MSG_PRIVSEP : NEW_AUTHTOK_MSG);
-			/* flag that password change is necessary */
-			password_change_required = 1;
-			/* disallow other functionality for now */
-			no_port_forwarding_flag |= 2;
-			no_agent_forwarding_flag |= 2;
-			no_x11_forwarding_flag |= 2;
+	ctxt = xmalloc(sizeof *ctxt);
+	ctxt->pam_done = 0;
+
+	/* Start the authentication thread */
+	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, PF_UNSPEC, socks) == -1) {
+		error("PAM: failed create sockets: %s", strerror(errno));
+		xfree(ctxt);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	ctxt->pam_psock = socks[0];
+	ctxt->pam_csock = socks[1];
+	if (pthread_create(&ctxt->pam_thread, NULL, sshpam_thread, ctxt) == -1) {
+		error("PAM: failed to start authentication thread: %s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+		close(socks[0]);
+		close(socks[1]);
+		xfree(ctxt);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	fatal_add_cleanup(sshpam_thread_cleanup, ctxt);
+	return (ctxt);
+}
+
+static int
+sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
+    u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+	Buffer buffer;
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
+	size_t plen;
+	u_char type;
+	char *msg;
+	size_t len;
+
+	buffer_init(&buffer);
+	*name = xstrdup("");
+	*info = xstrdup("");
+	*prompts = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
+	**prompts = NULL;
+	plen = 0;
+	*echo_on = xmalloc(sizeof(u_int));
+	while (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_psock, &buffer) == 0) {
+		type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
+		msg = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL);
+		switch (type) {
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+			*num = 1;
+			len = plen + strlen(msg) + 1;
+			**prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, len);
+			plen += snprintf(**prompts + plen, len, "%s", msg);
+			**echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON);
+			xfree(msg);
+			return (0);
+		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+			/* accumulate messages */
+			len = plen + strlen(msg) + 1;
+			**prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, len);
+			plen += snprintf(**prompts + plen, len, "%s", msg);
+			xfree(msg);
 			break;
+		case PAM_SUCCESS:
+		case PAM_AUTH_ERR:
+			if (**prompts != NULL) {
+				/* drain any accumulated messages */
+#if 0 /* XXX - not compatible with privsep */
+				packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
+				packet_put_cstring(**prompts);
+				packet_put_cstring("");
+				packet_send();
+				packet_write_wait();
 #endif
+				xfree(**prompts);
+				**prompts = NULL;
+			}
+			if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+				*num = 0;
+				**echo_on = 0;
+				ctxt->pam_done = 1;
+				xfree(msg);
+				return (0);
+			}
+			error("PAM: %s", msg);
 		default:
-			log("PAM rejected by account configuration[%d]: "
-			    "%.200s", pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, 
-			    pam_retval));
-			return(0);
+			*num = 0;
+			**echo_on = 0;
+			xfree(msg);
+			ctxt->pam_done = -1;
+			return (-1);
+		}
 	}
+	return (-1);
+}
 
-	return(1);
+/* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */
+static int
+sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
+{
+	Buffer buffer;
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
+
+	debug2("PAM: %s", __func__);
+	switch (ctxt->pam_done) {
+	case 1:
+		sshpam_authenticated = 1;
+		return (0);
+	case 0:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (num != 1) {
+		error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	buffer_init(&buffer);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp);
+	ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, &buffer);
+	buffer_free(&buffer);
+	return (1);
 }
 
-/* Do PAM-specific session initialisation */
-void do_pam_session(char *username, const char *ttyname)
+static void
+sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
 {
-	int pam_retval;
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
 
-	do_pam_set_conv(&conv);
+	fatal_remove_cleanup(sshpam_thread_cleanup, ctxt);
+	sshpam_thread_cleanup(ctxtp);
+	xfree(ctxt);
+	/*
+	 * We don't call sshpam_cleanup() here because we may need the PAM
+	 * handle at a later stage, e.g. when setting up a session.  It's
+	 * still on the cleanup list, so pam_end() *will* be called before
+	 * the server process terminates.
+	 */
+}
 
-	if (ttyname != NULL) {
-		debug("PAM setting tty to \"%.200s\"", ttyname);
-		pam_retval = pam_set_item(__pamh, PAM_TTY, ttyname);
-		if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
-			fatal("PAM set tty failed[%d]: %.200s",
-			    pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
-	}
+KbdintDevice sshpam_device = {
+	"pam",
+	sshpam_init_ctx,
+	sshpam_query,
+	sshpam_respond,
+	sshpam_free_ctx
+};
+
+KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device = {
+	"pam",
+	mm_sshpam_init_ctx,
+	mm_sshpam_query,
+	mm_sshpam_respond,
+	mm_sshpam_free_ctx
+};
 
-	pam_retval = pam_open_session(__pamh, 0);
-	if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
-		fatal("PAM session setup failed[%d]: %.200s",
-		    pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
+/*
+ * This replaces auth-pam.c
+ */
+void
+start_pam(const char *user)
+{
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		fatal("PAM: initialisation requested when UsePAM=no");
 
-	session_opened = 1;
+	if (sshpam_init(user) == -1)
+		fatal("PAM: initialisation failed");
 }
 
-/* Set PAM credentials */
-void do_pam_setcred(int init)
+void
+finish_pam(void)
 {
-	int pam_retval;
+	fatal_remove_cleanup(sshpam_cleanup, NULL);
+	sshpam_cleanup(NULL);
+}
 
-	if (__pamh == NULL)
-		return;
+u_int
+do_pam_account(void)
+{
+	sshpam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(sshpam_handle, 0);
+	debug3("%s: pam_acct_mgmt = %d", __func__, sshpam_err);
+	
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD)
+		return (0);
+
+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
+		sshpam_new_authtok_reqd = 1;
+
+		/* Prevent forwardings until password changed */
+		no_port_forwarding_flag |= 2;
+		no_agent_forwarding_flag |= 2;
+		no_x11_forwarding_flag |= 2;
+	}
 
-	do_pam_set_conv(&conv);
-
-	debug("PAM establishing creds");
-	pam_retval = pam_setcred(__pamh, 
-	    init ? PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED : PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
-	if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
-		if (was_authenticated)
-			fatal("PAM setcred failed[%d]: %.200s",
-			    pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
-		else
-			debug("PAM setcred failed[%d]: %.200s",
-			    pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
-	} else
-		creds_set = 1;
+	return (1);
 }
 
-/* accessor function for file scope static variable */
-int is_pam_password_change_required(void)
+void
+do_pam_session(void)
 {
-	return password_change_required;
+	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, 
+	    (const void *)&null_conv);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+	sshpam_err = pam_open_session(sshpam_handle, 0);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		fatal("PAM: pam_open_session(): %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+	sshpam_session_open = 1;
 }
 
-/*
- * Have user change authentication token if pam_acct_mgmt() indicated
- * it was expired.  This needs to be called after an interactive
- * session is established and the user's pty is connected to
- * stdin/stdout/stderr.
- */
-void do_pam_chauthtok(void)
+void
+do_pam_set_tty(const char *tty)
 {
-	int pam_retval;
-
-	do_pam_set_conv(&conv);
-
-	if (password_change_required) {
-		if (use_privsep)
-			fatal("Password changing is currently unsupported"
-			    " with privilege separation");
-		pamstate = OTHER;
-		pam_retval = pam_chauthtok(__pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
-		if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
-			fatal("PAM pam_chauthtok failed[%d]: %.200s",
-			    pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
-#if 0
-		/* XXX: This would need to be done in the parent process,
-		 * but there's currently no way to pass such request. */
-		no_port_forwarding_flag &= ~2;
-		no_agent_forwarding_flag &= ~2;
-		no_x11_forwarding_flag &= ~2;
-		if (!no_port_forwarding_flag && options.allow_tcp_forwarding)
-			channel_permit_all_opens();
-#endif
+	if (tty != NULL) {
+		debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"%s\"", tty);
+		sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, tty);
+		if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+			fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_TTY: %s",
+			    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
 	}
 }
 
-/* Cleanly shutdown PAM */
-void finish_pam(void)
+void
+do_pam_setcred(int init)
 {
-	do_pam_cleanup_proc(NULL);
-	fatal_remove_cleanup(&do_pam_cleanup_proc, NULL);
+	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+	    (const void *)&null_conv);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+	if (init) {
+		debug("PAM: establishing credentials");
+		sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
+	} else {
+		debug("PAM: reinitializing credentials");
+		sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
+	}
+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		sshpam_cred_established = 1;
+		return;
+	}
+	if (sshpam_authenticated)
+		fatal("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+	else
+		debug("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
 }
 
-/* Start PAM authentication for specified account */
-void start_pam(const char *user)
+int
+is_pam_password_change_required(void)
 {
-	int pam_retval;
-	extern ServerOptions options;
-	extern u_int utmp_len;
-	const char *rhost;
+	return (sshpam_new_authtok_reqd);
+}
 
-	debug("Starting up PAM with username \"%.200s\"", user);
+static int
+pam_chauthtok_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+	char input[PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
+	struct pam_response *reply;
+	int i;
 
-	pam_retval = pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &conv, &__pamh);
+	*resp = NULL;
 
-	if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
-		fatal("PAM initialisation failed[%d]: %.200s",
-		    pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
+	if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
 
-	rhost = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.verify_reverse_mapping);
-	debug("PAM setting rhost to \"%.200s\"", rhost);
+	if ((reply = malloc(n * sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+	memset(reply, 0, n * sizeof(*reply));
 
-	pam_retval = pam_set_item(__pamh, PAM_RHOST, rhost);
-	if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
-		fatal("PAM set rhost failed[%d]: %.200s", pam_retval,
-		    PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
-#ifdef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE
-	/*
-	 * Some PAM modules (e.g. pam_time) require a TTY to operate,
-	 * and will fail in various stupid ways if they don't get one.
-	 * sshd doesn't set the tty until too late in the auth process and may
-	 * not even need one (for tty-less connections)
-	 * Kludge: Set a fake PAM_TTY
-	 */
-	pam_retval = pam_set_item(__pamh, PAM_TTY, "NODEVssh");
-	if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
-		fatal("PAM set tty failed[%d]: %.200s",
-		    pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
-#endif /* PAM_TTY_KLUDGE */
+	for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+		switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+			reply[i].resp =
+			    read_passphrase(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), 
+			    RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+			reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+			break;
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+			fputs(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), stderr);
+			fgets(input, sizeof input, stdin);
+			reply[i].resp = xstrdup(input);
+			reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+			break;
+		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+			fputs(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), stderr);
+			reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+	*resp = reply;
+	return (PAM_SUCCESS);
 
-	fatal_add_cleanup(&do_pam_cleanup_proc, NULL);
+ fail:
+	for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		if (reply[i].resp != NULL)
+			xfree(reply[i].resp);
+	}
+	xfree(reply);
+	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
 }
 
-/* Return list of PAM environment strings */
-char **fetch_pam_environment(void)
+/*
+ * XXX this should be done in the authentication phase, but ssh1 doesn't
+ * support that
+ */
+void
+do_pam_chauthtok(void)
 {
-#ifdef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
-	return(pam_getenvlist(__pamh));
-#else /* HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST */
-	return(NULL);
-#endif /* HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST */
+	struct pam_conv pam_conv;
+
+	pam_conv.conv = pam_chauthtok_conv;
+	pam_conv.appdata_ptr = NULL;
+
+	if (use_privsep)
+		fatal("Password expired (unable to change with privsep)");
+	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+	    (const void *)&pam_conv);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+	debug("PAM: changing password");
+	sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		fatal("PAM: pam_chauthtok(): %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
 }
 
-void free_pam_environment(char **env)
+/* 
+ * Set a PAM environment string. We need to do this so that the session
+ * modules can handle things like Kerberos/GSI credentials that appear
+ * during the ssh authentication process.
+ */
+
+int
+do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value) 
 {
-	int i;
+	int ret = 1;
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV	
+	char *compound;
+	size_t len;
 
-	if (env != NULL) {
-		for (i = 0; env[i] != NULL; i++)
-			xfree(env[i]);
-	}
+	len = strlen(name) + strlen(value) + 2;
+	compound = xmalloc(len);
+
+	snprintf(compound, len, "%s=%s", name, value);
+	ret = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, compound);
+	xfree(compound);
+#endif
+
+	return (ret);
 }
 
-/* Print any messages that have been generated during authentication */
-/* or account checking to stderr */
-void print_pam_messages(void)
+void
+print_pam_messages(void)
 {
-	if (__pam_msg != NULL)
-		fputs(__pam_msg, stderr);
+	/* XXX */
 }
 
-/* Append a message to buffer */
-void message_cat(char **p, const char *a)
+char **
+fetch_pam_environment(void)
 {
-	char *cp;
-	size_t new_len;
-
-	new_len = strlen(a);
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
+	debug("PAM: retrieving environment");
+	return (pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle));
+#else
+	return (NULL);
+#endif
+}
 
-	if (*p) {
-		size_t len = strlen(*p);
+void
+free_pam_environment(char **env)
+{
+	char **envp;
 
-		*p = xrealloc(*p, new_len + len + 2);
-		cp = *p + len;
-	} else
-		*p = cp = xmalloc(new_len + 2);
+	if (env == NULL)
+		return;
 
-	memcpy(cp, a, new_len);
-	cp[new_len] = '\n';
-	cp[new_len + 1] = '\0';
+	for (envp = env; *envp; envp++)
+		xfree(*envp);
+	xfree(env);
 }
 
 #endif /* USE_PAM */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.h b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.h
index 376d9ea..0e8b4b1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: auth-pam.h,v 1.16 2002/07/23 00:44:07 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $Id: auth-pam.h,v 1.21 2003/09/02 13:18:53 djm Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 
 /*
@@ -32,19 +32,17 @@
 # define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE		__progname
 #endif
 
-void start_pam(const char *user);
+void start_pam(const char *);
 void finish_pam(void);
-int auth_pam_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password);
-char **fetch_pam_environment(void);
-void free_pam_environment(char **env);
-int do_pam_authenticate(int flags);
-int do_pam_account(const char *username, const char *remote_user);
-void do_pam_session(const char *username, const char *ttyname);
-void do_pam_setcred(int init);
-void print_pam_messages(void);
+u_int do_pam_account(void);
+void do_pam_session(void);
+void do_pam_set_tty(const char *);
+void do_pam_setcred(int );
 int is_pam_password_change_required(void);
 void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
-void do_pam_set_conv(struct pam_conv *);
-void message_cat(char **p, const char *a);
+int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
+void print_pam_messages(void);
+char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
+void free_pam_environment(char **);
 
 #endif /* USE_PAM */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c
index 2778ba01..3ea8cc7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c
@@ -36,63 +36,21 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.27 2002/05/24 16:45:16 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.29 2003/08/26 09:58:43 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "auth.h"
-
-/*
- * Do not try to use PAM for password authentication, as it is
- * already (and far better) supported by the challenge/response
- * authentication mechanism.
- */
-#undef USE_PAM
-
-#if !defined(USE_PAM) && !defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
-/* Don't need any of these headers for the PAM or SIA cases */
-# ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
-#  include <crypt.h>
-# endif
-# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
-#  include <login.h>
-# endif
-# ifdef __hpux
-#  include <hpsecurity.h>
-#  include <prot.h>
-# endif
-# ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
-#  include <sys/security.h>
-#  include <sys/audit.h>
-#  include <prot.h>
-# endif /* HAVE_SECUREWARE */
-# if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
-#  include <shadow.h>
-# endif
-# if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
-#  include <sys/label.h>
-#  include <sys/audit.h>
-#  include <pwdadj.h>
-# endif
-# if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT)
-#  include "md5crypt.h"
-# endif /* defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) */
-
-# ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-#  undef ERROR
-#  include <windows.h>
-#  include <sys/cygwin.h>
-#  define is_winnt       (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
-# endif
-#endif /* !USE_PAM && !HAVE_OSF_SIA */
-
-extern ServerOptions options;
 #ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
-extern char *aixloginmsg;
+# include "buffer.h"
+# include "canohost.h"
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
 #endif
 
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
 /*
  * Tries to authenticate the user using password.  Returns true if
  * authentication succeeds.
@@ -101,46 +59,26 @@ int
 auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 {
 	struct passwd * pw = authctxt->pw;
-#if !defined(USE_PAM) && !defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
-	char *encrypted_password;
-	char *pw_password;
-	char *salt;
-# if defined(__hpux) || defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
-	struct pr_passwd *spw;
-# endif /* __hpux || HAVE_SECUREWARE */
-# if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
-	struct spwd *spw;
-# endif
-# if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
-	struct passwd_adjunct *spw;
-# endif
-# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
-	char *authmsg;
-	int authsuccess;
-	int reenter = 1;
-# endif
-#endif /* !defined(USE_PAM) && !defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA) */
+	int ok = authctxt->valid;
 
 	/* deny if no user. */
 	if (pw == NULL)
 		return 0;
 #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
-       if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)
-		return 0;
+	if (pw && pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)
+		ok = 0;
 #endif
 	if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0)
 		return 0;
 
-#if defined(USE_PAM)
-	return auth_pam_password(authctxt, password);
-#elif defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
-	return auth_sia_password(authctxt, password);
+#if defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
+	return auth_sia_password(authctxt, password) && ok;
 #else
 # ifdef KRB5
 	if (options.kerberos_authentication == 1) {
 		int ret = auth_krb5_password(authctxt, password);
 		if (ret == 1 || ret == 0)
-			return ret;
+			return ret && ok;
 		/* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
 	}
 # endif
@@ -151,27 +89,47 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 		if (hToken == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
 			return 0;
 		cygwin_set_impersonation_token(hToken);
-		return 1;
+		return ok;
 	}
 # endif
 # ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
-	authsuccess = (authenticate(pw->pw_name,password,&reenter,&authmsg) == 0);
-
-	if (authsuccess)
-	        /* We don't have a pty yet, so just label the line as "ssh" */
-	        if (loginsuccess(authctxt->user,
-			get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping),
-			"ssh", &aixloginmsg) < 0)
-				aixloginmsg = NULL;
-
-	return(authsuccess);
-# endif
-# ifdef KRB4
-	if (options.kerberos_authentication == 1) {
-		int ret = auth_krb4_password(authctxt, password);
-		if (ret == 1 || ret == 0)
-			return ret;
-		/* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
+	{
+		char *authmsg = NULL;
+		int reenter = 1;
+		int authsuccess = 0;
+
+		if (authenticate(pw->pw_name, password, &reenter,
+		    &authmsg) == 0 && ok) {
+			char *msg;
+			char *host = 
+			    (char *)get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
+
+			authsuccess = 1;
+			aix_remove_embedded_newlines(authmsg);	
+
+			debug3("AIX/authenticate succeeded for user %s: %.100s",
+				pw->pw_name, authmsg);
+
+	        	/* No pty yet, so just label the line as "ssh" */
+			aix_setauthdb(authctxt->user);
+	        	if (loginsuccess(authctxt->user, host, "ssh", 
+			    &msg) == 0) {
+				if (msg != NULL) {
+					debug("%s: msg %s", __func__, msg);
+					buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, 
+					    strlen(msg));
+					xfree(msg);
+				}
+			}
+		} else {
+			debug3("AIX/authenticate failed for user %s: %.100s",
+			    pw->pw_name, authmsg);
+		}
+
+		if (authmsg != NULL)
+			xfree(authmsg);
+
+		return authsuccess;
 	}
 # endif
 # ifdef BSD_AUTH
@@ -179,64 +137,28 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 	    (char *)password) == 0)
 		return 0;
 	else
-		return 1;
-# endif
-	pw_password = pw->pw_passwd;
-
-	/*
-	 * Various interfaces to shadow or protected password data
-	 */
-# if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
-	spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
-	if (spw != NULL)
-		pw_password = spw->sp_pwdp;
-# endif /* defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) */
-
-# if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
-	if (issecure() && (spw = getpwanam(pw->pw_name)) != NULL)
-		pw_password = spw->pwa_passwd;
-# endif /* defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) */
-
-# ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
-	if ((spw = getprpwnam(pw->pw_name)) != NULL)
-		pw_password = spw->ufld.fd_encrypt;
-# endif /* HAVE_SECUREWARE */
-
-# if defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
-	if (iscomsec() && (spw = getprpwnam(pw->pw_name)) != NULL)
-		pw_password = spw->ufld.fd_encrypt;
-# endif /* defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) */
+		return ok;
+# else
+	{
+	/* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
+	char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
 
 	/* Check for users with no password. */
-	if ((password[0] == '\0') && (pw_password[0] == '\0'))
-		return 1;
-
-	if (pw_password[0] != '\0')
-		salt = pw_password;
-	else
-		salt = "xx";
+	if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
+		return ok;
+	else {
+		/* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */
+		char *encrypted_password = xcrypt(password,
+		    (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx");
+
+		/*
+		 * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
+		 * are identical.
+		 */
+		return (strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) == 0) && ok;
+	}
 
-# ifdef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS
-	if (is_md5_salt(salt))
-		encrypted_password = md5_crypt(password, salt);
-	else
-		encrypted_password = crypt(password, salt);
-# else /* HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS */
-#  if defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
-	if (iscomsec())
-		encrypted_password = bigcrypt(password, salt);
-	else
-		encrypted_password = crypt(password, salt);
-#  else
-#   ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
-	encrypted_password = bigcrypt(password, salt);
-#   else
-	encrypted_password = crypt(password, salt);
-#   endif /* HAVE_SECUREWARE */
-#  endif /* __hpux && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) */
-# endif /* HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS */
-
-	/* Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords are identical. */
-	return (strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) == 0);
-#endif /* !USE_PAM && !HAVE_OSF_SIA */
+	}
+# endif
+#endif /* !HAVE_OSF_SIA */
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c
index d7848d0..2eb7e6e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.34 2002/03/25 09:25:06 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.36 2003/06/02 09:17:34 markus Exp $");
 
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *pw, char *cuser, Key *client_host_key)
 	    client_host_key->rsa == NULL)
 		return 0;
 
-	chost = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping);
+	chost = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
 	debug("Rhosts RSA authentication: canonical host %.900s", chost);
 
 	if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(pw, cuser, chost, client_host_key))) {
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *pw, char *cuser, Key *client_host_key)
 
 	/* Perform the challenge-response dialog with the client for the host key. */
 	if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key)) {
-		log("Client on %.800s failed to respond correctly to host authentication.",
+		logit("Client on %.800s failed to respond correctly to host authentication.",
 		    chost);
 		return 0;
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c
index 92f6277..5631d23 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.56 2002/06/10 16:53:06 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.57 2003/04/08 20:21:28 itojun Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
 	    secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
 		xfree(file);
 		fclose(f);
-		log("Authentication refused: %s", line);
+		logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
 		restore_uid();
 		return (0);
 	}
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
 
 		/* check the real bits  */
 		if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))
-			log("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
+			logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
 			    "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
 			    file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.c b/crypto/openssh/auth.c
index e8f0ab9..479581f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.46 2002/11/04 10:07:53 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.49 2003/08/26 09:58:43 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
 
 /* Debugging messages */
 Buffer auth_debug;
@@ -73,26 +74,25 @@ int
 allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 {
 	struct stat st;
-	const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL;
+	const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
 	char *shell;
 	int i;
-#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
-	char *loginmsg;
-#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
-#if !defined(USE_PAM) && defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && \
-    !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
-	struct spwd *spw;
-	time_t today;
+#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
 #endif
 
 	/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
 	if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
 		return 0;
 
-#if !defined(USE_PAM) && defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && \
-    !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
+#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
 #define	DAY		(24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
-	if ((spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name)) != NULL) {
+	if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL) {
+		time_t today;
+
 		today = time(NULL) / DAY;
 		debug3("allowed_user: today %d sp_expire %d sp_lstchg %d"
 		    " sp_max %d", (int)today, (int)spw->sp_expire,
@@ -103,25 +103,58 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 		 * day after the day specified.
 		 */
 		if (spw->sp_expire != -1 && today > spw->sp_expire) {
-			log("Account %.100s has expired", pw->pw_name);
+			logit("Account %.100s has expired", pw->pw_name);
 			return 0;
 		}
 
 		if (spw->sp_lstchg == 0) {
-			log("User %.100s password has expired (root forced)",
+			logit("User %.100s password has expired (root forced)",
 			    pw->pw_name);
 			return 0;
 		}
 
 		if (spw->sp_max != -1 &&
 		    today > spw->sp_lstchg + spw->sp_max) {
-			log("User %.100s password has expired (password aged)",
+			logit("User %.100s password has expired (password aged)",
 			    pw->pw_name);
 			return 0;
 		}
 	}
+#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) */
+
+    	/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
+#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+	if (spw != NULL)
+		passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
+#else
+	passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
 #endif
 
+	/* check for locked account */ 
+	if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
+		int locked = 0;
+
+#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
+		if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
+			 locked = 1;
+#endif
+#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
+		if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
+		    strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0)
+			 locked = 1;
+#endif
+#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
+		if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
+			locked = 1;
+#endif
+		if (locked) {
+			logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
+			    pw->pw_name);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Get the shell from the password data.  An empty shell field is
 	 * legal, and means /bin/sh.
@@ -130,19 +163,19 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 
 	/* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */
 	if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
-		log("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s does not exist",
+		logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s does not exist",
 		    pw->pw_name, shell);
 		return 0;
 	}
 	if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
 	    (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
-		log("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s is not executable",
+		logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s is not executable",
 		    pw->pw_name, shell);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
 	if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0) {
-		hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping);
+		hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
 		ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
 	}
 
@@ -151,7 +184,7 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
 			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
 			    options.deny_users[i])) {
-				log("User %.100s not allowed because listed in DenyUsers",
+				logit("User %.100s not allowed because listed in DenyUsers",
 				    pw->pw_name);
 				return 0;
 			}
@@ -164,7 +197,7 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 				break;
 		/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
 		if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
-			log("User %.100s not allowed because not listed in AllowUsers",
+			logit("User %.100s not allowed because not listed in AllowUsers",
 			    pw->pw_name);
 			return 0;
 		}
@@ -172,7 +205,7 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 	if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
 		/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
 		if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
-			log("User %.100s not allowed because not in any group",
+			logit("User %.100s not allowed because not in any group",
 			    pw->pw_name);
 			return 0;
 		}
@@ -182,7 +215,7 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 			if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
 			    options.num_deny_groups)) {
 				ga_free();
-				log("User %.100s not allowed because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
+				logit("User %.100s not allowed because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
 				    pw->pw_name);
 				return 0;
 			}
@@ -194,7 +227,7 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 			if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
 			    options.num_allow_groups)) {
 				ga_free();
-				log("User %.100s not allowed because none of user's groups are listed in AllowGroups",
+				logit("User %.100s not allowed because none of user's groups are listed in AllowGroups",
 				    pw->pw_name);
 				return 0;
 			}
@@ -207,26 +240,23 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 	 * PermitRootLogin to control logins via ssh), or if running as
 	 * non-root user (since loginrestrictions will always fail).
 	 */
-	if ((pw->pw_uid != 0) && (geteuid() == 0) &&
-	    loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &loginmsg) != 0) {
-		int loginrestrict_errno = errno;
-
-		if (loginmsg && *loginmsg) {
-			/* Remove embedded newlines (if any) */
-			char *p;
-			for (p = loginmsg; *p; p++) {
-				if (*p == '\n')
-					*p = ' ';
+	if ((pw->pw_uid != 0) && (geteuid() == 0)) {
+		char *msg;
+
+	   	if (loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &msg) != 0) {
+			int loginrestrict_errno = errno;
+
+			if (msg && *msg) {
+				buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
+				aix_remove_embedded_newlines(msg);
+				logit("Login restricted for %s: %.100s",
+				    pw->pw_name, msg);
 			}
-			/* Remove trailing newline */
-			*--p = '\0';
-			log("Login restricted for %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, 
-			    loginmsg);
+			/* Don't fail if /etc/nologin  set */
+		    	if (!(loginrestrict_errno == EPERM && 
+			    stat(_PATH_NOLOGIN, &st) == 0))
+				return 0;
 		}
-		/* Don't fail if /etc/nologin  set */
-	    	if (!(loginrestrict_errno == EPERM && 
-		    stat(_PATH_NOLOGIN, &st) == 0))
-			return 0;
 	}
 #endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
 
@@ -253,7 +283,7 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
 	    !authctxt->valid ||
 	    authctxt->failures >= AUTH_FAIL_LOG ||
 	    strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
-		authlog = log;
+		authlog = logit;
 
 	if (authctxt->postponed)
 		authmsg = "Postponed";
@@ -269,13 +299,10 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
 	    get_remote_port(),
 	    info);
 
-#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
 	if (authenticated == 0 && strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
-	    loginfailed(authctxt->user,
-		get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping),
-		"ssh");
-#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
-
+		record_failed_login(authctxt->user, "ssh");
+#endif
 }
 
 /*
@@ -294,12 +321,12 @@ auth_root_allowed(char *method)
 		break;
 	case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
 		if (forced_command) {
-			log("Root login accepted for forced command.");
+			logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
 			return 1;
 		}
 		break;
 	}
-	log("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
+	logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -391,7 +418,7 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
 		    (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
 		    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
 		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
-			log("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
+			logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
 			    "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
 			    pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
 		} else {
@@ -495,12 +522,10 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
 
 	pw = getpwnam(user);
 	if (pw == NULL) {
-		log("Illegal user %.100s from %.100s",
+		logit("Illegal user %.100s from %.100s",
 		    user, get_remote_ipaddr());
-#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
-		loginfailed(user,
-		    get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping),
-		    "ssh");
+#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
+		record_failed_login(user, "ssh");
 #endif
 		return (NULL);
 	}
@@ -565,3 +590,24 @@ auth_debug_reset(void)
 		auth_debug_init = 1;
 	}
 }
+
+struct passwd *
+fakepw(void)
+{
+	static struct passwd fake;
+
+	memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
+	fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
+	fake.pw_passwd =
+	    "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";	
+	fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
+	fake.pw_uid = -1;
+	fake.pw_gid = -1;
+#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
+	fake.pw_class = "";
+#endif
+	fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
+	fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
+
+	return (&fake);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.h b/crypto/openssh/auth.h
index 4e19ee4..3cd0e2b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.41 2002/09/26 11:38:43 markus Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.46 2003/08/28 12:54:34 markus Exp $	*/
 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
 
 /*
@@ -49,29 +49,32 @@ typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice;
 
 struct Authctxt {
 	int		 success;
-	int		 postponed;
-	int		 valid;
+	int		 postponed;	/* authentication needs another step */
+	int		 valid;		/* user exists and is allowed to login */
 	int		 attempt;
 	int		 failures;
-	char		*user;
+	char		*user;		/* username sent by the client */
 	char		*service;
-	struct passwd	*pw;
+	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
 	char		*style;
 	void		*kbdintctxt;
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
 	auth_session_t	*as;
 #endif
-#ifdef KRB4
-	char		*krb4_ticket_file;
-#endif
 #ifdef KRB5
 	krb5_context	 krb5_ctx;
-	krb5_auth_context krb5_auth_ctx;
 	krb5_ccache	 krb5_fwd_ccache;
 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
 #endif
+	void		*methoddata;
 };
+/*
+ * Every authentication method has to handle authentication requests for
+ * non-existing users, or for users that are not allowed to login. In this
+ * case 'valid' is set to 0, but 'user' points to the username requested by
+ * the client.
+ */
 
 struct Authmethod {
 	char	*name;
@@ -112,20 +115,6 @@ int	 auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
 int	 hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
 int	 user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
 
-#ifdef KRB4
-#include <krb.h>
-int     auth_krb4(Authctxt *, KTEXT, char **, KTEXT);
-int	auth_krb4_password(Authctxt *, const char *);
-void    krb4_cleanup_proc(void *);
-
-#ifdef AFS
-#include <kafs.h>
-int     auth_krb4_tgt(Authctxt *, const char *);
-int     auth_afs_token(Authctxt *, const char *);
-#endif /* AFS */
-
-#endif /* KRB4 */
-
 #ifdef KRB5
 int	auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *);
 int	auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt);
@@ -134,7 +123,6 @@ void	krb5_cleanup_proc(void *authctxt);
 #endif /* KRB5 */
 
 #include "auth-pam.h"
-#include "auth2-pam.h"
 
 Authctxt *do_authentication(void);
 Authctxt *do_authentication2(void);
@@ -186,6 +174,8 @@ void	 auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
 void	 auth_debug_send(void);
 void	 auth_debug_reset(void);
 
+struct passwd *fakepw(void);
+
 #define AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6
 #define AUTH_FAIL_LOG (AUTH_FAIL_MAX/2)
 #define AUTH_FAIL_MSG "Too many authentication failures for %.100s"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth1.c b/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
index 18203fe..1ef6eae 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.47 2003/02/06 21:22:42 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.52 2003/08/28 12:54:34 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -50,10 +50,6 @@ get_authname(int type)
 	case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS:
 	case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE:
 		return "challenge-response";
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
-	case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS:
-		return "kerberos";
-#endif
 	}
 	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "bad-auth-msg-%d", type);
 	return buf;
@@ -82,7 +78,7 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 
 	/* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */
 	if (options.password_authentication &&
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+#ifdef KRB5
 	    (!options.kerberos_authentication || options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) &&
 #endif
 	    PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, ""))) {
@@ -120,100 +116,6 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 
 		/* Process the packet. */
 		switch (type) {
-
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
-		case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS:
-			if (!options.kerberos_authentication) {
-				verbose("Kerberos authentication disabled.");
-			} else {
-				char *kdata = packet_get_string(&dlen);
-				packet_check_eom();
-
-				if (kdata[0] == 4) { /* KRB_PROT_VERSION */
-#ifdef KRB4
-					KTEXT_ST tkt, reply;
-					tkt.length = dlen;
-					if (tkt.length < MAX_KTXT_LEN)
-						memcpy(tkt.dat, kdata, tkt.length);
-
-					if (PRIVSEP(auth_krb4(authctxt, &tkt,
-					    &client_user, &reply))) {
-						authenticated = 1;
-						snprintf(info, sizeof(info),
-						    " tktuser %.100s",
-						    client_user);
-
-						packet_start(
-						    SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE);
-						packet_put_string((char *)
-						    reply.dat, reply.length);
-						packet_send();
-						packet_write_wait();
-					}
-#endif /* KRB4 */
-				} else {
-#ifdef KRB5
-					krb5_data tkt, reply;
-					tkt.length = dlen;
-					tkt.data = kdata;
-
-					if (PRIVSEP(auth_krb5(authctxt, &tkt,
-					    &client_user, &reply))) {
-						authenticated = 1;
-						snprintf(info, sizeof(info),
-						    " tktuser %.100s",
-						    client_user);
-
- 						/* Send response to client */
- 						packet_start(
-						    SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE);
- 						packet_put_string((char *)
-						    reply.data, reply.length);
- 						packet_send();
- 						packet_write_wait();
-
- 						if (reply.length)
- 							xfree(reply.data);
-					}
-#endif /* KRB5 */
-				}
-				xfree(kdata);
-			}
-			break;
-#endif /* KRB4 || KRB5 */
-
-#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
-			/* XXX - punt on backward compatibility here. */
-		case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT:
-			packet_send_debug("Kerberos TGT passing disabled before authentication.");
-			break;
-#ifdef AFS
-		case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN:
-			packet_send_debug("AFS token passing disabled before authentication.");
-			break;
-#endif /* AFS */
-#endif /* AFS || KRB5 */
-
-		case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS:
-			if (!options.rhosts_authentication) {
-				verbose("Rhosts authentication disabled.");
-				break;
-			}
-			/*
-			 * Get client user name.  Note that we just have to
-			 * trust the client; this is one reason why rhosts
-			 * authentication is insecure. (Another is
-			 * IP-spoofing on a local network.)
-			 */
-			client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
-			packet_check_eom();
-
-			/* Try to authenticate using /etc/hosts.equiv and .rhosts. */
-			authenticated = auth_rhosts(pw, client_user);
-
-			snprintf(info, sizeof info, " ruser %.100s", client_user);
-			break;
-
 		case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA:
 			if (!options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) {
 				verbose("Rhosts with RSA authentication disabled.");
@@ -310,7 +212,7 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 			 * Any unknown messages will be ignored (and failure
 			 * returned) during authentication.
 			 */
-			log("Unknown message during authentication: type %d", type);
+			logit("Unknown message during authentication: type %d", type);
 			break;
 		}
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
@@ -324,8 +226,6 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 			    authctxt->user);
 
 #ifdef _UNICOS
-		if (type == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD && !authenticated)
-			cray_login_failure(authctxt->user, IA_UDBERR);
 		if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) {
 			authenticated = 0;
 			fatal("Access denied for user %s.",authctxt->user);
@@ -345,9 +245,10 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		    !auth_root_allowed(get_authname(type)))
 			authenticated = 0;
 #endif
+
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-		if (!use_privsep && authenticated && 
-		    !do_pam_account(pw->pw_name, client_user))
+		if (options.use_pam && authenticated && 
+		    !PRIVSEP(do_pam_account()))
 			authenticated = 0;
 #endif
 
@@ -362,9 +263,8 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		if (authenticated)
 			return;
 
-		if (authctxt->failures++ > AUTH_FAIL_MAX) {
+		if (authctxt->failures++ > AUTH_FAIL_MAX)
 			packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
-		}
 
 		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
 		packet_send();
@@ -393,16 +293,6 @@ do_authentication(void)
 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
 		*style++ = '\0';
 
-#ifdef KRB5
-	/* XXX - SSH.com Kerberos v5 braindeath. */
-	if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_K5USER) &&
-	    options.kerberos_authentication) {
-		char *p;
-		if ((p = strchr(user, '@')) != NULL)
-			*p = '\0';
-	}
-#endif
-
 	authctxt = authctxt_new();
 	authctxt->user = user;
 	authctxt->style = style;
@@ -410,14 +300,17 @@ do_authentication(void)
 	/* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
 	if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
 		authctxt->valid = 1;
-	else
+	else {
 		debug("do_authentication: illegal user %s", user);
+		authctxt->pw = fakepw();
+	}
 
 	setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->pw ? user : "unknown",
 	    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-	PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt->pw == NULL ? "NOUSER" : user));
+	if (options.use_pam)
+		PRIVSEP(start_pam(user));
 #endif
 
 	/*
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
index 1e48387..4e2a0f9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static void input_userauth_info_response(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 extern KbdintDevice bsdauth_device;
 #else
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-extern KbdintDevice pam_device;
+extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
 #endif
 #ifdef SKEY
 extern KbdintDevice skey_device;
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ KbdintDevice *devices[] = {
 	&bsdauth_device,
 #else
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-	&pam_device,
+	&sshpam_device,
 #endif
 #ifdef SKEY
 	&skey_device,
@@ -327,22 +327,24 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 void
 privsep_challenge_enable(void)
 {
+#if defined(BSD_AUTH) || defined(USE_PAM) || defined(SKEY)
+	int n = 0;
+#endif
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
 	extern KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device;
 #endif
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-	extern KbdintDevice mm_pam_device;
+	extern KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device;
 #endif
 #ifdef SKEY
 	extern KbdintDevice mm_skey_device;
 #endif
-	int n = 0;
 
