diff options
author | jkim <jkim@FreeBSD.org> | 2015-03-20 19:16:18 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | jkim <jkim@FreeBSD.org> | 2015-03-20 19:16:18 +0000 |
commit | d962da16eb69c08beb3d1028d1edbb20241cfead (patch) | |
tree | bf9f5c26fab5c18be80ab30783e5c7e5082594fc /crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c | |
parent | 778929f2cccf19c8b69d8bcd0da2243bf9e3fb95 (diff) | |
parent | 038f65e5fb1f35e1e485aa4781cda353c4e903f4 (diff) | |
download | FreeBSD-src-d962da16eb69c08beb3d1028d1edbb20241cfead.zip FreeBSD-src-d962da16eb69c08beb3d1028d1edbb20241cfead.tar.gz |
Merge OpenSSL 1.0.1m.
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c | 1254 |
1 files changed, 609 insertions, 645 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c index 3581fbf..77374f4 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c @@ -5,21 +5,21 @@ * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * + * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * + * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * + * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: @@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * + * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. - * + * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. - * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ @@ -124,550 +124,529 @@ #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/x509.h> -/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */ +/* + * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or + * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) + */ int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) - { - int ret; - - ret=ssl3_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], - s->init_num); - if (ret < 0) return(-1); - if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) - /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case - * we'll ignore the result anyway */ - ssl3_finish_mac(s,(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],ret); - - if (ret == s->init_num) - { - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg); - return(1); - } - s->init_off+=ret; - s->init_num-=ret; - return(0); - } +{ + int ret; + + ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], + s->init_num); + if (ret < 0) + return (-1); + if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) + /* + * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll + * ignore the result anyway + */ + ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], + ret); + + if (ret == s->init_num) { + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, + (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + return (1); + } + s->init_off += ret; + s->init_num -= ret; + return (0); +} int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen) - { - unsigned char *p,*d; - int i; - unsigned long l; - - if (s->state == a) - { - d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - p= &(d[4]); - - i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, - sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md); - if (i == 0) - return 0; - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i; - memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); - p+=i; - l=i; - - /* Copy the finished so we can use it for - renegotiation checks */ - if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) - { - OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, - s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); - s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i; - } - else - { - OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, - s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); - s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i; - } +{ + unsigned char *p, *d; + int i; + unsigned long l; + + if (s->state == a) { + d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + p = &(d[4]); + + i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, + sender, slen, + s->s3->tmp.finish_md); + if (i == 0) + return 0; + s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i; + memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); + p += i; + l = i; + + /* + * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks + */ + if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) { + OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; + } else { + OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; + } #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16 - /* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless - * I do this. - */ - l&=0xffff; + /* + * MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless I do + * this. + */ + l &= 0xffff; #endif - *(d++)=SSL3_MT_FINISHED; - l2n3(l,d); - s->init_num=(int)l+4; - s->init_off=0; + *(d++) = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; + l2n3(l, d); + s->init_num = (int)l + 4; + s->init_off = 0; - s->state=b; - } + s->state = b; + } - /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */ - return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); - } + /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */ + return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); +} #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to far. */ +/* + * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen + * to far. + */ static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) - { - const char *sender; - int slen; - /* If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will - * set the appropriate error. - */ - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) - return; - if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) - { - sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; - slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; - } - else - { - sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; - slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; - } - - s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, - sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); - } +{ + const char *sender; + int slen; + /* + * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set + * the appropriate error. + */ + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) + return; + if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) { + sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; + slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; + } else { + sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; + slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; + } + + s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, + sender, + slen, + s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); +} #endif int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b) - { - int al,i,ok; - long n; - unsigned char *p; +{ + int al, i, ok; + long n; + unsigned char *p; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - /* the