Initial import of OpenSSL 0.9.6c

61 files changed, 2305 insertions, 433 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c
index 732e68f..b7db681 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c
@@ -105,9 +105,9 @@ int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(char *p)
 		mask = strtoul(p + 5, &end, 0);
 		if(*end) return 0;
 	} else if(!strcmp(p, "nombstr"))
-			 mask = ~(B_ASN1_BMPSTRING|B_ASN1_UTF8STRING);
+		mask = ~((unsigned long)(B_ASN1_BMPSTRING|B_ASN1_UTF8STRING));
 	else if(!strcmp(p, "pkix"))
-			mask = ~B_ASN1_T61STRING;
+			mask = ~((unsigned long)B_ASN1_T61STRING);
 	else if(!strcmp(p, "utf8only")) mask = B_ASN1_UTF8STRING;
 	else if(!strcmp(p, "default"))
 	    mask = 0xFFFFFFFFL;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h
index 6f956b1..65dc5ed 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h
@@ -834,8 +834,6 @@ void ASN1_HEADER_free(ASN1_HEADER *a);
 
 int ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_to_string(ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING *s);
 
-void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
-
 /* Not used that much at this point, except for the first two */
 ASN1_METHOD *X509_asn1_meth(void);
 ASN1_METHOD *RSAPrivateKey_asn1_meth(void);
@@ -877,6 +875,7 @@ void ASN1_STRING_TABLE_cleanup(void);
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the ASN1 functions. */
 
@@ -1148,4 +1147,3 @@ void ASN1_STRING_TABLE_cleanup(void);
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c
index 91a0494..f0a50c2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ pow10(int exp)
 }
 
 static long
-round(LDOUBLE value)
+roundv(LDOUBLE value)
 {
     long intpart;
     intpart = (long) value;
@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ fmtfp(
 
     /* we "cheat" by converting the fractional part to integer by
        multiplying by a factor of 10 */
-    fracpart = round((pow10(max)) * (ufvalue - intpart));
+    fracpart = roundv((pow10(max)) * (ufvalue - intpart));
 
     if (fracpart >= pow10(max)) {
         intpart++;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/b_sock.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/b_sock.c
index 62cc3f1..7dfcbab 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/b_sock.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/b_sock.c
@@ -95,8 +95,10 @@ static struct ghbn_cache_st
 	} ghbn_cache[GHBN_NUM];
 
 static int get_ip(const char *str,unsigned char *ip);
+#if 0
 static void ghbn_free(struct hostent *a);
 static struct hostent *ghbn_dup(struct hostent *a);
+#endif
 int BIO_get_host_ip(const char *str, unsigned char *ip)
 	{
 	int i;
@@ -266,6 +268,7 @@ long BIO_ghbn_ctrl(int cmd, int iarg, char *parg)
 	return(1);
 	}
 
+#if 0
 static struct hostent *ghbn_dup(struct hostent *a)
 	{
 	struct hostent *ret;
@@ -342,21 +345,27 @@ static void ghbn_free(struct hostent *a)
 	if (a->h_name != NULL) OPENSSL_free(a->h_name);
 	OPENSSL_free(a);
 	}
+#endif
 
 struct hostent *BIO_gethostbyname(const char *name)
 	{
+#if 1
+	/* Caching gethostbyname() results forever is wrong,
+	 * so we have to let the true gethostbyname() worry about this */
+	return gethostbyname(name);
+#else
 	struct hostent *ret;
 	int i,lowi=0,j;
 	unsigned long low= (unsigned long)-1;
 
-/*	return(gethostbyname(name)); */
 
-#if 0 /* It doesn't make sense to use locking here: The function interface
-	   * is not thread-safe, because threads can never be sure when
-	   * some other thread destroys the data they were given a pointer to.
-	   */
+#  if 0
+	/* It doesn't make sense to use locking here: The function interface
+	 * is not thread-safe, because threads can never be sure when
+	 * some other thread destroys the data they were given a pointer to.
+	 */
 	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_GETHOSTBYNAME);
-#endif
+#  endif
 	j=strlen(name);
 	if (j < 128)
 		{
@@ -384,20 +393,21 @@ struct hostent *BIO_gethostbyname(const char *name)
 		 * parameter is 'char *', instead of 'const char *'
 		 */
 		ret=gethostbyname(
-#ifndef CONST_STRICT
+#  ifndef CONST_STRICT
 		    (char *)
-#endif
+#  endif
 		    name);
 
 		if (ret == NULL)
 			goto end;
 		if (j > 128) /* too big to cache */
 			{
-#if 0 /* If we were trying to make this function thread-safe (which
-	   * is bound to fail), we'd have to give up in this case
-	   * (or allocate more memory). */
+#  if 0
+			/* If we were trying to make this function thread-safe (which
+			 * is bound to fail), we'd have to give up in this case
+			 * (or allocate more memory). */
 			ret = NULL;
-#endif
+#  endif
 			goto end;
 			}
 