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
 	devices[n++] = &mm_bsdauth_device;
 #else
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-	devices[n++] = &mm_pam_device;
+	devices[n++] = &mm_sshpam_device;
 #endif
 #ifdef SKEY
 	devices[n++] = &mm_skey_device;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c
deleted file mode 100644
index e058981..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,634 +0,0 @@
-/*-
- * Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
- * NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc.
- * under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
- * DARPA CHATS research program.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-#include <security/pam_appl.h>
-
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "auth-pam.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "msg.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "readpass.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-
-#ifdef USE_POSIX_THREADS
-#include <pthread.h>
-#else
-/*
- * Simulate threads with processes.
- */
-typedef pid_t pthread_t;
-
-static void
-pthread_exit(void *value __unused)
-{
-	_exit(0);
-}
-
-static int
-pthread_create(pthread_t *thread, const void *attr __unused,
-    void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg)
-{
-	pid_t pid;
-
-	switch ((pid = fork())) {
-	case -1:
-		error("fork(): %s", strerror(errno));
-		return (-1);
-	case 0:
-		thread_start(arg);
-		_exit(1);
-	default:
-		*thread = pid;
-		return (0);
-	}
-}
-
-static int
-pthread_cancel(pthread_t thread)
-{
-	return (kill(thread, SIGTERM));
-}
-
-static int
-pthread_join(pthread_t thread, void **value __unused)
-{
-	int status;
-
-	waitpid(thread, &status, 0);
-	return (status);
-}
-#endif
-
-
-static pam_handle_t *pam_handle;
-static int pam_err;
-static int pam_authenticated;
-static int pam_new_authtok_reqd;
-static int pam_session_open;
-static int pam_cred_established;
-
-struct pam_ctxt {
-	pthread_t	 pam_thread;
-	int		 pam_psock;
-	int		 pam_csock;
-	int		 pam_done;
-};
-
-static void pam_free_ctx(void *);
-
-/*
- * Conversation function for authentication thread.
- */
-static int
-pam_thread_conv(int n,
-	 const struct pam_message **msg,
-	 struct pam_response **resp,
-	 void *data)
-{
-	Buffer buffer;
-	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
-	int i;
-
-	ctxt = data;
-	if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
-		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-	*resp = xmalloc(n * sizeof **resp);
-	memset(*resp, 0, n * sizeof **resp);
-	buffer_init(&buffer);
-	for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
-		(*resp)[i].resp_retcode = 0;
-		(*resp)[i].resp = NULL;
-		switch (msg[i]->msg_style) {
-		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
-			buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, msg[i]->msg);
-			ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, msg[i]->msg_style, &buffer);
-			ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, &buffer);
-			if (buffer_get_char(&buffer) != PAM_AUTHTOK)
-				goto fail;
-			(*resp)[i].resp = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL);
-			break;
-		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
-			buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, msg[i]->msg);
-			ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, msg[i]->msg_style, &buffer);
-			ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, &buffer);
-			if (buffer_get_char(&buffer) != PAM_AUTHTOK)
-				goto fail;
-			(*resp)[i].resp = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL);
-			break;
-		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
-			buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, msg[i]->msg);
-			ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, msg[i]->msg_style, &buffer);
-			break;
-		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
-			buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, msg[i]->msg);
-			ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, msg[i]->msg_style, &buffer);
-			break;
-		default:
-			goto fail;
-		}
-		buffer_clear(&buffer);
-	}
-	buffer_free(&buffer);
-	return (PAM_SUCCESS);
- fail:
-	for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
-		if ((*resp)[i].resp != NULL) {
-			memset((*resp)[i].resp, 0, strlen((*resp)[i].resp));
-			xfree((*resp)[i].resp);
-		}
-	}
-	memset(*resp, 0, n * sizeof **resp);
-	xfree(*resp);
-	*resp = NULL;
-	buffer_free(&buffer);
-	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-}
-
-/*
- * Authentication thread.
- */
-static void *
-pam_thread(void *ctxtp)
-{
-	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
-	Buffer buffer;
-	struct pam_conv pam_conv = { pam_thread_conv, ctxt };
-
-#ifndef USE_POSIX_THREADS
-	{
-		const char *pam_user;
-
-		pam_get_item(pam_handle, PAM_USER, (const void **)&pam_user);
-		setproctitle("%s [pam]", pam_user);
-	}
-#endif
-	buffer_init(&buffer);
-	pam_err = pam_set_item(pam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&pam_conv);
-	if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
-		goto auth_fail;
-	pam_err = pam_authenticate(pam_handle, 0);
-	if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
-		goto auth_fail;
-	pam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(pam_handle, 0);
-	if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && pam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD)
-		goto auth_fail;
-	buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, "OK");
-	ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, pam_err, &buffer);
-	buffer_free(&buffer);
-	pthread_exit(NULL);
- auth_fail:
-	buffer_put_cstring(&buffer,
-	    pam_strerror(pam_handle, pam_err));
-	ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, &buffer);
-	buffer_free(&buffer);
-	pthread_exit(NULL);
-}
-
-static void
-pam_thread_cleanup(void *ctxtp)
-{
-	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
-
-	pthread_cancel(ctxt->pam_thread);
-	pthread_join(ctxt->pam_thread, NULL);
-	close(ctxt->pam_psock);
-	close(ctxt->pam_csock);
-}
-
-static int
-pam_null_conv(int n,
-	 const struct pam_message **msg,
-	 struct pam_response **resp,
-	 void *data)
-{
-
-	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-}
-
-static struct pam_conv null_conv = { pam_null_conv, NULL };
-
-static void
-pam_cleanup(void *arg)
-{
-	(void)arg;
-	debug("PAM: cleanup");
-	pam_set_item(pam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv);
-	if (pam_cred_established) {
-		pam_setcred(pam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
-		pam_cred_established = 0;
-	}
-	if (pam_session_open) {
-		pam_close_session(pam_handle, PAM_SILENT);
-		pam_session_open = 0;
-	}
-	pam_authenticated = pam_new_authtok_reqd = 0;
-	pam_end(pam_handle, pam_err);
-	pam_handle = NULL;
-}
-
-static int
-pam_init(const char *user)
-{
-	extern ServerOptions options;
-	extern u_int utmp_len;
-	const char *pam_rhost, *pam_user;
-
-	if (pam_handle != NULL) {
-		/* We already have a PAM context; check if the user matches */
-		pam_err = pam_get_item(pam_handle,
-		    PAM_USER, (const void **)&pam_user);
-		if (pam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && strcmp(user, pam_user) == 0)
-			return (0);
-		fatal_remove_cleanup(pam_cleanup, NULL);
-		pam_end(pam_handle, pam_err);
-		pam_handle = NULL;
-	}
-	debug("PAM: initializing for \"%s\"", user);
-	pam_err = pam_start("sshd", user, &null_conv, &pam_handle);
-	if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
-		return (-1);
-	pam_rhost = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len,
-	    options.verify_reverse_mapping);
-	debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", pam_rhost);
-	pam_err = pam_set_item(pam_handle, PAM_RHOST, pam_rhost);
-	if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
-		pam_end(pam_handle, pam_err);
-		pam_handle = NULL;
-		return (-1);
-	}
-	fatal_add_cleanup(pam_cleanup, NULL);
-	return (0);
-}
-
-static void *
-pam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
-	int socks[2];
-
-	/* Initialize PAM */
-	if (pam_init(authctxt->user) == -1) {
-		error("PAM: initialization failed");
-		return (NULL);
-	}
-
-	ctxt = xmalloc(sizeof *ctxt);
-	ctxt->pam_done = 0;
-
-	/* Start the authentication thread */
-	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, PF_UNSPEC, socks) == -1) {
-		error("PAM: failed create sockets: %s", strerror(errno));
-		xfree(ctxt);
-		return (NULL);
-	}
-	ctxt->pam_psock = socks[0];
-	ctxt->pam_csock = socks[1];
-	if (pthread_create(&ctxt->pam_thread, NULL, pam_thread, ctxt) == -1) {
-		error("PAM: failed to start authentication thread: %s",
-		    strerror(errno));
-		close(socks[0]);
-		close(socks[1]);
-		xfree(ctxt);
-		return (NULL);
-	}
-	fatal_add_cleanup(pam_thread_cleanup, ctxt);
-	return (ctxt);
-}
-
-static int
-pam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
-    u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
-{
-	Buffer buffer;
-	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
-	size_t plen;
-	u_char type;
-	char *msg;
-
-	buffer_init(&buffer);
-	*name = xstrdup("");
-	*info = xstrdup("");
-	*prompts = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
-	**prompts = NULL;
-	plen = 0;
-	*echo_on = xmalloc(sizeof(u_int));
-	while (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_psock, &buffer) == 0) {
-		type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
-		msg = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL);
-		switch (type) {
-		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
-		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
-			*num = 1;
-			**prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, plen + strlen(msg) + 1);
-			plen += sprintf(**prompts + plen, "%s", msg);
-			**echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON);
-			xfree(msg);
-			return (0);
-		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
-		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
-			/* accumulate messages */
-			**prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, plen + strlen(msg) + 1);
-			plen += sprintf(**prompts + plen, "%s", msg);
-			xfree(msg);
-			break;
-		case PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD:
-			pam_new_authtok_reqd = 1;
-			/* FALLTHROUGH */
-		case PAM_SUCCESS:
-		case PAM_AUTH_ERR:
-			if (**prompts != NULL) {
-				/* drain any accumulated messages */
-#if 0 /* not compatible with privsep */
-				packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
-				packet_put_cstring(**prompts);
-				packet_put_cstring("");
-				packet_send();
-				packet_write_wait();
-#endif
-				xfree(**prompts);
-				**prompts = NULL;
-			}
-			if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) {
-				*num = 0;
-				**echo_on = 0;
-				ctxt->pam_done = 1;
-				xfree(msg);
-				return (0);
-			}
-			error("PAM: %s", msg);
-		default:
-			*num = 0;
-			**echo_on = 0;
-			xfree(msg);
-			ctxt->pam_done = -1;
-			return (-1);
-		}
-	}
-	return (-1);
-}
-
-static int
-pam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
-{
-	Buffer buffer;
-	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
-	char *msg;
-
-	debug2("PAM: %s", __func__);
-	switch (ctxt->pam_done) {
-	case 1:
-		pam_authenticated = 1;
-		return (0);
-	case 0:
-		break;
-	default:
-		return (-1);
-	}
-	if (num != 1) {
-		error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num);
-		return (-1);
-	}
-	buffer_init(&buffer);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp);
-	ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, &buffer);
-	buffer_free(&buffer);
-	return (1);
-}
-
-static void
-pam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
-{
-	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
-
-	fatal_remove_cleanup(pam_thread_cleanup, ctxt);
-	pam_thread_cleanup(ctxtp);
-	xfree(ctxt);
-	/*
-	 * We don't call pam_cleanup() here because we may need the PAM
-	 * handle at a later stage, e.g. when setting up a session.  It's
-	 * still on the cleanup list, so pam_end() *will* be called before
-	 * the server process terminates.
-	 */
-}
-
-KbdintDevice pam_device = {
-	"pam",
-	pam_init_ctx,
-	pam_query,
-	pam_respond,
-	pam_free_ctx
-};
-
-KbdintDevice mm_pam_device = {
-	"pam",
-	mm_pam_init_ctx,
-	mm_pam_query,
-	mm_pam_respond,
-	mm_pam_free_ctx
-};
-
-/*
- * This replaces auth-pam.c
- */
-void
-start_pam(const char *user)
-{
-	if (pam_init(user) == -1)
-		fatal("PAM: initialisation failed");
-}
-
-void
-finish_pam(void)
-{
-	fatal_remove_cleanup(pam_cleanup, NULL);
-	pam_cleanup(NULL);
-}
-
-int
-do_pam_account(const char *user, const char *ruser)
-{
-	/* XXX */
-	return (1);
-}
-
-void
-do_pam_session(const char *user, const char *tty)
-{
-	pam_err = pam_set_item(pam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv);
-	if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
-		fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
-		    pam_strerror(pam_handle, pam_err));
-	debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"%s\"", tty);
-	pam_err = pam_set_item(pam_handle, PAM_TTY, tty);
-	if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
-		fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_TTY: %s",
-		    pam_strerror(pam_handle, pam_err));
-	pam_err = pam_open_session(pam_handle, 0);
-	if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
-		fatal("PAM: pam_open_session(): %s",
-		    pam_strerror(pam_handle, pam_err));
-	pam_session_open = 1;
-}
-
-void
-do_pam_setcred(int init)
-{
-	pam_err = pam_set_item(pam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv);
-	if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
-		fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
-		    pam_strerror(pam_handle, pam_err));
-	if (init) {
-		debug("PAM: establishing credentials");
-		pam_err = pam_setcred(pam_handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
-	} else {
-		debug("PAM: reinitializing credentials");
-		pam_err = pam_setcred(pam_handle, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
-	}
-	if (pam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) {
-		pam_cred_established = 1;
-		return;
-	}
-	if (pam_authenticated)
-		fatal("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
-		    pam_strerror(pam_handle, pam_err));
-	else
-		debug("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
-		    pam_strerror(pam_handle, pam_err));
-}
-
-int
-is_pam_password_change_required(void)
-{
-	return (pam_new_authtok_reqd);
-}
-
-static int
-pam_chauthtok_conv(int n,
-	 const struct pam_message **msg,
-	 struct pam_response **resp,
-	 void *data)
-{
-	char input[PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
-	int i;
-
-	if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
-		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-	*resp = xmalloc(n * sizeof **resp);
-	for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
-		switch (msg[i]->msg_style) {
-		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
-			(*resp)[i].resp =
-			    read_passphrase(msg[i]->msg, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
-			(*resp)[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
-			break;
-		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
-			fputs(msg[i]->msg, stderr);
-			fgets(input, sizeof input, stdin);
-			(*resp)[i].resp = xstrdup(input);
-			(*resp)[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
-			break;
-		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
-		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
-			fputs(msg[i]->msg, stderr);
-			(*resp)[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
-			break;
-		default:
-			goto fail;
-		}
-	}
-	return (PAM_SUCCESS);
- fail:
-	xfree(*resp);
-	*resp = NULL;
-	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-}
-
-/*
- * XXX this should be done in the authentication phase, but ssh1 doesn't
- * support that
- */
-void
-do_pam_chauthtok(void)
-{
-	struct pam_conv pam_conv = { pam_chauthtok_conv, NULL };
-
-	if (use_privsep)
-		fatal("PAM: chauthtok not supprted with privsep");
-	pam_err = pam_set_item(pam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&pam_conv);
-	if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
-		fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
-		    pam_strerror(pam_handle, pam_err));
-	debug("PAM: changing password");
-	pam_err = pam_chauthtok(pam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
-	if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
-		fatal("PAM: pam_chauthtok(): %s",
-		    pam_strerror(pam_handle, pam_err));
-}
-
-void
-print_pam_messages(void)
-{
-	/* XXX */
-}
-
-char **
-fetch_pam_environment(void)
-{
-#ifdef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
-	debug("PAM: retrieving environment");
-	return (pam_getenvlist(pam_handle));
-#else
-	return (NULL);
-#endif
-}
-
-void
-free_pam_environment(char **env)
-{
-	char **envp;
-
-	for (envp = env; *envp; envp++)
-		xfree(*envp);
-	xfree(env);
-}
-
-#endif /* USE_PAM */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam.c
deleted file mode 100644
index ac28fb2..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
-#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$Id: auth2-pam.c,v 1.15 2003/01/08 01:37:03 djm Exp $");
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-#include <security/pam_appl.h>
-
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "auth-pam.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-static int do_pam_conversation_kbd_int(int num_msg, 
-    const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, 
-    void *appdata_ptr);
-void input_userauth_info_response_pam(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt);
-
-struct {
-	int finished, num_received, num_expected;
-	int *prompts;
-	struct pam_response *responses;
-} context_pam2 = {0, 0, 0, NULL};
-
-static struct pam_conv conv2 = {
-	do_pam_conversation_kbd_int,
-	NULL,
-};
-
-int
-auth2_pam(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int retval = -1;
-
-	if (authctxt->user == NULL)
-		fatal("auth2_pam: internal error: no user");
-
-	conv2.appdata_ptr = authctxt;
-	do_pam_set_conv(&conv2);
-
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE,
-	    &input_userauth_info_response_pam);
-	retval = (do_pam_authenticate(0) == PAM_SUCCESS);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL);
-
-	return retval;
-}
-
-static int
-do_pam_conversation_kbd_int(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg,
-    struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata_ptr)
-{
-	int i, j, done;
-	char *text;
-
-	context_pam2.finished = 0;
-	context_pam2.num_received = 0;
-	context_pam2.num_expected = 0;
-	context_pam2.prompts = xmalloc(sizeof(int) * num_msg);
-	context_pam2.responses = xmalloc(sizeof(struct pam_response) * num_msg);
-	memset(context_pam2.responses, 0, sizeof(struct pam_response) * num_msg);
-
-	text = NULL;
-	for (i = 0, context_pam2.num_expected = 0; i < num_msg; i++) {
-		int style = PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style);
-		switch (style) {
-		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
-		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
-			context_pam2.num_expected++;
-			break;
-		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
-		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
-		default:
-			/* Capture all these messages to be sent at once */
-			message_cat(&text, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-
-	if (context_pam2.num_expected == 0)
-		return PAM_SUCCESS;
-
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST);
-	packet_put_cstring("");	/* Name */
-	packet_put_cstring("");	/* Instructions */
-	packet_put_cstring("");	/* Language */
-	packet_put_int(context_pam2.num_expected);
-	
-	for (i = 0, j = 0; i < num_msg; i++) {
-		int style = PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style);
-		
-		/* Skip messages which don't need a reply */
-		if (style != PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON && style != PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF)
-			continue;
-		
-		context_pam2.prompts[j++] = i;
-		if (text) {
-			message_cat(&text, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
-			packet_put_cstring(text);
-			text = NULL;
-		} else
-			packet_put_cstring(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
-		packet_put_char(style == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON);
-	}
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	/*
-	 * Grabbing control of execution and spinning until we get what
-	 * we want is probably rude, but it seems to work properly, and
-	 * the client *should* be in lock-step with us, so the loop should
-	 * only be traversed once.
-	 */
-	while(context_pam2.finished == 0) {
-		done = 1;
-		dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &done, appdata_ptr);
-		if (context_pam2.finished == 0)
-			debug("extra packet during conversation");
-	}
-
-	if (context_pam2.num_received == context_pam2.num_expected) {
-		*resp = context_pam2.responses;
-		return PAM_SUCCESS;
-	} else
-		return PAM_CONV_ERR;
-}
-
-void
-input_userauth_info_response_pam(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-	unsigned int nresp = 0, rlen = 0, i = 0;
-	char *resp;
-
-	if (authctxt == NULL)
-		fatal("input_userauth_info_response_pam: no authentication context");
-
-	nresp = packet_get_int();	/* Number of responses. */
-	debug("got %d responses", nresp);
-
-
-	if (nresp != context_pam2.num_expected)
-		fatal("%s: Received incorrect number of responses "
-		    "(expected %d, received %u)", __func__, 
-		    context_pam2.num_expected, nresp);
-
-	if (nresp > 100)
-		fatal("%s: too many replies", __func__);
-
-	for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) {
-		int j = context_pam2.prompts[i];
-
-		resp = packet_get_string(&rlen);
-		context_pam2.responses[j].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
-		context_pam2.responses[j].resp = resp;
-		context_pam2.num_received++;
-	}
-
-	context_pam2.finished = 1;
-
-	packet_check_eom();
-}
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam.h b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam.h
deleted file mode 100644
index c54f811..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: auth2-pam.h,v 1.2 2001/02/09 01:55:36 djm Exp $ */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-
-int	auth2_pam(Authctxt *authctxt);
-
-#endif /* USE_PAM */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
index 9cbe376..2ce95e0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.96 2003/02/06 21:22:43 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.102 2003/08/26 09:58:43 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "canohost.h"
@@ -38,10 +38,14 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
 extern u_char *session_id2;
-extern int session_id2_len;
+extern u_int session_id2_len;
 
 Authctxt *x_authctxt = NULL;
 
@@ -52,10 +56,16 @@ extern Authmethod method_pubkey;
 extern Authmethod method_passwd;
 extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
 extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+#endif
 
 Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
 	&method_none,
 	&method_pubkey,
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	&method_gssapi,
+#endif
 	&method_passwd,
 	&method_kbdint,
 	&method_hostbased,
@@ -87,10 +97,6 @@ do_authentication2(void)
 	/* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */
 	if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
 		options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
-	if (options.pam_authentication_via_kbd_int)
-		options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
-	if (use_privsep)
-		options.pam_authentication_via_kbd_int = 0;
 
 	dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error);
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request);
@@ -143,7 +149,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	login_cap_t *lc;
 	const char *from_host, *from_ip;
 
-        from_host = get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping);
+        from_host = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
         from_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
 #endif
 
@@ -166,12 +172,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 			authctxt->valid = 1;
 			debug2("input_userauth_request: setting up authctxt for %s", user);
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-			PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt->pw->pw_name));
+			if (options.use_pam)
+				PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt->pw->pw_name));
 #endif
 		} else {
-			log("input_userauth_request: illegal user %s", user);
+			logit("input_userauth_request: illegal user %s", user);
+			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-			PRIVSEP(start_pam("NOUSER"));
+			if (options.use_pam)
+				PRIVSEP(start_pam(user));
 #endif
 		}
 		setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->pw ? user : "unknown",
@@ -194,12 +203,12 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
                 if (lc == NULL)
                         lc = login_getclassbyname(NULL, authctxt->pw);
                 if (!auth_hostok(lc, from_host, from_ip)) {
-                        log("Denied connection for %.200s from %.200s [%.200s].",
+                        logit("Denied connection for %.200s from %.200s [%.200s].",
                             authctxt->pw->pw_name, from_host, from_ip);
                         packet_disconnect("Sorry, you are not allowed to connect.");
                 }
                 if (!auth_timeok(lc, time(NULL))) {
-                        log("LOGIN %.200s REFUSED (TIME) FROM %.200s",
+                        logit("LOGIN %.200s REFUSED (TIME) FROM %.200s",
                             authctxt->pw->pw_name, from_host);
                         packet_disconnect("Logins not available right now.");
                 }
@@ -210,6 +219,12 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 
 	/* reset state */
 	auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
+#endif
+
 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
 
 	/* try to authenticate user */
@@ -240,10 +255,9 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 		authenticated = 0;
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-	if (!use_privsep && authenticated && authctxt->user && 
-	    !do_pam_account(authctxt->user, NULL))
+	if (options.use_pam && authenticated && !PRIVSEP(do_pam_account()))
 		authenticated = 0;
-#endif /* USE_PAM */
+#endif
 
 #ifdef _UNICOS
 	if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) {
@@ -268,13 +282,8 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 		/* now we can break out */
 		authctxt->success = 1;
 	} else {
-		if (authctxt->failures++ > AUTH_FAIL_MAX) {
+		if (authctxt->failures++ > AUTH_FAIL_MAX)
 			packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
-		}
-#ifdef _UNICOS
-		if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
-			cray_login_failure(authctxt->user, IA_UDBERR);
-#endif /* _UNICOS */
 		methods = authmethods_get();
 		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
 		packet_put_cstring(methods);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
index a186e01..c78db6d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.58 2003/01/23 13:50:27 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.61 2003/06/28 16:23:06 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
@@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply
 	PUT_32BIT(buf, len);
 
 	/* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
-	if (atomicio(write, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
-	    atomicio(write, auth->fd, buffer_ptr(request),
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
+	    atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buffer_ptr(request),
 	    buffer_len(request)) != buffer_len(request)) {
 		error("Error writing to authentication socket.");
 		return 0;
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int versio
 		buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n);
 		*comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
 		if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))
-			log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
+			logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
 			    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
 		break;
 	case 2:
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 	if (key->type != KEY_RSA1)
 		return 0;
 	if (response_type == 0) {
-		log("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported.");
+		logit("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported.");
 		return 0;
 	}
 	buffer_init(&buffer);
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 	type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
 
 	if (agent_failed(type)) {
-		log("Agent admitted failure to authenticate using the key.");
+		logit("Agent admitted failure to authenticate using the key.");
 	} else if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
 		fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
 	} else {
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 	}
 	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
 	if (agent_failed(type)) {
-		log("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key.");
+		logit("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key.");
 	} else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
 		fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
 	} else {
@@ -589,16 +589,33 @@ ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key)
 }
 
 int
-ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add, const char *reader_id, const char *pin)
+ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add, 
+    const char *reader_id, const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm)
 {
 	Buffer msg;
-	int type;
+	int type, constrained = (life || confirm);
+
+	if (add) {
+		type = constrained ?
+		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED :
+		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY;
+	} else
+		type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY;
 
 	buffer_init(&msg);
-	buffer_put_char(&msg, add ? SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY :
-	    SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
 	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, reader_id);
 	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, pin);
+	
+	if (constrained) {
+		if (life != 0) {
+			buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME);
+			buffer_put_int(&msg, life);
+		}
+		if (confirm != 0)
+			buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM);
+	}
+
 	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
 		buffer_free(&msg);
 		return 0;
@@ -641,7 +658,7 @@ decode_reply(int type)
 	case SSH_AGENT_FAILURE:
 	case SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE:
 	case SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE:
-		log("SSH_AGENT_FAILURE");
+		logit("SSH_AGENT_FAILURE");
 		return 0;
 	case SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS:
 		return 1;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfile.c b/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
index 90618ef..1f46093 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.52 2003/03/13 11:42:18 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.54 2003/05/24 09:30:39 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
 		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");
 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
 		error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.",
-		    st.st_mode & 0777, filename);
+		    (u_int)st.st_mode & 0777, filename);
 		error("It is recommended that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.");
 		error("This private key will be ignored.");
 		return 0;
@@ -629,9 +629,18 @@ key_load_public(const char *filename, char **commentp)
 	Key *pub;
 	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
 
+	/* try rsa1 private key */
 	pub = key_load_public_type(KEY_RSA1, filename, commentp);
 	if (pub != NULL)
 		return pub;
+
+	/* try rsa1 public key */
+	pub = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+	if (key_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp) == 1)
+		return pub;
+	key_free(pub);
+
+	/* try ssh2 public key */
 	pub = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
 	if (key_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp) == 1)
 		return pub;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c b/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c
index ebb59f7..cc8c5ba 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.28 2002/10/23 10:40:16 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.29 2003/04/08 20:21:28 itojun Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
 		/**XXX should be two's-complement */
 		int i, carry;
 		u_char *uc = buf;
-		log("negativ!");
+		logit("negativ!");
 		for (i = bytes-1, carry = 1; i>=0; i--) {
 			uc[i] ^= 0xff;
 			if (carry)
@@ -166,7 +166,6 @@ buffer_get_int(Buffer *buffer)
 	return GET_32BIT(buf);
 }
 
-#ifdef HAVE_U_INT64_T
 u_int64_t
 buffer_get_int64(Buffer *buffer)
 {
@@ -175,7 +174,6 @@ buffer_get_int64(Buffer *buffer)
 	buffer_get(buffer, (char *) buf, 8);
 	return GET_64BIT(buf);
 }
-#endif
 
 /*
  * Stores integers in the buffer, msb first.
@@ -198,7 +196,6 @@ buffer_put_int(Buffer *buffer, u_int value)
 	buffer_append(buffer, buf, 4);
 }
 
-#ifdef HAVE_U_INT64_T
 void
 buffer_put_int64(Buffer *buffer, u_int64_t value)
 {
@@ -207,7 +204,6 @@ buffer_put_int64(Buffer *buffer, u_int64_t value)
 	PUT_64BIT(buf, value);
 	buffer_append(buffer, buf, 8);
 }
-#endif
 
 /*
  * Returns an arbitrary binary string from the buffer.  The string cannot
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/canohost.c b/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
index 941db23..438175f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.35 2002/11/26 02:38:54 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.37 2003/06/02 09:17:34 markus Exp $");
 
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static void check_ip_options(int, char *);
  */
 
 static char *
-get_remote_hostname(int socket, int verify_reverse_mapping)
+get_remote_hostname(int socket, int use_dns)
 {
 	struct sockaddr_storage from;
 	int i;
@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ get_remote_hostname(int socket, int verify_reverse_mapping)
 	    NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
 		fatal("get_remote_hostname: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICHOST failed");
 
+	if (!use_dns)
+		return xstrdup(ntop);
+
 	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET)
 		check_ip_options(socket, ntop);
 
@@ -80,14 +83,24 @@ get_remote_hostname(int socket, int verify_reverse_mapping)
 	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
 	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
 		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
-#if 0
-		log("Could not reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
-#endif
 		return xstrdup(ntop);
 	}
 
-	/* Got host name. */
-	name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0';
+	/*
+	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
+	 */
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+	if (getaddrinfo(name, "0", &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+		    name, ntop);
+		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+		return xstrdup(ntop);
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Convert it to all lowercase (which is expected by the rest
 	 * of this software).
@@ -95,9 +108,6 @@ get_remote_hostname(int socket, int verify_reverse_mapping)
 	for (i = 0; name[i]; i++)
 		if (isupper(name[i]))
 			name[i] = tolower(name[i]);
-
-	if (!verify_reverse_mapping)
-		return xstrdup(name);
 	/*
 	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
 	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
@@ -111,7 +121,7 @@ get_remote_hostname(int socket, int verify_reverse_mapping)
 	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
 	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
-		log("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
 		    "failed - POSSIBLE BREAKIN ATTEMPT!", name);
 		return xstrdup(ntop);
 	}
@@ -126,7 +136,7 @@ get_remote_hostname(int socket, int verify_reverse_mapping)
 	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
 	if (!ai) {
 		/* Address not found for the host name. */
-		log("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
 		    "map back to the address - POSSIBLE BREAKIN ATTEMPT!",
 		    ntop, name);
 		return xstrdup(ntop);
@@ -149,6 +159,7 @@ get_remote_hostname(int socket, int verify_reverse_mapping)
 static void
 check_ip_options(int socket, char *ipaddr)
 {
+#ifdef IP_OPTIONS
 	u_char options[200];
 	char text[sizeof(options) * 3 + 1];
 	socklen_t option_size;
@@ -166,11 +177,12 @@ check_ip_options(int socket, char *ipaddr)
 		for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
 			snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
 			    " %2.2x", options[i]);
-		log("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
+		logit("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
 		    ipaddr, text);
 		packet_disconnect("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
 		    ipaddr, text);
 	}
+#endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
 }
 
 /*
@@ -180,14 +192,14 @@ check_ip_options(int socket, char *ipaddr)
  */
 
 const char *
-get_canonical_hostname(int verify_reverse_mapping)
+get_canonical_hostname(int use_dns)
 {
 	static char *canonical_host_name = NULL;
-	static int verify_reverse_mapping_done = 0;
+	static int use_dns_done = 0;
 
 	/* Check if we have previously retrieved name with same option. */
 	if (canonical_host_name != NULL) {
-		if (verify_reverse_mapping_done != verify_reverse_mapping)
+		if (use_dns_done != use_dns)
 			xfree(canonical_host_name);
 		else
 			return canonical_host_name;
@@ -196,11 +208,11 @@ get_canonical_hostname(int verify_reverse_mapping)
 	/* Get the real hostname if socket; otherwise return UNKNOWN. */
 	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket())
 		canonical_host_name = get_remote_hostname(
-		    packet_get_connection_in(), verify_reverse_mapping);
+		    packet_get_connection_in(), use_dns);
 	else
 		canonical_host_name = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
 
-	verify_reverse_mapping_done = verify_reverse_mapping;
+	use_dns_done = use_dns;
 	return canonical_host_name;
 }
 
@@ -294,11 +306,11 @@ get_remote_ipaddr(void)
 }
 
 const char *
-get_remote_name_or_ip(u_int utmp_len, int verify_reverse_mapping)
+get_remote_name_or_ip(u_int utmp_len, int use_dns)
 {
 	static const char *remote = "";
 	if (utmp_len > 0)
-		remote = get_canonical_hostname(verify_reverse_mapping);
+		remote = get_canonical_hostname(use_dns);
 	if (utmp_len == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_len)
 		remote = get_remote_ipaddr();
 	return remote;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
index b5d3874..ce53367 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.62 2002/11/21 22:45:31 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.65 2003/05/17 04:27:52 markus Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -49,11 +49,14 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.62 2002/11/21 22:45:31 markus Exp $");
 #endif
 
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
-#include "rijndael.h"
-static const EVP_CIPHER *evp_rijndael(void);
+extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_rijndael(void);
+extern void ssh_rijndael_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
 #endif
-static const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
-static const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
+extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
+extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
+extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
+extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void);
+extern void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
 
 struct Cipher {
 	char	*name;
@@ -84,6 +87,11 @@ struct Cipher {
 	{ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
 				SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
 #endif
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00906000L
+	{ "aes128-ctr", 	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+	{ "aes192-ctr", 	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+	{ "aes256-ctr", 	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+#endif
 
 	{ NULL,			SSH_CIPHER_ILLEGAL, 0, 0, NULL }
 };
@@ -296,298 +304,6 @@ cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher,
 	memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
 }
 
-/* Implementations for other non-EVP ciphers */
-
-/*
- * This is used by SSH1:
- *
- * What kind of triple DES are these 2 routines?
- *
- * Why is there a redundant initialization vector?
- *
- * If only iv3 was used, then, this would till effect have been
- * outer-cbc. However, there is also a private iv1 == iv2 which
- * perhaps makes differential analysis easier. On the other hand, the
- * private iv1 probably makes the CRC-32 attack ineffective. This is a
- * result of that there is no longer any known iv1 to use when
- * choosing the X block.
- */
-struct ssh1_3des_ctx
-{
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	k1, k2, k3;
-};
-
-static int
-ssh1_3des_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
-    int enc)
-{
-	struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
-	u_char *k1, *k2, *k3;
-
-	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
-		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
-	}
-	if (key == NULL)
-		return (1);
-	if (enc == -1)
-		enc = ctx->encrypt;
-	k1 = k2 = k3 = (u_char *) key;
-	k2 += 8;
-	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) >= 16+8) {
-		if (enc)
-			k3 += 16;
-		else
-			k1 += 16;
-	}
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k1);
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k2);
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k3);
-#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
-	EVP_CipherInit(&c->k1, EVP_des_cbc(), k1, NULL, enc);
-	EVP_CipherInit(&c->k2, EVP_des_cbc(), k2, NULL, !enc);
-	EVP_CipherInit(&c->k3, EVP_des_cbc(), k3, NULL, enc);
-#else
-	if (EVP_CipherInit(&c->k1, EVP_des_cbc(), k1, NULL, enc) == 0 ||
-	    EVP_CipherInit(&c->k2, EVP_des_cbc(), k2, NULL, !enc) == 0 ||
-	    EVP_CipherInit(&c->k3, EVP_des_cbc(), k3, NULL, enc) == 0) {
-		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
-		xfree(c);
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
-		return (0);
-	}
-#endif
-	return (1);
-}
-
-static int
-ssh1_3des_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len)
-{
-	struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
-
-	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
-		error("ssh1_3des_cbc: no context");
-		return (0);
-	}
-#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
-	EVP_Cipher(&c->k1, dest, (u_char *)src, len);
-	EVP_Cipher(&c->k2, dest, dest, len);
-	EVP_Cipher(&c->k3, dest, dest, len);
-#else
-	if (EVP_Cipher(&c->k1, dest, (u_char *)src, len) == 0 ||
-	    EVP_Cipher(&c->k2, dest, dest, len) == 0 ||
-	    EVP_Cipher(&c->k3, dest, dest, len) == 0)
-		return (0);
-#endif
-	return (1);
-}
-
-static int
-ssh1_3des_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-{
-	struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
-
-	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
-		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
-		xfree(c);
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
-	}
-	return (1);
-}
-
-static const EVP_CIPHER *
-evp_ssh1_3des(void)
-{
-	static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_3des;
-
-	memset(&ssh1_3des, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
-	ssh1_3des.nid = NID_undef;
-	ssh1_3des.block_size = 8;
-	ssh1_3des.iv_len = 0;
-	ssh1_3des.key_len = 16;
-	ssh1_3des.init = ssh1_3des_init;
-	ssh1_3des.cleanup = ssh1_3des_cleanup;
-	ssh1_3des.do_cipher = ssh1_3des_cbc;
-#ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
-	ssh1_3des.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH;
-#endif
-	return (&ssh1_3des);
-}
-
-/*
- * SSH1 uses a variation on Blowfish, all bytes must be swapped before
- * and after encryption/decryption. Thus the swap_bytes stuff (yuk).
- */
-static void
-swap_bytes(const u_char *src, u_char *dst, int n)
-{
-	u_char c[4];
-
-	/* Process 4 bytes every lap. */
-	for (n = n / 4; n > 0; n--) {
-		c[3] = *src++;
-		c[2] = *src++;
-		c[1] = *src++;
-		c[0] = *src++;
-
-		*dst++ = c[0];
-		*dst++ = c[1];
-		*dst++ = c[2];
-		*dst++ = c[3];
-	}
-}
-
-#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
-static void bf_ssh1_init (EVP_CIPHER_CTX * ctx, const unsigned char *key,
-			  const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-{
-	if (iv != NULL)
-		memcpy (&(ctx->oiv[0]), iv, 8);
-	memcpy (&(ctx->iv[0]), &(ctx->oiv[0]), 8);
-	if (key != NULL)
-		BF_set_key (&(ctx->c.bf_ks), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length (ctx),
-			    key);
-}
-#endif
-static int (*orig_bf)(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int) = NULL;
-
-static int
-bf_ssh1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *out, const u_char *in, u_int len)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	swap_bytes(in, out, len);
-	ret = (*orig_bf)(ctx, out, out, len);
-	swap_bytes(out, out, len);
-	return (ret);
-}
-
-static const EVP_CIPHER *
-evp_ssh1_bf(void)
-{
-	static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_bf;
-
-	memcpy(&ssh1_bf, EVP_bf_cbc(), sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
-	orig_bf = ssh1_bf.do_cipher;
-	ssh1_bf.nid = NID_undef;
-#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
-	ssh1_bf.init = bf_ssh1_init;
-#endif
-	ssh1_bf.do_cipher = bf_ssh1_cipher;
-	ssh1_bf.key_len = 32;
-	return (&ssh1_bf);
-}
-
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
-/* RIJNDAEL */
-#define RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE 16
-struct ssh_rijndael_ctx
-{
-	rijndael_ctx	r_ctx;
-	u_char		r_iv[RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE];
-};
-
-static int
-ssh_rijndael_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
-    int enc)
-{
-	struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c;
-
-	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
-		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
-	}
-	if (key != NULL) {
-		if (enc == -1)
-			enc = ctx->encrypt;
-		rijndael_set_key(&c->r_ctx, (u_char *)key,
-		    8*EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), enc);
-	}
-	if (iv != NULL)
-		memcpy(c->r_iv, iv, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
-	return (1);
-}
-
-static int
-ssh_rijndael_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
-    u_int len)
-{
-	struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c;
-	u_char buf[RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE];
-	u_char *cprev, *cnow, *plain, *ivp;
-	int i, j, blocks = len / RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
-
-	if (len == 0)
-		return (1);
-	if (len % RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE)
-		fatal("ssh_rijndael_cbc: bad len %d", len);
-	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
-		error("ssh_rijndael_cbc: no context");
-		return (0);
-	}
-	if (ctx->encrypt) {
-		cnow  = dest;
-		plain = (u_char *)src;
-		cprev = c->r_iv;
-		for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++, plain+=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE,
-		    cnow+=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) {
-			for (j = 0; j < RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; j++)
-				buf[j] = plain[j] ^ cprev[j];
-			rijndael_encrypt(&c->r_ctx, buf, cnow);
-			cprev = cnow;
-		}
-		memcpy(c->r_iv, cprev, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
-	} else {
-		cnow  = (u_char *) (src+len-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
-		plain = dest+len-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
-
-		memcpy(buf, cnow, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
-		for (i = blocks; i > 0; i--, cnow-=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE,
-		    plain-=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) {
-			rijndael_decrypt(&c->r_ctx, cnow, plain);
-			ivp = (i == 1) ? c->r_iv : cnow-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
-			for (j = 0; j < RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; j++)
-				plain[j] ^= ivp[j];
-		}
-		memcpy(c->r_iv, buf, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
-	}
-	return (1);
-}
-
-static int
-ssh_rijndael_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-{
-	struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c;
-
-	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
-		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
-		xfree(c);
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
-	}
-	return (1);
-}
-
-static const EVP_CIPHER *
-evp_rijndael(void)
-{
-	static EVP_CIPHER rijndal_cbc;
-
-	memset(&rijndal_cbc, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
-	rijndal_cbc.nid = NID_undef;
-	rijndal_cbc.block_size = RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
-	rijndal_cbc.iv_len = RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
-	rijndal_cbc.key_len = 16;
-	rijndal_cbc.init = ssh_rijndael_init;
-	rijndal_cbc.cleanup = ssh_rijndael_cleanup;
-	rijndal_cbc.do_cipher = ssh_rijndael_cbc;
-#ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
-	rijndal_cbc.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
-	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
-#endif
-	return (&rijndal_cbc);
-}
-#endif
-
 /*
  * Exports an IV from the CipherContext required to export the key
  * state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent
@@ -611,7 +327,6 @@ void
 cipher_get_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv, u_int len)
 {
 	Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
-	u_char *civ = NULL;
 	int evplen;
 
 	switch (c->number) {
@@ -624,45 +339,28 @@ cipher_get_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv, u_int len)
 		if (evplen != len)
 			fatal("%s: wrong iv length %d != %d", __func__,
 			    evplen, len);
-
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
-		if (c->evptype == evp_rijndael) {
-			struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *aesc;
-
-			aesc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(&cc->evp);
-			if (aesc == NULL)
-				fatal("%s: no rijndael context", __func__);
-			civ = aesc->r_iv;
-		} else
+		if (c->evptype == evp_rijndael)
+			ssh_rijndael_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, len);
+		else
 #endif
-		{
-			civ = cc->evp.iv;
-		}
+		if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr)
+			ssh_aes_ctr_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, len);
+		else
+			memcpy(iv, cc->evp.iv, len);
+		break;
+	case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
+		ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, 24);
 		break;
-	case SSH_CIPHER_3DES: {
-		struct ssh1_3des_ctx *desc;
-		if (len != 24)
-			fatal("%s: bad 3des iv length: %d", __func__, len);
-		desc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(&cc->evp);
-		if (desc == NULL)
-			fatal("%s: no 3des context", __func__);
-		debug3("%s: Copying 3DES IV", __func__);
-		memcpy(iv, desc->k1.iv, 8);
-		memcpy(iv + 8, desc->k2.iv, 8);
-		memcpy(iv + 16, desc->k3.iv, 8);
-		return;
-	}
 	default:
 		fatal("%s: bad cipher %d", __func__, c->number);
 	}
-	memcpy(iv, civ, len);
 }
 
 void
 cipher_set_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv)
 {
 	Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
-	u_char *div = NULL;
 	int evplen = 0;
 
 	switch (c->number) {
@@ -672,36 +370,22 @@ cipher_set_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv)
 		evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
 		if (evplen == 0)
 			return;
-
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
-		if (c->evptype == evp_rijndael) {
-			struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *aesc;
-
-			aesc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(&cc->evp);
-			if (aesc == NULL)
-				fatal("%s: no rijndael context", __func__);
-			div = aesc->r_iv;
-		} else
+		if (c->evptype == evp_rijndael)
+			ssh_rijndael_iv(&cc->evp, 1, iv, evplen);
+		else
 #endif
-		{
-			div = cc->evp.iv;
-		}
+		if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr)
+			ssh_aes_ctr_iv(&cc->evp, 1, iv, evplen);
+		else
+			memcpy(cc->evp.iv, iv, evplen);
+		break;
+	case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
+		ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 1, iv, 24);
 		break;
-	case SSH_CIPHER_3DES: {
-		struct ssh1_3des_ctx *desc;
-		desc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(&cc->evp);
-		if (desc == NULL)
-			fatal("%s: no 3des context", __func__);
-		debug3("%s: Installed 3DES IV", __func__);
-		memcpy(desc->k1.iv, iv, 8);
-		memcpy(desc->k2.iv, iv + 8, 8);
-		memcpy(desc->k3.iv, iv + 16, 8);
-		return;
-	}
 	default:
 		fatal("%s: bad cipher %d", __func__, c->number);
 	}
-	memcpy(div, iv, evplen);
 }
 
