Bug fix: When the client connects to a server and Kerberos

authentication is  enabled, the  client effectively ignores  any error
from krb5_rd_rep due to a missing branch.

In  theory  this could  result  in  an  ssh  client using  Kerberos  5
authentication accepting  a spoofed  AP-REP.  I doubt  this is  a real
possiblity, however, because  the AP-REP is passed from  the server to
the client via the SSH  encrypted channel.  Any tampering should cause
the decryption or MAC to fail.

Approved by:	green
MFC after:	1 week

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
index eb3e66a..679660f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
@@ -802,6 +802,7 @@ try_krb5_authentication(krb5_context *context, krb5_auth_context *auth_context)
                 problem = krb5_rd_rep(*context, *auth_context, &ap, &reply);
                 if (problem) { 
 		   ret = 0;
+		   goto out;
                 } 
 		ret = 1;
 		break;