mac has already been generated when we received the - * change cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md. - */ + /* + * the mac has already been generated when we received the change cipher + * spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md. + */ #endif - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - a, - b, - SSL3_MT_FINISHED, - 64, /* should actually be 36+4 :-) */ - &ok); - - if (!ok) return((int)n); - - /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ - if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); - goto f_err; - } - s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; - - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; - - if (i != n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - - if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); - goto f_err; - } - - /* Copy the finished so we can use it for - renegotiation checks */ - if(s->type == SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - { - OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, - s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); - s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i; - } - else - { - OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, - s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); - s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i; - } + /* 64 argument should actually be 36+4 :-) */ + n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, a, b, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, 64, &ok); + + if (!ok) + return ((int)n); + + /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ + if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); + goto f_err; + } + s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; + + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; + + if (i != n) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + + if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks + */ + if (s->type == SSL_ST_ACCEPT) { + OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; + } else { + OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; + } + + return (1); + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + return (0); +} - return(1); -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); - return(0); - } - -/* for these 2 messages, we need to - * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init - * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero - * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init - * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign - * ssl->session->read_compression assign - * ssl->session->read_hash assign +/*- + * for these 2 messages, we need to + * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init + * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero + * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init + * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign + * ssl->session->read_compression assign + * ssl->session->read_hash assign */ int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b) - { - unsigned char *p; +{ + unsigned char *p; - if (s->state == a) - { - p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - *p=SSL3_MT_CCS; - s->init_num=1; - s->init_off=0; + if (s->state == a) { + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + *p = SSL3_MT_CCS; + s->init_num = 1; + s->init_off = 0; - s->state=b; - } + s->state = b; + } - /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */ - return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)); - } + /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */ + return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)); +} static int ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x) - { - int n; - unsigned char *p; - - n=i2d_X509(x,NULL); - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - return(-1); - } - p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]); - l2n3(n,p); - i2d_X509(x,&p); - *l+=n+3; - - return(0); - } +{ + int n; + unsigned char *p; + + n = i2d_X509(x, NULL); + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + return (-1); + } + p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]); + l2n3(n, p); + i2d_X509(x, &p); + *l += n + 3; + + return (0); +} unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x) - { - unsigned char *p; - int i; - unsigned long l=7; - BUF_MEM *buf; - int no_chain; - - if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || s->ctx->extra_certs) - no_chain = 1; - else - no_chain = 0; - - /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */ - buf=s->init_buf; - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - return(0); - } - if (x != NULL) - { - if (no_chain) - { - if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x)) - return(0); - } - else - { - X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx; - - if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,NULL)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB); - return(0); - } - X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx); - /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ - ERR_clear_error(); - for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) - { - x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i); - - if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x)) - { - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); - return 0; - } - } - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); - } - } - /* Thawte special :-) */ - for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++) - { - x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i); - if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x)) - return(0); - } - - l-=7; - p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); - l2n3(l,p); - l+=3; - p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]); - *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; - l2n3(l,p); - l+=4; - return(l); - } - -/* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1), - * maximum acceptable body length 'max'. - * The first four bytes (msg_type and length) are read in state 'st1', - * the body is read in state 'stn'. +{ + unsigned char *p; + int i; + unsigned long l = 7; + BUF_MEM *buf; + int no_chain; + + if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || s->ctx->extra_certs) + no_chain = 1; + else + no_chain = 0; + + /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */ + buf = s->init_buf; + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 10)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + return (0); + } + if (x != NULL) { + if (no_chain) { + if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x)) + return (0); + } else { + X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx; + + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, s->ctx->cert_store, x, NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); + return (0); + } + X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx); + /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ + ERR_clear_error(); + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i); + + if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x)) { + X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); + return 0; + } + } + X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); + } + } + /* Thawte special :-) */ + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs, i); + if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x)) + return (0); + } + + l -= 7; + p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); + l2n3(l, p); + l += 3; + p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]); + *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; + l2n3(l, p); + l += 4; + return (l); +} + +/* + * Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1), maximum + * acceptable body length 'max'. The first four bytes (msg_type and length) + * are read in state 'st1', the body is read in state 'stn'. */ long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok) - { - unsigned char *p; - unsigned long l; - long n; - int i,al; - - if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) - { - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0; - if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt)) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - goto f_err; - } - *ok=1; - s->state = stn; - s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4; - s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size; - return s->init_num; - } - - p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - - if (s->state == st1) /* s->init_num < 4 */ - { - int skip_message; - - do - { - while (s->init_num < 4) - { - i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, - &p[s->init_num],4 - s->init_num, 0); - if (i <= 0) - { - s->rwstate=SSL_READING; - *ok = 0; - return i; - } - s->init_num+=i; - } - - skip_message = 0; - if (!s->server) - if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) - /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- - * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them - * if their format is correct. Does not count for - * 'Finished' MAC. */ - if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 &&p[3] == 0) - { - s->init_num = 0; - skip_message = 1; - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - } - } - while (skip_message); - - /* s->init_num == 4 */ - - if ((mt >= 0) && (*p != mt)) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - goto f_err; - } - if ((mt < 0) && (*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && - (st1 == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A) && - (stn == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B)) - { - /* At this point we have got an MS SGC second client - * hello (maybe we should always allow the client to - * start a new handshake?). We need to restart the mac. - * Don't increment {num,total}_renegotiations because - * we have not completed the handshake. */ - ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); - } - - s->s3->tmp.message_type= *(p++); - - n2l3(p,l); - if (l > (unsigned long)max) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); - goto f_err; - } - if (l > (INT_MAX-4)) /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); - goto f_err; - } - if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)l+4)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - goto err; - } - s->s3->tmp.message_size=l; - s->state=stn; - - s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4; - s->init_num = 0; - } - - /* next state (stn) */ - p = s->init_msg; - n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; - while (n > 0) - { - i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num],n,0); - if (i <= 0) - { - s->rwstate=SSL_READING; - *ok = 0; - return i; - } - s->init_num += i; - n -= i; - } +{ + unsigned char *p; + unsigned long l; + long n; + int i, al; + + if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) { + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0; + if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt)) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } + *ok = 1; + s->state = stn; + s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4; + s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size; + return s->init_num; + } + + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + + if (s->state == st1) { /* s->init_num < 4 */ + int skip_message; + + do { + while (s->init_num < 4) { + i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, + &p[s->init_num], + 4 - s->init_num, 0); + if (i <= 0) { + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + *ok = 0; + return i; + } + s->init_num += i; + } + + skip_message = 0; + if (!s->server) + if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) + /* + * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- + * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if + * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' + * MAC. + */ + if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { + s->init_num = 0; + skip_message = 1; + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, + p, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + } + } + while (skip_message); + + /* s->init_num == 4 */ + + if ((mt >= 0) && (*p != mt)) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } + if ((mt < 0) && (*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && + (st1 == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A) && (stn == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B)) { + /* + * At this point we have got an MS SGC second client hello (maybe + * we should always allow the client to start a new handshake?). + * We need to restart the mac. Don't increment + * {num,total}_renegotiations because we have not completed the + * handshake. + */ + ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); + } + + s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); + + n2l3(p, l); + if (l > (unsigned long)max) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); + goto f_err; + } + if (l > (INT_MAX - 4)) { /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); + goto f_err; + } + if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)l + 4)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + goto err; + } + s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; + s->state = stn; + + s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4; + s->init_num = 0; + } + + /* next state (stn) */ + p = s->init_msg; + n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; + while (n > 0) { + i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[s->init_num], + n, 0); + if (i <= 0) { + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + *ok = 0; + return i; + } + s->init_num += i; + n -= i; + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - /* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for - * Finished verification. */ - if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) - ssl3_take_mac(s); + /* + * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for + * Finished verification. + */ + if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) + ssl3_take_mac(s); #endif - /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ - ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4); - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - *ok=1; - return s->init_num; -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); -err: - *ok=0; - return(-1); - } + /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ + ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4); + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, + (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + *ok = 1; + return s->init_num; + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + err: + *ok = 0; + return (-1); +} int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey) - { - EVP_PKEY *pk; - int ret= -1,i; - - if (pkey == NULL) - pk=X509_get_pubkey(x); - else - pk=pkey; - if (pk == NULL) goto err; - - i=pk->type; - if (i == EVP_PKEY_RSA) - { - ret=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; - } - else if (i == EVP_PKEY_DSA) - { - ret=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; - } +{ + EVP_PKEY *pk; + int ret = -1, i; + + if (pkey == NULL) + pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); + else + pk = pkey; + if (pk == NULL) + goto err; + + i = pk->type; + if (i == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { + ret = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; + } else if (i == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { + ret = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - else if (i == EVP_PKEY_EC) - { - ret = SSL_PKEY_ECC; - } + else if (i == EVP_PKEY_EC) { + ret = SSL_PKEY_ECC; + } #endif - else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || i == NID_id_GostR3410_94_cc) - { - ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST94; - } - else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 || i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001_cc) - { - ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST01; - } -err: - if(!pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(pk); - return(ret); - } + else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || i == NID_id_GostR3410_94_cc) { + ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST94; + } else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 || i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001_cc) { + ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST01; + } + err: + if (!pkey) + EVP_PKEY_free(pk); + return (ret); +} int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) - { - int al; - - switch(type) - { - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: - al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: - case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: - al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: - case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: - al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: - case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: - al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: - al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: - al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: - case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: - case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: - case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: - al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: - al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; - break; - default: - al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; - break; - } - return(al); - } +{ + int al; + + switch (type) { + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: + al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; + break; + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: + case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: + case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: + case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: + case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: + case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: + al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + break; + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: + case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + break; + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: + case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: + al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; + break; + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: + al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; + break; + case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + break; + case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: + case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: + case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: + case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: + al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; + break; + case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + break; + case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: + al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; + break; + default: + al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; + break; + } + return (al); +} #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS -/* On some platforms, malloc() performance is bad enough that you can't just +/*- + * On some platforms, malloc() performance is bad enough that you can't just * free() and malloc() buffers all the time, so we need to use freelists from * unused buffers. Currently, each freelist holds memory chunks of only a * given size (list->chunklen); other sized chunks are freed and malloced. @@ -686,169 +665,154 @@ int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) * - Use a separate SSL_CTX for each option set. * - Improve this code. */ -static void * -freelist_extract(SSL_CTX *ctx, int for_read, int sz) - { - SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list; - SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent = NULL; - void *result = NULL; - - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - list = for_read ? ctx->rbuf_freelist : ctx->wbuf_freelist; - if (list != NULL && sz == (int)list->chunklen) - ent = list->head; - if (ent != NULL) - { - list->head = ent->next; - result = ent; - if (--list->len == 0) - list->chunklen = 0; - } - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - if (!result) - result = OPENSSL_malloc(sz); - return result; +static void *freelist_extract(SSL_CTX *ctx, int for_read, int sz) +{ + SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list; + SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent = NULL; + void *result = NULL; + + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + list = for_read ? ctx->rbuf_freelist : ctx->wbuf_freelist; + if (list != NULL && sz == (int)list->chunklen) + ent = list->head; + if (ent != NULL) { + list->head = ent->next; + result = ent; + if (--list->len == 0) + list->chunklen = 0; + } + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + if (!result) + result = OPENSSL_malloc(sz); + return result; } -static void -freelist_insert(SSL_CTX *ctx, int for_read, size_t sz, void *mem) - { - SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list; - SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent; - - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - list = for_read ? ctx->rbuf_freelist : ctx->wbuf_freelist; - if (list != NULL && - (sz == list->chunklen || list->chunklen == 0) && - list->len < ctx->freelist_max_len && - sz >= sizeof(*ent)) - { - list->chunklen = sz; - ent = mem; - ent->next = list->head; - list->head = ent; - ++list->len; - mem = NULL; - } - - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - if (mem) - OPENSSL_free(mem); - } +static void freelist_insert(SSL_CTX *ctx, int for_read, size_t sz, void *mem) +{ + SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list; + SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent; + + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + list = for_read ? ctx->rbuf_freelist : ctx->wbuf_freelist; + if (list != NULL && + (sz == list->chunklen || list->chunklen == 0) && + list->len < ctx->freelist_max_len && sz >= sizeof(*ent)) { + list->chunklen = sz; + ent = mem; + ent->next = list->head; + list->head = ent; + ++list->len; + mem = NULL; + } + + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + if (mem) + OPENSSL_free(mem); +} #else -#define freelist_extract(c,fr,sz) OPENSSL_malloc(sz) -#define freelist_insert(c,fr,sz,m) OPENSSL_free(m) +# define freelist_extract(c,fr,sz) OPENSSL_malloc(sz) +# define freelist_insert(c,fr,sz,m) OPENSSL_free(m) #endif int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s) - { - unsigned char *p; - size_t len,align=0,headerlen; - - if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) - headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; - else - headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; +{ + unsigned char *p; + size_t len, align = 0, headerlen; + + if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + else + headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 - align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); + align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); #endif - if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) - { - len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH - + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD - + headerlen + align; - if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) - { - s->s3->init_extra = 1; - len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; - } + if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) { + len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align; + if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) { + s->s3->init_extra = 1; + len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)) - len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)) + len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; #endif - if ((p=freelist_extract(s->ctx, 1, len)) == NULL) - goto err; - s->s3->rbuf.buf = p; - s->s3->rbuf.len = len; - } - - s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]); - return 1; - -err: - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } + if ((p = freelist_extract(s->ctx, 1, len)) == NULL) + goto err; + s->s3->rbuf.buf = p; + s->s3->rbuf.len = len; + } + + s->packet = &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]); + return 1; + + err: + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; +} int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s) - { - unsigned char *p; - size_t len,align=0,headerlen; +{ + unsigned char *p; + size_t len, align = 0, headerlen; - if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) - headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1; - else - headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1; + else + headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 - align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); + align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); #endif - if (s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL) - { - len = s->max_send_fragment - + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD - + headerlen + align; + if (s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL) { + len = s->max_send_fragment + + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)) - len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)) + len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; #endif - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)) - len += headerlen + align - + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD; + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)) + len += headerlen + align + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD; - if ((p=freelist_extract(s->ctx, 0, len)) == NULL) - goto err; - s->s3->wbuf.buf = p; - s->s3->wbuf.len = len; - } + if ((p = freelist_extract(s->ctx, 0, len)) == NULL) + goto err; + s->s3->wbuf.buf = p; + s->s3->wbuf.len = len; + } - return 1; - -err: - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } + return 1; + err: + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; +} int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s) - { - if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) - return 0; - if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) - return 0; - return 1; - } +{ + if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) + return 0; + if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) + return 0; + return 1; +} int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s) - { - if (s->s3->wbuf.buf != NULL) - { - freelist_insert(s->ctx, 0, s->s3->wbuf.len, s->s3->wbuf.buf); - s->s3->wbuf.buf = NULL; - } - return 1; - } +{ + if (s->s3->wbuf.buf != NULL) { + freelist_insert(s->ctx, 0, s->s3->wbuf.len, s->s3->wbuf.buf); + s->s3->wbuf.buf = NULL; + } + return 1; +} int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s) - { - if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) - { - freelist_insert(s->ctx, 1, s->s3->rbuf.len, s->s3->rbuf.buf); - s->s3->rbuf.buf = NULL; - } - return 1; - } - +{ + if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) { + freelist_insert(s->ctx, 1, s->s3->rbuf.len, s->s3->rbuf.buf); + s->s3->rbuf.buf = NULL; + } + return 1; +} |