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compat.c b/crypto/openssh/compat.c
index b256ba5..64226a3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/compat.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/compat.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.66 2003/04/01 10:31:26 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.69 2003/08/29 10:03:15 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "buffer.h"
@@ -80,7 +80,11 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version)
 		{ "OpenSSH_2.5.3*",	SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
 		{ "OpenSSH_2.*,"
 		  "OpenSSH_3.0*,"
-		  "OpenSSH_3.1*",	SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
+		  "OpenSSH_3.1*",	SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_BUG_GSSAPI_BER},
+		{ "OpenSSH_3.2*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_3.3*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_3.4*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_3.5*",	SSH_BUG_GSSAPI_BER},
 		{ "Sun_SSH_1.0*",	SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
 		{ "OpenSSH*",		0 },
 		{ "*MindTerm*",		0 },
@@ -132,12 +136,9 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version)
 		  "1.2.19*,"
 		  "1.2.20*,"
 		  "1.2.21*,"
-		  "1.2.22*",		SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG|SSH_BUG_K5USER },
+		  "1.2.22*",		SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },
 		{ "1.3.2*",		/* F-Secure */
-					SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG|SSH_BUG_K5USER },
-		{ "1.2.1*,"
-		  "1.2.2*,"
-		  "1.2.3*",		SSH_BUG_K5USER },
+					SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },
 		{ "*SSH Compatible Server*",			/* Netscreen */
 					SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
 		{ "*OSU_0*,"
@@ -189,7 +190,7 @@ proto_spec(const char *spec)
 			ret |= SSH_PROTO_2;
 			break;
 		default:
-			log("ignoring bad proto spec: '%s'.", p);
+			logit("ignoring bad proto spec: '%s'.", p);
 			break;
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compat.h b/crypto/openssh/compat.h
index 881e450..7a50044 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/compat.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/compat.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.34 2003/04/01 10:31:26 markus Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.36 2003/08/29 10:03:15 markus Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -53,9 +53,9 @@
 #define SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY	0x00040000
 #define SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN	0x00100000
 #define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF		0x00200000
-#define SSH_BUG_K5USER		0x00400000
-#define SSH_BUG_PROBE		0x00800000
-#define SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX	0x01000000
+#define SSH_BUG_PROBE		0x00400000
+#define SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX	0x00800000
+#define SSH_BUG_GSSAPI_BER	0x01000000
 
 void     enable_compat13(void);
 void     enable_compat20(void);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/configure.ac b/crypto/openssh/configure.ac
index 240d67d..f6580a1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/configure.ac
+++ b/crypto/openssh/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.113 2003/03/21 01:18:09 mouring Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.154.2.11 2003/09/23 09:24:21 djm Exp $
 # $FreeBSD$
 
 AC_INIT
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ AC_CANONICAL_HOST
 AC_C_BIGENDIAN
 
 # Checks for programs.
+AC_PROG_AWK
 AC_PROG_CPP
 AC_PROG_RANLIB
 AC_PROG_INSTALL
@@ -55,36 +56,56 @@ fi
 # Check for some target-specific stuff
 case "$host" in
 *-*-aix*)
-	AFS_LIBS="-lld"
 	CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include"
 	LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib"
-	if (test "$LD" != "gcc" && test -z "$blibpath"); then
-		AC_MSG_CHECKING([if linkage editor ($LD) accepts -blibpath])
-		saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
-		LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -blibpath:/usr/lib:/lib:/usr/local/lib"
-		AC_TRY_LINK([],
-			[],
-			[
-				AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
-				blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib:/usr/local/lib"
-			],
-			[ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ]
-		)
-		LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)]) 
+	if (test -z "$blibpath"); then
+		blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib:/usr/local/lib"
+	fi
+	saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+	for tryflags in -blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, ;do
+		if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
+			LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath"
+			AC_TRY_LINK([], [], [blibflags=$tryflags])
+		fi
+	done
+	if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
+		AC_MSG_RESULT(not found)
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log])
+	else
+		AC_MSG_RESULT($blibflags)
 	fi
+	LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+	dnl Check for authenticate.  Might be in libs.a on older AIXes
 	AC_CHECK_FUNC(authenticate, [AC_DEFINE(WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE)],
 		[AC_CHECK_LIB(s,authenticate,
 			[ AC_DEFINE(WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE)
 				LIBS="$LIBS -ls"
 			])
 		])
+	dnl Check if loginfailed is declared and takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2)
+	AC_CHECK_DECL(loginfailed,
+		 [AC_MSG_CHECKING(if loginfailed takes 4 arguments)
+		  AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+			[#include <usersec.h>],
+			[(void)loginfailed("user","host","tty",0);],
+			[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+			 AC_DEFINE(AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG)],
+			[AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
+		)],
+		[],
+		[#include <usersec.h>]
+	)
+	AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setauthdb)
 	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO)
 	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_REALPATH)
+	AC_DEFINE(SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREUID)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREGID)
 	dnl AIX handles lastlog as part of its login message
 	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
 	AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX)
-	AC_DEFINE(SETPROCTITLE_STRATEGY,PS_USE_CLOBBER_ARGV)
-	AC_DEFINE(SETPROCTITLE_PS_PADDING, '\0')
+	AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_REUSEARGV)
 	;;
 *-*-cygwin*)
 	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
@@ -92,7 +113,6 @@ case "$host" in
 	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CYGWIN)
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
 	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW)
-	AC_DEFINE(IPV4_DEFAULT)
 	AC_DEFINE(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
 	AC_DEFINE(NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS)
 	AC_DEFINE(NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT)
@@ -113,6 +133,9 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
 	[AC_MSG_RESULT(buggy)
 	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO)],
 	[AC_MSG_RESULT(assume it is working)])
+	AC_DEFINE(SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREUID)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREGID)
 	;;
 *-*-hpux10.26)
 	if test -z "$GCC"; then
@@ -126,7 +149,8 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
 	AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX)
 	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW)
 	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP)
-	AC_DEFINE(SETPROCTITLE_STRATEGY,PS_USE_PSTAT)
+	AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING, "*")
+	AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_PSTAT)
 	LIBS="$LIBS -lsec -lsecpw"
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(xnet, t_error, ,AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***]))
 	disable_ptmx_check=yes
@@ -142,7 +166,8 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
 	AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX)
 	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW)
 	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP)
-	AC_DEFINE(SETPROCTITLE_STRATEGY,PS_USE_PSTAT)
+	AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING, "*")
+	AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_PSTAT)
 	LIBS="$LIBS -lsec"
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(xnet, t_error, ,AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***]))
 	;;
@@ -155,7 +180,8 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
 	AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX)
 	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW)
 	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP)
-	AC_DEFINE(SETPROCTITLE_STRATEGY,PS_USE_PSTAT)
+	AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING, "*")
+	AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_PSTAT)
 	LIBS="$LIBS -lsec"
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(xnet, t_error, ,AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***]))
 	;;
@@ -165,6 +191,7 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
 	PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
 	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_INET_NTOA)
 	AC_DEFINE(WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY)
+	AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING, "*LK*")
 	;;
 *-*-irix6*)
 	CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include"
@@ -175,16 +202,26 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
 	AC_DEFINE(WITH_IRIX_AUDIT)
 	AC_CHECK_FUNC(jlimit_startjob, [AC_DEFINE(WITH_IRIX_JOBS)])
 	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_INET_NTOA)
+	AC_DEFINE(SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREUID)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREGID)
 	AC_DEFINE(WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY)
+	AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING, "*LK*")
 	;;
 *-*-linux*)
 	no_dev_ptmx=1
 	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+	check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
 	AC_DEFINE(DONT_TRY_OTHER_AF)
 	AC_DEFINE(PAM_TTY_KLUDGE)
-	AC_DEFINE(SETPROCTITLE_STRATEGY,PS_USE_CLOBBER_ARGV)
-	AC_DEFINE(SETPROCTITLE_PS_PADDING, '\0')
+	AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX, "!!")
+	AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_REUSEARGV)
 	inet6_default_4in6=yes
+	case `uname -r` in
+	1.*|2.0.*)
+		AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE)
+		;;
+	esac
 	;;
 mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_NEWS4)
@@ -197,6 +234,11 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 *-*-freebsd*)
 	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
 	;;
+*-*-bsdi*)
+	AC_DEFINE(SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREUID)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREGID)
+	;;
 *-next-*)
 	conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog"
 	conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
@@ -217,7 +259,10 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX)
 	AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM)
 	AC_DEFINE(PAM_TTY_KLUDGE)
-	AC_DEFINE(STREAMS_PUSH_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
+	AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING, "*LK*")
+	# Pushing STREAMS modules will cause sshd to acquire a controlling tty.
+	AC_DEFINE(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
+	external_path_file=/etc/default/login
 	# hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions)
 	conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog"
 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x)
@@ -244,6 +289,10 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib"
 	LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
+	AC_DEFINE(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
+	AC_DEFINE(SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREUID)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREGID)
 	;;
 *-sni-sysv*)
 	CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include"
@@ -252,6 +301,8 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
 	AC_DEFINE(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
+	AC_DEFINE(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
+	external_path_file=/etc/default/login
 	# /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX
 	# Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc,
 	# otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog
@@ -260,11 +311,17 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include"
 	LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib"
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
+	AC_DEFINE(SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREUID)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREGID)
 	;;
 *-*-sysv5*)
 	CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include"
 	LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib"
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
+	AC_DEFINE(SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREUID)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREGID)
 	;;
 *-*-sysv*)
 	CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include"
@@ -281,6 +338,7 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
 	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW)
 	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS)
+	AC_DEFINE(WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY)
 	AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getluid setluid)
 	MANTYPE=man
 	do_sco3_extra_lib_check=yes
@@ -297,6 +355,10 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
 	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW)
 	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_FD_PASSING)
+	AC_DEFINE(SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREUID)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREGID)
+	AC_DEFINE(WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY)
 	AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getluid setluid)
 	MANTYPE=man
 	;;
@@ -307,6 +369,14 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc -lshare -luex -lacm"
 	MANTYPE=cat
 	;;
+*-*-unicosmp*)
+	AC_DEFINE(WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY)
+	AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
+	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_FD_PASSING)
+	LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+	LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lacid"
+	MANTYPE=cat
+	;;
 *-*-unicos*)
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
 	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_FD_PASSING)
@@ -339,6 +409,11 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 		fi
 	fi
 	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_FD_PASSING)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO)
+	AC_DEFINE(SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREUID)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREGID)
+	AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR, "Nologin")
 	;;
 
 *-*-nto-qnx)
@@ -384,17 +459,29 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(libs,
 	]	
 )
 
+AC_MSG_CHECKING(compiler and flags for sanity)
+AC_TRY_RUN([
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(){exit(0);}
+	],
+	[	AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ],
+	[
+		AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([*** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***])
+	]
+)
+
 # Checks for header files.
-AC_CHECK_HEADERS(bstring.h crypt.h endian.h floatingpoint.h \
-	getopt.h glob.h ia.h lastlog.h libgen.h limits.h login.h \
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(bstring.h crypt.h endian.h features.h floatingpoint.h \
+	getopt.h glob.h ia.h lastlog.h limits.h login.h \
 	login_cap.h maillock.h netdb.h netgroup.h \
 	netinet/in_systm.h paths.h pty.h readpassphrase.h \
 	rpc/types.h security/pam_appl.h shadow.h stddef.h stdint.h \
-	strings.h sys/bitypes.h sys/bsdtty.h sys/cdefs.h \
-	sys/mman.h sys/pstat.h sys/select.h sys/stat.h \
+	strings.h sys/strtio.h sys/audit.h sys/bitypes.h sys/bsdtty.h \
+	sys/cdefs.h sys/mman.h sys/pstat.h sys/select.h sys/stat.h \
 	sys/stropts.h sys/sysmacros.h sys/time.h sys/timers.h \
 	sys/un.h time.h tmpdir.h ttyent.h usersec.h \
-	util.h utime.h utmp.h utmpx.h)
+	util.h utime.h utmp.h utmpx.h vis.h)
 
 # Checks for libraries.
 AC_CHECK_FUNC(yp_match, , AC_CHECK_LIB(nsl, yp_match))
@@ -407,8 +494,46 @@ if test "x$with_tcp_wrappers" != "xno" ; then
     fi
 fi
 
+dnl IRIX and Solaris 2.5.1 have dirname() in libgen
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(dirname, [AC_CHECK_HEADERS(libgen.h)] ,[
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(gen, dirname,[
+		AC_CACHE_CHECK([for broken dirname],
+			ac_cv_have_broken_dirname, [
+			save_LIBS="$LIBS"
+			LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
+			AC_TRY_RUN(
+				[
+#include <libgen.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+    char *s, buf[32];
+
+    strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32);
+    s = dirname(buf);
+    if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) {
+	exit(1);
+    } else {
+	exit(0);
+    }
+}
+				],
+				[ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ],
+				[ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes" ]
+			)
+			LIBS="$save_LIBS"
+		])
+		if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then
+			LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
+			AC_DEFINE(HAVE_DIRNAME)
+			AC_CHECK_HEADERS(libgen.h)
+		fi
+	])
+])
+
 AC_CHECK_FUNC(getspnam, ,
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(gen, getspnam, LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"))
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS(basename, gen, AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BASENAME))
 
 AC_ARG_WITH(rpath,
 	[  --without-rpath         Disable auto-added -R linker paths],
@@ -640,60 +765,47 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(tcp-wrappers,
 
 dnl    Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order
 AC_CHECK_FUNCS(\
-	arc4random __b64_ntop b64_ntop __b64_pton b64_pton basename bcopy \
-	bindresvport_sa clock fchmod fchown freeaddrinfo futimes \
-	gai_strerror getaddrinfo getcwd getgrouplist getnameinfo getopt \
-	getpeereid _getpty getrlimit getrusage getttyent glob inet_aton \
+	arc4random __b64_ntop b64_ntop __b64_pton b64_pton basename \
+	bcopy bindresvport_sa clock fchmod fchown freeaddrinfo futimes \
+	getaddrinfo getcwd getgrouplist getnameinfo getopt \
+	getpeereid _getpty getrlimit getttyent glob inet_aton \
 	inet_ntoa inet_ntop innetgr login_getcapbool md5_crypt memmove \
-	mkdtemp mmap ngetaddrinfo nsleep ogetaddrinfo openpty pstat \
-	readpassphrase realpath recvmsg rresvport_af sendmsg setdtablesize \
-	setegid setenv seteuid setgroups setlogin setpcred setproctitle \
-	setresgid setreuid setrlimit setsid setvbuf sigaction sigvec \
-	snprintf socketpair strerror strlcat strlcpy strmode strnvis \
-	sysconf tcgetpgrp truncate utimes vhangup vsnprintf waitpid \
+	mkdtemp mmap ngetaddrinfo nsleep ogetaddrinfo openlog_r openpty \
+	pstat readpassphrase realpath recvmsg rresvport_af sendmsg \
+	setdtablesize setegid setenv seteuid setgroups setlogin setpcred \
+	setproctitle setregid setresgid setresuid setreuid setrlimit \
+	setsid setvbuf sigaction sigvec snprintf socketpair strerror \
+	strlcat strlcpy strmode strnvis sysconf tcgetpgrp \
+	truncate utimes vhangup vsnprintf waitpid \
 )
 
-AC_SEARCH_LIBS(nanosleep, rt posix4, AC_DEFINE(HAVE_NANOSLEEP))
+# IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror()
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(gai_strerror,[
+	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR)
+	AC_TRY_COMPILE([
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
 
-dnl Make sure strsep prototype is defined before defining HAVE_STRSEP
-AC_CHECK_DECL(strsep, [AC_CHECK_FUNCS(strsep)])
+const char *gai_strerror(int);],[
+char *str;
 
-dnl IRIX and Solaris 2.5.1 have dirname() in libgen
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS(dirname, [AC_CHECK_HEADERS(libgen.h)] ,[
-	AC_CHECK_LIB(gen, dirname,[
-		AC_CACHE_CHECK([for broken dirname],
-			ac_cv_have_broken_dirname, [
-			save_LIBS="$LIBS"
-			LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
-			AC_TRY_RUN(
-				[
-#include <libgen.h>
-#include <string.h>
+str = gai_strerror(0);],[
+		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO, 1,
+		[Define if gai_strerror() returns const char *])])])
 
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
-    char *s, buf[32];
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS(nanosleep, rt posix4, AC_DEFINE(HAVE_NANOSLEEP))
 
-    strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32);
-    s = dirname(buf);
-    if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) {
-	exit(1);
-    } else {
-	exit(0);
-    }
-}
-				],
-				[ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ],
-				[ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes" ]
-			)
-			LIBS="$save_LIBS"
-		])
-		if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then
-			LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
-			AC_DEFINE(HAVE_DIRNAME)
-			AC_CHECK_HEADERS(libgen.h)
-		fi
-	])
-])
+dnl Make sure prototypes are defined for these before using them.
+AC_CHECK_DECL(strsep, [AC_CHECK_FUNCS(strsep)])
+AC_CHECK_DECL(getrusage, [AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getrusage)])
+
+dnl tcsendbreak might be a macro
+AC_CHECK_DECL(tcsendbreak,
+	[AC_DEFINE(HAVE_TCSENDBREAK)],
+	[AC_CHECK_FUNCS(tcsendbreak)], 
+	[#include <termios.h>]
+)
 
 dnl    Checks for time functions
 AC_CHECK_FUNCS(gettimeofday time)
@@ -757,6 +869,53 @@ unlink(template); exit(0);
 )
 fi
 
+dnl make sure that openpty does not reacquire controlling terminal
+if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if openpty correctly handles controlling tty)
+	AC_TRY_RUN(
+		[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+int
+main()
+{
+	pid_t pid;
+	int fd, ptyfd, ttyfd, status;
+
+	pid = fork();
+	if (pid < 0) {		/* failed */
+		exit(1);
+	} else if (pid > 0) {	/* parent */
+		waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
+		if (WIFEXITED(status)) 
+			exit(WEXITSTATUS(status));
+		else
+			exit(2);
+	} else {		/* child */
+		close(0); close(1); close(2);
+		setsid();
+		openpty(&ptyfd, &ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+		fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+		if (fd >= 0)
+			exit(3);	/* Acquired ctty: broken */
+		else
+			exit(0);	/* Did not acquire ctty: OK */
+	}
+}
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+			AC_DEFINE(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
+		]
+	)
+fi
+
 AC_FUNC_GETPGRP
 
 # Check for PAM libs
@@ -772,6 +931,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(pam,
 			AC_CHECK_LIB(dl, dlopen, , )
 			AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_set_item, , AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libpam missing]))
 			AC_CHECK_FUNCS(pam_getenvlist)
+			AC_CHECK_FUNCS(pam_putenv)
 
 			disable_shadow=yes
 			PAM_MSG="yes"
@@ -936,13 +1096,15 @@ int main(void) { exit(SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1); }
 	],
 	[
 		AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
-		AC_MSG_ERROR(Your OpenSSL headers do not match your library)
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your library.
+Check config.log for details.
+Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.])
 	]
 )
 
 # Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the 
 # version in OpenSSL. Skip this for PAM
-if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xno" -a "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then
+if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt")
 fi
 
@@ -1787,7 +1949,6 @@ if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then
 fi
 
 SCARD_MSG="no" 
-
 # Check whether user wants sectok support
 AC_ARG_WITH(sectok,
 	[  --with-sectok           Enable smartcard support using libsectok],
@@ -1837,6 +1998,29 @@ if test x$opensc_config_prefix != x ; then
   fi
 fi
 
+# Check whether user wants DNS support
+DNS_MSG="no" 
+AC_ARG_WITH(dns,
+	[  --with-dns              Support for fetching keys from DNS (experimental)],
+	[
+		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			DNS_MSG="yes"
+			AC_DEFINE(DNS)
+			AC_SEARCH_LIBS(getrrsetbyname, resolv, 
+				[AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME)],
+				[
+					# Needed by our getrrsetbyname()
+					AC_SEARCH_LIBS(res_query, resolv)
+					AC_SEARCH_LIBS(dn_expand, resolv)
+					AC_CHECK_FUNCS(_getshort _getlong)
+					AC_CHECK_MEMBER(HEADER.ad,
+						[AC_DEFINE(HAVE_HEADER_AD)],,
+						[#include <arpa/nameser.h>])
+				])
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
 # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
 KRB5_MSG="no" 
 AC_ARG_WITH(kerberos5,
@@ -1869,93 +2053,38 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(kerberos5,
                         if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
                                 blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
                         fi
-                        AC_CHECK_LIB(resolv, dn_expand, , )
+			AC_SEARCH_LIBS(dn_expand, resolv)
+
+			AC_CHECK_LIB(gssapi,gss_init_sec_context,
+				[ AC_DEFINE(GSSAPI)
+				  K5LIBS="-lgssapi $K5LIBS" ],
+				[ AC_CHECK_LIB(gssapi_krb5,gss_init_sec_context,
+					[ AC_DEFINE(GSSAPI)
+				  	  K5LIBS="-lgssapi_krb5 $K5LIBS" ],
+					AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail]),
+					$K5LIBS)
+				],
+				$K5LIBS)
+			
+			AC_CHECK_HEADER(gssapi.h, ,
+				[ unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h
+				  CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi" 
+				  AC_CHECK_HEADERS(gssapi.h, ,
+					AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail])
+				  ) 
+				]
+			)
+
+			oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS"
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
+			AC_CHECK_HEADER(gssapi_krb5.h, ,
+					[ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" ])
 
                         KRB5=yes
                 fi
         ]
 )
-# Check whether user wants Kerberos 4 support
-KRB4_MSG="no" 
-AC_ARG_WITH(kerberos4,
-	[  --with-kerberos4=PATH   Enable Kerberos 4 support],
-	[
-		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-			if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
-				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
-				LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
-				if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then
-					LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -R${withval}/lib"
-				fi
-				if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
-					blibpath="$blibpath:${withval}/lib"
-				fi
-			else
-				if test -d /usr/include/kerberosIV ; then
-					CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/include/kerberosIV"
-				fi
-			fi
-
-			AC_CHECK_HEADERS(krb.h)
-			if test "$ac_cv_header_krb_h" != yes; then
-				AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find krb.h, build may fail])
-			fi
-			AC_CHECK_LIB(krb, main)
-			if test "$ac_cv_lib_krb_main" != yes; then
-				AC_CHECK_LIB(krb4, main)
-				if test "$ac_cv_lib_krb4_main" != yes; then
-					AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find libkrb nor libkrb4, build may fail])
-				else
-					KLIBS="-lkrb4"
-				fi
-			else
-				KLIBS="-lkrb"
-			fi
-			AC_CHECK_LIB(des, des_cbc_encrypt)
-			if test "$ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" != yes; then
-				AC_CHECK_LIB(des425, des_cbc_encrypt)
-				if test "$ac_cv_lib_des425_des_cbc_encrypt" != yes; then
-					AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find libdes nor libdes425, build may fail])
-				else
-					KLIBS="-ldes425"
-				fi
-			else
-				KLIBS="-ldes"
-			fi
-			AC_CHECK_LIB(resolv, dn_expand, , )
-			KRB4=yes
-			KRB4_MSG="yes" 
-			AC_DEFINE(KRB4)
-		fi
-	]
-)
-
-# Check whether user wants AFS support
-AFS_MSG="no" 
-AC_ARG_WITH(afs,
-	[  --with-afs=PATH         Enable AFS support],
-	[
-		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-
-			if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
-				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
-				LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
-			fi
-
-			if test -z "$KRB4" ; then
-				AC_MSG_WARN([AFS requires Kerberos IV support, build may fail])
-			fi
-
-			LIBS="-lkafs $LIBS"
-			if test ! -z "$AFS_LIBS" ; then
-				LIBS="$LIBS $AFS_LIBS"
-			fi
-			AC_DEFINE(AFS)
-			AFS_MSG="yes" 
-		fi
-	]
-)
-LIBS="$LIBS $KLIBS $K5LIBS"
+LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS"
 
 # Looking for programs, paths and files
 
@@ -2125,30 +2254,52 @@ else
 	)
 fi
 
+# check for /etc/default/login and use it if present.
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(etc-default-login,
+	[  --disable-etc-default-login       Disable using PATH from /etc/default/login [no]],,
+[
+AC_CHECK_FILE("/etc/default/login", [ external_path_file=/etc/default/login ])
+
+if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/default/login"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN)
+fi
+])
+
 dnl BSD systems use /etc/login.conf so --with-default-path= has no effect
 if test $ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool = "yes" -a \
 	$ac_cv_header_login_cap_h = "yes" ; then
-	USES_LOGIN_CONF=yes
+	external_path_file=/etc/login.conf
 fi
+
 # Whether to mess with the default path
 SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)" 
 AC_ARG_WITH(default-path,
 	[  --with-default-path=    Specify default \$PATH environment for server],
 	[
-		if test "$USES_LOGIN_CONF" = "yes" ; then
+		if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
 			AC_MSG_WARN([
 --with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system.
 Edit /etc/login.conf instead.])
 		elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then	
+			if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
+				AC_MSG_WARN([
+--with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in
+$external_path_file .])
+			fi
 			user_path="$withval"
 			SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval" 
 		fi
 	],
-	[ if test "$USES_LOGIN_CONF" = "yes" ; then
-	AC_MSG_WARN([Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf])
+	[ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
+		AC_MSG_WARN([Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf])
 	else
-	AC_TRY_RUN(
-		[
+		if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
+			AC_MSG_WARN([
+If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included,
+otherwise scp will not work.])
+		fi
+		AC_TRY_RUN(
+			[
 /* find out what STDPATH is */
 #include <stdio.h>
 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
@@ -2202,7 +2353,7 @@ main()
 		fi
 	fi ]
 )
-if test "$USES_LOGIN_CONF" != "yes" ; then
+if test "x$external_path_file" != "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
 	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(USER_PATH, "$user_path")
 	AC_SUBST(user_path)
 fi
@@ -2219,18 +2370,6 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(superuser-path,
 )
 
 
-# Whether to force IPv4 by default (needed on broken glibc Linux)
-IPV4_HACK_MSG="no" 
-AC_ARG_WITH(ipv4-default,
-	[  --with-ipv4-default     Use IPv4 by connections unless '-6' specified],
-	[
-		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then	
-			AC_DEFINE(IPV4_DEFAULT)
-			IPV4_HACK_MSG="yes" 
-		fi
-	]
-)
-
 AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses])
 IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no" 
 AC_ARG_WITH(4in6,
@@ -2294,35 +2433,67 @@ AC_SUBST(piddir)
 dnl allow user to disable some login recording features
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(lastlog,
 	[  --disable-lastlog       disable use of lastlog even if detected [no]],
-	[ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LASTLOG) ]
+	[
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
+		fi
+	]
 )
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(utmp,
 	[  --disable-utmp          disable use of utmp even if detected [no]],
-	[ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP) ]
+	[
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP)
+		fi
+	]
 )
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(utmpx,
 	[  --disable-utmpx         disable use of utmpx even if detected [no]],
-	[ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMPX) ]
+	[
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMPX)
+		fi
+	]
 )
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(wtmp,
 	[  --disable-wtmp          disable use of wtmp even if detected [no]],
-	[ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_WTMP) ]
+	[
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_WTMP)
+		fi
+	]
 )
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(wtmpx,
 	[  --disable-wtmpx         disable use of wtmpx even if detected [no]],
-	[ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_WTMPX) ]
+	[
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_WTMPX)
+		fi
+	]
 )
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(libutil,
 	[  --disable-libutil       disable use of libutil (login() etc.) [no]],
-	[ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LOGIN) ]
+	[
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LOGIN)
+		fi
+	]
 )
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(pututline,
 	[  --disable-pututline     disable use of pututline() etc. ([uw]tmp) [no]],
-	[ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_PUTUTLINE) ]
+	[
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_PUTUTLINE) 
+		fi
+	]
 )
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(pututxline,
 	[  --disable-pututxline    disable use of pututxline() etc. ([uw]tmpx) [no]],
-	[ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE) ]
+	[
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE)
+		fi
+	]
 )
 AC_ARG_WITH(lastlog,
   [  --with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location [common locations]],
@@ -2513,8 +2684,8 @@ fi
 
 
 if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
-	LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -blibpath:$blibpath"
-	AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit -blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile])
+	LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $blibflags$blibpath"
+	AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile])
 fi
 
 dnl remove pam and dl because they are in $LIBPAM
@@ -2552,26 +2723,29 @@ echo "                   Askpass program: $E"
 echo "                      Manual pages: $F"
 echo "                          PID file: $G"
 echo "  Privilege separation chroot path: $H"
-if test "$USES_LOGIN_CONF" = "yes" ; then
-echo "   At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in /etc/login.conf"
+if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
+echo "   At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in $external_path_file"
+echo "   Make sure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work"
 else
 echo "            sshd default user PATH: $I"
+	if test ! -z "$external_path_file"; then
+echo "   (If PATH is set in $external_path_file it will be used instead. If"
+echo "   used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)"
+	fi
 fi
 if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then
 echo "          sshd superuser user PATH: $J"
 fi
 echo "                    Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
-echo "                       PAM support: ${PAM_MSG}"
-echo "                KerberosIV support: $KRB4_MSG"
+echo "                       DNS support: $DNS_MSG"
+echo "                       PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
 echo "                 KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
 echo "                 Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
-echo "                       AFS support: $AFS_MSG"
 echo "                     S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
 echo "                      OPIE support: $OPIE_MSG"
 echo "              TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
 echo "              MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
 echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
-echo "          Use IPv4 by default hack: $IPV4_HACK_MSG"
 echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
 echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
 echo "              Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c
index dcee034..42a8aa7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.30 2002/07/24 16:11:18 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.31 2003/04/08 20:21:28 itojun Exp $");
 
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "match.h"
@@ -77,10 +77,10 @@ hostfile_check_key(int bits, Key *key, const char *host, const char *filename, i
 	if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_RSA1 || key->rsa == NULL)
 		return 1;
 	if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) {
-		log("Warning: %s, line %d: keysize mismatch for host %s: "
+		logit("Warning: %s, line %d: keysize mismatch for host %s: "
 		    "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
 		    filename, linenum, host, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
-		log("Warning: replace %d with %d in %s, line %d.",
+		logit("Warning: replace %d with %d in %s, line %d.",
 		    bits, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), filename, linenum);
 	}
 	return 1;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/includes.h b/crypto/openssh/includes.h
index 9a9bd0c..c1ed053 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/includes.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/includes.h
@@ -51,9 +51,6 @@ __RCSID(msg)
 #ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
 # include <netgroup.h>
 #endif
-#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H)
-# include <netdb.h>
-#endif
 #ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
 # include <endian.h>
 #endif
@@ -69,6 +66,7 @@ __RCSID(msg)
 #ifdef HAVE_NEXT
 #  include <libc.h>
 #endif
+#define __USE_GNU /* before unistd.h, activate extra prototypes for glibc */
 #include <unistd.h> /* For STDIN_FILENO, etc */
 #include <termios.h> /* Struct winsize */
 
@@ -134,12 +132,18 @@ __RCSID(msg)
 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
 #include <sys/mman.h> /* for MAP_ANONYMOUS */
 #endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H
+#include <sys/strtio.h>	/* for TIOCCBRK on HP-UX */
+#endif
 
 #include <netinet/in_systm.h> /* For typedefs */
 #include <netinet/in.h> /* For IPv6 macros */
 #include <netinet/ip.h> /* For IPTOS macros */
 #include <netinet/tcp.h>
 #include <arpa/inet.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H)
+# include <netdb.h>
+#endif
 #ifdef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H
 # include <rpc/types.h> /* For INADDR_LOOPBACK */
 #endif
@@ -168,7 +172,6 @@ __RCSID(msg)
 
 #include "version.h"
 #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
-#include "openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h"
 #include "openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h"
 
 #include "entropy.h"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/key.c b/crypto/openssh/key.c
index 060b637..54318cb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/key.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/key.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.51 2003/02/12 09:33:04 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.54 2003/07/09 13:58:19 avsm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ key_equal(Key *a, Key *b)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static u_char *
+u_char*
 key_fingerprint_raw(Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, u_int *dgst_raw_length)
 {
 	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
@@ -236,8 +236,10 @@ key_fingerprint_hex(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len)
 	for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
 		char hex[4];
 		snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%02x:", dgst_raw[i]);
-		strlcat(retval, hex, dgst_raw_len * 3);
+		strlcat(retval, hex, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1);
 	}
+
+	/* Remove the trailing ':' character */
 	retval[(dgst_raw_len * 3) - 1] = '\0';
 	return retval;
 }
@@ -438,7 +440,7 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
 			xfree(blob);
 			return -1;
 		}
-		k = key_from_blob(blob, n);
+		k = key_from_blob(blob, (u_int)n);
 		xfree(blob);
 		if (k == NULL) {
 			error("key_read: key_from_blob %s failed", cp);
@@ -674,7 +676,7 @@ key_names_valid2(const char *names)
 }
 
 Key *
-key_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)
+key_from_blob(u_char *blob, u_int blen)
 {
 	Buffer b;
 	char *ktype;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/log.h b/crypto/openssh/log.h
index 628086a..555f089 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/log.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/log.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.8 2002/07/19 15:43:33 markus Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.9 2003/04/08 20:21:28 itojun Exp $	*/
 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
 
 /*
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ LogLevel log_level_number(char *);
 
 #define fatal	ssh_fatal
 #define error	ssh_error
-#define log	ssh_log
+#define logit	ssh_logit
 #define verbose	ssh_verbose
 #define debug	ssh_debug
 #define debug2	ssh_debug2
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ LogLevel log_level_number(char *);
 
 void     fatal(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
 void     error(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void     log(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void     logit(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
 void     verbose(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
 void     debug(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
 void     debug2(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c b/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c
index 55b408a..80a4f7f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c
@@ -12,11 +12,6 @@
  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *      This product includes software developed by Markus Friedl.
- * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
- *    derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
  *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
@@ -163,7 +158,7 @@
 #include "log.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
 
-RCSID("$Id: loginrec.c,v 1.47 2003/03/10 00:23:07 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id: loginrec.c,v 1.52 2003/07/06 05:20:46 dtucker Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
@@ -414,7 +409,7 @@ login_write (struct logininfo *li)
 {
 #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
 	if ((int)geteuid() != 0) {
-	  log("Attempt to write login records by non-root user (aborting)");
+	  logit("Attempt to write login records by non-root user (aborting)");
 	  return 1;
 	}
 #endif
@@ -820,7 +815,7 @@ utmp_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
 	endttyent();
 
 	if((struct ttyent *)0 == ty) {
-		log("utmp_write_entry: tty not found");
+		logit("utmp_write_entry: tty not found");
 		return(1);
 	}
 #else /* FIXME */
@@ -844,8 +839,8 @@ utmp_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
 		}
 
 		(void)lseek(fd, (off_t)(tty * sizeof(struct utmp)), SEEK_SET);
-		if (atomicio(write, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut))
-			log("utmp_write_direct: error writing %s: %s",
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut))
+			logit("utmp_write_direct: error writing %s: %s",
 			    UTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
 
