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| author | jedgar <jedgar@FreeBSD.org> | 2003-03-20 20:41:45 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | jedgar <jedgar@FreeBSD.org> | 2003-03-20 20:41:45 +0000 |
| commit | 5514cd49874521671b211831af2ced0740d907d6 (patch) | |
| tree | 3f2e33322135a3ee9ccd9a40a9b0e0502741df68 /crypto/openssl | |
| parent | 6c9986c446b6cf77f5e83d111dbcca682d6fdd71 (diff) | |
| download | FreeBSD-src-5514cd49874521671b211831af2ced0740d907d6.zip FreeBSD-src-5514cd49874521671b211831af2ced0740d907d6.tar.gz | |
Import of PKCS #1 security fix.
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030319.txt
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c | 25 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c index 7643877..df40032 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -1447,7 +1447,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); + /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ } if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) @@ -1463,30 +1463,29 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); - goto f_err; + /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ + + /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack + * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version + * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would + * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext + * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except + * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, + * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */ + p[0] = (char)(int) "CAN-2003-0131 patch 2003-03-19"; } } if (al != -1) { -#if 0 - goto f_err; -#else /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding - * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). - * But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the - * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher: - * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA - * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12). - */ + * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */ ERR_clear_error(); i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; p[0] = s->client_version >> 8; p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */ -#endif } s->session->master_key_length= |
