diff options
author | simon <simon@FreeBSD.org> | 2010-03-13 19:22:41 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | simon <simon@FreeBSD.org> | 2010-03-13 19:22:41 +0000 |
commit | 0d816bbd980d8201a2ad23ccd05f7bde16565282 (patch) | |
tree | 909a7c21b7df72ae8c08b80b468a4dd75b3820be /crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c | |
parent | 7fd3bd147ec574621124307eca10ead5353e34ba (diff) | |
parent | cdb6eef1f013e22a10ab5f5829dcdc3b5e32d385 (diff) | |
download | FreeBSD-src-0d816bbd980d8201a2ad23ccd05f7bde16565282.zip FreeBSD-src-0d816bbd980d8201a2ad23ccd05f7bde16565282.tar.gz |
Merge OpenSSL 0.9.8m into head.
This also "reverts" some FreeBSD local changes so we should now
be back to using entirely stock OpenSSL. The local changes were
simple $FreeBSD$ lines additions, which were required in the CVS
days, and the patch for FreeBSD-SA-09:15.ssl which has been
superseded with OpenSSL 0.9.8m's RFC5746 'TLS renegotiation
extension' support.
MFC after: 3 weeks
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c | 64 |
1 files changed, 55 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c index 1644f19..a2ba574 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c @@ -141,9 +141,10 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ } - /* extend reads should not span multiple packets for DTLS */ - if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION && - extend) + /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets + * because the read operation returns the whole packet + * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */ + if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION) { if ( s->s3->rbuf.left > 0 && n > s->s3->rbuf.left) n = s->s3->rbuf.left; @@ -209,6 +210,14 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) return(i); } newb+=i; + /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because + * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed + * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */ + if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION) + { + if (n > newb) + n = newb; /* makes the while condition false */ + } } /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ @@ -983,7 +992,9 @@ start: if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - if (0) + if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && + !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && + !s->s3->renegotiate) { ssl3_renegotiate(s); if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) @@ -1018,7 +1029,25 @@ start: * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ goto start; } - + /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't + * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. + * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) + */ + if (s->server && + SSL_is_init_finished(s) && + !s->s3->send_connection_binding && + (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && + (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && + (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && + (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && + !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) + + { + /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/ + rr->length = 0; + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + goto start; + } if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) { int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; @@ -1048,6 +1077,21 @@ start: s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; return(0); } + /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested + * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with + * a fatal alert because if application tried to + * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and + * expects it to succeed. + * + * In future we might have a renegotiation where we + * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on. + */ + else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) + { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + goto f_err; + } } else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */ { @@ -1114,7 +1158,8 @@ start: /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) { - if (0) + if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && + !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting @@ -1265,13 +1310,13 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) return(1); } -void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) +int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) { /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */ - if (desc < 0) return; + if (desc < 0) return -1; /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); @@ -1280,9 +1325,10 @@ void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) s->s3->send_alert[0]=level; s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc; if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ - s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); + return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); /* else data is still being written out, we will get written * some time in the future */ + return -1; } int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) |