 		(void)close(fd);
@@ -864,12 +859,12 @@ utmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
 	construct_utmp(li, &ut);
 # ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
 	if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) {
-		log("utmp_perform_login: utmp_write_library() failed");
+		logit("utmp_perform_login: utmp_write_library() failed");
 		return 0;
 	}
 # else
 	if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
-		log("utmp_perform_login: utmp_write_direct() failed");
+		logit("utmp_perform_login: utmp_write_direct() failed");
 		return 0;
 	}
 # endif
@@ -885,12 +880,12 @@ utmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
 	construct_utmp(li, &ut);
 # ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
 	if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) {
-		log("utmp_perform_logout: utmp_write_library() failed");
+		logit("utmp_perform_logout: utmp_write_library() failed");
 		return 0;
 	}
 # else
 	if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
-		log("utmp_perform_logout: utmp_write_direct() failed");
+		logit("utmp_perform_logout: utmp_write_direct() failed");
 		return 0;
 	}
 # endif
@@ -909,7 +904,7 @@ utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 		return utmp_perform_logout(li);
 
 	default:
-		log("utmp_write_entry: invalid type field");
+		logit("utmp_write_entry: invalid type field");
 		return 0;
 	}
 }
@@ -950,7 +945,7 @@ utmpx_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
 static int
 utmpx_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
 {
-	log("utmpx_write_direct: not implemented!");
+	logit("utmpx_write_direct: not implemented!");
 	return 0;
 }
 # endif /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */
@@ -963,12 +958,12 @@ utmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
 	construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
 # ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
 	if (!utmpx_write_library(li, &utx)) {
-		log("utmpx_perform_login: utmp_write_library() failed");
+		logit("utmpx_perform_login: utmp_write_library() failed");
 		return 0;
 	}
 # else
 	if (!utmpx_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
-		log("utmpx_perform_login: utmp_write_direct() failed");
+		logit("utmpx_perform_login: utmp_write_direct() failed");
 		return 0;
 	}
 # endif
@@ -1006,7 +1001,7 @@ utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
 		return utmpx_perform_logout(li);
 	default:
-		log("utmpx_write_entry: invalid type field");
+		logit("utmpx_write_entry: invalid type field");
 		return 0;
 	}
 }
@@ -1028,14 +1023,14 @@ wtmp_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
 	int fd, ret = 1;
 
 	if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) {
-		log("wtmp_write: problem writing %s: %s",
+		logit("wtmp_write: problem writing %s: %s",
 		    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
 		return 0;
 	}
 	if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0)
-		if (atomicio(write, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) {
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) {
 			ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size);
-			log("wtmp_write: problem writing %s: %s",
+			logit("wtmp_write: problem writing %s: %s",
 			    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
 			ret = 0;
 		}
@@ -1072,7 +1067,7 @@ wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
 		return wtmp_perform_logout(li);
 	default:
-		log("wtmp_write_entry: invalid type field");
+		logit("wtmp_write_entry: invalid type field");
 		return 0;
 	}
 }
@@ -1121,12 +1116,12 @@ wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 	li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
 
 	if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
-		log("wtmp_get_entry: problem opening %s: %s",
+		logit("wtmp_get_entry: problem opening %s: %s",
 		    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
 		return 0;
 	}
 	if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
-		log("wtmp_get_entry: couldn't stat %s: %s",
+		logit("wtmp_get_entry: couldn't stat %s: %s",
 		    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
 		close(fd);
 		return 0;
@@ -1141,7 +1136,7 @@ wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 
 	while (!found) {
 		if (atomicio(read, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut)) {
-			log("wtmp_get_entry: read of %s failed: %s",
+			logit("wtmp_get_entry: read of %s failed: %s",
 			    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
 			close (fd);
 			return 0;
@@ -1194,15 +1189,15 @@ wtmpx_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
 	int fd, ret = 1;
 
 	if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) {
-		log("wtmpx_write: problem opening %s: %s",
+		logit("wtmpx_write: problem opening %s: %s",
 		    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
 		return 0;
 	}
 
 	if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0)
-		if (atomicio(write, fd, utx, sizeof(*utx)) != sizeof(*utx)) {
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, utx, sizeof(*utx)) != sizeof(*utx)) {
 			ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size);
-			log("wtmpx_write: problem writing %s: %s",
+			logit("wtmpx_write: problem writing %s: %s",
 			    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
 			ret = 0;
 		}
@@ -1241,7 +1236,7 @@ wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
 		return wtmpx_perform_logout(li);
 	default:
-		log("wtmpx_write_entry: invalid type field");
+		logit("wtmpx_write_entry: invalid type field");
 		return 0;
 	}
 }
@@ -1277,12 +1272,12 @@ wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 	li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
 
 	if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
-		log("wtmpx_get_entry: problem opening %s: %s",
+		logit("wtmpx_get_entry: problem opening %s: %s",
 		    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
 		return 0;
 	}
 	if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
-		log("wtmpx_get_entry: couldn't stat %s: %s",
+		logit("wtmpx_get_entry: couldn't stat %s: %s",
 		    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
 		close(fd);
 		return 0;
@@ -1297,7 +1292,7 @@ wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 
 	while (!found) {
 		if (atomicio(read, fd, &utx, sizeof(utx)) != sizeof(utx)) {
-			log("wtmpx_get_entry: read of %s failed: %s",
+			logit("wtmpx_get_entry: read of %s failed: %s",
 			    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
 			close (fd);
 			return 0;
@@ -1342,7 +1337,7 @@ syslogin_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
 	struct utmp *ut;
 
 	if (! (ut = (struct utmp *)malloc(sizeof(*ut)))) {
-		log("syslogin_perform_login: couldn't malloc()");
+		logit("syslogin_perform_login: couldn't malloc()");
 		return 0;
 	}
 	construct_utmp(li, ut);
@@ -1361,7 +1356,7 @@ syslogin_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
 	(void)line_stripname(line, li->line, sizeof(line));
 
 	if (!logout(line)) {
-		log("syslogin_perform_logout: logout() returned an error");
+		logit("syslogin_perform_logout: logout() returned an error");
 #  ifdef HAVE_LOGWTMP
 	} else {
 		logwtmp(line, "", "");
@@ -1384,7 +1379,7 @@ syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
 		return syslogin_perform_logout(li);
 	default:
-		log("syslogin_write_entry: Invalid type field");
+		logit("syslogin_write_entry: Invalid type field");
 		return 0;
 	}
 }
@@ -1419,7 +1414,7 @@ lastlog_filetype(char *filename)
 	struct stat st;
 
 	if (stat(LASTLOG_FILE, &st) != 0) {
-		log("lastlog_perform_login: Couldn't stat %s: %s", LASTLOG_FILE,
+		logit("lastlog_perform_login: Couldn't stat %s: %s", LASTLOG_FILE,
 			strerror(errno));
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -1450,12 +1445,12 @@ lastlog_openseek(struct logininfo *li, int *fd, int filemode)
 				 LASTLOG_FILE, li->username);
 			break;
 		default:
-			log("lastlog_openseek: %.100s is not a file or directory!",
+			logit("lastlog_openseek: %.100s is not a file or directory!",
 			    LASTLOG_FILE);
 			return 0;
 	}
 
-	*fd = open(lastlog_file, filemode);
+	*fd = open(lastlog_file, filemode, 0600);
 	if ( *fd < 0) {
 		debug("lastlog_openseek: Couldn't open %s: %s",
 		    lastlog_file, strerror(errno));
@@ -1467,7 +1462,7 @@ lastlog_openseek(struct logininfo *li, int *fd, int filemode)
 		offset = (off_t) ((long)li->uid * sizeof(struct lastlog));
 
 		if ( lseek(*fd, offset, SEEK_SET) != offset ) {
-			log("lastlog_openseek: %s->lseek(): %s",
+			logit("lastlog_openseek: %s->lseek(): %s",
 			 lastlog_file, strerror(errno));
 			return 0;
 		}
@@ -1489,9 +1484,9 @@ lastlog_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
 		return(0);
 
 	/* write the entry */
-	if (atomicio(write, fd, &last, sizeof(last)) != sizeof(last)) {
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &last, sizeof(last)) != sizeof(last)) {
 		close(fd);
-		log("lastlog_write_filemode: Error writing to %s: %s",
+		logit("lastlog_write_filemode: Error writing to %s: %s",
 		    LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -1507,7 +1502,7 @@ lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
 		return lastlog_perform_login(li);
 	default:
-		log("lastlog_write_entry: Invalid type field");
+		logit("lastlog_write_entry: Invalid type field");
 		return 0;
 	}
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/mdoc2man.pl b/crypto/openssh/mdoc2man.pl
deleted file mode 100644
index 928fc5d..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/mdoc2man.pl
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,592 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/perl
-###
-### Quick usage:  mdoc2man.pl < mdoc_manpage.8 > man_manpage.8
-###
-###
-###  Copyright (c) 2001 University of Illinois Board of Trustees
-###  Copyright (c) 2001 Mark D. Roth
-###  All rights reserved.
-### 
-###  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-###  modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-###  are met:
-###  1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-###     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-###  2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-###     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-###     documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-###  3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
-###     must display the following acknowledgement:
-###     This product includes software developed by the University of
-###     Illinois at Urbana, and their contributors.
-###  4. The University nor the names of their
-###     contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
-###     this software without specific prior written permission.
-### 
-###  THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE TRUSTEES AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
-###  ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-###  IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
-###  ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE TRUSTEES OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
-###  FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
-###  DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
-###  OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-###  HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
-###  LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
-###  OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
-###  SUCH DAMAGE.
-###
-
-use strict;
-
-my ($name, $date, $id);
-my ($line);
-my ($optlist, $oldoptlist, $nospace, $enum, $synopsis);
-my ($reference, $block, $ext, $extopt, $literal);
-my (@refauthors, $reftitle, $refissue, $refdate, $refopt);
-
-
-$optlist = 0;		### 1 = bullet, 2 = enum, 3 = tag, 4 = item
-$oldoptlist = 0;
-$nospace = 0;
-$synopsis = 0;
-$reference = 0;
-$block = 0;
-$ext = 0;
-$extopt = 0;
-$literal = 0;
-
-while ($line = <STDIN>)
-{
-	if ($line !~ /^\./)
-	{
-		print $line;
-		print ".br\n"
-			if ($literal);
-		next;
-	}
-
-	$line =~ s/^\.//;
-
-	next
-		if ($line =~ m/\\"/);
-
-	$line = ParseMacro($line);
-	print($line)
-		if (defined $line);
-}
-
-
-
-sub ParseMacro # ($line)
-{
-	my ($line) = @_;
-	my (@words, $retval, $option, $parens);
-
-	@words = split(/\s+/, $line);
-	$retval = '';
-	$option = 0;
-	$parens = 0;
-
-#	print('@words = ', scalar(@words), ': ', join(' ', @words), "\n");
-
-	while ($_ = shift @words)
-	{
-#		print "WORD: $_\n";
-
-		next
-			if (/^(Li|Pf)$/);
-
-		if (/^Xo$/)
-		{
-			$ext = 1;
-			$retval .= ' '
-				if ($retval ne '' && $retval !~ m/[\n ]$/);
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Xc$/)
-		{
-			$ext = 0;
-			$retval .= "\n"
-				if (! $extopt);
-			last;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Bd$/)
-		{
-			$literal = 1
-				if ($words[0] eq '-literal');
-			$retval .= "\n";
-			last;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Ed$/)
-		{
-			$literal = 0;
-			last;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Ns$/)
-		{
-			$nospace = 1
-				if (! $nospace);
-			$retval =~ s/ $//;
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if (/^No$/)
-		{
-			$retval =~ s/ $//;
-			$retval .= shift @words;
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Dq$/)
-		{
-			$retval .= '``';
-			do
-			{
-				$retval .= (shift @words) . ' ';
-			}
-			while (@words > 0 && $words[0] !~ m/^[\.,]/);
-			$retval =~ s/ $//;
-			$retval .= '\'\'';
-			$nospace = 1
-				if (! $nospace && $words[0] =~ m/^[\.,]/);
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if (/^(Sq|Ql)$/)
-		{
-			$retval .= '`' . (shift @words) . '\'';
-			$nospace = 1
-				if (! $nospace && $words[0] =~ m/^[\.,]/);
-			next;
-		}
-
-#		if (/^Ic$/)
-#		{
-#			$retval .= '\\fB' . shift(@words) . '\\fP';
-#			next;
-#		}
-
-		if (/^Oo$/)
-		{
-#			$retval .= "[\\c\n";
-			$extopt = 1;
-			$nospace = 1
-				if (! $nospace);
-			$retval .= '[';
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Oc$/)
-		{
-			$extopt = 0;
-			$retval .= ']';
-			next;
-		}
-
-		$retval .= ' '
-			if (! $nospace && $retval ne '' && $retval !~ m/[\n ]$/);
-		$nospace = 0
-			if ($nospace == 1);
-
-		if (/^Dd$/)
-		{
-			$date = join(' ', @words);
-			return undef;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Dt$/)
-		{
-			$id = join(' ', @words);
-			return undef;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Os$/)
-		{
-			$retval .= '.TH '
-				. $id
-				. " \"$date\" \""
-				. join(' ', @words)
-				. "\"";
-			last;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Sh$/)
-		{
-			$retval .= '.SH';
-			if ($words[0] eq 'SYNOPSIS')
-			{
-				$synopsis = 1;
-			}
-			else
-			{
-				$synopsis = 0;
-			}
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Xr$/)
-		{
-			$retval .= '\\fB' . (shift @words) .
-				'\\fP(' . (shift @words) . ')'
-				. (shift @words);
-			last;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Rs/)
-		{
-			@refauthors = ();
-			$reftitle = '';
-			$refissue = '';
-			$refdate = '';
-			$refopt = '';
-			$reference = 1;
-			last;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Re/)
-		{
-			$retval .= "\n";
-
-			# authors
-			while (scalar(@refauthors) > 1)
-			{
-				$retval .= shift(@refauthors) . ', ';
-			}
-			$retval .= 'and '
-				if ($retval ne '');
-			$retval .= shift(@refauthors);
-			
-			# title 
-			$retval .= ', \\fI' . $reftitle . '\\fP';
-
-			# issue
-			$retval .= ', ' . $refissue
-				if ($refissue ne '');
-
-			# date
-			$retval .= ', ' . $refdate
-				if ($refdate ne '');
-
-			# optional info
-			$retval .= ', ' . $refopt
-				if ($refopt ne '');
-
-			$retval .= ".\n";
-
-			$reference = 0;
-			last;
-		}
-
-		if ($reference)
-		{
-			if (/^%A$/)
-			{
-				unshift(@refauthors, join(' ', @words));
-				last;
-			}
-
-			if (/^%T$/)
-			{
-				$reftitle = join(' ', @words);
-				$reftitle =~ s/^"//;
-				$reftitle =~ s/"$//;
-				last;
-			}
-
-			if (/^%N$/)
-			{
-				$refissue = join(' ', @words);
-				last;
-			}
-
-			if (/^%D$/)
-			{
-				$refdate = join(' ', @words);
-				last;
-			}
-
-			if (/^%O$/)
-			{
-				$refopt = join(' ', @words);
-				last;
-			}
-		}
-
-		if (/^Nm$/)
-		{
-			my $n = $name;
-			$n = shift @words
-				if (@words > 0);
-			$name = $n unless $name;
-			$retval .= ".br\n"
-				if ($synopsis);
-			$retval .= "\\fB$n\\fP";
-			$nospace = 1
-				if (! $nospace && $words[0] =~ m/^[\.,]/);
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Nd$/)
-		{
-			$retval .= '\\-';
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Fl$/)
-		{
-			$retval .= '\\fB\\-' . (shift @words) . '\\fP';
-			$nospace = 1
-				if (! $nospace && $words[0] =~ m/^[\.,]/);
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Ar$/)
-		{
-			$retval .= '\\fI';
-			if (! defined $words[0])
-			{
-				$retval .= 'file ...\\fP';
-			}
-			else
-			{
-				$retval .= shift(@words) . '\\fP';
-				while ($words[0] eq '|')
-				{
-					$retval .= ' ' . shift(@words);
-					$retval .= ' \\fI' . shift(@words);
-					$retval .= '\\fP';
-				}
-			}
-			$nospace = 1
-				if (! $nospace && $words[0] =~ m/^[\.,]/);
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Cm$/)
-		{
-			$retval .= '\\fB' . (shift @words) . '\\fP';
-			while ($words[0] =~ m/^[\.,:)]$/)
-			{
-				$retval .= shift(@words);
-			}
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Op$/)
-		{
-			$option = 1;
-			$nospace = 1
-				if (! $nospace);
-			$retval .= '[';
-#			my $tmp = pop(@words);
-#			$tmp .= ']';
-#			push(@words, $tmp);
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Pp$/)
-		{
-			$retval .= "\n";
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Ss$/)
-		{
-			$retval .= '.SS';
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Pa$/ && ! $option)
-		{
-			$retval .= '\\fI';
-			$retval .= '\\&'
-				if ($words[0] =~ m/^\./);
-			$retval .= (shift @words) . '\\fP';
-			while ($words[0] =~ m/^[\.,:;)]$/)
-			{
-				$retval .= shift(@words);
-			}
-#			$nospace = 1
-#				if (! $nospace && $words[0] =~ m/^[\.,:)]/);
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Dv$/)
-		{
-			$retval .= '.BR';
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if (/^(Em|Ev)$/)
-		{
-			$retval .= '.IR';
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Pq$/)
-		{
-			$retval .= '(';
-			$nospace = 1;
-			$parens = 1;
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if (/^(S[xy])$/)
-		{
-			$retval .= '.B ' . join(' ', @words);
-			last;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Ic$/)
-		{
-			$retval .= '\\fB';
-			while (defined $words[0]
-				&& $words[0] !~ m/^[\.,]/)
-			{
-				if ($words[0] eq 'Op')
-				{
-					shift(@words);
-					$retval .= '[';
-					my $tmp = pop(@words);
-					$tmp .= ']';
-					push(@words, $tmp);
-					next;
-				}
-				if ($words[0] eq 'Ar')
-				{
-					shift @words;
-					$retval .= '\\fI';
-					$retval .= shift @words;
-					$retval .= '\\fP';
-				}
-				else
-				{
-					$retval .= shift @words;
-				}
-				$retval .= ' '
-					if (! $nospace);
-			}
-			$retval =~ s/ $//;
-			$retval .= '\\fP';
-			$retval .= shift @words
-				if (defined $words[0]);
-			last;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Bl$/)
-		{
-			$oldoptlist = $optlist;
-			if ($words[0] eq '-bullet')
-			{
-				$optlist = 1;
-			}
-			elsif ($words[0] eq '-enum')
-			{
-				$optlist = 2;
-				$enum = 0;
-			}
-			elsif ($words[0] eq '-tag')
-			{
-				$optlist = 3;
-			}
-			elsif ($words[0] eq '-item')
-			{
-				$optlist = 4;
-			}
-			last;
-		}
-
-		if (/^El$/)
-		{
-			$optlist = $oldoptlist;
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if ($optlist && /^It$/)
-		{
-			if ($optlist == 1)
-			{
-				# bullets
-				$retval .= '.IP \\(bu';
-				next;
-			}
-
-			if ($optlist == 2)
-			{
-				# enum
-				$retval .= '.IP ' . (++$enum) . '.';
-				next;
-			}
-
-			if ($optlist == 3)
-			{
-				# tags
-				$retval .= ".TP\n";
-				if ($words[0] =~ m/^(Pa|Ev)$/)
-				{
-					shift @words;
-					$retval .= '.B';
-				}
-				next;
-			}
-
-			if ($optlist == 4)
-			{
-				# item
-				$retval .= ".IP\n";
-				next;
-			}
-
-			next;
-		}
-
-		if (/^Sm$/)
-		{
-			if ($words[0] eq 'off')
-			{
-				$nospace = 2;
-			}
-			elsif ($words[0] eq 'on')
-			{
-#				$retval .= "\n";
-				$nospace = 0;
-			}
-			shift @words;
-			next;
-		}
-
-		$retval .= "$_";
-	}
-
-	return undef
-		if ($retval eq '.');
-
-	$retval =~ s/^\.([^a-zA-Z])/$1/;
-#	$retval =~ s/ $//;
-
-	$retval .= ')'
-		if ($parens == 1);
-
-	$retval .= ']'
-		if ($option == 1);
-
-#	$retval .= ' '
-#		if ($nospace && $retval ne '' && $retval !~ m/\n$/);
-
-#	$retval .= ' '
-#		if ($extended && $retval !~ m/ $/);
-
-	$retval .= ' '
-		if ($ext && ! $extopt && $retval !~ m/ $/);
-
-	$retval .= "\n"
-		if (! $ext && ! $extopt && $retval ne '' && $retval !~ m/\n$/);
-
-	return $retval;
-}
-
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
index 17a1ce6..59281be 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.36 2003/04/01 10:22:21 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.49 2003/08/28 12:54:34 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
@@ -68,6 +68,11 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "mpaux.h"
 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
+#endif
+
 /* Imports */
 extern ServerOptions options;
 extern u_int utmp_len;
@@ -102,7 +107,7 @@ struct {
 	u_int olen;
 } child_state;
 
-/* Functions on the montior that answer unprivileged requests */
+/* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
 
 int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
@@ -127,17 +132,17 @@ int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pam_account(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_pam_query(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_pam_respond(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int, Buffer *);
 #endif
 
-#ifdef KRB4
-int mm_answer_krb4(int, Buffer *);
-#endif
-#ifdef KRB5
-int mm_answer_krb5(int, Buffer *);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
 #endif
 
 static Authctxt *authctxt;
@@ -150,8 +155,9 @@ static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
 static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
 static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
 static char *auth_method = "unknown";
-static int session_id2_len = 0;
+static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
 static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
+static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
 
 struct mon_table {
 	enum monitor_reqtype type;
@@ -176,6 +182,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
 #ifdef USE_PAM
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
@@ -191,6 +198,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
 #endif
     {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
     {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+#endif
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -222,17 +234,12 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
 #endif
 #ifdef USE_PAM
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
 #endif
-#ifdef KRB4
-    {MONITOR_REQ_KRB4, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTH, mm_answer_krb4},
-#endif
-#ifdef KRB5
-    {MONITOR_REQ_KRB5, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTH, mm_answer_krb5},
-#endif
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -306,6 +313,18 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
 			if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
 			    !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
 				authenticated = 0;
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+			/* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */
+			if (options.use_pam) {
+				Buffer m;
+
+				buffer_init(&m);
+				mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, 
+				    MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
+				authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
+				buffer_free(&m);
+			}
+#endif
 		}
 
 		if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
@@ -327,9 +346,25 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
 	return (authctxt);
 }
 
+static void
+monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
+{
+	monitor_child_pid = pid;
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_child_handler(int signal)
+{
+	kill(monitor_child_pid, signal);
+}
+
 void
 monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
 {
+	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
+	signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
+	signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+
 	if (compat20) {
 		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
 
@@ -337,7 +372,6 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-
 	} else {
 		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
@@ -573,7 +607,8 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int socket, Buffer *m)
 	}
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
+	if (options.use_pam)
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
 #endif
 
 	return (0);
@@ -623,7 +658,7 @@ mm_answer_authpassword(int socket, Buffer *m)
 	passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
 	/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
 	authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
-	    authctxt->valid && auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
+	    auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
 	memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
 	xfree(passwd);
 
@@ -756,17 +791,39 @@ mm_answer_pam_start(int socket, Buffer *m)
 {
 	char *user;
 	
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
+
 	user = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
 
 	start_pam(user);
 
 	xfree(user);
 
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1);
+
 	return (0);
 }
 
-static void *pam_ctxt, *pam_authok;
-extern KbdintDevice pam_device;
+int
+mm_answer_pam_account(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_int ret;
+	
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
+
+	ret = do_pam_account();
+
+	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
+
+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok;
+extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
 
 int
 mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int socket, Buffer *m)
@@ -774,10 +831,10 @@ mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int socket, Buffer *m)
 
 	debug3("%s", __func__);
 	authctxt->user = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-	pam_ctxt = (pam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
-	pam_authok = NULL;
+	sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
+	sshpam_authok = NULL;
 	buffer_clear(m);
-	if (pam_ctxt != NULL) {
+	if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
 		buffer_put_int(m, 1);
 	} else {
@@ -795,10 +852,10 @@ mm_answer_pam_query(int socket, Buffer *m)
 	int i, ret;
 
 	debug3("%s", __func__);
-	pam_authok = NULL;
-	ret = (pam_device.query)(pam_ctxt, &name, &info, &num, &prompts, &echo_on);
+	sshpam_authok = NULL;
+	ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info, &num, &prompts, &echo_on);
 	if (ret == 0 && num == 0)
-		pam_authok = pam_ctxt;
+		sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
 	if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL)
 		ret = -1;
 	buffer_clear(m);
@@ -829,25 +886,25 @@ mm_answer_pam_respond(int socket, Buffer *m)
 	int i, ret;
 
 	debug3("%s", __func__);
-	pam_authok = NULL;
+	sshpam_authok = NULL;
 	num = buffer_get_int(m);
 	if (num > 0) {
 		resp = xmalloc(num * sizeof(char *));
 		for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
 			resp[i] = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-		ret = (pam_device.respond)(pam_ctxt, num, resp);
+		ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp);
 		for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
 			xfree(resp[i]);
 		xfree(resp);
 	} else {
-		ret = (pam_device.respond)(pam_ctxt, num, NULL);
+		ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL);
 	}
 	buffer_clear(m);
 	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
 	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
 	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
 	if (ret == 0)
-		pam_authok = pam_ctxt;
+		sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
 	return (0);
 }
 
@@ -856,10 +913,10 @@ mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int socket, Buffer *m)
 {
 
 	debug3("%s", __func__);
-	(pam_device.free_ctx)(pam_ctxt);
+	(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
 	buffer_clear(m);
 	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
-	return (pam_authok == pam_ctxt);
+	return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
 }
 #endif
 
@@ -984,7 +1041,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
 		fail++;
 	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
 	if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
-		log("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
+		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
 		    authctxt->user, p);
 		fail++;
 	}
@@ -1032,7 +1089,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
 		fail++;
 	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
 	if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
-		log("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
+		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
 		    authctxt->user, p);
 		fail++;
 	}
@@ -1142,14 +1199,14 @@ mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
 	}
 	/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
 	record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
-	    get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.verify_reverse_mapping),
+	    get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
 	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
 }
 
 static void
 mm_session_close(Session *s)
 {
-	debug3("%s: session %d pid %d", __func__, s->self, s->pid);
+	debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
 		debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d",  __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
 		fatal_remove_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup2, (void *)s);
@@ -1413,89 +1470,6 @@ mm_answer_rsa_response(int socket, Buffer *m)
 	return (success);
 }
 
-#ifdef KRB4
-int
-mm_answer_krb4(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
-	KTEXT_ST auth, reply;
-	char  *client, *p;
-	int success;
-	u_int alen;
-
-	reply.length = auth.length = 0;
- 
-	p = buffer_get_string(m, &alen);
-	if (alen >=  MAX_KTXT_LEN)
-		 fatal("%s: auth too large", __func__);
-	memcpy(auth.dat, p, alen);
-	auth.length = alen;
-	memset(p, 0, alen);
-	xfree(p);
-
-	success = options.kerberos_authentication &&
-	    authctxt->valid &&
-	    auth_krb4(authctxt, &auth, &client, &reply);
-
-	memset(auth.dat, 0, alen);
-	buffer_clear(m);
-	buffer_put_int(m, success);
-
-	if (success) {
-		buffer_put_cstring(m, client);
-		buffer_put_string(m, reply.dat, reply.length);
-		if (client)
-			xfree(client);
-		if (reply.length)
-			memset(reply.dat, 0, reply.length);
-	}
-
-	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, success);
-	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KRB4, m);
-
-	auth_method = "kerberos";
-
-	/* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
-	return (success);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef KRB5
-int
-mm_answer_krb5(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
-	krb5_data tkt, reply;
-	char *client_user;
-	u_int len;
-	int success;
-
-	/* use temporary var to avoid size issues on 64bit arch */
-	tkt.data = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-	tkt.length = len;
-
-	success = options.kerberos_authentication &&
-	    authctxt->valid &&
-	    auth_krb5(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user, &reply);
-
-	if (tkt.length)
-		xfree(tkt.data);
-
-	buffer_clear(m);
-	buffer_put_int(m, success);
-
-	if (success) {
-		buffer_put_cstring(m, client_user);
-		buffer_put_string(m, reply.data, reply.length);
-		if (client_user)
-			xfree(client_user);
-		if (reply.length)
-			xfree(reply.data);
-	}
-	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KRB5, m);
-
-	return success;
-}
-#endif
-
 int
 mm_answer_term(int socket, Buffer *req)
 {
@@ -1611,6 +1585,8 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
 	Buffer m;
 	u_char *blob, *p;
 	u_int bloblen, plen;
+	u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
+	u_int64_t blocks;
 
 	debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
 
@@ -1640,8 +1616,14 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
 	xfree(blob);
 
 	/* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
-	packet_set_seqnr(MODE_OUT, buffer_get_int(&m));
-	packet_set_seqnr(MODE_IN, buffer_get_int(&m));
+	seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+	packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	packet_set_state(MODE_OUT, seqnr, blocks, packets);
+	seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+	packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	packet_set_state(MODE_IN, seqnr, blocks, packets);
 
  skip:
 	/* Get the key context */
@@ -1762,3 +1744,79 @@ monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
 	mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
 	mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
 }
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int
+mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	gss_OID_desc oid;
+	OM_uint32 major;
+	u_int len;
+
+	oid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+	oid.length = len;
+
+	major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &oid);
+
+	xfree(oid.elements);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, major);
+
+	mm_request_send(socket,MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
+
+	/* Now we have a context, enable the step */
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	gss_buffer_desc in;
+	gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	OM_uint32 major,minor;
+	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
+	u_int len;
+
+	in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+	in.length = len;
+	major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
+	xfree(in.value);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, major);
+	buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
+	buffer_put_int(m, flags);
+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
+
+	gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
+
+	/* Complete - now we can do signing */
+	if (major==GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_userok(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	int authenticated;
+
+	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
+
+	auth_method="gssapi";
+
+	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
+	return (authenticated);
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor.h
index 5fd6ec2..08d7614 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.8 2002/09/26 11:38:43 markus Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.11 2003/08/28 12:54:34 markus Exp $	*/
 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
 
 /*
@@ -50,9 +50,11 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
 	MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED,
 	MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE,
 	MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE,
-	MONITOR_REQ_KRB4, MONITOR_ANS_KRB4,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_KRB5, MONITOR_ANS_KRB5,
+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP,
+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP,
+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK,
 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT,
 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX,
 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY,
 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND,
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c
index 54a5216..1c3bc90 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.24 2003/04/01 10:22:21 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.31 2003/08/28 12:54:34 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -48,11 +48,16 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
 #include "getput.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
 
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "channels.h"
 #include "session.h"
 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+
 /* Imports */
 extern int compat20;
 extern Newkeys *newkeys[];
@@ -60,6 +65,7 @@ extern z_stream incoming_stream;
 extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
 extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
 extern Buffer input, output;
+extern ServerOptions options;
 
 void
 mm_request_send(int socket, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
@@ -71,9 +77,9 @@ mm_request_send(int socket, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
 
 	PUT_32BIT(buf, mlen + 1);
 	buf[4] = (u_char) type;		/* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
-	if (atomicio(write, socket, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf))
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, socket, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf))
 		fatal("%s: write", __func__);
-	if (atomicio(write, socket, buffer_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen)
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, socket, buffer_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen)
 		fatal("%s: write", __func__);
 }
 
@@ -521,6 +527,8 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
 	Buffer m;
 	u_char *blob, *p;
 	u_int bloblen, plen;
+	u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
+	u_int64_t blocks;
 
 	buffer_init(&m);
 
@@ -569,8 +577,14 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
 	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
 	xfree(blob);
 
-	buffer_put_int(&m, packet_get_seqnr(MODE_OUT));
-	buffer_put_int(&m, packet_get_seqnr(MODE_IN));
+	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, seqnr);
+	buffer_put_int64(&m, blocks);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, packets);
+	packet_get_state(MODE_IN, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, seqnr);
+	buffer_put_int64(&m, blocks);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, packets);
 
 	debug3("%s: New keys have been sent", __func__);
  skip:
@@ -662,6 +676,8 @@ mm_start_pam(char *user)
 	Buffer m;
 
 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
 
 	buffer_init(&m);
 	buffer_put_cstring(&m, user);
@@ -671,8 +687,32 @@ mm_start_pam(char *user)
 	buffer_free(&m);
 }
 
+u_int
+mm_do_pam_account(void)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	u_int ret;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
+
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, 
+	    MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
+	ret = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+	
+	debug3("%s returning %d", __func__, ret);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
 void *
-mm_pam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
+mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
 	Buffer m;
 	int success;
@@ -694,7 +734,7 @@ mm_pam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
 }
 
 int
-mm_pam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
+mm_sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
     u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
 {
 	Buffer m;
@@ -721,7 +761,7 @@ mm_pam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
 }
 
 int
-mm_pam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
+mm_sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
 {
 	Buffer m;
 	int i, ret;
@@ -741,7 +781,7 @@ mm_pam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
 }
 
 void
-mm_pam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
+mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
 {
 	Buffer m;
 
@@ -1034,73 +1074,69 @@ mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16])
 	return (success);
 }
 
-#ifdef KRB4
-int
-mm_auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, void *_auth, char **client, void *_reply)
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+OM_uint32
+mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
 {
-	KTEXT auth, reply;
- 	Buffer m;
-	u_int rlen;
-	int success = 0;
-	char *p;
+	Buffer m;
+	OM_uint32 major;
 
-	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-	auth = _auth;
-	reply = _reply;
+	/* Client doesn't get to see the context */
+	*ctx = NULL;
 
 	buffer_init(&m);
-	buffer_put_string(&m, auth->dat, auth->length);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, oid->elements, oid->length);
 
-	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KRB4, &m);
-	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KRB4, &m);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, &m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, &m);
+
+	major = buffer_get_int(&m);
 
-	success = buffer_get_int(&m);
-	if (success) {
-		*client = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
-		p = buffer_get_string(&m, &rlen);
-		if (rlen >= MAX_KTXT_LEN)
-			fatal("%s: reply from monitor too large", __func__);
-		reply->length = rlen;
-		memcpy(reply->dat, p, rlen);
-		memset(p, 0, rlen);
-		xfree(p);
-	}
 	buffer_free(&m);
-	return (success);
+	return (major);
 }
-#endif
 
-#ifdef KRB5
-int
-mm_auth_krb5(void *ctx, void *argp, char **userp, void *resp)
+OM_uint32
+mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *in,
+    gss_buffer_desc *out, OM_uint32 *flags)
 {
-	krb5_data *tkt, *reply;
 	Buffer m;
-	int success;
-
-	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-	tkt = (krb5_data *) argp;
-	reply = (krb5_data *) resp;
+	OM_uint32 major;
+	u_int len;
 
 	buffer_init(&m);
-	buffer_put_string(&m, tkt->data, tkt->length);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, in->value, in->length);
 
-	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KRB5, &m);
-	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KRB5, &m);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, &m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, &m);
 
-	success = buffer_get_int(&m);
-	if (success) {
-		u_int len;
+	major = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	out->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
+	out->length = len;
+	if (flags)
+		*flags = buffer_get_int(&m);
 
-		*userp = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
-		reply->data = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
-		reply->length = len;
-	} else {
-		memset(reply, 0, sizeof(*reply));
-		*userp = NULL;
-	}
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (major);
+}
+
+int
+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	int authenticated = 0;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, &m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK,
+				  &m);
+
+	authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m);
 
 	buffer_free(&m);
-	return (success);
+	debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+	return (authenticated);
 }
-#endif
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h
index e404be5..69f3e6c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.8 2002/09/26 11:38:43 markus Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.11 2003/08/28 12:54:34 markus Exp $	*/
 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
 
 /*
@@ -56,12 +56,21 @@ int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
 int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
 BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctxt, gss_OID oid);
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctxt,
+   gss_buffer_desc *recv, gss_buffer_desc *send, OM_uint32 *flags);
+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
+#endif
+
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 void mm_start_pam(char *);
-void *mm_pam_init_ctx(struct Authctxt *);
-int mm_pam_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
-int mm_pam_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
-void mm_pam_free_ctx(void *);
+u_int mm_do_pam_account(void);
+void *mm_sshpam_init_ctx(struct Authctxt *);
+int mm_sshpam_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
 #endif
 
 void mm_terminate(void);
@@ -88,16 +97,6 @@ int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
 int mm_skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
 int mm_skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
 
-/* auth_krb */
-#ifdef KRB4
-int mm_auth_krb4(struct Authctxt *, void *, char **, void *);
-#endif
-#ifdef KRB5
-/* auth and reply are really krb5_data objects, but we don't want to
- * include all of the krb5 headers here */
-int mm_auth_krb5(void *authctxt, void *auth, char **client, void *reply);
-#endif
-
 /* zlib allocation hooks */
 
 void *mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *, u_int, u_int);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h b/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h
index 372ac7e..065dd44 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.14 2002/04/03 09:26:11 markus Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.15 2003/05/17 04:27:52 markus Exp $	*/
 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
 
