Prevent cross-site forgery attacks on lukemftpd(8) due to splitting

long commands into multiple requests. [09:01]

Fix incorrect OpenSSL checks for malformed signatures due to invalid
check of return value from EVP_VerifyFinal(), DSA_verify, and
DSA_do_verify. [09:02]

Security:	FreeBSD-SA-09:01.lukemftpd
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-09:02.openssl
Obtained from:	NetBSD [SA-09:01]
Obtained from:	OpenSSL Project [SA-09:02]
Approved by:	so (simon)

5 files changed, 8 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c
index ce60de6..6c7ef68 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c
@@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@ int ssl2_set_certificate(SSL *s, int type, int len, const unsigned char *data)
 
 	i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
 		
-	if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (!i))
+	if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0))
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
 		goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
index 27d71a2..e2cba0b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
@@ -1054,7 +1054,7 @@ static int request_certificate(SSL *s)
 
 	i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
 
-	if (i)	/* we like the packet, now check the chksum */
+	if (i > 0)	/* we like the packet, now check the chksum */
 		{
 		EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
 		EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
@@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@ static int request_certificate(SSL *s)
 		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 
-		if (i) 
+		if (i > 0) 
 			{
 			if (s->session->peer != NULL)
 				X509_free(s->session->peer);
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 278be82..e52e9ca 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
 		}
 
 	i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
-	if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (!i)
+	if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
 	        && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
 	        != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5)
@@ -1368,7 +1368,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
-			if (!EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey))
+			if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
 				{
 				/* bad signature */
 				al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
@@ -1386,7 +1386,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
-			if (!EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey))
+			if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
 				{
 				/* bad signature */
 				al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 9414cf0..38ab682 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -2481,7 +2481,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
 	else
 		{
 		i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
-		if (!i)
+		if (i <= 0)
 			{
 			al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
index 517657c0..41dafbb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
@@ -2072,7 +2072,7 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
 
 	if (cb_arg->proxy_auth)
 		{
-		if (ok)
+		if (ok > 0)
 			{
 			const char *cond_end = NULL;