 /*
@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@
 #define	KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG	"ssh-dss,ssh-rsa"
 #define	KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT \
 	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour," \
-	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se"
+	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
+	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr"
 #define	KEX_DEFAULT_MAC \
 	"hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160," \
 	"hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com," \
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/basename.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/basename.h
deleted file mode 100644
index a8bd6c1..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/basename.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: basename.h,v 1.3 2003/02/25 03:32:16 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BASENAME_H 
-#define _BASENAME_H
-#include "config.h"
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_BASENAME)
-
-char *basename(const char *path);
-
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_BASENAME) */
-#endif /* _BASENAME_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.h
deleted file mode 100644
index b42f469..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: bindresvport.h,v 1.2 2001/02/09 01:55:36 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_BINDRESVPORT_H
-#define _BSD_BINDRESVPORT_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
-int bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa);
-#endif /* !HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA */
-
-#endif /* _BSD_BINDRESVPORT_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 7af757b..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-/* $Id: bsd-arc4random.h,v 1.2 2001/02/09 01:55:36 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_ARC4RANDOM_H
-#define _BSD_ARC4RANDOM_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
-unsigned int arc4random(void);
-void arc4random_stir(void);
-#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
-
-#endif /* _BSD_ARC4RANDOM_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 2e9f077..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: bsd-getpeereid.h,v 1.1 2002/09/12 00:33:02 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_GETPEEREID_H
-#define _BSD_GETPEEREID_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h> /* For uid_t, gid_t */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GETPEEREID
-int	 getpeereid(int , uid_t *, gid_t *);
-#endif /* HAVE_GETPEEREID */
-
-#endif /* _BSD_GETPEEREID_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 002b764..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: bsd-snprintf.h,v 1.2 2001/02/09 01:55:36 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_SNPRINTF_H
-#define _BSD_SNPRINTF_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h> /* For size_t */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF
-int snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...);
-#endif /* !HAVE_SNPRINTF */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
-int vsnprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, va_list args);
-#endif /* !HAVE_SNPRINTF */
-
-
-#endif /* _BSD_SNPRINTF_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 95a0773..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: daemon.h,v 1.2 2001/02/09 01:55:36 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_DAEMON_H
-#define _BSD_DAEMON_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON
-int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose);
-#endif /* !HAVE_DAEMON */
-
-#endif /* _BSD_DAEMON_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 1d61dd0..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME
-
-char *dirname(const char *path);
-
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-gai-errnos.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-gai-errnos.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 5edc31b..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-gai-errnos.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * fake library for ssh
- *
- * This file is included in getaddrinfo.c and getnameinfo.c.
- * See getaddrinfo.c and getnameinfo.c.
- */
-
-/* $Id: fake-gai-errnos.h,v 1.2 2001/02/09 01:55:36 djm Exp $ */
-
-/* for old netdb.h */
-#ifndef EAI_NODATA
-#define EAI_NODATA	1
-#define EAI_MEMORY	2
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getaddrinfo.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getaddrinfo.c
deleted file mode 100644
index e63bda9..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getaddrinfo.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * fake library for ssh
- *
- * This file includes getaddrinfo(), freeaddrinfo() and gai_strerror().
- * These funtions are defined in rfc2133.
- *
- * But these functions are not implemented correctly. The minimum subset
- * is implemented for ssh use only. For exapmle, this routine assumes
- * that ai_family is AF_INET. Don't use it for another purpose.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-
-RCSID("$Id: fake-getaddrinfo.c,v 1.5 2003/03/24 02:35:59 djm Exp $");
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
-char *gai_strerror(int ecode)
-{
-	switch (ecode) {
-		case EAI_NODATA:
-			return "no address associated with hostname.";
-		case EAI_MEMORY:
-			return "memory allocation failure.";
-		default:
-			return "unknown error.";
-	}
-}    
-#endif /* !HAVE_GAI_STRERROR */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
-void freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *ai)
-{
-	struct addrinfo *next;
-
-	do {
-		next = ai->ai_next;
-		free(ai);
-	} while (NULL != (ai = next));
-}
-#endif /* !HAVE_FREEADDRINFO */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
-static struct addrinfo *malloc_ai(int port, u_long addr)
-{
-	struct addrinfo *ai;
-
-	ai = malloc(sizeof(struct addrinfo) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
-	if (ai == NULL)
-		return(NULL);
-	
-	memset(ai, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
-	
-	ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1);
-	/* XXX -- ssh doesn't use sa_len */
-	ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
-	ai->ai_addr->sa_family = ai->ai_family = AF_INET;
-
-	((struct sockaddr_in *)(ai)->ai_addr)->sin_port = port;
-	((struct sockaddr_in *)(ai)->ai_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr = addr;
-	
-	return(ai);
-}
-
-int getaddrinfo(const char *hostname, const char *servname, 
-                const struct addrinfo *hints, struct addrinfo **res)
-{
-	struct addrinfo *cur, *prev = NULL;
-	struct hostent *hp;
-	struct servent *sp;
-	struct in_addr in;
-	int i;
-	long int port;
-	u_long addr;
-
-	port = 0;
-	if (servname != NULL) {
-		char *cp;
-
-		port = strtol(servname, &cp, 10);
-		if (port > 0 && port <= 65535 && *cp == '\0')
-			port = htons(port);
-		else if ((sp = getservbyname(servname, NULL)) != NULL)
-			port = sp->s_port;
-		else
-			port = 0;
-	}
-
-	if (hints && hints->ai_flags & AI_PASSIVE) {
-		addr = htonl(0x00000000);
-		if (hostname && inet_aton(hostname, &in) != 0)
-			addr = in.s_addr;
-		if (NULL != (*res = malloc_ai(port, addr)))
-			return 0;
-		else
-			return EAI_MEMORY;
-	}
-		
-	if (!hostname) {
-		if (NULL != (*res = malloc_ai(port, htonl(0x7f000001))))
-			return 0;
-		else
-			return EAI_MEMORY;
-	}
-	
-	if (inet_aton(hostname, &in)) {
-		if (NULL != (*res = malloc_ai(port, in.s_addr)))
-			return 0;
-		else
-			return EAI_MEMORY;
-	}
-	
-	hp = gethostbyname(hostname);
-	if (hp && hp->h_name && hp->h_name[0] && hp->h_addr_list[0]) {
-		for (i = 0; hp->h_addr_list[i]; i++) {
-			cur = malloc_ai(port, ((struct in_addr *)hp->h_addr_list[i])->s_addr);
-			if (cur == NULL) {
-				if (*res)
-					freeaddrinfo(*res);
-				return EAI_MEMORY;
-			}
-			
-			if (prev)
-				prev->ai_next = cur;
-			else
-				*res = cur;
-
-			prev = cur;
-		}
-		return 0;
-	}
-	
-	return EAI_NODATA;
-}
-#endif /* !HAVE_GETADDRINFO */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getaddrinfo.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getaddrinfo.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 6943378..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getaddrinfo.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: fake-getaddrinfo.h,v 1.4 2003/02/24 01:35:09 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _FAKE_GETADDRINFO_H
-#define _FAKE_GETADDRINFO_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-
-#include "fake-gai-errnos.h"
-
-#ifndef AI_PASSIVE
-# define AI_PASSIVE        1
-# define AI_CANONNAME      2
-#endif
-
-#ifndef NI_NUMERICHOST
-# define NI_NUMERICHOST    2
-# define NI_NAMEREQD       4
-# define NI_NUMERICSERV    8
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO
-struct addrinfo {
-	int	ai_flags;	/* AI_PASSIVE, AI_CANONNAME */
-	int	ai_family;	/* PF_xxx */
-	int	ai_socktype;	/* SOCK_xxx */
-	int	ai_protocol;	/* 0 or IPPROTO_xxx for IPv4 and IPv6 */
-	size_t	ai_addrlen;	/* length of ai_addr */
-	char	*ai_canonname;	/* canonical name for hostname */
-	struct sockaddr *ai_addr;	/* binary address */
-	struct addrinfo *ai_next;	/* next structure in linked list */
-};
-#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
-int getaddrinfo(const char *hostname, const char *servname, 
-                const struct addrinfo *hints, struct addrinfo **res);
-#endif /* !HAVE_GETADDRINFO */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
-char *gai_strerror(int ecode);
-#endif /* !HAVE_GAI_STRERROR */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
-void freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *ai);
-#endif /* !HAVE_FREEADDRINFO */
-
-#endif /* _FAKE_GETADDRINFO_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getnameinfo.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getnameinfo.c
deleted file mode 100644
index e255ed3..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getnameinfo.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * fake library for ssh
- *
- * This file includes getnameinfo().
- * These funtions are defined in rfc2133.
- *
- * But these functions are not implemented correctly. The minimum subset
- * is implemented for ssh use only. For exapmle, this routine assumes
- * that ai_family is AF_INET. Don't use it for another purpose.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-
-RCSID("$Id: fake-getnameinfo.c,v 1.2 2001/02/09 01:55:36 djm Exp $");
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
-int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host, 
-                size_t hostlen, char *serv, size_t servlen, int flags)
-{
-	struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
-	struct hostent *hp;
-	char tmpserv[16];
-
-	if (serv) {
-		snprintf(tmpserv, sizeof(tmpserv), "%d", ntohs(sin->sin_port));
-		if (strlen(tmpserv) >= servlen)
-			return EAI_MEMORY;
-		else
-			strcpy(serv, tmpserv);
-	}
-
-	if (host) {
-		if (flags & NI_NUMERICHOST) {
-			if (strlen(inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr)) >= hostlen)
-				return EAI_MEMORY;
-
-			strcpy(host, inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr));
-			return 0;
-		} else {
-			hp = gethostbyaddr((char *)&sin->sin_addr, 
-				sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
-			if (hp == NULL)
-				return EAI_NODATA;
-			
-			if (strlen(hp->h_name) >= hostlen)
-				return EAI_MEMORY;
-
-			strcpy(host, hp->h_name);
-			return 0;
-		}
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif /* !HAVE_GETNAMEINFO */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getnameinfo.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getnameinfo.h
deleted file mode 100644
index c9b7908..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getnameinfo.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: fake-getnameinfo.h,v 1.2 2001/02/09 01:55:36 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _FAKE_GETNAMEINFO_H
-#define _FAKE_GETNAMEINFO_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
-int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host, 
-                size_t hostlen, char *serv, size_t servlen, int flags);
-#endif /* !HAVE_GETNAMEINFO */
-
-#ifndef NI_MAXSERV
-# define NI_MAXSERV 32
-#endif /* !NI_MAXSERV */
-#ifndef NI_MAXHOST
-# define NI_MAXHOST 1025
-#endif /* !NI_MAXHOST */
-
-#endif /* _FAKE_GETNAMEINFO_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-socket.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-socket.h
deleted file mode 100644
index f364797..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-socket.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: fake-socket.h,v 1.3 2002/04/12 03:35:40 tim Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _FAKE_SOCKET_H
-#define _FAKE_SOCKET_H
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#include "sys/types.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE
-# define	_SS_MAXSIZE	128	/* Implementation specific max size */
-# define       _SS_PADSIZE     (_SS_MAXSIZE - sizeof (struct sockaddr))
-
-struct sockaddr_storage {
-	struct	sockaddr ss_sa;
-	char		__ss_pad2[_SS_PADSIZE];
-};
-# define ss_family ss_sa.sa_family
-#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE */
-
-#ifndef IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK
-# define IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(a) \
-	(((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0 && \
-	 ((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *) (a))[3] == htonl (1))
-#endif /* !IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR
-struct in6_addr {
-	u_int8_t		s6_addr[16];
-};
-#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6
-struct sockaddr_in6 {
-   unsigned short sin6_family;
-	u_int16_t sin6_port;
-	u_int32_t sin6_flowinfo;
-	struct in6_addr sin6_addr;
-};
-#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 */
-
-#ifndef AF_INET6
-/* Define it to something that should never appear */
-#define AF_INET6 AF_MAX
-#endif
-
-#endif /* !_FAKE_SOCKET_H */
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 1137b3e..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: getcwd.h,v 1.2 2001/02/09 01:55:36 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_GETCWD_H 
-#define _BSD_GETCWD_H
-#include "config.h"
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_GETCWD)
-
-char *getcwd(char *pt, size_t size);
-
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETCWD) */
-#endif /* _BSD_GETCWD_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 27a9703..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: getgrouplist.h,v 1.2 2001/02/09 01:55:36 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_GETGROUPLIST_H
-#define _BSD_GETGROUPLIST_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
-
-#include <grp.h>
-
-int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *);
-
-#endif
-
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 9abdae8..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: getopt.h,v 1.4 2001/09/18 05:05:21 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BSDGETOPT_H
-#define _BSDGETOPT_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET)
-
-int BSDgetopt(int argc, char * const *argv, const char *opts);
-
-#endif
-
-#endif /* _BSDGETOPT_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 9b59cb9..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: inet_aton.h,v 1.4 2001/07/16 02:07:51 tim Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_INET_ATON_H
-#define _BSD_INET_ATON_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON
-int inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr);
-#endif /* HAVE_INET_ATON */
-
-#endif /* _BSD_INET_ATON_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 85bc3d6..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: inet_ntoa.h,v 1.2 2001/02/09 01:55:36 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_INET_NTOA_H
-#define _BSD_INET_NTOA_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-
-#if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA)
-char *inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in);
-#endif /* defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) */
-
-#endif /* _BSD_INET_NTOA_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.h
deleted file mode 100644
index c774df9..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: inet_ntop.h,v 1.4 2001/08/09 00:56:53 mouring Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_INET_NTOP_H
-#define _BSD_INET_NTOP_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP
-const char *                 
-inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, size_t size);
-#endif /* !HAVE_INET_NTOP */
-
-#endif /* _BSD_INET_NTOP_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 505ca6a..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: mktemp.h,v 1.3 2003/01/07 04:18:33 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_MKTEMP_H
-#define _BSD_MKTEMP_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-#if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP)
-int mkstemps(char *path, int slen);
-int mkstemp(char *path);
-char *mkdtemp(char *path);
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP) */
-
-#endif /* _BSD_MKTEMP_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 25e4075..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: realpath.h,v 1.2 2001/02/09 01:55:36 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_REALPATH_H
-#define _BSD_REALPATH_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH)
-
-char *realpath(const char *path, char *resolved);
-
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) */
-#endif /* _BSD_REALPATH_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.h
deleted file mode 100644
index a52e451..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: rresvport.h,v 1.2 2001/02/09 01:55:36 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_RRESVPORT_H
-#define _BSD_RRESVPORT_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
-int rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af);
-#endif /* !HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF */
-
-#endif /* _BSD_RRESVPORT_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 77256d8..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: setenv.h,v 1.2 2001/02/09 01:55:36 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_SETENV_H
-#define _BSD_SETENV_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
-
-int setenv(register const char *name, register const char *value, int rewrite);
-
-#endif /* !HAVE_SETENV */
-
-#endif /* _BSD_SETENV_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 48d26c6..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: setproctitle.h,v 1.3 2003/01/09 22:53:13 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_SETPROCTITLE_H
-#define _BSD_SETPROCTITLE_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
-void setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...);
-void compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[]);
-#endif
-
-#endif /* _BSD_SETPROCTITLE_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 7536685..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: strlcat.h,v 1.2 2001/02/09 01:55:36 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_STRLCAT_H
-#define _BSD_STRLCAT_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT
-#include <sys/types.h>
-size_t strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
-#endif /* !HAVE_STRLCAT */
-
-#endif /* _BSD_STRLCAT_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 3b13767..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: strlcpy.h,v 1.2 2001/02/09 01:55:36 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_STRLCPY_H
-#define _BSD_STRLCPY_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY
-#include <sys/types.h>
-size_t strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
-#endif /* !HAVE_STRLCPY */
-
-#endif /* _BSD_STRLCPY_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strmode.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strmode.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 64f7c8a..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strmode.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: strmode.h,v 1.3 2001/06/09 02:22:17 mouring Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_STRMODE
-
-void strmode(register mode_t mode, register char *p);
-
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 6ed810a..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: strsep.h,v 1.2 2001/02/09 01:55:36 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_STRSEP_H
-#define _BSD_STRSEP_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE_STRSEP
-char *strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim);
-#endif /* HAVE_STRSEP */
-
-#endif /* _BSD_STRSEP_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xmmap.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xmmap.h
deleted file mode 100644
index c0fa04a..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xmmap.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-void *xmmap(size_t size);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/packet.h b/crypto/openssh/packet.h
index 46830c3..7732faf 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/packet.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/packet.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.37 2003/04/01 10:22:21 markus Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.40 2003/06/24 08:23:46 markus Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ int	 packet_get_keyiv_len(int);
 void	 packet_get_keyiv(int, u_char *, u_int);
 int	 packet_get_keycontext(int, u_char *);
 void	 packet_set_keycontext(int, u_char *);
-u_int32_t packet_get_seqnr(int);
-void	 packet_set_seqnr(int, u_int32_t);
+void	 packet_get_state(int, u_int32_t *, u_int64_t *, u_int32_t *);
+void	 packet_set_state(int, u_int32_t, u_int64_t, u_int32_t);
 int	 packet_get_ssh1_cipher(void);
 void	 packet_set_iv(int, u_char *);
 
@@ -81,8 +81,8 @@ void	 packet_add_padding(u_char);
 void	 tty_make_modes(int, struct termios *);
 void	 tty_parse_modes(int, int *);
 
-extern int max_packet_size;
-int      packet_set_maxsize(int);
+extern u_int max_packet_size;
+u_int	 packet_set_maxsize(u_int);
 #define  packet_get_maxsize() max_packet_size
 
 /* don't allow remaining bytes after the end of the message */
@@ -90,10 +90,13 @@ int      packet_set_maxsize(int);
 do { \
 	int _len = packet_remaining(); \
 	if (_len > 0) { \
-		log("Packet integrity error (%d bytes remaining) at %s:%d", \
+		logit("Packet integrity error (%d bytes remaining) at %s:%d", \
 		    _len ,__FILE__, __LINE__); \
 		packet_disconnect("Packet integrity error."); \
 	} \
 } while (0)
 
+int	 packet_need_rekeying(void);
+void	 packet_set_rekey_limit(u_int32_t);
+
 #endif				/* PACKET_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/radix.c b/crypto/openssh/radix.c
deleted file mode 100644
index c680d6b..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/radix.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song.  All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#include "uuencode.h"
-
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: radix.c,v 1.22 2002/09/09 14:54:15 markus Exp $");
-
-#ifdef AFS
-#include <krb.h>
-
-#include <radix.h>
-#include "bufaux.h"
-
-int
-creds_to_radix(CREDENTIALS *creds, u_char *buf, size_t buflen)
-{
-	Buffer b;
-	int ret;
-
-	buffer_init(&b);
-
-	buffer_put_char(&b, 1);	/* version */
-
-	buffer_append(&b, creds->service, strlen(creds->service));
-	buffer_put_char(&b, '\0');
-	buffer_append(&b, creds->instance, strlen(creds->instance));
-	buffer_put_char(&b, '\0');
-	buffer_append(&b, creds->realm, strlen(creds->realm));
-	buffer_put_char(&b, '\0');
-	buffer_append(&b, creds->pname, strlen(creds->pname));
-	buffer_put_char(&b, '\0');
-	buffer_append(&b, creds->pinst, strlen(creds->pinst));
-	buffer_put_char(&b, '\0');
-
-	/* Null string to repeat the realm. */
-	buffer_put_char(&b, '\0');
-
-	buffer_put_int(&b, creds->issue_date);
-	buffer_put_int(&b, krb_life_to_time(creds->issue_date,
-	    creds->lifetime));
-	buffer_append(&b, creds->session, sizeof(creds->session));
-	buffer_put_short(&b, creds->kvno);
-
-	/* 32 bit size + data */
-	buffer_put_string(&b, creds->ticket_st.dat, creds->ticket_st.length);
-
-	ret = uuencode(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), (char *)buf, buflen);
-
-	buffer_free(&b);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-#define GETSTRING(b, t, tlen) \
-	do { \
-		int i, found = 0; \
-		for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { \
-			if (buffer_len(b) == 0) \
-				goto done; \
-			t[i] = buffer_get_char(b); \
-			if (t[i] == '\0') { \
-				found = 1; \
-				break; \
-			} \
-		} \
-		if (!found) \
-			goto done; \
-	} while(0)
-
-int
-radix_to_creds(const char *buf, CREDENTIALS *creds)
-{
-	Buffer b;
-	u_char *space;
-	char c, version, *p;
-	u_int endTime, len;
-	int blen, ret;
-
-	ret = 0;
-	blen = strlen(buf);
-
-	/* sanity check for size */
-	if (blen > 8192)
-		return 0;
-
-	buffer_init(&b);
-	space = buffer_append_space(&b, blen);
-
-	/* check version and length! */
-	len = uudecode(buf, space, blen);
-	if (len < 1)
-		goto done;
-
-	version = buffer_get_char(&b);
-
-	GETSTRING(&b, creds->service, sizeof creds->service);
-	GETSTRING(&b, creds->instance, sizeof creds->instance);
-	GETSTRING(&b, creds->realm, sizeof creds->realm);
-	GETSTRING(&b, creds->pname, sizeof creds->pname);
-	GETSTRING(&b, creds->pinst, sizeof creds->pinst);
-
-	if (buffer_len(&b) == 0)
-		goto done;
-
-	/* Ignore possibly different realm. */
-	while (buffer_len(&b) > 0 && (c = buffer_get_char(&b)) != '\0')
-		;
-
-	if (buffer_len(&b) == 0)
-		goto done;
-
-	creds->issue_date = buffer_get_int(&b);
-
-	endTime = buffer_get_int(&b);
-	creds->lifetime = krb_time_to_life(creds->issue_date, endTime);
-
-	len = buffer_len(&b);
-	if (len < sizeof(creds->session))
-		goto done;
-	memcpy(&creds->session, buffer_ptr(&b), sizeof(creds->session));
-	buffer_consume(&b, sizeof(creds->session));
-
-	creds->kvno = buffer_get_short(&b);
-
-	p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
-	if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(creds->ticket_st.dat))
-		goto done;
-	memcpy(&creds->ticket_st.dat, p, len);
-	creds->ticket_st.length = len;
-
-	ret = 1;
-done:
-	buffer_free(&b);
-	return ret;
-}
-#endif /* AFS */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/radix.h b/crypto/openssh/radix.h
deleted file mode 100644
index e94e4ac..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/radix.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: radix.h,v 1.4 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $	*/
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-int	 creds_to_radix(CREDENTIALS *, u_char *, size_t);
-int	 radix_to_creds(const char *, CREDENTIALS *);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
index 0742b5f..d7be4aa 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.104 2003/04/01 10:22:21 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.121 2003/09/01 18:15:50 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
    Host fascist.blob.com
      Port 23123
      User tylonen
-     RhostsAuthentication no
      PasswordAuthentication no
 
    Host puukko.hut.fi
@@ -76,7 +75,6 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
    Host *
      ForwardAgent no
      ForwardX11 no
-     RhostsAuthentication yes
      PasswordAuthentication yes
      RSAAuthentication yes
      RhostsRSAAuthentication yes
@@ -92,18 +90,9 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 typedef enum {
 	oBadOption,
-	oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oGatewayPorts, oRhostsAuthentication,
+	oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oGatewayPorts,
 	oPasswordAuthentication, oRSAAuthentication,
 	oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation,
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
-	oKerberosAuthentication,
-#endif
-#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
-	oKerberosTgtPassing,
-#endif
-#ifdef AFS
-	oAFSTokenPassing,
-#endif
 	oIdentityFile, oHostName, oPort, oCipher, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward,
 	oUser, oHost, oEscapeChar, oRhostsRSAAuthentication, oProxyCommand,
 	oGlobalKnownHostsFile, oUserKnownHostsFile, oConnectionAttempts,
@@ -115,9 +104,10 @@ typedef enum {
 	oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication,
 	oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oSmartcardDevice,
 	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
-	oEnableSSHKeysign,
+	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
 	oVersionAddendum,
-	oDeprecated
+	oDeprecated, oUnsupported
 } OpCodes;
 
 /* Textual representations of the tokens. */
@@ -131,7 +121,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation },
 	{ "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts },
 	{ "useprivilegedport", oUsePrivilegedPort },
-	{ "rhostsauthentication", oRhostsAuthentication },
+	{ "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated },
 	{ "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication },
 	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
 	{ "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices },
@@ -143,14 +133,15 @@ static struct {
 	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication },
 	{ "skeyauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
 	{ "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication },  /* alias */
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
-	{ "kerberosauthentication", oKerberosAuthentication },
-#endif
-#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
-	{ "kerberostgtpassing", oKerberosTgtPassing },
-#endif
-#ifdef AFS
-	{ "afstokenpassing", oAFSTokenPassing },
+	{ "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported },
+	{ "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported },
+	{ "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
+#if defined(GSSAPI)
+	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
+	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
+#else
+	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
 #endif
 	{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
 	{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
@@ -186,10 +177,22 @@ static struct {
 	{ "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications },
 	{ "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms },
 	{ "bindaddress", oBindAddress },
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
 	{ "smartcarddevice", oSmartcardDevice },
+#else
+	{ "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported },
+#endif
 	{ "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings },
 	{ "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign },
+#ifdef DNS
+	{ "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS },
+#else
+	{ "verifyhostkeydns", oUnsupported },
+#endif
 	{ "nohostauthenticationforlocalhost", oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost },
+	{ "rekeylimit", oRekeyLimit },
+	{ "connecttimeout", oConnectTimeout },
+	{ "addressfamily", oAddressFamily },
 	{ "versionaddendum", oVersionAddendum },
 	{ NULL, oBadOption }
 };
@@ -284,6 +287,13 @@ process_config_line(Options *options, const char *host,
 	u_short fwd_port, fwd_host_port;
 	char sfwd_host_port[6];
 
+	/* Strip trailing whitespace */
+	for(len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) {
+		if (strchr(WHITESPACE, line[len]) == NULL)
+			break;
+		line[len] = '\0';
+	}
+
 	s = line;
 	/* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */
 	keyword = strdelim(&s);
@@ -300,6 +310,20 @@ process_config_line(Options *options, const char *host,
 		/* don't panic, but count bad options */
 		return -1;
 		/* NOTREACHED */
+	case oConnectTimeout:
+		intptr = &options->connection_timeout;
+/* parse_time: */
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1)
+			fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (*intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
 	case oForwardAgent:
 		intptr = &options->forward_agent;
 parse_flag:
@@ -329,10 +353,6 @@ parse_flag:
 		intptr = &options->use_privileged_port;
 		goto parse_flag;
 
-	case oRhostsAuthentication:
-		intptr = &options->rhosts_authentication;
-		goto parse_flag;
-
 	case oPasswordAuthentication:
 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
@@ -364,21 +384,15 @@ parse_flag:
 	case oChallengeResponseAuthentication:
 		intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
-	case oKerberosAuthentication:
-		intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication;
-		goto parse_flag;
-#endif
-#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
-	case oKerberosTgtPassing:
-		intptr = &options->kerberos_tgt_passing;
+
+	case oGssAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
-#endif
-#ifdef AFS
-	case oAFSTokenPassing:
-		intptr = &options->afs_token_passing;
+
+	case oGssDelegateCreds:
+		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
 		goto parse_flag;
-#endif
+
 	case oBatchMode:
 		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
 		goto parse_flag;
@@ -387,6 +401,10 @@ parse_flag:
 		intptr = &options->check_host_ip;
 		goto parse_flag;
 
+	case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
+		intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
 	case oStrictHostKeyChecking:
 		intptr = &options->strict_host_key_checking;
 		arg = strdelim(&s);
@@ -426,6 +444,31 @@ parse_flag:
 		intptr = &options->compression_level;
 		goto parse_int;
 
+	case oRekeyLimit:
+		intptr = &options->rekey_limit;
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+		if (arg[0] < '0' || arg[0] > '9')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum);
+		value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 10);
+		if (arg == endofnumber)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum);
+		switch (toupper(*endofnumber)) {
+		case 'K':
+			value *= 1<<10;
+			break;
+		case 'M':
+			value *= 1<<20;
+			break;
+		case 'G':
+			value *= 1<<30;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
 	case oIdentityFile:
 		arg = strdelim(&s);
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
@@ -492,6 +535,8 @@ parse_string:
 		goto parse_string;
 
 	case oProxyCommand:
+		if (s == NULL)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
 		charptr = &options->proxy_command;
 		len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE "=");
 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
@@ -629,7 +674,7 @@ parse_int:
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Badly formatted port number.",
 			    filename, linenum);
 		if (*activep)
-			add_local_forward(options, fwd_port, "socks4", 0);
+			add_local_forward(options, fwd_port, "socks", 0);
 		break;
 
 	case oClearAllForwardings:
@@ -669,6 +714,21 @@ parse_int:
 			*intptr = value;
 		break;
 
+	case oAddressFamily:
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		intptr = &options->address_family;
+		if (strcasecmp(arg, "inet") == 0)
+			value = AF_INET;
+		else if (strcasecmp(arg, "inet6") == 0)
+			value = AF_INET6;
+		else if (strcasecmp(arg, "any") == 0)
+			value = AF_UNSPEC;
+		else
+			fatal("Unsupported AddressFamily \"%s\"", arg);
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
 	case oEnableSSHKeysign:
 		intptr = &options->enable_ssh_keysign;
 		goto parse_flag;
@@ -685,6 +745,11 @@ parse_int:
 		    filename, linenum, keyword);
 		return 0;
 
+	case oUnsupported:
+		error("%s line %d: Unsupported option \"%s\"",
+		    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		return 0;
+
 	default:
 		fatal("process_config_line: Unimplemented opcode %d", opcode);
 	}
@@ -754,19 +819,11 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
 	options->xauth_location = NULL;
 	options->gateway_ports = -1;
 	options->use_privileged_port = -1;
-	options->rhosts_authentication = -1;
 	options->rsa_authentication = -1;
 	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
-	options->kerberos_authentication = -1;
-#endif
-#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
-	options->kerberos_tgt_passing = -1;
-#endif
-#ifdef AFS
-	options->afs_token_passing = -1;
-#endif
+	options->gss_authentication = -1;
+	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
 	options->password_authentication = -1;
 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
 	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
@@ -779,7 +836,9 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
 	options->keepalives = -1;
 	options->compression_level = -1;
 	options->port = -1;
+	options->address_family = -1;
 	options->connection_attempts = -1;
+	options->connection_timeout = -1;
 	options->number_of_password_prompts = -1;
 	options->cipher = -1;
 	options->ciphers = NULL;
@@ -805,6 +864,8 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
 	options->smartcard_device = NULL;
 	options->enable_ssh_keysign = - 1;
 	options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1;
+	options->rekey_limit = - 1;
+	options->verify_host_key_dns = -1;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -827,26 +888,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 		options->gateway_ports = 0;
 	if (options->use_privileged_port == -1)
 		options->use_privileged_port = 0;
-	if (options->rhosts_authentication == -1)
-		options->rhosts_authentication = 0;
 	if (options->rsa_authentication == -1)
 		options->rsa_authentication = 1;
 	if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
 		options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
 	if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
 		options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
-	if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1)
-		options->kerberos_authentication = 1;
-#endif
-#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
-	if (options->kerberos_tgt_passing == -1)
-		options->kerberos_tgt_passing = 1;
-#endif
-#ifdef AFS
-	if (options->afs_token_passing == -1)
-		options->afs_token_passing = 1;
-#endif
+	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+		options->gss_authentication = 1;
+	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+		options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
 		options->password_authentication = 1;
 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
@@ -869,6 +920,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 		options->compression_level = 6;
 	if (options->port == -1)
 		options->port = 0;	/* Filled in ssh_connect. */
+	if (options->address_family == -1)
+		options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
 	if (options->connection_attempts == -1)
 		options->connection_attempts = 1;
 	if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1)
@@ -921,6 +974,10 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 		options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0;
 	if (options->enable_ssh_keysign == -1)
 		options->enable_ssh_keysign = 0;
+	if (options->rekey_limit == -1)
+		options->rekey_limit = 0;
+	if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1)
+		options->verify_host_key_dns = 0;
 	/* options->proxy_command should not be set by default */
 	/* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */
 	/* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readconf.h b/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
index 78e04fe..60287f7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.46 2003/04/01 10:22:21 markus Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.55 2003/09/01 18:15:50 markus Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ typedef struct {
 	char   *xauth_location;	/* Location for xauth program */
 	int     gateway_ports;	/* Allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */
 	int     use_privileged_port;	/* Don't use privileged port if false. */
-	int     rhosts_authentication;	/* Try rhosts authentication. */
 	int     rhosts_rsa_authentication;	/* Try rhosts with RSA
 						 * authentication. */
 	int     rsa_authentication;	/* Try RSA authentication. */
@@ -41,15 +40,8 @@ typedef struct {
 	int     hostbased_authentication;	/* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
 	int     challenge_response_authentication;
 					/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
-	int     kerberos_authentication;	/* Try Kerberos authentication. */
-#endif
-#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
-	int     kerberos_tgt_passing;	/* Try Kerberos TGT passing. */
-#endif
-#ifdef AFS
-	int     afs_token_passing;	/* Try AFS token passing. */
-#endif
+	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
+	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* Delegate GSS credentials */
 	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
 						 * authentication. */
 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
@@ -64,8 +56,11 @@ typedef struct {
 	LogLevel log_level;	/* Level for logging. */
 
 	int     port;		/* Port to connect. */
+	int     address_family;
 	int     connection_attempts;	/* Max attempts (seconds) before
 					 * giving up */
+	int     connection_timeout;	/* Max time (seconds) before
+				 	 * aborting connection attempt */
 	int     number_of_password_prompts;	/* Max number of password
 						 * prompts. */
 	int     cipher;		/* Cipher to use. */
@@ -86,6 +81,7 @@ typedef struct {
 	char   *preferred_authentications;
 	char   *bind_address;	/* local socket address for connection to sshd */
 	char   *smartcard_device; /* Smartcard reader device */
+	int	verify_host_key_dns;	/* Verify host key using DNS */
 
 	int     num_identity_files;	/* Number of files for RSA/DSA identities. */
 	char   *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
@@ -101,6 +97,7 @@ typedef struct {
 	int	clear_forwardings;
 
 	int	enable_ssh_keysign;
+	int	rekey_limit;
 	int	no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
 }       Options;
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/authorized_keys_root b/crypto/openssh/regress/authorized_keys_root
deleted file mode 100644
index 3285371..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/authorized_keys_root
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAIEAt6ttBacbgvLPsF1VWWfT51t55/5Mj62Xp8EaoH5SNSaLiGIgrrja077lKEept75U4uKFUYU5JJX9GPE9A7Y43LXv+/A6Jm4rEj/U0s4H8tf0UmzVC3t6xh0sRK0hYVNILyoHnIAgdY8CmOiybw7p6DxJY8MRAehD3n9+kFcachU= root@xenon
-1024 35 132789427207755621599908461558918671787816692978751485815532032934821830960131244604702969298486352138126114080367609979552547448841583955126231410604842765726397407176910594168641969541792069550006878863592030567875913190224374005367884774859544943329148178663694126456638431428703289837638970464685771819219 root@xenon
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scp.c b/crypto/openssh/scp.c
index 35d4c5f..4f9247c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/scp.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/scp.c
@@ -52,11 +52,7 @@
  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *	This product includes software developed by the University of
- *	California, Berkeley and its contributors.
- * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
  *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
  *    without specific prior written permission.
  *
@@ -75,7 +71,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.102 2003/03/05 22:33:43 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.108 2003/07/18 01:54:25 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
@@ -111,7 +107,16 @@ int showprogress = 1;
 char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM;
 
 /* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */
-pid_t do_cmd_pid;
+pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1;
+
+static void
+killchild(int signo)
+{
+	if (do_cmd_pid > 1)
+		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo);
+
+	_exit(1);
+}
 
 /*
  * This function executes the given command as the specified user on the
@@ -146,7 +151,7 @@ do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout, int argc)
 	close(reserved[0]);
 	close(reserved[1]);
 
-	/* For a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */
+	/* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */
 	do_cmd_pid = fork();
 	if (do_cmd_pid == 0) {
 		/* Child. */
@@ -174,6 +179,9 @@ do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout, int argc)
 	*fdout = pin[1];
 	close(pout[1]);
 	*fdin = pout[0];
+	signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
+	signal(SIGINT, killchild);
+	signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -206,9 +214,7 @@ void toremote(char *, int, char *[]);
 void usage(void);
 
 int
-main(argc, argv)
-	int argc;
-	char *argv[];
+main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	int ch, fflag, tflag, status;
 	double speed;
@@ -216,7 +222,7 @@ main(argc, argv)
 	extern char *optarg;
 	extern int optind;
 
-	__progname = get_progname(argv[0]);
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
 
 	args.list = NULL;
 	addargs(&args, "ssh");		/* overwritten with ssh_program */
@@ -292,7 +298,7 @@ main(argc, argv)
 	argv += optind;
 
 	if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL)
-		fatal("unknown user %d", (int) userid);
+		fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid);
 
 	if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO))
 		showprogress = 0;
@@ -353,9 +359,7 @@ main(argc, argv)
 }
 
 void
-toremote(targ, argc, argv)
-	char *targ, *argv[];
-	int argc;
+toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	int i, len;
 	char *bp, *host, *src, *suser, *thost, *tuser;
@@ -443,9 +447,7 @@ toremote(targ, argc, argv)
 }
 
 void
-tolocal(argc, argv)
-	int argc;
-	char *argv[];
+tolocal(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	int i, len;
 	char *bp, *host, *src, *suser;
@@ -494,9 +496,7 @@ tolocal(argc, argv)
 }
 
 void
-source(argc, argv)
-	int argc;
-	char *argv[];
+source(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	struct stat stb;
 	static BUF buffer;
@@ -549,25 +549,18 @@ syserr:			run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
 			(void) snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "T%lu 0 %lu 0\n",
 			    (u_long) stb.st_mtime,
 			    (u_long) stb.st_atime);
-			(void) atomicio(write, remout, buf, strlen(buf));
+			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, buf, strlen(buf));
 			if (response() < 0)
 				goto next;
 		}
 #define	FILEMODEMASK	(S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)
-#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG_INT
 		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n",
 		    (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK),
-		    (long long)stb.st_size, last);
-#else
-		/* XXX: Handle integer overflow? */
-		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lu %s\n",
-		    (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK),
-		    (u_long) stb.st_size, last);
-#endif
+		    (int64_t)stb.st_size, last);
 		if (verbose_mode) {
 			fprintf(stderr, "Sending file modes: %s", buf);
 		}
-		(void) atomicio(write, remout, buf, strlen(buf));
+		(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, buf, strlen(buf));
 		if (response() < 0)
 			goto next;
 		if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, 2048)) == NULL) {
@@ -587,9 +580,9 @@ next:			(void) close(fd);
 					haderr = result >= 0 ? EIO : errno;
 			}
 			if (haderr)
-				(void) atomicio(write, remout, bp->buf, amt);
+				(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt);
 			else {
-				result = atomicio(write, remout, bp->buf, amt);
+				result = atomicio(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt);
 				if (result != amt)
 					haderr = result >= 0 ? EIO : errno;
 				statbytes += result;
@@ -603,7 +596,7 @@ next:			(void) close(fd);
 		if (close(fd) < 0 && !haderr)
 			haderr = errno;
 		if (!haderr)
-			(void) atomicio(write, remout, "", 1);
+			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
 		else
 			run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr));
 		(void) response();
@@ -611,9 +604,7 @@ next:			(void) close(fd);
 }
 
 void
-rsource(name, statp)
-	char *name;
-	struct stat *statp;
+rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp)
 {
 	DIR *dirp;
 	struct dirent *dp;
@@ -632,7 +623,7 @@ rsource(name, statp)
 		(void) snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "T%lu 0 %lu 0\n",
 		    (u_long) statp->st_mtime,
 		    (u_long) statp->st_atime);
-		(void) atomicio(write, remout, path, strlen(path));
+		(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, path, strlen(path));
 		if (response() < 0) {
 			closedir(dirp);
 			return;
@@ -642,7 +633,7 @@ rsource(name, statp)
 	    (u_int) (statp->st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), 0, last);
 	if (verbose_mode)
 		fprintf(stderr, "Entering directory: %s", path);
-	(void) atomicio(write, remout, path, strlen(path));
+	(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, path, strlen(path));
 	if (response() < 0) {
 		closedir(dirp);
 		return;
@@ -661,7 +652,7 @@ rsource(name, statp)
 		source(1, vect);
 	}
 	(void) closedir(dirp);
-	(void) atomicio(write, remout, "E\n", 2);
+	(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "E\n", 2);
 	(void) response();
 }
 
@@ -720,9 +711,7 @@ bwlimit(int amount)
 }
 
 void
-sink(argc, argv)
-	int argc;
-	char *argv[];
+sink(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	static BUF buffer;
 	struct stat stb;
@@ -753,7 +742,7 @@ sink(argc, argv)
 	if (targetshouldbedirectory)
 		verifydir(targ);
 
-	(void) atomicio(write, remout, "", 1);
+	(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
 	if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
 		targisdir = 1;
 	for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
@@ -771,7 +760,7 @@ sink(argc, argv)
 
 		if (buf[0] == '\01' || buf[0] == '\02') {
 			if (iamremote == 0)
-				(void) atomicio(write, STDERR_FILENO,
+				(void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO,
 				    buf + 1, strlen(buf + 1));
 			if (buf[0] == '\02')
 				exit(1);
@@ -779,7 +768,7 @@ sink(argc, argv)
 			continue;
 		}
 		if (buf[0] == 'E') {
-			(void) atomicio(write, remout, "", 1);
+			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
 			return;
 		}
 		if (ch == '\n')
@@ -801,7 +790,7 @@ sink(argc, argv)
 			atime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
 			if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0')
 				SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited");
-			(void) atomicio(write, remout, "", 1);
+			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
 			continue;
 		}
 		if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') {
@@ -886,7 +875,7 @@ sink(argc, argv)
 bad:			run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
 			continue;
 		}
-		(void) atomicio(write, remout, "", 1);
+		(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
 		if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, 4096)) == NULL) {
 			(void) close(ofd);
 			continue;
@@ -923,7 +912,7 @@ bad:			run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
 			if (count == bp->cnt) {
 				/* Keep reading so we stay sync'd up. */
 				if (wrerr == NO) {
-					j = atomicio(write, ofd, bp->buf, count);
+					j = atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count);
 					if (j != count) {
 						wrerr = YES;
 						wrerrno = j >= 0 ? EIO : errno;
@@ -936,7 +925,7 @@ bad:			run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
 		if (showprogress)
 			stop_progress_meter();
 		if (count != 0 && wrerr == NO &&
-		    (j = atomicio(write, ofd, bp->buf, count)) != count) {
+		    (j = atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count)) != count) {
 			wrerr = YES;
 			wrerrno = j >= 0 ? EIO : errno;
 		}
@@ -981,7 +970,7 @@ bad:			run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
 			run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(wrerrno));
 			break;
 		case NO:
-			(void) atomicio(write, remout, "", 1);
+			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
 			break;
 		case DISPLAYED:
 			break;
@@ -1016,7 +1005,7 @@ response(void)
 		} while (cp < &rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] && ch != '\n');
 
 		if (!iamremote)
-			(void) atomicio(write, STDERR_FILENO, rbuf, cp - rbuf);
+			(void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, rbuf, cp - rbuf);
 		++errs;
 		if (resp == 1)
 			return (-1);
@@ -1061,8 +1050,7 @@ run_err(const char *fmt,...)
 }
 
 void
-verifydir(cp)
-	char *cp;
+verifydir(char *cp)
 {
 	struct stat stb;
 
@@ -1076,8 +1064,7 @@ verifydir(cp)
 }
 
 int
-okname(cp0)
-	char *cp0;
+okname(char *cp0)
 {
 	int c;
 	char *cp;
@@ -1107,9 +1094,7 @@ bad:	fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name\n", cp0);
 }
 
 BUF *
-allocbuf(bp, fd, blksize)
-	BUF *bp;
-	int fd, blksize;
+allocbuf(BUF *bp, int fd, int blksize)
 {
 	size_t size;
 #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE
@@ -1137,8 +1122,7 @@ allocbuf(bp, fd, blksize)
 }
 
 void
-lostconn(signo)
-	int signo;
+lostconn(int signo)
 {
 	if (!iamremote)
 		write(STDERR_FILENO, "lost connection\n", 16);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
index fcb4809..017827e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
@@ -10,25 +10,9 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.116 2003/02/21 09:05:53 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.127 2003/09/01 18:15:50 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
-#if defined(KRB4)
-#include <krb.h>
-#endif
-#if defined(KRB5)
-#ifdef HEIMDAL
-#include <krb5.h>
-#else
-/* Bodge - but then, so is using the kerberos IV KEYFILE to get a Kerberos V
- * keytab */
-#define KEYFILE "/etc/krb5.keytab"
-#endif
-#endif
-#ifdef AFS
-#include <kafs.h>
-#endif
-
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
@@ -57,7 +41,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options));
 
 	/* Portable-specific options */
-	options->pam_authentication_via_kbd_int = -1;
+	options->use_pam = -1;
 
 	/* Standard Options */
 	options->num_ports = 0;
@@ -81,23 +65,16 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	options->keepalives = -1;
 	options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET;
 	options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
-	options->rhosts_authentication = -1;
 	options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1;
 	options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
 	options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = -1;
 	options->rsa_authentication = -1;
 	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
 	options->kerberos_authentication = -1;
 	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
 	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
-#endif
-#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
-	options->kerberos_tgt_passing = -1;
-#endif
-#ifdef AFS
-	options->afs_token_passing = -1;
-#endif
+	options->gss_authentication=-1;
+	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
 	options->password_authentication = -1;
 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
@@ -119,7 +96,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	options->max_startups_rate = -1;
 	options->max_startups = -1;
 	options->banner = NULL;
-	options->verify_reverse_mapping = -1;
+	options->use_dns = -1;
 	options->client_alive_interval = -1;
 	options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
 	options->authorized_keys_file = NULL;
@@ -133,8 +110,8 @@ void
 fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 {
 	/* Portable-specific options */
-	if (options->pam_authentication_via_kbd_int == -1)
-		options->pam_authentication_via_kbd_int = 0;
+	if (options->use_pam == -1)
+		options->use_pam = 0;
 
 	/* Standard Options */
 	if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
@@ -187,8 +164,6 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 		options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
 	if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
 		options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
-	if (options->rhosts_authentication == -1)
-		options->rhosts_authentication = 0;
 	if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1)
 		options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
 	if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
@@ -199,34 +174,16 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 		options->rsa_authentication = 1;
 	if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
 		options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
-#if defined(KRB4) && defined(KRB5)
-        if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1)
-                options->kerberos_authentication =
-                    (access(KEYFILE, R_OK) == 0 ||
-		    access(krb5_defkeyname, R_OK) == 0);
-#elif defined(KRB4)
-        if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1)
-                options->kerberos_authentication =
-		    (access(KEYFILE, R_OK) == 0);
-#elif defined(KRB5)
 	if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1)
-                options->kerberos_authentication =
-                    (access(krb5_defkeyname, R_OK) == 0);
-#endif
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+		options->kerberos_authentication = 0;
 	if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1)
 		options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1;
 	if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1)
 		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
-#endif
-#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
-	if (options->kerberos_tgt_passing == -1)
-		options->kerberos_tgt_passing = 0;
-#endif
-#ifdef AFS
-	if (options->afs_token_passing == -1)
-		options->afs_token_passing = 0;
-#endif
+	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+		options->gss_authentication = 0;
+	if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+		options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
 		options->password_authentication = 1;
 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
@@ -251,8 +208,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 		options->max_startups_rate = 100;		/* 100% */
 	if (options->max_startups_begin == -1)
 		options->max_startups_begin = options->max_startups;
-	if (options->verify_reverse_mapping == -1)
-		options->verify_reverse_mapping = 0;
+	if (options->use_dns == -1)
+		options->use_dns = 1;
 	if (options->client_alive_interval == -1)
 		options->client_alive_interval = 0;
 	if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1)
@@ -286,21 +243,13 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 typedef enum {
 	sBadOption,		/* == unknown option */
 	/* Portable-specific options */
-	sPAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt,
+	sUsePAM,
 	/* Standard Options */
 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime, sKeyRegenerationTime,
 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
-	sRhostsAuthentication, sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
-#endif
-#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
-	sKerberosTgtPassing,
-#endif
-#ifdef AFS
-	sAFSTokenPassing,
-#endif
-	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+	sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress,
 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
@@ -309,12 +258,13 @@ typedef enum {
 	sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
 	sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile,
 	sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups,
-	sBanner, sVerifyReverseMapping, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+	sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
 	sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2,
+	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds,
 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation,
 	sVersionAddendum,
-	sDeprecated
+	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
 } ServerOpCodes;
 
 /* Textual representation of the tokens. */
@@ -323,9 +273,12 @@ static struct {
 	ServerOpCodes opcode;
 } keywords[] = {
 	/* Portable-specific options */
-#if 0
-	{ "PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt", sPAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt },
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	{ "usepam", sUsePAM },
+#else
+	{ "usepam", sUnsupported },
 #endif
+	{ "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated },
 	/* Standard Options */
 	{ "port", sPort },
 	{ "hostkey", sHostKeyFile },
@@ -337,23 +290,30 @@ static struct {
 	{ "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin },
 	{ "syslogfacility", sLogFacility },
 	{ "loglevel", sLogLevel },
-	{ "rhostsauthentication", sRhostsAuthentication },
+	{ "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated },
 	{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", sRhostsRSAAuthentication },
 	{ "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication },
 	{ "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly },
 	{ "rsaauthentication", sRSAAuthentication },
 	{ "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication },
 	{ "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication },			/* alias */
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+#ifdef KRB5
 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication },
 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd },
 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup },
+#else
+	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported },
+	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported },
+	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported },
 #endif
-#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
-	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sKerberosTgtPassing },
-#endif
-#ifdef AFS
-	{ "afstokenpassing", sAFSTokenPassing },
+	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported },
+	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported },
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication },
+	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds },
+#else
+	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported },
+	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported },
 #endif
 	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication },
 	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
@@ -387,8 +347,9 @@ static struct {
 	{ "subsystem", sSubsystem },
 	{ "maxstartups", sMaxStartups },
 	{ "banner", sBanner },
-	{ "verifyreversemapping", sVerifyReverseMapping },
-	{ "reversemappingcheck", sVerifyReverseMapping },
+	{ "usedns", sUseDNS },
+	{ "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated },
+	{ "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated },
 	{ "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval },
 	{ "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax },
 	{ "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile },
@@ -473,8 +434,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 	opcode = parse_token(arg, filename, linenum);
 	switch (opcode) {
 	/* Portable-specific options */
-	case sPAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt:
-		intptr = &options->pam_authentication_via_kbd_int;
+	case sUsePAM:
+		intptr = &options->use_pam;
 		goto parse_flag;
 
 	/* Standard Options */
@@ -637,10 +598,6 @@ parse_flag:
 		intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts;
 		goto parse_flag;
 
-	case sRhostsAuthentication:
-		intptr = &options->rhosts_authentication;
-		goto parse_flag;
-
 	case sRhostsRSAAuthentication:
 		intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
@@ -660,7 +617,7 @@ parse_flag:
 	case sPubkeyAuthentication:
 		intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+
 	case sKerberosAuthentication:
 		intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
@@ -672,17 +629,14 @@ parse_flag:
 	case sKerberosTicketCleanup:
 		intptr = &options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup;
 		goto parse_flag;
-#endif
-#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
-	case sKerberosTgtPassing:
-		intptr = &options->kerberos_tgt_passing;
+
+	case sGssAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
-#endif
-#ifdef AFS
-	case sAFSTokenPassing:
-		intptr = &options->afs_token_passing;
+
+	case sGssCleanupCreds:
+		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
 		goto parse_flag;
-#endif
 
 	case sPasswordAuthentication:
 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
@@ -748,8 +702,8 @@ parse_flag:
 		intptr = &options->gateway_ports;
 		goto parse_flag;
 
-	case sVerifyReverseMapping:
-		intptr = &options->verify_reverse_mapping;
+	case sUseDNS:
+		intptr = &options->use_dns;
 		goto parse_flag;
 
 	case sLogFacility:
@@ -932,7 +886,14 @@ parse_flag:
 		break;
 
 	case sDeprecated:
-		log("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
+		logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
+		    filename, linenum, arg);
+		while (arg)
+		    arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		break;
+
+	case sUnsupported:
+		logit("%s line %d: Unsupported option %s",
 		    filename, linenum, arg);
 		while (arg)
 		    arg = strdelim(&cp);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.h b/crypto/openssh/servconf.h
index ea74f6e..29e945d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/servconf.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.59 2002/07/30 17:03:55 markus Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.65 2003/09/01 18:15:50 markus Exp $	*/
 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
 
 /*
@@ -66,15 +66,12 @@ typedef struct {
 	int     gateway_ports;	/* If true, allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */
 	SyslogFacility log_facility;	/* Facility for system logging. */
 	LogLevel log_level;	/* Level for system logging. */
-	int     rhosts_authentication;	/* If true, permit rhosts
-					 * authentication. */
 	int     rhosts_rsa_authentication;	/* If true, permit rhosts RSA
 						 * authentication. */
 	int     hostbased_authentication;	/* If true, permit ssh2 hostbased auth */
 	int     hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */
 	int     rsa_authentication;	/* If true, permit RSA authentication. */
 	int     pubkey_authentication;	/* If true, permit ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
 	int     kerberos_authentication;	/* If true, permit Kerberos
 						 * authentication. */
 	int     kerberos_or_local_passwd;	/* If true, permit kerberos
@@ -84,14 +81,8 @@ typedef struct {
 						 * /etc/passwd */
 	int     kerberos_ticket_cleanup;	/* If true, destroy ticket
 						 * file on logout. */
-#endif
-#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
-	int     kerberos_tgt_passing;	/* If true, permit Kerberos TGT
-					 * passing. */
-#endif
-#ifdef AFS
-	int     afs_token_passing;	/* If true, permit AFS token passing. */
-#endif
+	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
 	int     password_authentication;	/* If true, permit password
 						 * authentication. */
 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication;	/* If true, permit */
@@ -119,7 +110,7 @@ typedef struct {
 	int	max_startups_rate;
 	int	max_startups;
 	char   *banner;			/* SSH-2 banner message */
-	int	verify_reverse_mapping;	/* cross-check ip and dns */
+	int	use_dns;
 	int	client_alive_interval;	/*
 					 * poke the client this often to
 					 * see if it's still there
@@ -132,7 +123,7 @@ typedef struct {
 
 	char   *authorized_keys_file;	/* File containing public keys */
 	char   *authorized_keys_file2;
-	int	pam_authentication_via_kbd_int;
+	int	use_pam;		/* Enable auth via PAM */
 }       ServerOptions;
 
 void	 initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
index f4df9cc..a953902 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.106 2003/04/01 10:22:21 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.110 2003/06/24 08:23:46 markus Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "packet.h"
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ sigchld_handler(int sig)
 static void
 make_packets_from_stderr_data(void)
 {
-	int len;
+	u_int len;
 
 	/* Send buffered stderr data to the client. */
 	while (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0 &&
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ make_packets_from_stderr_data(void)
 static void
 make_packets_from_stdout_data(void)
 {
-	int len;
+	u_int len;
 
 	/* Send buffered stdout data to the client. */
 	while (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0 &&
@@ -771,8 +771,14 @@ server_loop2(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		    &nalloc, 0);
 
 		collect_children();
-		if (!rekeying)
+		if (!rekeying) {
 			channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
+			if (packet_need_rekeying()) {
+				debug("need rekeying");
+				xxx_kex->done = 0;
+				kex_send_kexinit(xxx_kex);
+			}
+		}
 		process_input(readset);
 		if (connection_closed)
 			break;
@@ -874,7 +880,7 @@ server_request_direct_tcpip(char *ctype)
 		return NULL;
 	c = channel_new(ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING,
 	    sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT,
-	    CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, xstrdup("direct-tcpip"), 1);
+	    CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "direct-tcpip", 1);
 	return c;
 }
 
@@ -893,7 +899,7 @@ server_request_session(char *ctype)
 	 */
 	c = channel_new(ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL,
 	    -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT,
-	    0, xstrdup("server-session"), 1);
+	    0, "server-session", 1);
 	if (session_open(xxx_authctxt, c->self) != 1) {
 		debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self);
 		channel_free(c);
@@ -971,7 +977,7 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		pw = auth_get_user();
 		if (pw == NULL)
 			fatal("server_input_global_request: no user");
-		listen_address = packet_get_string(NULL); /* XXX currently ignored */
+		listen_address = packet_get_string(NULL);
 		listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int();
 		debug("server_input_global_request: tcpip-forward listen %s port %d",
 		    listen_address, listen_port);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/session.c b/crypto/openssh/session.c
index f2d73a4..f90bf06 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/session.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/session.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.154 2003/03/05 22:33:43 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.164 2003/09/18 08:49:45 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
@@ -59,10 +59,8 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "session.h"
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-#include <windows.h>
-#include <sys/cygwin.h>
-#define is_winnt       (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
 #endif
 
 /* func */
@@ -96,6 +94,7 @@ extern int debug_flag;
 extern u_int utmp_len;
 extern int startup_pipe;
 extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
 
 /* original command from peer. */
 const char *original_command = NULL;
@@ -104,10 +103,6 @@ const char *original_command = NULL;
 #define MAX_SESSIONS 10
 Session	sessions[MAX_SESSIONS];
 
-#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
-char *aixloginmsg;
-#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
-
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
 login_cap_t *lc;
 #endif
@@ -193,7 +188,7 @@ auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd * pw)
 	nc = channel_new("auth socket",
 	    SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1,
 	    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
-	    0, xstrdup("auth socket"), 1);
+	    0, "auth socket", 1);
 	strlcpy(nc->path, auth_sock_name, sizeof(nc->path));
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -226,10 +221,6 @@ do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	/* remove agent socket */
 	if (auth_sock_name != NULL)
 		auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
-#ifdef KRB4
-	if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup)
-		krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
-#endif
 #ifdef KRB5
 	if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup)
 		krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
@@ -342,58 +333,6 @@ do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
 				success = 1;
 			break;
 
-#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
-		case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT:
-			if (!options.kerberos_tgt_passing) {
-				verbose("Kerberos TGT passing disabled.");
-			} else {
-				char *kdata = packet_get_string(&dlen);
-				packet_check_eom();
-
-				/* XXX - 0x41, see creds_to_radix version */
-				if (kdata[0] != 0x41) {
-#ifdef KRB5
-					krb5_data tgt;
-					tgt.data = kdata;
-					tgt.length = dlen;
-
-					if (auth_krb5_tgt(s->authctxt, &tgt))
-						success = 1;
-					else
-						verbose("Kerberos v5 TGT refused for %.100s", s->authctxt->user);
-#endif /* KRB5 */
-				} else {
-#ifdef AFS
-					if (auth_krb4_tgt(s->authctxt, kdata))
-						success = 1;
-					else
-						verbose("Kerberos v4 TGT refused for %.100s", s->authctxt->user);
-#endif /* AFS */
-				}
-				xfree(kdata);
-			}
-			break;
-#endif /* AFS || KRB5 */
-
-#ifdef AFS
-		case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN:
-			if (!options.afs_token_passing || !k_hasafs()) {
-				verbose("AFS token passing disabled.");
-			} else {
-				/* Accept AFS token. */
-				char *token = packet_get_string(&dlen);
-				packet_check_eom();
-
-				if (auth_afs_token(s->authctxt, token))
-					success = 1;
-				else
-					verbose("AFS token refused for %.100s",
-					    s->authctxt->user);
-				xfree(token);
-			}
-			break;
-#endif /* AFS */
-
 		case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL:
 		case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD:
 			if (type == SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD) {
@@ -413,7 +352,7 @@ do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
 			 * Any unknown messages in this phase are ignored,
 			 * and a failure message is returned.
 			 */
-			log("Unknown packet type received after authentication: %d", type);
+			logit("Unknown packet type received after authentication: %d", type);
 		}
 		packet_start(success ? SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS : SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
 		packet_send();
@@ -457,11 +396,12 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
 	session_proctitle(s);
 
 #if defined(USE_PAM)
-	do_pam_session(s->pw->pw_name, NULL);
-	do_pam_setcred(1);
-	if (is_pam_password_change_required())
-		packet_disconnect("Password change required but no "
-		    "TTY available");
+	if (options.use_pam) {
+		do_pam_setcred(1);
+		if (is_pam_password_change_required())
+			packet_disconnect("Password change required but no "
+			    "TTY available");
+	}
 #endif /* USE_PAM */
 
 	/* Fork the child. */
@@ -584,8 +524,10 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
 	ttyfd = s->ttyfd;
 
 #if defined(USE_PAM)
-	do_pam_session(s->pw->pw_name, s->tty);
-	do_pam_setcred(1);
+	if (options.use_pam) {
+		do_pam_set_tty(s->tty);
+		do_pam_setcred(1);
+	}
 #endif
 
 	/* Fork the child. */
@@ -691,7 +633,7 @@ do_pre_login(Session *s)
 	}
 
 	record_utmp_only(pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name,
-	    get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.verify_reverse_mapping),
+	    get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
 	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
 }
 #endif
@@ -709,6 +651,14 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
 		debug("Forced command '%.900s'", command);
 	}
 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	if (options.gss_authentication) {
+		temporarily_use_uid(s->pw);
+		ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
+		restore_uid();
+	}
+#endif
+
 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
 		do_exec_pty(s, command);
 	else
@@ -746,7 +696,7 @@ do_login(Session *s, const char *command)
 	if (!use_privsep)
 		record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
 		    get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len,
-		    options.verify_reverse_mapping),
+		    options.use_dns),
 		    (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -754,9 +704,10 @@ do_login(Session *s, const char *command)
 	 * If password change is needed, do it now.
 	 * This needs to occur before the ~/.hushlogin check.
 	 */
-	if (is_pam_password_change_required()) {
+	if (options.use_pam && is_pam_password_change_required()) {
 		print_pam_messages();
 		do_pam_chauthtok();
+		/* XXX - signal [net] parent to enable forwardings */
 	}
 #endif
 
@@ -764,13 +715,16 @@ do_login(Session *s, const char *command)
 		return;
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-	if (!is_pam_password_change_required())
+	if (options.use_pam && !is_pam_password_change_required())
 		print_pam_messages();
 #endif /* USE_PAM */
-#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
-	if (aixloginmsg && *aixloginmsg)
-		printf("%s\n", aixloginmsg);
-#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
+
+	/* display post-login message */
+	if (buffer_len(&loginmsg) > 0) {
+		buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
+		printf("%s\n", (char *)buffer_ptr(&loginmsg));
+	}
+	buffer_free(&loginmsg);
 
 #ifndef NO_SSH_LASTLOG
 	if (options.print_lastlog && s->last_login_time != 0) {
@@ -859,7 +813,7 @@ check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command)
  * Sets the value of the given variable in the environment.  If the variable
  * already exists, its value is overriden.
  */
-static void
+void
 child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
 	const char *value)
 {
@@ -868,6 +822,16 @@ child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
 	u_int i, namelen;
 
 	/*
+	 * If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null
+	 * entry before continuing.
+	 */
+	if (*envp == NULL && *envsizep == 0) {
+		*envp = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
+		*envp[0] = NULL;
+		*envsizep = 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
 	 * Find the slot where the value should be stored.  If the variable
 	 * already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot
 	 * at the end of the array, expanding if necessary.
@@ -944,6 +908,61 @@ read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize,
 	fclose(f);
 }
 
+#ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
+/*
+ * Return named variable from specified environment, or NULL if not present.
+ */
+static char *
+child_get_env(char **env, const char *name)
+{
+	int i;
+	size_t len;
+
+	len = strlen(name);
+	for (i=0; env[i] != NULL; i++)
+		if (strncmp(name, env[i], len) == 0 && env[i][len] == '=')
+			return(env[i] + len + 1);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read /etc/default/login.
+ * We pick up the PATH (or SUPATH for root) and UMASK.
+ */
+static void
+read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_int *envsize, uid_t uid)
+{
+	char **tmpenv = NULL, *var;
+	u_int i, tmpenvsize = 0;
+	mode_t mask;
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't want to copy the whole file to the child's environment,
+	 * so we use a temporary environment and copy the variables we're
+	 * interested in.
+	 */
+	read_environment_file(&tmpenv, &tmpenvsize, "/etc/default/login");
+
+	if (tmpenv == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (uid == 0)
+		var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "SUPATH");
+	else
+		var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "PATH");
+	if (var != NULL)
+		child_set_env(env, envsize, "PATH", var);
+	
+	if ((var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "UMASK")) != NULL)
+		if (sscanf(var, "%5lo", &mask) == 1)
+			umask(mask);
+	
+	for (i = 0; tmpenv[i] != NULL; i++)
+		xfree(tmpenv[i]);
+	xfree(tmpenv);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
+
 void copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize)
 {
 	char *var_name, *var_val;
@@ -972,7 +991,7 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
 {
 	char buf[256];
 	u_int i, envsize;
-	char **env, *laddr;
+	char **env, *laddr, *path = NULL;
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
 	extern char **environ;
 	char **senv, **var;
@@ -994,6 +1013,14 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
 
 	if (getenv("TZ"))
 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ"));
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter 
+	 * the childs environment as they see fit
+	 */
+	ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
+#endif
+
 	if (!options.use_login) {
 		/* Set basic environment. */
 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
@@ -1026,12 +1053,15 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
 		 * needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better
 		 * remains intact here.
 		 */
-#  ifdef SUPERUSER_PATH
-		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", 
-		    s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ? SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH);
-#  else 
-		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
-#  endif /* SUPERUSER_PATH */
+#  ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
+		read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid);
+		path = child_get_env(env, "PATH");
+#  endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
+		if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
+			child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", 
+			    s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ?
+				SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH);
+		}
 # endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
 #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
 
@@ -1094,11 +1124,6 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
 		read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment");
 	}
 #endif
-#ifdef KRB4
-	if (s->authctxt->krb4_ticket_file)
-		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRBTKFILE",
-		    s->authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
-#endif
 #ifdef KRB5
 	if (s->authctxt->krb5_ticket_file)
 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
@@ -1109,10 +1134,9 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
 	 * Pull in any environment variables that may have
 	 * been set by PAM.
 	 */
-	{
-		char **p;
+	if (options.use_pam) {
+		char **p = fetch_pam_environment();
 
-		p = fetch_pam_environment();
 		copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
 		free_pam_environment(p);
 	}
@@ -1224,7 +1248,7 @@ do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
 #endif
 	if (f) {
 		/* /etc/nologin exists.  Print its contents and exit. */
-		log("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists",
+		logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists",
 		    pw->pw_name, _PATH_NOLOGIN);
 		while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
 			fputs(buf, stderr);
@@ -1244,7 +1268,8 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
 	{
 
 #ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED
-		setpcred(pw->pw_name);
+		if (setpcred(pw->pw_name, (char **)NULL) == -1)
+			fatal("Failed to set process credentials");
 #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
 # ifdef __bsdi__
@@ -1280,7 +1305,10 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
 		 * These will have been wiped by the above initgroups() call.
 		 * Reestablish them here.
 		 */
-		do_pam_setcred(0);
+		if (options.use_pam) {
+			do_pam_session();
+			do_pam_setcred(0);
+		}
 # endif /* USE_PAM */
 # if defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)
 		irix_setusercontext(pw);
@@ -1384,7 +1412,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 	/* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */
 	if (options.use_login)
 		hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len,
-		    options.verify_reverse_mapping);
+		    options.use_dns);
 	/*
 	 * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and
 	 * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important
@@ -1430,18 +1458,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 	 */
 	environ = env;
 
-#ifdef AFS
-	/* Try to get AFS tokens for the local cell. */
-	if (k_hasafs()) {
-		char cell[64];
-
-		if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0)
-			krb_afslog(cell, 0);
-
-		krb_afslog(0, 0);
-	}
-#endif /* AFS */
-
 	/* Change current directory to the user\'s home directory. */
 	if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home directory %s: %s\n",
@@ -1711,7 +1727,7 @@ session_subsystem_req(Session *s)
 	int i;
 
 	packet_check_eom();
-	log("subsystem request for %.100s", subsys);
+	logit("subsystem request for %.100s", subsys);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) {
 		if (strcmp(subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) {
@@ -1730,7 +1746,7 @@ session_subsystem_req(Session *s)
 	}
 
 	if (!success)
-		log("subsystem request for %.100s failed, subsystem not found",
+		logit("subsystem request for %.100s failed, subsystem not found",
 		    subsys);
 
 	xfree(subsys);
@@ -1778,6 +1794,20 @@ session_exec_req(Session *s)
 }
 
 static int
+session_break_req(Session *s)
+{
+	u_int break_length;
+
+	break_length = packet_get_int();	/* ignored */
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	if (s->ttyfd == -1 ||
+	    tcsendbreak(s->ttyfd, 0) < 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
 session_auth_agent_req(Session *s)
 {
 	static int called = 0;
@@ -1801,7 +1831,7 @@ session_input_channel_req(Channel *c, const char *rtype)
 	Session *s;
 
 	if ((s = session_by_channel(c->self)) == NULL) {
-		log("session_input_channel_req: no session %d req %.100s",
+		logit("session_input_channel_req: no session %d req %.100s",
 		    c->self, rtype);
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -1824,6 +1854,8 @@ session_input_channel_req(Channel *c, const char *rtype)
 			success = session_auth_agent_req(s);
 		} else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) {
 			success = session_subsystem_req(s);
+		} else if (strcmp(rtype, "break") == 0) {
+			success = session_break_req(s);
 		}
 	}
 	if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) {
@@ -2160,4 +2192,8 @@ static void
 do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
 	server_loop2(authctxt);
+#if defined(GSSAPI)
+	if (options.gss_cleanup_creds)
+		ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(NULL);
+#endif
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/session.h b/crypto/openssh/session.h
index d3ddfab..525e47f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/session.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/session.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.19 2002/06/30 21:59:45 deraadt Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.20 2003/08/22 10:56:09 markus Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -68,4 +68,7 @@ Session	*session_new(void);
 Session	*session_by_tty(char *);
 void	 session_close(Session *);
 void	 do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
+void	 child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
+		       const char *value);
+
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c
index 9adec30..2e394e5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.66 2003/03/05 22:33:43 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.68 2003/06/16 10:22:45 markus Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
@@ -164,7 +164,8 @@ add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename)
 			if (private != NULL)
 				break;
 			clear_pass();
-			strlcpy(msg, "Bad passphrase, try again: ", sizeof msg);
+			snprintf(msg, sizeof msg,
+			    "Bad passphrase, try again for %.200s: ", comment);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -201,7 +202,7 @@ update_card(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int add, const char *id)
 	if (pin == NULL)
 		return -1;
 
-	if (ssh_update_card(ac, add, id, pin)) {
+	if (ssh_update_card(ac, add, id, pin, lifetime, confirm)) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Card %s: %s\n",
 		    add ? "added" : "removed", id);
 		ret = 0;
@@ -318,7 +319,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	char *sc_reader_id = NULL;
 	int i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0;
 
-	__progname = get_progname(argv[0]);
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
 	init_rng();
 	seed_rng();
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
index 097fad9..d0b19fd 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.108 2003/03/13 11:44:50 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.112 2003/09/18 08:49:45 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e)
 		/* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
 		len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
 		if (len <= 0 || len > 32) {
-			log("process_authentication_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len);
+			logit("process_authentication_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len);
 			goto failure;
 		}
 		memset(buf, 0, 32);
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
 		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->n);
 
 		if (bits != key_size(key))
-			log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %u, announced %u",
+			logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %u, announced %u",
 			    key_size(key), bits);
 		break;
 	case 2:
@@ -581,13 +581,29 @@ static void
 process_add_smartcard_key (SocketEntry *e)
 {
 	char *sc_reader_id = NULL, *pin;
-	int i, version, success = 0;
+	int i, version, success = 0, death = 0, confirm = 0;
 	Key **keys, *k;
 	Identity *id;
 	Idtab *tab;
 
 	sc_reader_id = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
 	pin = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
+
+	while (buffer_len(&e->request)) {
+		switch (buffer_get_char(&e->request)) {
+		case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
+			death = time(NULL) + buffer_get_int(&e->request);
+			break;
+		case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
+			confirm = 1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (lifetime && !death)
+		death = time(NULL) + lifetime;
+
 	keys = sc_get_keys(sc_reader_id, pin);
 	xfree(sc_reader_id);
 	xfree(pin);
@@ -603,9 +619,9 @@ process_add_smartcard_key (SocketEntry *e)
 		if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) {
 			id = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity));
 			id->key = k;
-			id->comment = xstrdup("smartcard key");
-			id->death = 0;
-			id->confirm = 0;
+			id->comment = sc_get_key_label(k);
+			id->death = death;
+			id->confirm = confirm;
 			TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
 			tab->nentries++;
 			success = 1;
@@ -749,6 +765,7 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e)
 		break;
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
 	case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY:
+	case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED:
 		process_add_smartcard_key(e);
 		break;
 	case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY:
@@ -964,7 +981,7 @@ check_parent_exists(int sig)
 		/* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */
 		cleanup_handler(sig); /* safe */
 	}
-	signal(SIGALRM, check_parent_exists);
+	mysignal(SIGALRM, check_parent_exists);
 	alarm(10);
 	errno = save_errno;
 }
@@ -1010,7 +1027,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 
 	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
 
-	__progname = get_progname(av[0]);
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
 	init_rng();
 	seed_rng();
 
@@ -1197,7 +1214,7 @@ skip:
 	fatal_add_cleanup(cleanup_socket, NULL);
 	new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock);
 	if (ac > 0) {
-		signal(SIGALRM, check_parent_exists);
+		mysignal(SIGALRM, check_parent_exists);
 		alarm(10);
 	}
 	idtab_init();
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.h
deleted file mode 100644
index e69de29..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.h
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c
index 5b4eb82..9fa8aae 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.41 2003/02/16 17:09:57 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.44 2003/06/28 16:23:06 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 
@@ -31,11 +31,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.41 2003/02/16 17:09:57 markus Exp $");
 
 /* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6.  This can be set on the command line.
    Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */
-#ifdef IPV4_DEFAULT
-int IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
-#else
 int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
-#endif
 
 int ssh_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
 
@@ -397,7 +393,7 @@ tcpconnect(char *host)
 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
 		fatal("getaddrinfo %s: %s", host, gai_strerror(gaierr));
 	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
-		s = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+		s = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
 		if (s < 0) {
 			error("socket: %s", strerror(errno));
 			continue;
@@ -545,7 +541,7 @@ congreet(int s)
 	n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n",
 	    c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2,
 	    c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MINOR_2);
-	if (atomicio(write, s, buf, n) != n) {
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != n) {
 		error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
 		confree(s);
 		return;
@@ -685,7 +681,7 @@ fatal(const char *fmt,...)
 static void
 usage(void)
 {
-	fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-v46] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-f file]\n"
+	fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-v46] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type] [-f file]\n"
 	    "\t\t   [host | addrlist namelist] [...]\n",
 	    __progname);
 	exit(1);
@@ -701,7 +697,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	extern int optind;
 	extern char *optarg;
 
-	__progname = get_progname(argv[0]);
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
 	init_rng();
 	seed_rng();
 	TAILQ_INIT(&tq);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.h
deleted file mode 100644
index e69de29..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.h
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh.1
index 0699ada..4629bd1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.1
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.168 2003/03/28 10:11:43 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.175 2003/07/22 13:35:22 markus Exp $
 .\" $FreeBSD$
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSH 1
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
 .Pp
 .Nm ssh
 .Bk -words
-.Op Fl afgknqstvxACNTX1246
+.Op Fl afgknqstvxACNTVX1246
 .Op Fl b Ar bind_address
 .Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec
 .Op Fl e Ar escape_char
@@ -302,6 +302,9 @@ Background ssh at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions
 to terminate
 .It Cm ~?
 Display a list of escape characters
+.It Cm ~B
+Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful for SSH protocol version 2
+and if the peer supports it)
 .It Cm ~C
 Open command line (only useful for adding port forwardings using the
 .Fl L
@@ -487,13 +490,13 @@ It is possible to have multiple
 options (and multiple identities specified in
 configuration files).
 .It Fl I Ar smartcard_device
-Specifies which smartcard device to use. The argument is
-the device
+Specifies which smartcard device to use.
+The argument is the device
 .Nm
 should use to communicate with a smartcard used for storing the user's
 private RSA key.
 .It Fl k
-Disables forwarding of Kerberos tickets and AFS tokens.
+Disables forwarding of Kerberos tickets.
 This may also be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
 .It Fl l Ar login_name
 Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine.
@@ -541,9 +544,10 @@ per-host basis in the configuration file.
 Quiet mode.
 Causes all warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed.
 .It Fl s
-May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system. Subsystems are a feature of the SSH2 protocol which facilitate the use
-of SSH as a secure transport for other applications (eg. sftp). The
-subsystem is specified as the remote command.
+May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system.
+Subsystems are a feature of the SSH2 protocol which facilitate the use
+of SSH as a secure transport for other applications (eg. sftp).
+The subsystem is specified as the remote command.
 .It Fl t
 Force pseudo-tty allocation.
 This can be used to execute arbitrary
@@ -565,8 +569,10 @@ This is helpful in
 debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
 Multiple
 .Fl v
-options increases the verbosity.
-Maximum is 3.
+options increase the verbosity.
+The maximum is 3.
+.It Fl V
+Display the version number and exit.
 .It Fl x
 Disables X11 forwarding.
 .It Fl X
@@ -645,9 +651,9 @@ on the local side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the
 connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application
 protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
 remote machine.
-Currently the SOCKS4 protocol is supported, and
+Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
 .Nm
-will act as a SOCKS4 server.
+will act as a SOCKS server.
 Only root can forward privileged ports.
 Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
 .It Fl 1
@@ -961,15 +967,6 @@ above.
 .Nm
 exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255
 if an error occurred.
-.Sh AUTHORS
-OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
-ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
-Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
-Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
-removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
-created OpenSSH.
-Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
-protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr rsh 1 ,
 .Xr scp 1 ,
@@ -992,3 +989,12 @@ protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
 .%D January 2002
 .%O work in progress material
 .Re
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
index 51a9fc8..ef9c778 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.190 2003/02/06 09:27:29 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.201 2003/09/01 18:15:50 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -80,14 +80,6 @@ extern char *__progname;
 char *__progname;
 #endif
 
-/* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6.  This can be set on the command line.
-   Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */
-#ifdef IPV4_DEFAULT
-int IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
-#else
-int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
-#endif
-
 /* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on.  This can be set on the command line. */
 int debug_flag = 0;
 
@@ -163,9 +155,6 @@ usage(void)
 	     _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -A          Enable authentication agent forwarding.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -a          Disable authentication agent forwarding (default).\n");
-#ifdef AFS
-	fprintf(stderr, "  -k          Disable Kerberos ticket and AFS token forwarding.\n");
-#endif				/* AFS */
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -X          Enable X11 connection forwarding.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -x          Disable X11 connection forwarding (default).\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -i file     Identity for public key authentication "
@@ -223,7 +212,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	extern int optind, optreset;
 	extern char *optarg;
 
-	__progname = get_progname(av[0]);
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
 	init_rng();
 
 	/*
@@ -254,7 +243,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	/* Get user data. */
 	pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid);
 	if (!pw) {
-		log("unknown user %d", original_real_uid);
+		logit("You don't exist, go away!");
 		exit(1);
 	}
 	/* Take a copy of the returned structure. */
@@ -285,10 +274,10 @@ again:
 			options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
 			break;
 		case '4':
-			IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
+			options.address_family = AF_INET;
 			break;
 		case '6':
-			IPv4or6 = AF_INET6;
+			options.address_family = AF_INET6;
 			break;
 		case 'n':
 			stdin_null_flag = 1;
@@ -315,12 +304,9 @@ again:
 		case 'A':
 			options.forward_agent = 1;
 			break;
-#ifdef AFS
 		case 'k':
-			options.kerberos_tgt_passing = 0;
-			options.afs_token_passing = 0;
+			/* ignored for backward compatibility */
 			break;
-#endif
 		case 'i':
 			if (stat(optarg, &st) < 0) {
 				fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s "
@@ -347,22 +333,22 @@ again:
 			tty_flag = 1;
 			break;
 		case 'v':
-			if (0 == debug_flag) {
+			if (debug_flag == 0) {
 				debug_flag = 1;
 				options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
-			} else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) {
-				options.log_level++;
+			} else {
+				if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+					options.log_level++;
 				break;
-			} else
-				fatal("Too high debugging level.");
+			}
 			/* fallthrough */
 		case 'V':
 			fprintf(stderr,
-			    "%s, SSH protocols %d.%d/%d.%d, OpenSSL 0x%8.8lx\n",
+			    "%s, SSH protocols %d.%d/%d.%d, %s\n",
 			    SSH_VERSION,
 			    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, PROTOCOL_MINOR_1,
 			    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2,
-			    SSLeay());
+			    SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
 			if (opt == 'V')
 				exit(0);
 			break;
@@ -428,9 +414,9 @@ again:
 
 		case 'L':
 		case 'R':
-			if (sscanf(optarg, "%5[0-9]:%255[^:]:%5[0-9]",
+			if (sscanf(optarg, "%5[0123456789]:%255[^:]:%5[0123456789]",
 			    sfwd_port, buf, sfwd_host_port) != 3 &&
-			    sscanf(optarg, "%5[0-9]/%255[^/]/%5[0-9]",
+			    sscanf(optarg, "%5[0123456789]/%255[^/]/%5[0123456789]",
 			    sfwd_port, buf, sfwd_host_port) != 3) {
 				fprintf(stderr,
 				    "Bad forwarding specification '%s'\n",
@@ -459,7 +445,7 @@ again:
 				    optarg);
 				exit(1);
 			}
-			add_local_forward(&options, fwd_port, "socks4", 0);
+			add_local_forward(&options, fwd_port, "socks", 0);
 			break;
 
 		case 'C':
@@ -519,7 +505,6 @@ again:
 
 	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
 	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
-	channel_set_af(IPv4or6);
 
 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
 	buffer_init(&command);
@@ -560,7 +545,7 @@ again:
 	/* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
 	if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)) && !force_tty_flag) {
 		if (tty_flag)
-			log("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because stdin is not a terminal.");
+			logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because stdin is not a terminal.");
 		tty_flag = 0;
 	}
 
@@ -591,6 +576,8 @@ again:
 	/* Fill configuration defaults. */
 	fill_default_options(&options);
 
+	channel_set_af(options.address_family);
+
 	/* reinit */
 	log_init(av[0], options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
 
@@ -608,7 +595,7 @@ again:
 		struct addrinfo *ai = NULL;
 		int errgai;
 		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
-		hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+		hints.ai_family = options.address_family;
 		hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
 		hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
 		errgai = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &ai);
@@ -619,25 +606,20 @@ again:
 		}
 	}
 
+	/* force lowercase for hostkey matching */
+	if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) {
+		for (p = options.host_key_alias; *p; p++)
+			if (isupper(*p))
+				*p = tolower(*p);
+	}
+
 	if (options.proxy_command != NULL &&
 	    strcmp(options.proxy_command, "none") == 0)
 		options.proxy_command = NULL;
 
-	/* Disable rhosts authentication if not running as root. */
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-	/* Ignore uid if running under Windows */
-	if (!options.use_privileged_port) {
-#else
-	if (original_effective_uid != 0 || !options.use_privileged_port) {
-#endif
-		debug("Rhosts Authentication disabled, "
-		    "originating port will not be trusted.");
-		options.rhosts_authentication = 0;
-	}
 	/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
-
-	if (ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port, IPv4or6,
-	    options.connection_attempts,
+	if (ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port,
+	    options.address_family, options.connection_attempts,
 #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
 	    options.use_privileged_port,
 #else
@@ -811,7 +793,7 @@ x11_get_proto(char **_proto, char **_data)
 	if (!got_data) {
 		u_int32_t rand = 0;
 
-		log("Warning: No xauth data; using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding.");
+		logit("Warning: No xauth data; using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding.");
 		strlcpy(proto, "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1", sizeof proto);
 		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
 			if (i % 4 == 0)
@@ -891,7 +873,7 @@ ssh_session(void)
 		if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
 			packet_start_compression(options.compression_level);
 		else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
-			log("Warning: Remote host refused compression.");
+			logit("Warning: Remote host refused compression.");
 		else
 			packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for compression response.");
 	}
@@ -930,7 +912,7 @@ ssh_session(void)
 			interactive = 1;
 			have_tty = 1;
 		} else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
-			log("Warning: Remote host failed or refused to allocate a pseudo tty.");
+			logit("Warning: Remote host failed or refused to allocate a pseudo tty.");
 		else
 			packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for pty request response.");
 	}
@@ -948,7 +930,7 @@ ssh_session(void)
 		if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
 			interactive = 1;
 		} else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
-			log("Warning: Remote host denied X11 forwarding.");
+			logit("Warning: Remote host denied X11 forwarding.");
 		} else {
 			packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for X11 forwarding");
 		}
@@ -967,7 +949,7 @@ ssh_session(void)
 		type = packet_read();
 		packet_check_eom();
 		if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
-			log("Warning: Remote host denied authentication agent forwarding.");
+			logit("Warning: Remote host denied authentication agent forwarding.");
 	}
 
 	/* Initiate port forwardings. */
@@ -1035,7 +1017,7 @@ client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	    options.remote_forwards[i].host,
 	    options.remote_forwards[i].host_port);
 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)
-		log("Warning: remote port forwarding failed for listen port %d",
+		logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed for listen port %d",
 		    options.remote_forwards[i].port);
 }
 
@@ -1150,7 +1132,7 @@ ssh_session2_open(void)
 	c = channel_new(
 	    "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err,
 	    window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE,
-	    xstrdup("client-session"), /*nonblock*/0);
+	    "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
 
 	debug3("ssh_session2_open: channel_new: %d", c->self);
 
@@ -1202,7 +1184,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(void)
 			    sizeof(Key *) * (SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES - 1));
 			options.num_identity_files++;
 			options.identity_keys[0] = keys[i];
-			options.identity_files[0] = xstrdup("smartcard key");;
+			options.identity_files[0] = sc_get_key_label(keys[i]);
 		}
 		if (options.num_identity_files > SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
 			options.num_identity_files = SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh.h
index 0a6ad13..e88b9b8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.71 2002/06/22 02:00:29 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.74 2003/09/01 13:52:18 markus Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
 #include <stdarg.h> /* For va_list */
 #include <syslog.h> /* For LOG_AUTH and friends */
 #include <sys/socket.h> /* For struct sockaddr_storage */
-#include "openbsd-compat/fake-socket.h" /* For struct sockaddr_storage */
 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
 # include <sys/select.h>
 #endif
@@ -89,9 +88,6 @@
  */
 #define SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH		32
 
-/* Name of Kerberos service for SSH to use. */
-#define KRB4_SERVICE_NAME		"rcmd"
-
 /* Used to identify ``EscapeChar none'' */
 #define SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE		-2
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
index e3f82cf..7eb617b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.16 2002/07/03 14:21:05 markus Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.19 2003/08/13 08:46:31 markus Exp $
 #	$FreeBSD$
 
 # This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file.  See
@@ -19,13 +19,14 @@
 # Host *
 #   ForwardAgent no
 #   ForwardX11 no
-#   RhostsAuthentication no
 #   RhostsRSAAuthentication no
 #   RSAAuthentication yes
 #   PasswordAuthentication yes
 #   HostbasedAuthentication no
 #   BatchMode no
 #   CheckHostIP no
+#   AddressFamily any
+#   ConnectTimeout 0
 #   StrictHostKeyChecking ask
 #   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
 #   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa
@@ -35,4 +36,4 @@
 #   Cipher 3des
 #   Ciphers aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc
 #   EscapeChar ~
-#   VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20030924
+#   VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20040106
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5
index f67f37d..b2ab20a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.7 2003/03/28 10:11:43 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.20 2003/09/02 18:50:06 jmc Exp $
 .\" $FreeBSD$
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns
 given after the keyword.
 .Ql \&*
 and
-.Ql ?
+.Ql \&?
 can be used as wildcards in the
 patterns.
 A single
@@ -116,13 +116,14 @@ The host is the
 .Ar hostname
 argument given on the command line (i.e., the name is not converted to
 a canonicalized host name before matching).
-.It Cm AFSTokenPassing
-Specifies whether to pass AFS tokens to remote host.
-The argument to this keyword must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-This option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+.It Cm AddressFamily
+Specifies which address family to use when connecting.
+Valid arguments are
+.Dq any ,
+.Dq inet
+(Use IPv4 only) or
+.Dq inet6
+(Use IPv6 only.)
 .It Cm BatchMode
 If set to
 .Dq yes ,
@@ -228,18 +229,41 @@ Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting.
 The argument must be an integer.
 This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails.
 The default is 1.
+.It Cm ConnectTimeout
+Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the ssh
+server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout.
+This value is used only when the target is down or really unreachable,
+not when it refuses the connection.
 .It Cm DynamicForward
 Specifies that a TCP/IP port on the local machine be forwarded
 over the secure channel, and the application
 protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
 remote machine.
 The argument must be a port number.
-Currently the SOCKS4 protocol is supported, and
+Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
 .Nm ssh
-will act as a SOCKS4 server.
+will act as a SOCKS server.
 Multiple forwardings may be specified, and
 additional forwardings can be given on the command line.
 Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+.It Cm EnableSSHKeysign
+Setting this option to
+.Dq yes
+in the global client configuration file
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+enables the use of the helper program
+.Xr ssh-keysign 8
+during
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+See
+.Xr ssh-keysign 8
+for more information.
 .It Cm EscapeChar
 Sets the escape character (default:
 .Ql ~ ) .
@@ -308,6 +332,18 @@ The default is
 Specifies a file to use for the global
 host key database instead of
 .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts .
+.It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
+Specifies whether authentication based on GSSAPI may be used, either using
+the result of a successful key exchange, or using GSSAPI user
+authentication.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
 .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
 Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
 authentication.
@@ -340,7 +376,8 @@ Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in
 specifications).
 .It Cm IdentityFile
 Specifies a file from which the user's RSA or DSA authentication identity
-is read. The default is
+is read.
+The default is
 .Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
 for protocol version 1, and
 .Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa
@@ -371,19 +408,6 @@ This is important in scripts, and many users want it too.
 .Pp
 To disable keepalives, the value should be set to
 .Dq no .
-.It Cm KerberosAuthentication
-Specifies whether Kerberos authentication will be used.
-The argument to this keyword must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm KerberosTgtPassing
-Specifies whether a Kerberos TGT will be forwarded to the server.
-This will only work if the Kerberos server is actually an AFS kaserver.
-The argument to this keyword must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
 .It Cm LocalForward
 Specifies that a TCP/IP port on the local machine be forwarded over
 the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine.
@@ -437,7 +461,8 @@ Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host.
 Default is 22.
 .It Cm PreferredAuthentications
 Specifies the order in which the client should try protocol 2
-authentication methods. This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.
+authentication methods.
+This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.
 .Cm keyboard-interactive )
 over another method (e.g.
 .Cm password )
@@ -505,26 +530,6 @@ IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax:
 Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional
 forwardings can be given on the command line.
 Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
-.It Cm RhostsAuthentication
-Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication.
-Note that this
-declaration only affects the client side and has no effect whatsoever
-on security.
-Most servers do not permit RhostsAuthentication because it
-is not secure (see
-.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication ) .
-The argument to this keyword must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-This option applies to protocol version 1 only and requires
-.Nm ssh
-to be setuid root and
-.Cm UsePrivilegedPort
-to be set to
-.Dq yes .
 .It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
 Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with RSA host
 authentication.
@@ -550,12 +555,12 @@ The default is
 .Dq yes .
 Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only.
 .It Cm SmartcardDevice
-Specifies which smartcard device to use. The argument to this keyword is
-the device
+Specifies which smartcard device to use.
+The argument to this keyword is the device
 .Nm ssh
 should use to communicate with a smartcard used for storing the user's
-private RSA key. By default, no device is specified and smartcard support
-is not activated.
+private RSA key.
+By default, no device is specified and smartcard support is not activated.
 .It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
 If this flag is set to
 .Dq yes ,
@@ -605,11 +610,9 @@ If set to
 must be setuid root.
 Note that this option must be set to
 .Dq yes
-if
-.Cm RhostsAuthentication
-and
+for
 .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
-authentications are needed with older servers.
+with older servers.
 .It Cm User
 Specifies the user to log in as.
 This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines.
@@ -619,11 +622,17 @@ having to remember to give the user name on the command line.
 Specifies a file to use for the user
 host key database instead of
 .Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts .
+.It Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS
+Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource
+records.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
 .It Cm VersionAddendum
 Specifies a string to append to the regular version string to identify
 OS- or site-specific modifications.
 The default is
-.Dq FreeBSD-20030924 .
+.Dq FreeBSD-20040106 .
 .It Cm XAuthLocation
 Specifies the full pathname of the
 .Xr xauth 1
@@ -649,6 +658,8 @@ values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and
 for those users who do not have a configuration file.
 This file must be world-readable.
 .El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1
 .Sh AUTHORS
 OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
 ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
@@ -658,5 +669,3 @@ removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
 created OpenSSH.
 Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
 protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr ssh 1
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
index dae2596..f29ac80 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.137 2002/11/21 23:03:51 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.148 2003/09/18 07:52:54 markus Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 
@@ -33,9 +33,17 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.137 2002/11/21 23:03:51 deraadt Exp $");
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "readpass.h"
 
+#ifdef DNS
+#include "dns.h"
+#endif
+
 char *client_version_string = NULL;
 char *server_version_string = NULL;
 
+#ifdef DNS
+int verified_host_key_dns = 0;
+#endif
+
 /* import */
 extern Options options;
 extern char *__progname;
@@ -163,7 +171,7 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
  * Creates a (possibly privileged) socket for use as the ssh connection.
  */
 static int
-ssh_create_socket(int privileged, int family)
+ssh_create_socket(int privileged, struct addrinfo *ai)
 {
 	int sock, gaierr;
 	struct addrinfo hints, *res;
@@ -175,15 +183,16 @@ ssh_create_socket(int privileged, int family)
 	if (privileged) {
 		int p = IPPORT_RESERVED - 1;
 		PRIV_START;
-		sock = rresvport_af(&p, family);
+		sock = rresvport_af(&p, ai->ai_family);
 		PRIV_END;
 		if (sock < 0)
-			error("rresvport: af=%d %.100s", family, strerror(errno));
+			error("rresvport: af=%d %.100s", ai->ai_family,
+			    strerror(errno));
 		else
 			debug("Allocated local port %d.", p);
 		return sock;
 	}
-	sock = socket(family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
 	if (sock < 0)
 		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 
@@ -192,8 +201,9 @@ ssh_create_socket(int privileged, int family)
 		return sock;
 
 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
-	hints.ai_family = family;
-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype;
+	hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol;
 	hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
 	gaierr = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, "0", &hints, &res);
 	if (gaierr) {
@@ -212,6 +222,74 @@ ssh_create_socket(int privileged, int family)
 	return sock;
 }
 
+static int
+timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
+    socklen_t addrlen, int timeout)
+{
+	fd_set *fdset;
+	struct timeval tv;
+	socklen_t optlen;
+	int fdsetsz, optval, rc, result = -1;
+
+	if (timeout <= 0)
+		return (connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen));
+
+	if (fcntl(sockfd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	rc = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		return (0);
+	if (errno != EINPROGRESS)
+		return (-1);
+
+	fdsetsz = howmany(sockfd + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
+	fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz);
+
+	memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz);
+	FD_SET(sockfd, fdset);
+	tv.tv_sec = timeout;
+	tv.tv_usec = 0;
+
+	for(;;) {
+		rc = select(sockfd + 1, NULL, fdset, NULL, &tv);
+		if (rc != -1 || errno != EINTR)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	switch(rc) {
+	case 0:
+		/* Timed out */
+		errno = ETIMEDOUT;
+		break;
+	case -1:
+		/* Select error */
+	    	debug("select: %s", strerror(errno));
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		/* Completed or failed */
+		optval = 0;
+		optlen = sizeof(optval);
+		if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, 
+		    &optlen) == -1) {
+		    	debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno));
+			break;
+		}
+		if (optval != 0) {
+			errno = optval;
+			break;
+		}
+		result = 0;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Should not occur */
+		fatal("Bogus return (%d) from select()", rc);
+	}
+
+	xfree(fdset);
+	return (result);
+}
+
 /*
  * Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host.
  * The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr.
@@ -295,12 +373,13 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
 				host, ntop, strport);
 
 			/* Create a socket for connecting. */
-			sock = ssh_create_socket(needpriv, ai->ai_family);
+			sock = ssh_create_socket(needpriv, ai);
 			if (sock < 0)
 				/* Any error is already output */
 				continue;
 
-			if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) >= 0) {
+			if (timeout_connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+			    options.connection_timeout) >= 0) {
 				/* Successful connection. */
 				memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
 				break;
@@ -332,7 +411,7 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
 
 	/* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */
 	if (attempt >= connection_attempts) {
-		log("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s",
+		logit("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s",
 		    host, strport, strerror(errno));
 		return full_failure ? ECONNABORTED : ECONNREFUSED;
 	}
@@ -421,7 +500,7 @@ ssh_exchange_identification(void)
 			enable_compat13();
 			minor1 = 3;
 			if (options.forward_agent) {
-				log("Agent forwarding disabled for protocol 1.3");
+				logit("Agent forwarding disabled for protocol 1.3");
 				options.forward_agent = 0;
 			}
 		}
@@ -445,7 +524,7 @@ ssh_exchange_identification(void)
 	    compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1,
 	    compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 : minor1,
 	    SSH_VERSION);
-	if (atomicio(write, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf)) != strlen(buf))
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf)) != strlen(buf))
 		fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 	client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
 	chop(client_version_string);
@@ -496,7 +575,7 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 	int salen;
 	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
 	char msg[1024];
-	int len, host_line, ip_line, has_keys;
+	int len, host_line, ip_line;
 	const char *host_file = NULL, *ip_file = NULL;
 
 	/*
@@ -612,16 +691,16 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 		debug("Found key in %s:%d", host_file, host_line);
 		if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
 			if (readonly)
-				log("%s host key for IP address "
+				logit("%s host key for IP address "
 				    "'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.",
 				    type, ip);
 			else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile, ip,
 			    host_key))
-				log("Failed to add the %s host key for IP "
+				logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP "
 				    "address '%.128s' to the list of known "
 				    "hosts (%.30s).", type, ip, user_hostfile);
 			else
-				log("Warning: Permanently added the %s host "
+				logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host "
 				    "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
 				    "of known hosts.", type, ip);
 		}
@@ -640,19 +719,36 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 			    "have requested strict checking.", type, host);
 			goto fail;
 		} else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) {
-			has_keys = show_other_keys(host, host_key);
+			char msg1[1024], msg2[1024];
+
+			if (show_other_keys(host, host_key))
+				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1),
+				   "\nbut keys of different type are already"
+				   " known for this host.");
+			else
+				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
 			/* The default */
 			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+			msg2[0] = '\0';
+#ifdef DNS
+			if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
+				if (verified_host_key_dns)
+					snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
+					    "Matching host key fingerprint"
+					    " found in DNS.\n");
+				else
+					snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
+					    "No matching host key fingerprint"
+					    " found in DNS.\n");
+			}
+#endif
 			snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
 			    "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
 			    "established%s\n"
-			    "%s key fingerprint is %s.\n"
+			    "%s key fingerprint is %s.\n%s"
 			    "Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
 			    "(yes/no)? ",
-			    host, ip,
-			    has_keys ? ",\nbut keys of different type are already "
-			    "known for this host." : ".",
-			    type, fp);
+			    host, ip, msg1, type, fp, msg2);
 			xfree(fp);
 			if (!confirm(msg))
 				goto fail;
@@ -668,10 +764,10 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 		 * local known_hosts file.
 		 */
 		if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile, hostp, host_key))
-			log("Failed to add the host to the list of known "
+			logit("Failed to add the host to the list of known "
 			    "hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfile);
 		else
-			log("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the "
+			logit("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the "
 			    "list of known hosts.", hostp, type);
 		break;
 	case HOST_CHANGED:
@@ -722,7 +818,7 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 
 		/*
 		 * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow
-		 * the connection but without password authentication or
+		 * the connection but without MITM-able authentication or
 		 * agent forwarding.
 		 */
 		if (options.password_authentication) {
@@ -730,6 +826,17 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 			    "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
 			options.password_authentication = 0;
 		}
+		if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) {
+			error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled"
+			    " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+			options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
+			options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
+		}
+		if (options.challenge_response_authentication) {
+			error("Challenge/response authentication is disabled"
+			    " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+			options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
+		}
 		if (options.forward_agent) {
 			error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid "
 			    "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
@@ -774,7 +881,7 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 			    host_file, host_line);
 		}
 		if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) {
-			log(msg);
+			logit("%s", msg);
 			error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking.");
 			goto fail;
 		} else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) {
@@ -783,7 +890,7 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 			if (!confirm(msg))
 				goto fail;
 		} else {
-			log(msg);
+			logit("%s", msg);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -795,11 +902,33 @@ fail:
 	return -1;
 }
 
+/* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */
 int
 verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
 {
 	struct stat st;
 
+#ifdef DNS
+	if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
+		switch(verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key)) {
+		case DNS_VERIFY_OK:
+#ifdef DNSSEC
+			return 0;
+#else
+			verified_host_key_dns = 1;
+			break;
+#endif
+		case DNS_VERIFY_FAILED:
+			return -1;
+		case DNS_VERIFY_ERROR:
+			break;
+		default:
+			debug3("bad return value from verify_host_key_dns");
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+#endif /* DNS */
+
 	/* return ok if the key can be found in an old keyfile */
 	if (stat(options.system_hostfile2, &st) == 0 ||
 	    stat(options.user_hostfile2, &st) == 0) {
@@ -881,7 +1010,7 @@ show_key_from_file(const char *file, const char *host, int keytype)
 	if ((ret = lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(file, host,
 	    keytype, found, &line))) {
 		fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-		log("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
+		logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
 		    "in %s:%d\n"
 		    "%s key fingerprint %s.",
 		    key_type(found), host, file, line,
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
index 2fc9a98..2f89964 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
@@ -13,25 +13,11 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.52 2002/08/08 13:50:23 aaron Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.56 2003/08/28 12:54:34 markus Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
 
-#ifdef KRB4
-#include <krb.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef KRB5
-#include <krb5.h>
-#ifndef HEIMDAL
-#define krb5_get_err_text(context,code) error_message(code)
-#endif /* !HEIMDAL */
-#endif
-#ifdef AFS
-#include <kafs.h>
-#include "radix.h"
-#endif
-
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -122,7 +108,7 @@ try_agent_authentication(void)
 			 * although it advertised it supports this.  Just
 			 * return a wrong value.
 			 */
-			log("Authentication agent failed to decrypt challenge.");
+			logit("Authentication agent failed to decrypt challenge.");
 			memset(response, 0, sizeof(response));
 		}
 		key_free(key);
@@ -380,478 +366,6 @@ try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(const char *local_user, Key * host_key)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-#ifdef KRB4
-static int
-try_krb4_authentication(void)
-{
-	KTEXT_ST auth;		/* Kerberos data */
-	char *reply;
-	char inst[INST_SZ];
-	char *realm;
-	CREDENTIALS cred;
-	int r, type;
-	socklen_t slen;
-	Key_schedule schedule;
-	u_long checksum, cksum;
-	MSG_DAT msg_data;
-	struct sockaddr_in local, foreign;
-	struct stat st;
-
-	/* Don't do anything if we don't have any tickets. */
-	if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	strlcpy(inst, (char *)krb_get_phost(get_canonical_hostname(1)),
-	    INST_SZ);
-
-	realm = (char *)krb_realmofhost(get_canonical_hostname(1));
-	if (!realm) {
-		debug("Kerberos v4: no realm for %s", get_canonical_hostname(1));
-		return 0;
-	}
-	/* This can really be anything. */
-	checksum = (u_long)getpid();
-
-	r = krb_mk_req(&auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, inst, realm, checksum);
-	if (r != KSUCCESS) {
-		debug("Kerberos v4 krb_mk_req failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	/* Get session key to decrypt the server's reply with. */
-	r = krb_get_cred(KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, inst, realm, &cred);
-	if (r != KSUCCESS) {
-		debug("get_cred failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	des_key_sched((des_cblock *) cred.session, schedule);
-
-	/* Send authentication info to server. */
-	packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS);
-	packet_put_string((char *) auth.dat, auth.length);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	/* Zero the buffer. */
-	(void) memset(auth.dat, 0, MAX_KTXT_LEN);
-
-	slen = sizeof(local);
-	memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local));
-	if (getsockname(packet_get_connection_in(),
-	    (struct sockaddr *)&local, &slen) < 0)
-		debug("getsockname failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-
-	slen = sizeof(foreign);
-	memset(&foreign, 0, sizeof(foreign));
-	if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
-	    (struct sockaddr *)&foreign, &slen) < 0) {
-		debug("getpeername failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-		fatal_cleanup();
-	}
-	/* Get server reply. */
-	type = packet_read();
-	switch (type) {
-	case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE:
-		/* Should really be SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_FAILURE */
-		debug("Kerberos v4 authentication failed.");
-		return 0;
-		break;
-
-	case SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE:
-		/* SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_SUCCESS */
-		debug("Kerberos v4 authentication accepted.");
-
-		/* Get server's response. */
-		reply = packet_get_string((u_int *) &auth.length);
-		if (auth.length >= MAX_KTXT_LEN)
-			fatal("Kerberos v4: Malformed response from server");
-		memcpy(auth.dat, reply, auth.length);
-		xfree(reply);
-
-		packet_check_eom();
-
-		/*
-		 * If his response isn't properly encrypted with the session
-		 * key, and the decrypted checksum fails to match, he's
-		 * bogus. Bail out.
-		 */
-		r = krb_rd_priv(auth.dat, auth.length, schedule, &cred.session,
-		    &foreign, &local, &msg_data);
-		if (r != KSUCCESS) {
-			debug("Kerberos v4 krb_rd_priv failed: %s",
-			    krb_err_txt[r]);
-			packet_disconnect("Kerberos v4 challenge failed!");
-		}
-		/* Fetch the (incremented) checksum that we supplied in the request. */
-		memcpy((char *)&cksum, (char *)msg_data.app_data,
-		    sizeof(cksum));
-		cksum = ntohl(cksum);
-
-		/* If it matches, we're golden. */
-		if (cksum == checksum + 1) {
-			debug("Kerberos v4 challenge successful.");
-			return 1;
-		} else
-			packet_disconnect("Kerberos v4 challenge failed!");
-		break;
-
-	default:
-		packet_disconnect("Protocol error on Kerberos v4 response: %d", type);
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-#endif /* KRB4 */
-
-#ifdef KRB5
-static int
-try_krb5_authentication(krb5_context *context, krb5_auth_context *auth_context)
-{
-	krb5_error_code problem;
-	const char *tkfile;
-	struct stat buf;
-	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-	const char *remotehost;
-	krb5_data ap;
-	int type;
-	krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *reply = NULL;
-	int ret;
-
-	memset(&ap, 0, sizeof(ap));
-
-	problem = krb5_init_context(context);
-	if (problem) {
-		debug("Kerberos v5: krb5_init_context failed");
-		ret = 0;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	
-	problem = krb5_auth_con_init(*context, auth_context);
-	if (problem) {
-		debug("Kerberos v5: krb5_auth_con_init failed");
-		ret = 0;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-#ifndef HEIMDAL
-	problem = krb5_auth_con_setflags(*context, *auth_context,
-					 KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_RET_TIME);
-	if (problem) {
-		debug("Keberos v5: krb5_auth_con_setflags failed");
-		ret = 0;
-		goto out;
-	}
-#endif
-
-	tkfile = krb5_cc_default_name(*context);
-	if (strncmp(tkfile, "FILE:", 5) == 0)
-		tkfile += 5;
-
-	if (stat(tkfile, &buf) == 0 && getuid() != buf.st_uid) {
-		debug("Kerberos v5: could not get default ccache (permission denied).");
-		ret = 0;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	problem = krb5_cc_default(*context, &ccache);
-	if (problem) {
-		debug("Kerberos v5: krb5_cc_default failed: %s",
-		    krb5_get_err_text(*context, problem));
-		ret = 0;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	remotehost = get_canonical_hostname(1);
-
-	problem = krb5_mk_req(*context, auth_context, AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED,
-	    "host", remotehost, NULL, ccache, &ap);
-	if (problem) {
-		debug("Kerberos v5: krb5_mk_req failed: %s",
-		    krb5_get_err_text(*context, problem));
-		ret = 0;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS);
-	packet_put_string((char *) ap.data, ap.length);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	xfree(ap.data);
-	ap.length = 0;
-
-	type = packet_read();
-	switch (type) {
-	case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE:
-		/* Should really be SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_FAILURE */
-		debug("Kerberos v5 authentication failed.");
-		ret = 0;
-		break;
-
-	case SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE:
-		/* SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_SUCCESS */
-		debug("Kerberos v5 authentication accepted.");
-
-		/* Get server's response. */
-		ap.data = packet_get_string((unsigned int *) &ap.length);
-		packet_check_eom();
-		/* XXX je to dobre? */
-
-		problem = krb5_rd_rep(*context, *auth_context, &ap, &reply);
-		if (problem) {
-			ret = 0;
-		}
-		ret = 1;
-		break;
-
-	default:
-		packet_disconnect("Protocol error on Kerberos v5 response: %d",
-		    type);
-		ret = 0;
-		break;
-
-	}
-
- out:
-	if (ccache != NULL)
-		krb5_cc_close(*context, ccache);
-	if (reply != NULL)
-		krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part(*context, reply);
-	if (ap.length > 0)
-#ifdef HEIMDAL
-		krb5_data_free(&ap);
-#else
-		krb5_free_data_contents(*context, &ap);
-#endif
-
-	return (ret);
-}
-
-static void
-send_krb5_tgt(krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context auth_context)
-{
-	int fd, type;
-	krb5_error_code problem;
-	krb5_data outbuf;
-	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-	krb5_creds creds;
-#ifdef HEIMDAL
-	krb5_kdc_flags flags;
-#else
-	int forwardable;
-#endif
-	const char *remotehost;
-
-	memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-	memset(&outbuf, 0, sizeof(outbuf));
-
-	fd = packet_get_connection_in();
-
-#ifdef HEIMDAL
-	problem = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd(context, auth_context, &fd);
-#else
-	problem = krb5_auth_con_genaddrs(context, auth_context, fd,
-			KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_REMOTE_FULL_ADDR |
-			KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_LOCAL_FULL_ADDR);
-#endif
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-
-	problem = krb5_cc_default(context, &ccache);
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-
-	problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, ccache, &creds.client);
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-
-	remotehost = get_canonical_hostname(1);
-	
-#ifdef HEIMDAL
-	problem = krb5_build_principal(context, &creds.server,
-	    strlen(creds.client->realm), creds.client->realm,
-	    "krbtgt", creds.client->realm, NULL);
-#else
-	problem = krb5_build_principal(context, &creds.server,
-	    creds.client->realm.length, creds.client->realm.data,
-	    "host", remotehost, NULL);
-#endif
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-
-	creds.times.endtime = 0;
-
-#ifdef HEIMDAL
-	flags.i = 0;
-	flags.b.forwarded = 1;
-	flags.b.forwardable = krb5_config_get_bool(context,  NULL,
-	    "libdefaults", "forwardable", NULL);
-	problem = krb5_get_forwarded_creds(context, auth_context,
-	    ccache, flags.i, remotehost, &creds, &outbuf);
-#else
-	forwardable = 1;
-	problem = krb5_fwd_tgt_creds(context, auth_context, remotehost,
-	    creds.client, creds.server, ccache, forwardable, &outbuf);
-#endif
-
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-
-	packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT);
-	packet_put_string((char *)outbuf.data, outbuf.length);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	type = packet_read();
-
-	if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
-		char *pname;
-
-		krb5_unparse_name(context, creds.client, &pname);
-		debug("Kerberos v5 TGT forwarded (%s).", pname);
-		xfree(pname);
-	} else
-		debug("Kerberos v5 TGT forwarding failed.");
-
-	return;
-
- out:
-	if (problem)
-		debug("Kerberos v5 TGT forwarding failed: %s",
-		    krb5_get_err_text(context, problem));
-	if (creds.client)
-		krb5_free_principal(context, creds.client);
-	if (creds.server)
-		krb5_free_principal(context, creds.server);
-	if (ccache)
-		krb5_cc_close(context, ccache);
-	if (outbuf.data)
-		xfree(outbuf.data);
-}
-#endif /* KRB5 */
-
-#ifdef AFS
-static void
-send_krb4_tgt(void)
-{
-	CREDENTIALS *creds;
-	struct stat st;
-	char buffer[4096], pname[ANAME_SZ], pinst[INST_SZ], prealm[REALM_SZ];
-	int problem, type;
-
-	/* Don't do anything if we don't have any tickets. */
-	if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0)
-		return;
-
-	creds = xmalloc(sizeof(*creds));
-
-	problem = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, pname, pinst, prealm);
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-
-	problem = krb_get_cred("krbtgt", prealm, prealm, creds);
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-
-	if (time(0) > krb_life_to_time(creds->issue_date, creds->lifetime)) {
-		problem = RD_AP_EXP;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	creds_to_radix(creds, (u_char *)buffer, sizeof(buffer));
-
-	packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT);
-	packet_put_cstring(buffer);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	type = packet_read();
-
-	if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
-		debug("Kerberos v4 TGT forwarded (%s%s%s@%s).",
-		    creds->pname, creds->pinst[0] ? "." : "",
-		    creds->pinst, creds->realm);
-	else
-		debug("Kerberos v4 TGT rejected.");
-
-	xfree(creds);
-	return;
-
- out:
-	debug("Kerberos v4 TGT passing failed: %s", krb_err_txt[problem]);
-	xfree(creds);
-}
-
-static void
-send_afs_tokens(void)
-{
-	CREDENTIALS creds;
-	struct ViceIoctl parms;
-	struct ClearToken ct;
-	int i, type, len;
-	char buf[2048], *p, *server_cell;
-	char buffer[8192];
-
-	/* Move over ktc_GetToken, here's something leaner. */
-	for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {	/* just in case */
-		parms.in = (char *) &i;
-		parms.in_size = sizeof(i);
-		parms.out = buf;
-		parms.out_size = sizeof(buf);
-		if (k_pioctl(0, VIOCGETTOK, &parms, 0) != 0)
-			break;
-		p = buf;
-
-		/* Get secret token. */
-		memcpy(&creds.ticket_st.length, p, sizeof(u_int));
-		if (creds.ticket_st.length > MAX_KTXT_LEN)
-			break;
-		p += sizeof(u_int);
-		memcpy(creds.ticket_st.dat, p, creds.ticket_st.length);
-		p += creds.ticket_st.length;
-
-		/* Get clear token. */
-		memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
-		if (len != sizeof(struct ClearToken))
-			break;
-		p += sizeof(len);
-		memcpy(&ct, p, len);
-		p += len;
-		p += sizeof(len);	/* primary flag */
-		server_cell = p;
-
-		/* Flesh out our credentials. */
-		strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof(creds.service));
-		creds.instance[0] = '\0';
-		strlcpy(creds.realm, server_cell, REALM_SZ);
-		memcpy(creds.session, ct.HandShakeKey, DES_KEY_SZ);
-		creds.issue_date = ct.BeginTimestamp;
-		creds.lifetime = krb_time_to_life(creds.issue_date,
-		    ct.EndTimestamp);
-		creds.kvno = ct.AuthHandle;
-		snprintf(creds.pname, sizeof(creds.pname), "AFS ID %d", ct.ViceId);
-		creds.pinst[0] = '\0';
-
-		/* Encode token, ship it off. */
-		if (creds_to_radix(&creds, (u_char *)buffer,
-		    sizeof(buffer)) <= 0)
-			break;
-		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN);
-		packet_put_cstring(buffer);
-		packet_send();
-		packet_write_wait();
-
-		/* Roger, Roger. Clearance, Clarence. What's your vector,
-		   Victor? */
-		type = packet_read();
-
-		if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
-			debug("AFS token for cell %s rejected.", server_cell);
-		else if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
-			packet_disconnect("Protocol error on AFS token response: %d", type);
-	}
-}
-
-#endif /* AFS */
-
 /*
  * Tries to authenticate with any string-based challenge/response system.
  * Note that the client code is not tied to s/key or TIS.
@@ -890,7 +404,7 @@ try_challenge_response_authentication(void)
 		if (i != 0)
 			error("Permission denied, please try again.");
 		if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
-			log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! "
+			logit("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! "
 			    "Response will be transmitted in clear text.");
 		response = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
 		if (strcmp(response, "") == 0) {
@@ -925,7 +439,7 @@ try_password_authentication(char *prompt)
 
 	debug("Doing password authentication.");
 	if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
-		log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Password will be transmitted in clear text.");
+		logit("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Password will be transmitted in clear text.");
 	for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
 		if (i != 0)
 			error("Permission denied, please try again.");
@@ -981,9 +495,9 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 
 	rbits = BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n);
 	if (bits != rbits) {
-		log("Warning: Server lies about size of server public key: "
+		logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server public key: "
 		    "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
-		log("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
+		logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
 	}
 	/* Get the host key. */
 	host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
@@ -993,9 +507,9 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 
 	rbits = BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n);
 	if (bits != rbits) {
-		log("Warning: Server lies about size of server host key: "
+		logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server host key: "
 		    "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
-		log("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
+		logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
 	}
 
 	/* Get protocol flags. */
@@ -1086,7 +600,7 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 			options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default;
 	} else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_ILLEGAL ||
 	    !(cipher_mask_ssh1(1) & (1 << options.cipher))) {
-		log("No valid SSH1 cipher, using %.100s instead.",
+		logit("No valid SSH1 cipher, using %.100s instead.",
 		    cipher_name(ssh_cipher_default));
 		options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default;
 	}
@@ -1140,10 +654,6 @@ void
 ssh_userauth1(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
     Sensitive *sensitive)
 {
-#ifdef KRB5
-	krb5_context context = NULL;
-	krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
-#endif
 	int i, type;
 
 	if (supported_authentications == 0)
@@ -1168,56 +678,6 @@ ssh_userauth1(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
 	if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
 		packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to SSH_CMSG_USER", type);
 
-#ifdef KRB5
-	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS)) &&
-	    options.kerberos_authentication) {
-		debug("Trying Kerberos v5 authentication.");
-
-		if (try_krb5_authentication(&context, &auth_context)) {
-			type = packet_read();
-			if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
-				goto success;
-			if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
-				packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to Kerberos v5 auth", type);
-		}
-	}
-#endif /* KRB5 */
-
-#ifdef KRB4
-	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS)) &&
-	    options.kerberos_authentication) {
-		debug("Trying Kerberos v4 authentication.");
-
-		if (try_krb4_authentication()) {
-			type = packet_read();
-			if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
-				goto success;
-			if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
-				packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to Kerberos v4 auth", type);
-		}
-	}
-#endif /* KRB4 */
-
-	/*
-	 * Use rhosts authentication if running in privileged socket and we
-	 * do not wish to remain anonymous.
-	 */
-	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS)) &&
-	    options.rhosts_authentication) {
-		debug("Trying rhosts authentication.");
-		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS);
-		packet_put_cstring(local_user);
-		packet_send();
-		packet_write_wait();
-
-		/* The server should respond with success or failure. */
-		type = packet_read();
-		if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
-			goto success;
-		if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
-			packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to rhosts auth",
-					  type);
-	}
 	/*
 	 * Try .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication with RSA host
 	 * authentication.
@@ -1271,36 +731,5 @@ ssh_userauth1(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
 	/* NOTREACHED */
 
  success:
-#ifdef KRB5
-	/* Try Kerberos v5 TGT passing. */
-	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT)) &&
-	    options.kerberos_tgt_passing && context && auth_context) {
-		if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
-			log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Ticket will be transmitted in the clear!");
-		send_krb5_tgt(context, auth_context);
-	}
-	if (auth_context)
-		krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
-	if (context)
-		krb5_free_context(context);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef AFS
-	/* Try Kerberos v4 TGT passing if the server supports it. */
-	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT)) &&
-	    options.kerberos_tgt_passing) {
-		if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
-			log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Ticket will be transmitted in the clear!");
-		send_krb4_tgt();
-	}
-	/* Try AFS token passing if the server supports it. */
-	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN)) &&
-	    options.afs_token_passing && k_hasafs()) {
-		if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
-			log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Token will be transmitted in the clear!");
-		send_afs_tokens();
-	}
-#endif /* AFS */
-
 	return;	/* need statement after label */
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
index 642b34b..933c223 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
@@ -23,7 +23,9 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.114 2003/04/01 10:22:21 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.124 2003/08/25 10:33:33 djm Exp $");
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
@@ -48,6 +50,10 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.114 2003/04/01 10:22:21 markus Exp $");
 #include "msg.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+
 /* import */
 extern char *client_version_string;
 extern char *server_version_string;
@@ -58,7 +64,7 @@ extern Options options;
  */
 
 u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
-int session_id2_len = 0;
+u_int session_id2_len = 0;
 
 char *xxx_host;
 struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr;
@@ -82,7 +88,7 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
 
 	if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
-		log("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
+		logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
 		options.ciphers = NULL;
 	}
 	if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
@@ -108,6 +114,9 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
 		    options.hostkeyalgorithms;
 
+	if (options.rekey_limit)
+		packet_set_rekey_limit(options.rekey_limit);
+
 	/* start key exchange */
 	kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
@@ -138,10 +147,18 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 
 typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt;
 typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod;
-
-typedef int sign_cb_fn(
-    Authctxt *authctxt, Key *key,
-    u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, u_char *data, u_int datalen);
+typedef struct identity Identity;
+typedef struct idlist Idlist;
+
+struct identity {
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
+	AuthenticationConnection *ac;	/* set if agent supports key */
+	Key	*key;			/* public/private key */
+	char	*filename;		/* comment for agent-only keys */
+	int	tried;
+	int	isprivate;		/* key points to the private key */
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(idlist, identity);
 
 struct Authctxt {
 	const char *server_user;
@@ -152,14 +169,14 @@ struct Authctxt {
 	int success;
 	char *authlist;
 	/* pubkey */
-	Key *last_key;
-	sign_cb_fn *last_key_sign;
-	int last_key_hint;
+	Idlist keys;
 	AuthenticationConnection *agent;
 	/* hostbased */
 	Sensitive *sensitive;
 	/* kbd-interactive */
 	int info_req_seen;
+	/* generic */
+	void *methoddata;
 };
 struct Authmethod {
 	char	*name;		/* string to compare against server's list */
@@ -181,17 +198,35 @@ int	userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *);
 int	userauth_passwd(Authctxt *);
 int	userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *);
 int	userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *);
+int	userauth_kerberos(Authctxt *);
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int	userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt);
+void	input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+#endif
 
 void	userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
 
-static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *, Key *, sign_cb_fn *);
-static void clear_auth_state(Authctxt *);
+static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *, Identity *);
+static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *);
+static void pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *);
+static Key *load_identity_file(char *);
 
 static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist);
 static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name);
 static char *authmethods_get(void);
 
 Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	{"gssapi",
+		userauth_gssapi,
+		&options.gss_authentication,
+		NULL},
+#endif
 	{"hostbased",
 		userauth_hostbased,
 		&options.hostbased_authentication,
@@ -248,7 +283,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
 
 	/* setup authentication context */
 	memset(&authctxt, 0, sizeof(authctxt));
-	authctxt.agent = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
+	pubkey_prepare(&authctxt);
 	authctxt.server_user = server_user;
 	authctxt.local_user = local_user;
 	authctxt.host = host;
@@ -256,6 +291,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
 	authctxt.success = 0;
 	authctxt.method = authmethod_lookup("none");
 	authctxt.authlist = NULL;
+	authctxt.methoddata = NULL;
 	authctxt.sensitive = sensitive;
 	authctxt.info_req_seen = 0;
 	if (authctxt.method == NULL)
@@ -270,14 +306,19 @@ ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner);
 	dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success, &authctxt);	/* loop until success */
 
-	if (authctxt.agent != NULL)
-		ssh_close_authentication_connection(authctxt.agent);
+	pubkey_cleanup(&authctxt);
+	dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL);
 
 	debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name);
 }
+
 void
 userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist)
 {
+	if (authctxt->methoddata) {
+		xfree(authctxt->methoddata);
+		authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+	}
 	if (authlist == NULL) {
 		authlist = authctxt->authlist;
 	} else {
@@ -290,6 +331,12 @@ userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist)
 		if (method == NULL)
 			fatal("Permission denied (%s).", authlist);
 		authctxt->method = method;
+
+		/* reset the per method handler */
+		dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN,
+		    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX, NULL);
+
+		/* and try new method */
 		if (method->userauth(authctxt) != 0) {
 			debug2("we sent a %s packet, wait for reply", method->name);
 			break;
@@ -314,7 +361,7 @@ input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	debug3("input_userauth_banner");
 	msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
 	lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
-	fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
+	logit("%s", msg);
 	xfree(msg);
 	xfree(lang);
 }
@@ -327,7 +374,8 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		fatal("input_userauth_success: no authentication context");
 	if (authctxt->authlist)
 		xfree(authctxt->authlist);
-	clear_auth_state(authctxt);
+	if (authctxt->methoddata)
+		xfree(authctxt->methoddata);
 	authctxt->success = 1;			/* break out */
 }
 
@@ -346,10 +394,9 @@ input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	packet_check_eom();
 
 	if (partial != 0)
-		log("Authenticated with partial success.");
+		logit("Authenticated with partial success.");
 	debug("Authentications that can continue: %s", authlist);
 
-	clear_auth_state(authctxt);
 	userauth(authctxt, authlist);
 }
 void
@@ -357,6 +404,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
 	Key *key = NULL;
+	Identity *id = NULL;
 	Buffer b;
 	int pktype, sent = 0;
 	u_int alen, blen;
@@ -379,55 +427,267 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	}
 	packet_check_eom();
 
-	debug("Server accepts key: pkalg %s blen %u lastkey %p hint %d",
-	    pkalg, blen, authctxt->last_key, authctxt->last_key_hint);
+	debug("Server accepts key: pkalg %s blen %u", pkalg, blen);
 
-	do {
-		if (authctxt->last_key == NULL ||
-		    authctxt->last_key_sign == NULL) {
-			debug("no last key or no sign cb");
-			break;
-		}
-		if ((pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) {
-			debug("unknown pkalg %s", pkalg);
-			break;
-		}
-		if ((key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen)) == NULL) {
-			debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s", pkalg);
-			break;
-		}
-		if (key->type != pktype) {
-			error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
-			    "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
-			    key->type, pktype);
-			break;
-		}
-		fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-		debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
-		xfree(fp);
-		if (!key_equal(key, authctxt->last_key)) {
-			debug("key != last_key");
+	if ((pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+		debug("unknown pkalg %s", pkalg);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen)) == NULL) {
+		debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s", pkalg);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (key->type != pktype) {
+		error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
+		    "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
+		    key->type, pktype);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
+	xfree(fp);
+
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &authctxt->keys, next) {
+		if (key_equal(key, id->key)) {
+			sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, id);
 			break;
 		}
-		sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, key,
-		   authctxt->last_key_sign);
-	} while (0);
-
+	}
+done:
 	if (key != NULL)
 		key_free(key);
 	xfree(pkalg);
 	xfree(pkblob);
 
-	/* unregister */
-	clear_auth_state(authctxt);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, NULL);
-
 	/* try another method if we did not send a packet */
 	if (sent == 0)
 		userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+}
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int 
+userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL;
+	static gss_OID_set supported = NULL;
+	static int mech = 0;
+	OM_uint32 min;
+	int ok = 0;
+
+	/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+	 * once. */
+
+	if (supported == NULL)
+		gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &supported);
+
+	/* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
+	while (mech<supported->count && !ok) {
+		if (gssctxt)
+			ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&gssctxt);
+		ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&gssctxt);
+		ssh_gssapi_set_oid(gssctxt, &supported->elements[mech]);
+
+		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+		if (supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+		    !GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(gssctxt,
+		    authctxt->host))) {
+			ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+		} else {
+			mech++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!ok) return 0;
+
+	authctxt->methoddata=(void *)gssctxt;
+
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
 
+	packet_put_int(1);
+
+	/* Some servers encode the OID incorrectly (as we used to) */
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_GSSAPI_BER) {
+		packet_put_string(supported->elements[mech].elements,
+		    supported->elements[mech].length);
+	} else {
+		packet_put_int((supported->elements[mech].length)+2);
+		packet_put_char(SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE);
+		packet_put_char(supported->elements[mech].length);
+		packet_put_raw(supported->elements[mech].elements,
+		    supported->elements[mech].length);
+	}
+
+	packet_send();
+
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE, &input_gssapi_response);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR, &input_gssapi_error);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok);
+
+	mech++; /* Move along to next candidate */
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+void
+input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+	OM_uint32 status, ms;
+	int oidlen;
+	char *oidv;
+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+	gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+
+	/* Setup our OID */
+	oidv = packet_get_string(&oidlen);
+
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_GSSAPI_BER) {
+		if (!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(gssctxt, oidv, oidlen))
+			fatal("Server returned different OID than expected");
+	} else {
+		if(oidv[0] != SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE || oidv[1] != oidlen-2) {
+			debug("Badly encoded mechanism OID received");
+			userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+			xfree(oidv);
+			return;
+		}
+		if (!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(gssctxt, oidv+2, oidlen-2))
+			fatal("Server returned different OID than expected");
+	}
+
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	xfree(oidv);
+
+	status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
+	    GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &send_tok, NULL);
+	if (GSS_ERROR(status)) {
+		if (send_tok.length > 0) {
+			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK);
+			packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+			packet_send();
+			gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
+		}
+		/* Start again with next method on list */
+		debug("Trying to start again");
+		userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* We must have data to send */
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
+	packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+	packet_send();
+	gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
 }
 
+void
+input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+	OM_uint32 status, ms;
+	u_int slen;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+	gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+
+	recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
+	recv_tok.length = slen;	/* safe typecast */
+
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	status=ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
+	    &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL);
+
+	xfree(recv_tok.value);
+
+	if (GSS_ERROR(status)) {
+		if (send_tok.length > 0) {
+			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK);
+			packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+			packet_send();
+			gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
+		}
+		/* Start again with the next method in the list */
+		userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (send_tok.length > 0) {
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
+		packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+		packet_send();
+		gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
+	}
+
+	if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+		/* If that succeeded, send a exchange complete message */
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE);
+		packet_send();
+	}
+}
+
+void
+input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+	OM_uint32 status, ms;
+	u_int len;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+	gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+
+	recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len);
+	recv_tok.length = len;
+
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	/* Stick it into GSSAPI and see what it says */
+	status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
+				     &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL);
+
+	xfree(recv_tok.value);
+	gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
+
+	/* Server will be returning a failed packet after this one */
+}
+
+void
+input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+	OM_uint32 maj, min;
+	char *msg;
+	char *lang;
+
+	maj=packet_get_int();
+	min=packet_get_int();
+	msg=packet_get_string(NULL);
+	lang=packet_get_string(NULL);
+
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	debug("Server GSSAPI Error:\n%s\n", msg);
+	xfree(msg);
+	xfree(lang);
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
 int
 userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
@@ -491,7 +751,7 @@ input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
 	info = packet_get_string(NULL);
 	lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
 	if (strlen(info) > 0)
-		log("%s", info);
+		logit("%s", info);
 	xfree(info);
 	xfree(lang);
 	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
@@ -523,7 +783,7 @@ input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
 		if (strcmp(password, retype) != 0) {
 			memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
 			xfree(password);
-			log("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit.");
+			logit("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit.");
 			password = NULL;
 		}
 		memset(retype, 0, strlen(retype));
@@ -539,34 +799,44 @@ input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
 	    &input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
 }
 
-static void
-clear_auth_state(Authctxt *authctxt)
+static int
+identity_sign(Identity *id, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+    u_char *data, u_int datalen)
 {
-	/* XXX clear authentication state */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, NULL);
+	Key *prv;
+	int ret;
 
-	if (authctxt->last_key != NULL && authctxt->last_key_hint == -1) {
-		debug3("clear_auth_state: key_free %p", authctxt->last_key);
-		key_free(authctxt->last_key);
-	}
-	authctxt->last_key = NULL;
-	authctxt->last_key_hint = -2;
-	authctxt->last_key_sign = NULL;
+	/* the agent supports this key */
+	if (id->ac)
+		return (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, sigp, lenp,
+		    data, datalen));
+	/*
+	 * we have already loaded the private key or
+	 * the private key is stored in external hardware
+	 */
+	if (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT))
+		return (key_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen));
+	/* load the private key from the file */
+	if ((prv = load_identity_file(id->filename)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+	ret = key_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
+	key_free(prv);
+	return (ret);
 }
 
 static int
-sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *k, sign_cb_fn *sign_callback)
+sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
 {
 	Buffer b;
 	u_char *blob, *signature;
 	u_int bloblen, slen;
-	int skip = 0;
+	u_int skip = 0;
 	int ret = -1;
 	int have_sig = 1;
 
 	debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey");
 
-	if (key_to_blob(k, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
+	if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
 		/* we cannot handle this key */
 		debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: cannot handle key");
 		return 0;
@@ -591,12 +861,12 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *k, sign_cb_fn *sign_callback)
 	} else {
 		buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name);
 		buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
-		buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(k));
+		buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(id->key));
 	}
 	buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen);
 
 	/* generate signature */
-	ret = (*sign_callback)(authctxt, k, &signature, &slen,
+	ret = identity_sign(id, &signature, &slen,
 	    buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
 	if (ret == -1) {
 		xfree(blob);
@@ -616,7 +886,7 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *k, sign_cb_fn *sign_callback)
 		buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name);
 		buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
 		if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH))
-			buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(k));
+			buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(id->key));
 		buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen);
 	}
 	xfree(blob);
@@ -640,23 +910,19 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *k, sign_cb_fn *sign_callback)
 }
 
 static int
-send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *k, sign_cb_fn *sign_callback,
-    int hint)
+send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
 {
 	u_char *blob;
 	u_int bloblen, have_sig = 0;
 
 	debug3("send_pubkey_test");
 
-	if (key_to_blob(k, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
+	if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
 		/* we cannot handle this key */
 		debug3("send_pubkey_test: cannot handle key");
 		return 0;
 	}
 	/* register callback for USERAUTH_PK_OK message */
-	authctxt->last_key_sign = sign_callback;
-	authctxt->last_key_hint = hint;
-	authctxt->last_key = k;
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, &input_userauth_pk_ok);
 
 	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
@@ -665,7 +931,7 @@ send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *k, sign_cb_fn *sign_callback,
 	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
 	packet_put_char(have_sig);
 	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH))
-		packet_put_cstring(key_ssh_name(k));
+		packet_put_cstring(key_ssh_name(id->key));
 	packet_put_string(blob, bloblen);
 	xfree(blob);
 	packet_send();
@@ -710,103 +976,134 @@ load_identity_file(char *filename)
 	return private;
 }
 
-static int
-identity_sign_cb(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
-    u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
-	Key *private;
-	int idx, ret;
-
-	idx = authctxt->last_key_hint;
-	if (idx < 0)
-		return -1;
-
-	/* private key is stored in external hardware */
-	if (options.identity_keys[idx]->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT)
-		return key_sign(options.identity_keys[idx], sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
-
-	private = load_identity_file(options.identity_files[idx]);
-	if (private == NULL)
-		return -1;
-	ret = key_sign(private, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
-	key_free(private);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int
-agent_sign_cb(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
-    u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
-	return ssh_agent_sign(authctxt->agent, key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
-}
-
-static int
-key_sign_cb(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
-    u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+/*
+ * try keys in the following order:
+ *	1. agent keys that are found in the config file
+ *	2. other agent keys
+ *	3. keys that are only listed in the config file
+ */
+static void
+pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
-	return key_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
+	Identity *id;
+	Idlist agent, files, *preferred;
+	Key *key;
+	AuthenticationConnection *ac;
+	char *comment;
+	int i, found;
+
+	TAILQ_INIT(&agent);	/* keys from the agent */
+	TAILQ_INIT(&files);	/* keys from the config file */
+	preferred = &authctxt->keys;
+	TAILQ_INIT(preferred);	/* preferred order of keys */
+
+	/* list of keys stored in the filesystem */
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
+		key = options.identity_keys[i];
+		if (key && key->type == KEY_RSA1)
+			continue;
+		options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
+		id = xmalloc(sizeof(*id));
+		memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
+		id->key = key;
+		id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]);
+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next);
+	}
+	/* list of keys supported by the agent */
+	if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection())) {
+		for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2);
+		    key != NULL;
+		    key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) {
+			found = 0;
+			TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) {
+				/* agent keys from the config file are preferred */ 
+				if (key_equal(key, id->key)) {
+					key_free(key);
+					xfree(comment);
+					TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
+					TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
+					id->ac = ac;
+					found = 1;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			if (!found) {
+				id = xmalloc(sizeof(*id));
+				memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
+				id->key = key;
+				id->filename = comment;
+				id->ac = ac;
+				TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&agent, id, next);
+			}
+		}
+		/* append remaining agent keys */
+		for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent)) {
+			TAILQ_REMOVE(&agent, id, next);
+			TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
+		}
+		authctxt->agent = ac;
+	}
+	/* append remaining keys from the config file */
+	for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files)) {
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
+	}
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(id, preferred, next) {
+		debug2("key: %s (%p)", id->filename, id->key);
+	}
 }
 
-static int
-userauth_pubkey_agent(Authctxt *authctxt)
+static void
+pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
-	static int called = 0;
-	int ret = 0;
-	char *comment;
-	Key *k;
-
-	if (called == 0) {
-		if (ssh_get_num_identities(authctxt->agent, 2) == 0)
-			debug2("userauth_pubkey_agent: no keys at all");
-		called = 1;
-	}
-	k = ssh_get_next_identity(authctxt->agent, &comment, 2);
-	if (k == NULL) {
-		debug2("userauth_pubkey_agent: no more keys");
-	} else {
-		debug("Offering agent key: %s", comment);
-		xfree(comment);
-		ret = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, k, agent_sign_cb, -1);
-		if (ret == 0)
-			key_free(k);
+	Identity *id;
+
+	if (authctxt->agent != NULL)
+		ssh_close_authentication_connection(authctxt->agent);
+	for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys); id;
+	    id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys)) {
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
+		if (id->key)
+			key_free(id->key);
+		if (id->filename)
+			xfree(id->filename);
+		xfree(id);
 	}
-	if (ret == 0)
-		debug2("userauth_pubkey_agent: no message sent");
-	return ret;
 }
 
 int
 userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
-	static int idx = 0;
+	Identity *id;
 	int sent = 0;
-	Key *key;
-	char *filename;
 
-	if (authctxt->agent != NULL) {
-		do {
-			sent = userauth_pubkey_agent(authctxt);
-		} while (!sent && authctxt->agent->howmany > 0);
-	}
-	while (!sent && idx < options.num_identity_files) {
-		key = options.identity_keys[idx];
-		filename = options.identity_files[idx];
-		if (key == NULL) {
-			debug("Trying private key: %s", filename);
-			key = load_identity_file(filename);
-			if (key != NULL) {
-				sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, key,
-				    key_sign_cb);
-				key_free(key);
+	while ((id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys))) {
+		if (id->tried++)
+			return (0);
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
+		/*
+		 * send a test message if we have the public key. for
+		 * encrypted keys we cannot do this and have to load the
+		 * private key instead
+		 */
+		if (id->key && id->key->type != KEY_RSA1) {
+			debug("Offering public key: %s", id->filename);
+			sent = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, id);
+		} else if (id->key == NULL) {
+			debug("Trying private key: %s", id->filename);
+			id->key = load_identity_file(id->filename);
+			if (id->key != NULL) {
+				id->isprivate = 1;
+				sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, id);
+				key_free(id->key);
+				id->key = NULL;
 			}
-		} else if (key->type != KEY_RSA1) {
-			debug("Offering public key: %s", filename);
-			sent = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, key,
-			    identity_sign_cb, idx);
 		}
-		idx++;
+		if (sent)
+			return (sent);
 	}
-	return sent;
+	return (0);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -862,9 +1159,9 @@ input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	inst = packet_get_string(NULL);
 	lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
 	if (strlen(name) > 0)
-		log("%s", name);
+		logit("%s", name);
 	if (strlen(inst) > 0)
-		log("%s", inst);
+		logit("%s", inst);
 	xfree(name);
 	xfree(inst);
 	xfree(lang);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8
index b7eddc9..ca826f0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.194 2003/01/31 21:54:40 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.199 2003/08/13 08:46:31 markus Exp $
 .\" $FreeBSD$
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSHD 8
@@ -115,6 +115,29 @@ authentication combined with RSA host
 authentication, RSA challenge-response authentication, or password
 based authentication.
 .Pp
+Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to
+ensure that it is accessible.  An account is not accessible if it is
+locked, listed in
+.Cm DenyUsers
+or its group is listed in
+.Cm DenyGroups
+\&.  The definition of a locked account is system dependant. Some platforms
+have their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field (
+.Ql \&*LK\&*
+on Solaris,
+.Ql \&*
+on HP-UX, containing
+.Ql Nologin
+on Tru64 and a leading
+.Ql \&!!
+on Linux).  If there is a requirement to disable password authentication
+for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field
+should be set to something other than these values (eg
+.Ql NP
+or
+.Ql \&*NP\&*
+).
+.Pp
 Rhosts authentication is normally disabled
 because it is fundamentally insecure, but can be enabled in the server
 configuration file if desired.
@@ -291,7 +314,6 @@ may also be used to prevent
 from making DNS requests unless the authentication
 mechanism or configuration requires it.
 Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include
-.Cm RhostsAuthentication ,
 .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication ,
 .Cm HostbasedAuthentication
 and using a
@@ -430,13 +452,13 @@ that option keywords are case-insensitive):
 Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, the canonical name
 of the remote host must be present in the comma-separated list of
 patterns
-.Pf ( Ql *
+.Pf ( Ql \&*
 and
-.Ql ?
+.Ql \&?
 serve as wildcards).
 The list may also contain
 patterns negated by prefixing them with
-.Ql ! ;
+.Ql \&! ;
 if the canonical host name matches a negated pattern, the key is not accepted.
 The purpose
 of this option is to optionally increase security: public key authentication
@@ -498,9 +520,9 @@ IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax:
 .Ar host/port .
 Multiple
 .Cm permitopen
-options may be applied separated by commas. No pattern matching is
-performed on the specified hostnames, they must be literal domains or
-addresses.
+options may be applied separated by commas.
+No pattern matching is performed on the specified hostnames,
+they must be literal domains or addresses.
 .El
 .Ss Examples
 1024 33 12121.\|.\|.\|312314325 ylo@foo.bar
@@ -525,12 +547,16 @@ Each line in these files contains the following fields: hostnames,
 bits, exponent, modulus, comment.
 The fields are separated by spaces.
 .Pp
-Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns ('*' and '?' act as
+Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns
+.Pf ( Ql \&*
+and
+.Ql \&?
+act as
 wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host
 name (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied
 name (when authenticating a server).
 A pattern may also be preceded by
-.Ql !
+.Ql \&!
 to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated
 pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another
 pattern on the line.
@@ -768,17 +794,6 @@ This can be used to specify
 machine-specific login-time initializations globally.
 This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
 .El
-.Sh AUTHORS
-OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
-ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
-Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
-Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
-removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
-created OpenSSH.
-Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
-protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
-Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
-for privilege separation.
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr scp 1 ,
 .Xr sftp 1 ,
@@ -810,3 +825,14 @@ for privilege separation.
 .%D January 2002
 .%O work in progress material
 .Re
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
+for privilege separation.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
index bdf16d1..b0aa83d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.263 2003/02/16 17:09:57 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.276 2003/08/28 12:54:34 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
@@ -117,11 +117,7 @@ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
  * Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6.  This can be set on the command line.
  * Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6.
  */
-#ifdef IPV4_DEFAULT
-int IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
-#else
 int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
-#endif
 
 /*
  * Debug mode flag.  This can be set on the command line.  If debug
@@ -197,7 +193,7 @@ u_char session_id[16];
 
 /* same for ssh2 */
 u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
-int session_id2_len = 0;
+u_int session_id2_len = 0;
 
 /* record remote hostname or ip */
 u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN;
@@ -210,6 +206,9 @@ int startup_pipe;		/* in child */
 int use_privsep;
 struct monitor *pmonitor;
 
+/* message to be displayed after login */
+Buffer loginmsg;
+
 /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
 void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
 void demote_sensitive_data(void);
@@ -263,11 +262,11 @@ sighup_handler(int sig)
 static void
 sighup_restart(void)
 {
-	log("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
+	logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
 	close_listen_socks();
 	close_startup_pipes();
 	execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
-	log("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
+	logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
 	    strerror(errno));
 	exit(1);
 }
@@ -376,39 +375,37 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
 	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_VERSION);
 	server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
 
-	if (client_version_string == NULL) {
-		/* Send our protocol version identification. */
-		if (atomicio(write, sock_out, server_version_string,
-		    strlen(server_version_string))
-		    != strlen(server_version_string)) {
-			log("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
+	/* Send our protocol version identification. */
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
+	    strlen(server_version_string))
+	    != strlen(server_version_string)) {
+		logit("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
+		fatal_cleanup();
+	}
+
+	/* Read other sides version identification. */
+	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
+		if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
+			logit("Did not receive identification string from %s",
+			    get_remote_ipaddr());
 			fatal_cleanup();
 		}
-
-		/* Read other sides version identification. */
-		memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
-		for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
-			if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
-				log("Did not receive identification string from %s",
-				    get_remote_ipaddr());
-				fatal_cleanup();
-			}
-			if (buf[i] == '\r') {
-				buf[i] = 0;
-				/* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
-				if (i == 12 &&
-				    strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
-					break;
-				continue;
-			}
-			if (buf[i] == '\n') {
-				buf[i] = 0;
+		if (buf[i] == '\r') {
+			buf[i] = 0;
+			/* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
+			if (i == 12 &&
+			    strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
 				break;
-			}
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (buf[i] == '\n') {
+			buf[i] = 0;
+			break;
 		}
-		buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
-		client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
 	}
+	buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
+	client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
 
 	/*
 	 * Check that the versions match.  In future this might accept
@@ -417,10 +414,10 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
 	if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
 	    &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
 		s = "Protocol mismatch.\n";
-		(void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
+		(void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
 		close(sock_in);
 		close(sock_out);
-		log("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s",
+		logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s",
 		    client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr());
 		fatal_cleanup();
 	}
@@ -430,13 +427,13 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
 	compat_datafellows(remote_version);
 
 	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PROBE) {
-		log("probed from %s with %s.  Don't panic.",
+		logit("probed from %s with %s.  Don't panic.",
 		    get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
 		fatal_cleanup();
 	}
 
 	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) {
-		log("scanned from %s with %s.  Don't panic.",
+		logit("scanned from %s with %s.  Don't panic.",
 		    get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
 		fatal_cleanup();
 	}
@@ -478,10 +475,10 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
 
 	if (mismatch) {
 		s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
-		(void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
+		(void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
 		close(sock_in);
 		close(sock_out);
-		log("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
+		logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
 		    get_remote_ipaddr(),
 		    server_version_string, client_version_string);
 		fatal_cleanup();
@@ -573,8 +570,6 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
 	do_setusercontext(pw);
 #else
 	gidset[0] = pw->pw_gid;
-	if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0)
-		fatal("setgid failed for %u", pw->pw_gid );
 	if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0)
 		fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 	permanently_set_uid(pw);
@@ -829,27 +824,27 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
 	(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
 #endif
-	__progname = get_progname(av[0]);
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
 	init_rng();
 
 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
 	saved_argc = ac;
-	saved_argv = av;
 	saved_argv = xmalloc(sizeof(*saved_argv) * (ac + 1));
 	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
 		saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
-	saved_argv[ac] = NULL;
+	saved_argv[i] = NULL;
 
 #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
 	/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
 	compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
+	av = saved_argv;
 #endif
 
 	/* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
 	initialize_server_options(&options);
 
 	/* Parse command-line arguments. */
-	while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:V:u:o:dDeiqtQ46")) != -1) {
+	while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:dDeiqtQ46")) != -1) {
 		switch (opt) {
 		case '4':
 			IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
@@ -861,15 +856,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			config_file_name = optarg;
 			break;
 		case 'd':
-			if (0 == debug_flag) {
+			if (debug_flag == 0) {
 				debug_flag = 1;
 				options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
-			} else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) {
+			} else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
 				options.log_level++;
-			} else {
-				fprintf(stderr, "Too high debugging level.\n");
-				exit(1);
-			}
 			break;
 		case 'D':
 			no_daemon_flag = 1;
@@ -920,11 +911,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			}
 			options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] = optarg;
 			break;
-		case 'V':
-			client_version_string = optarg;
-			/* only makes sense with inetd_flag, i.e. no listen() */
-			inetd_flag = 1;
-			break;
 		case 't':
 			test_flag = 1;
 			break;
@@ -1016,15 +1002,15 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		    key_type(key));
 	}
 	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
-		log("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
+		logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
 		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
 	}
 	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
-		log("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
+		logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
 		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
 	}
 	if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
-		log("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+		logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
 		exit(1);
 	}
 
@@ -1159,7 +1145,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 				continue;
 			}
 			/* Create socket for listening. */
-			listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+			listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
+			    ai->ai_protocol);
 			if (listen_sock < 0) {
 				/* kernel may not support ipv6 */
 				verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
@@ -1192,7 +1179,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			num_listen_socks++;
 
 			/* Start listening on the port. */
-			log("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
+			logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
 			if (listen(listen_sock, 5) < 0)
 				fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 
@@ -1227,7 +1214,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			 * overwrite any old pid in the file.
 			 */
 			f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb");
-			if (f) {
+			if (f == NULL) {
+				error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
+				    options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
+			} else {
 				fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
 				fclose(f);
 			}
@@ -1268,7 +1258,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
 				error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 			if (received_sigterm) {
-				log("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+				logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
 				    (int) received_sigterm);
 				close_listen_socks();
 				unlink(options.pid_file);
@@ -1406,11 +1396,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	 * setlogin() affects the entire process group.  We don't
 	 * want the child to be able to affect the parent.
 	 */
-#if !defined(STREAMS_PUSH_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
+#if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
 	/*
-	 * If setsid is called on Solaris, sshd will acquire the controlling
-	 * terminal while pushing STREAMS modules. This will prevent the
-	 * shell from acquiring it later.
+	 * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a
+	 * controlling terminal which will result in "could not set
+	 * controlling tty" errors.
 	 */
 	if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
 		error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
@@ -1488,37 +1478,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		alarm(options.login_grace_time);
 
 	sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
-	/*
-	 * Check that the connection comes from a privileged port.
-	 * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from privileged
-	 * programs.  Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local
-	 * machine, he can connect from any port.  So do not use these
-	 * authentication methods from machines that you do not trust.
-	 */
-	if (options.rhosts_authentication &&
-	    (remote_port >= IPPORT_RESERVED ||
-	    remote_port < IPPORT_RESERVED / 2)) {
-		debug("Rhosts Authentication disabled, "
-		    "originating port %d not trusted.", remote_port);
-		options.rhosts_authentication = 0;
-	}
-#if defined(KRB4) && !defined(KRB5)
-	if (!packet_connection_is_ipv4() &&
-	    options.kerberos_authentication) {
-		debug("Kerberos Authentication disabled, only available for IPv4.");
-		options.kerberos_authentication = 0;
-	}
-#endif /* KRB4 && !KRB5 */
-#ifdef AFS
-	/* If machine has AFS, set process authentication group. */
-	if (k_hasafs()) {
-		k_setpag();
-		k_unlog();
-	}
-#endif /* AFS */
 
 	packet_set_nonblocking();
 
+        /* prepare buffers to collect authentication messages */
+	buffer_init(&loginmsg);
+
 	if (use_privsep)
 		if ((authctxt = privsep_preauth()) != NULL)
 			goto authenticated;
@@ -1560,7 +1525,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip);
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-	finish_pam();
+	if (options.use_pam)
+		finish_pam();
 #endif /* USE_PAM */
 
 	packet_close();
@@ -1672,24 +1638,10 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
 
 	/* Declare supported authentication types. */
 	auth_mask = 0;
-	if (options.rhosts_authentication)
-		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS;
 	if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication)
 		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
 	if (options.rsa_authentication)
 		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
-	if (options.kerberos_authentication)
-		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS;
-#endif
-#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
-	if (options.kerberos_tgt_passing)
-		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT;
-#endif
-#ifdef AFS
-	if (options.afs_token_passing)
-		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN;
-#endif
 	if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1)
 		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
 	if (options.password_authentication)
@@ -1767,7 +1719,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
 		u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
 		MD5_CTX md;
 
-		log("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key");
+		logit("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key");
 		BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf);
 		MD5_Init(&md);
 		MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
index 56fb52c..4e3ec31 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.59 2002/09/25 11:17:16 markus Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.65 2003/08/28 12:54:34 markus Exp $
 #	$FreeBSD$
 
 # This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file.  See
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 # Note that some of FreeBSD's defaults differ from OpenBSD's, and
 # FreeBSD has a few additional options.
 
-#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20030924
+#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20040106
 
 #Port 22
 #Protocol 2,1
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
 
 # Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server key
-#KeyRegenerationInterval 3600
+#KeyRegenerationInterval 1h
 #ServerKeyBits 768
 
 # Logging
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
 
 # Authentication:
 
-#LoginGraceTime 120
+#LoginGraceTime 2m
 #PermitRootLogin no
 #StrictModes yes
 
@@ -45,10 +45,6 @@
 #PubkeyAuthentication yes
 #AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
 
-# rhosts authentication should not be used
-#RhostsAuthentication no
-# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
-#IgnoreRhosts yes
 # For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
 #RhostsRSAAuthentication no
 # similar for protocol version 2
@@ -56,6 +52,8 @@
 # Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for
 # RhostsRSAAuthentication and HostbasedAuthentication
 #IgnoreUserKnownHosts no
+# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
+#IgnoreRhosts yes
 
 # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
 #PasswordAuthentication yes
@@ -69,11 +67,17 @@
 #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
 #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
 
-#AFSTokenPassing no
+# GSSAPI options
+#GSSAPIAuthentication no
+#GSSAPICleanupCreds yes
 
-# Kerberos TGT Passing only works with the AFS kaserver
-#KerberosTgtPassing no
+# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication (via challenge-response)
+# and session processing. Depending on your PAM configuration, this may
+# bypass the setting of 'PasswordAuthentication'
+#UsePAM yes
 
+#AllowTcpForwarding yes
+#GatewayPorts no
 #X11Forwarding yes
 #X11DisplayOffset 10
 #X11UseLocalhost yes
@@ -84,11 +88,14 @@
 #UsePrivilegeSeparation yes
 #PermitUserEnvironment no
 #Compression yes
-
+#ClientAliveInterval 0
+#ClientAliveCountMax 3
+#UseDNS yes
+#PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
 #MaxStartups 10
+
 # no default banner path
 #Banner /some/path
-#VerifyReverseMapping no
 
 # override default of no subsystems
 Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
index 7a07a11..dc221e7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.15 2003/03/28 10:11:43 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.25 2003/09/01 09:50:04 markus Exp $
 .\" $FreeBSD$
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
@@ -62,10 +62,6 @@ The possible
 keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
 keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Cm AFSTokenPassing
-Specifies whether an AFS token may be forwarded to the server.
-Default is
-.Dq no .
 .It Cm AllowGroups
 This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
 by spaces.
@@ -73,7 +69,7 @@ If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary
 group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns.
 .Ql \&*
 and
-.Ql ?
+.Ql \&?
 can be used as
 wildcards in the patterns.
 Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
@@ -94,7 +90,7 @@ If specified, login is allowed only for user names that
 match one of the patterns.
 .Ql \&*
 and
-.Ql ?
+.Ql \&?
 can be used as
 wildcards in the patterns.
 Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
@@ -108,7 +104,8 @@ Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
 for user authentication.
 .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
 may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection
-set-up. The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%',
+set-up.
+The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%',
 %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated and
 %u is replaced by the username of that user.
 After expansion,
@@ -146,7 +143,7 @@ The default is
 .Pp
 .Bd -literal
   ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour,
-    aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc''
+    aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr''
 .Ed
 .It Cm ClientAliveInterval
 Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
@@ -161,20 +158,24 @@ This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
 Sets the number of client alive messages (see above) which may be
 sent without
 .Nm sshd
-receiving any messages back from the client. If this threshold is
-reached while client alive messages are being sent,
+receiving any messages back from the client.
+If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent,
 .Nm sshd
-will disconnect the client, terminating the session. It is important
-to note that the use of client alive messages is very different from
+will disconnect the client, terminating the session.
+It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very
+different from
 .Cm KeepAlive
-(below). The client alive messages are sent through the
-encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive
-option enabled by
+(below).
+The client alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel
+and therefore will not be spoofable.
+The TCP keepalive option enabled by
 .Cm KeepAlive
-is spoofable. The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or
+is spoofable.
+The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or
 server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive.
 .Pp
-The default value is 3. If
+The default value is 3.
+If
 .Cm ClientAliveInterval
 (above) is set to 15, and
 .Cm ClientAliveCountMax
@@ -195,7 +196,7 @@ Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary
 group list matches one of the patterns.
 .Ql \&*
 and
-.Ql ?
+.Ql \&?
 can be used as
 wildcards in the patterns.
 Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
@@ -207,7 +208,7 @@ by spaces.
 Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns.
 .Ql \&*
 and
-.Ql ?
+.Ql \&?
 can be used as wildcards in the patterns.
 Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
 By default, login is allowed for all users.
@@ -232,6 +233,17 @@ or
 .Dq no .
 The default is
 .Dq no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
+Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+The default is 
+.Dq no .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
+Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+on logout.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
 .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
 Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
 with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
@@ -265,7 +277,6 @@ Specifies that
 and
 .Pa .shosts
 files will not be used in
-.Cm RhostsAuthentication ,
 .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
 or
 .Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
@@ -309,11 +320,9 @@ This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
 To disable keepalives, the value should be set to
 .Dq no .
 .It Cm KerberosAuthentication
-Specifies whether Kerberos authentication is allowed.
-This can be in the form of a Kerberos ticket, or if
+Specifies whether the password provided by the user for
 .Cm PasswordAuthentication
-is yes, the password provided by the user will be validated through
-the Kerberos KDC.
+will be validated through the Kerberos KDC.
 To use this option, the server needs a
 Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity.
 Default is
@@ -325,11 +334,6 @@ such as
 .Pa /etc/passwd .
 Default is
 .Dq yes .
-.It Cm KerberosTgtPassing
-Specifies whether a Kerberos TGT may be forwarded to the server.
-Default is
-.Dq no ,
-as this only works when the Kerberos KDC is actually an AFS kaserver.
 .It Cm KerberosTicketCleanup
 Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
 file on logout.
@@ -375,11 +379,12 @@ is not specified,
 .Nm sshd
 will listen on the address and all prior
 .Cm Port
-options specified. The default is to listen on all local
-addresses.
+options specified.
+The default is to listen on all local addresses.
 Multiple
 .Cm ListenAddress
-options are permitted. Additionally, any
+options are permitted.
+Additionally, any
 .Cm Port
 options must precede this option for non port qualified addresses.
 .It Cm LoginGraceTime
@@ -478,8 +483,8 @@ but only if the
 .Ar command
 option has been specified
 (which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is
-normally not allowed). All other authentication methods are disabled
-for root.
+normally not allowed).
+All other authentication methods are disabled for root.
 .Pp
 If this option is set to
 .Dq no
@@ -552,20 +557,6 @@ Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed.
 The default is
 .Dq yes .
 Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-.It Cm RhostsAuthentication
-Specifies whether authentication using rhosts or
-.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
-files is sufficient.
-Normally, this method should not be permitted because it is insecure.
-.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
-should be used
-instead, because it performs RSA-based host authentication in addition
-to normal rhosts or
-.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
-authentication.
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-This option applies to protocol version 1 only.
 .It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
 Specifies whether rhosts or
 .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
@@ -608,6 +599,14 @@ Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
 The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
 LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
 The default is AUTH.
+.It Cm UseDNS
+Specifies whether
+.Nm sshd
+should lookup the remote host name and check that
+the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the
+very same IP address.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
 .It Cm UseLogin
 Specifies whether
 .Xr login 1
@@ -627,6 +626,13 @@ cookies.
 If
 .Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
 is specified, it will be disabled after authentication.
+.It Cm UsePAM
+Enables PAM authentication (via challenge-response) and session set up. 
+If you enable this, you should probably disable 
+.Cm PasswordAuthentication .
+If you enable 
+.CM UsePAM
+then you will not be able to run sshd as a non-root user.
 .It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
 Specifies whether
 .Nm sshd
@@ -638,19 +644,11 @@ The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege
 escalation by containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes.
 The default is
 .Dq yes .
-.It Cm VerifyReverseMapping
-Specifies whether
-.Nm sshd
-should try to verify the remote host name and check that
-the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the
-very same IP address.
-The default is
-.Dq no .
 .It Cm VersionAddendum
 Specifies a string to append to the regular version string to identify
 OS- or site-specific modifications.
 The default is
-.Dq FreeBSD-20030924 .
+.Dq FreeBSD-20040106 .
 .It Cm X11DisplayOffset
 Specifies the first display number available for
 .Nm sshd Ns 's
@@ -681,7 +679,7 @@ display server may be exposed to attack when the ssh client requests
 forwarding (see the warnings for
 .Cm ForwardX11
 in
-.Xr ssh_config 5 ).
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ) .
 A system administrator may have a stance in which they want to
 protect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly
 requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a
@@ -727,7 +725,6 @@ The default is
 .Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth .
 .El
 .Ss Time Formats
-.Pp
 .Nm sshd
 command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time
 may be expressed using a sequence of the form:
@@ -776,6 +773,8 @@ Contains configuration data for
 This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended
 (though not necessary) that it be world-readable.
 .El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr sshd 8
 .Sh AUTHORS
 OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
 ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
@@ -787,5 +786,3 @@ Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
 protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
 Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
 for privilege separation.
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr sshd 8
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
index 12555d6..36b6489 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.5 2002/08/29 15:57:25 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.7 2003/06/12 07:57:38 markus Exp $");
 
 #include "loginrec.h"
 
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ get_last_login_time(uid_t uid, const char *logname,
 }
 
 /*
- * Records that the user has logged in.  I these parts of operating systems
- * were more standardized.
+ * Records that the user has logged in.  I wish these parts of operating
+ * systems were more standardized.
  */
 void
 record_login(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user, uid_t uid,
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c b/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c
index d28947f..4747cea 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.8 2003/02/03 08:56:16 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.10 2003/06/12 07:57:38 markus Exp $");
 
 #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
 # include <util.h>
@@ -101,12 +101,12 @@ pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, int namebuflen)
 		error("/dev/ptmx: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 		return 0;
 	}
-	old_signal = mysignal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+	old_signal = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
 	if (grantpt(ptm) < 0) {
 		error("grantpt: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 		return 0;
 	}
-	mysignal(SIGCHLD, old_signal);
+	signal(SIGCHLD, old_signal);
 	if (unlockpt(ptm) < 0) {
 		error("unlockpt: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 		return 0;
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, int namebuflen)
 		}
 		/* set tty modes to a sane state for broken clients */
 		if (tcgetattr(*ptyfd, &tio) < 0)
-			log("Getting tty modes for pty failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			logit("Getting tty modes for pty failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 		else {
 			tio.c_lflag |= (ECHO | ISIG | ICANON);
 			tio.c_oflag |= (OPOST | ONLCR);
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, int namebuflen)
 
 			/* Set the new modes for the terminal. */
 			if (tcsetattr(*ptyfd, TCSANOW, &tio) < 0)
-				log("Setting tty modes for pty failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+				logit("Setting tty modes for pty failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 		}
 
 		return 1;
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ pty_release(const char *ttyname)
 		error("chmod %.100s 0666 failed: %.100s", ttyname, strerror(errno));
 }
 
-/* Makes the tty the processes controlling tty and sets it to sane modes. */
+/* Makes the tty the process's controlling tty and sets it to sane modes. */
 
 void
 pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *ttyname)
@@ -274,9 +274,9 @@ pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *ttyname)
 
 	fd = open(ttyname, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY);
 	if (fd != -1) {
-		mysignal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
+		signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
 		ioctl(fd, TCVHUP, (char *)NULL);
-		mysignal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
+		signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
 		setpgid(0, 0);
 		close(fd);
 	} else {
@@ -323,9 +323,9 @@ pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *ttyname)
 		error("SETPGRP %s",strerror(errno));
 #endif /* HAVE_NEWS4 */
 #ifdef USE_VHANGUP
-	old = mysignal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
+	old = signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
 	vhangup();
-	mysignal(SIGHUP, old);
+	signal(SIGHUP, old);
 #endif /* USE_VHANGUP */
 	fd = open(ttyname, O_RDWR);
 	if (fd < 0) {
@@ -409,10 +409,10 @@ pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *ttyname)
 			if (errno == EROFS &&
 			    (st.st_mode & (S_IRGRP | S_IROTH)) == 0)
 				debug("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s",
-				    ttyname, mode, strerror(errno));
+				    ttyname, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno));
 			else
 				fatal("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s",
-				    ttyname, mode, strerror(errno));
+				    ttyname, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno));
 		}
 	}
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/version.h b/crypto/openssh/version.h
index 0e4887a..3f29aa3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/version.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/version.h
@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.37 2003/04/01 10:56:46 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.39 2003/09/16 21:02:40 markus Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 
 #ifndef SSH_VERSION
 
 #define SSH_VERSION             (ssh_version_get())
-#define SSH_VERSION_BASE        "OpenSSH_3.6.1p1"
-#define SSH_VERSION_ADDENDUM    "FreeBSD-20030924"
+#define SSH_VERSION_BASE        "OpenSSH_3.7.1p2"
+#define SSH_VERSION_ADDENDUM    "FreeBSD-20040106"
 
 const char *ssh_version_get(void);
 void ssh_version_set_addendum(const char *add);
 #endif /* SSH_VERSION */
-