@@ -421,12 +431,14 @@ struct hostent *BIO_gethostbyname(const char *name)
 		ghbn_cache[i].order=BIO_ghbn_miss+BIO_ghbn_hits;
 		}
 end:
-#if 0
+#  if 0
 	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_GETHOSTBYNAME);
-#endif
+#  endif
 	return(ret);
+#endif
 	}
 
+
 int BIO_sock_init(void)
 	{
 #ifdef WINDOWS
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h
index 97003b5..3777f28 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ int BIO_read_filename(BIO *b,const char *name);
 #define BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes(b,num) \
 	BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES,num,NULL);
 #define BIO_get_num_renegotiates(b) \
-	BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES,0,NULL);
+	BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES,0,NULL);
 #define BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout(b,seconds) \
 	BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT,seconds,NULL);
 
@@ -588,8 +588,6 @@ int BIO_sock_init(void );
 void BIO_sock_cleanup(void);
 int BIO_set_tcp_ndelay(int sock,int turn_on);
 
-void ERR_load_BIO_strings(void );
-
 BIO *BIO_new_socket(int sock, int close_flag);
 BIO *BIO_new_fd(int fd, int close_flag);
 BIO *BIO_new_connect(char *host_port);
@@ -615,6 +613,7 @@ int BIO_vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, va_list args);
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+void ERR_load_BIO_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the BIO functions. */
 
@@ -684,4 +683,3 @@ int BIO_vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, va_list args);
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c
index 78c6ab4..4614ad4 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c
@@ -474,7 +474,8 @@ static long bio_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 		break;
 
 	case BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE:
-		num = (long) b->size;
+		ret = (long) b->size;
+		break;
 
 	case BIO_C_MAKE_BIO_PAIR:
 		{
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile.ssl b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile.ssl
index ad36267..9e075a2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile.ssl
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile.ssl
@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ asm/sparcv8plus-gcc27.o: asm/sparcv8plus.S
 	$(CC) $(ASFLAGS) -E asm/sparcv8plus.S | \
 		/usr/ccs/bin/as -xarch=v8plus - -o asm/sparcv8plus-gcc27.o
 
+asm/ia64.o: asm/ia64.S
+
 files:
 	$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile.ssl >> $(TOP)/MINFO
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae56066
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
@@ -0,0 +1,1498 @@
+.explicit
+.text
+.ident	"ia64.S, Version 1.1"
+.ident	"IA-64 ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>"
+
+//
+// ====================================================================
+// Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+// project.
+//
+// Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are
+// granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is
+// disclaimed.
+// ====================================================================
+//
+
+// Q.	How much faster does it get?
+// A.	Here is the output from 'openssl speed rsa dsa' for vanilla
+//	0.9.6a compiled with gcc version 2.96 20000731 (Red Hat
+//	Linux 7.1 2.96-81):
+//
+//	                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+//	rsa  512 bits   0.0036s   0.0003s    275.3   2999.2
+//	rsa 1024 bits   0.0203s   0.0011s     49.3    894.1
+//	rsa 2048 bits   0.1331s   0.0040s      7.5    250.9
+//	rsa 4096 bits   0.9270s   0.0147s      1.1     68.1
+//	                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+//	dsa  512 bits   0.0035s   0.0043s    288.3    234.8
+//	dsa 1024 bits   0.0111s   0.0135s     90.0     74.2
+//
+//	And here is similar output but for this assembler
+//	implementation:-)
+//
+//	                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+//	rsa  512 bits   0.0021s   0.0001s    549.4   9638.5
+//	rsa 1024 bits   0.0055s   0.0002s    183.8   4481.1
+//	rsa 2048 bits   0.0244s   0.0006s     41.4   1726.3
+//	rsa 4096 bits   0.1295s   0.0018s      7.7    561.5
+//	                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+//	dsa  512 bits   0.0012s   0.0013s    891.9    756.6
+//	dsa 1024 bits   0.0023s   0.0028s    440.4    376.2
+//	
+//	Yes, you may argue that it's not fair comparison as it's
+//	possible to craft the C implementation with BN_UMULT_HIGH
+//	inline assembler macro. But of course! Here is the output
+//	with the macro:
+//
+//	                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+//	rsa  512 bits   0.0020s   0.0002s    495.0   6561.0
+//	rsa 1024 bits   0.0086s   0.0004s    116.2   2235.7
+//	rsa 2048 bits   0.0519s   0.0015s     19.3    667.3
+//	rsa 4096 bits   0.3464s   0.0053s      2.9    187.7
+//	                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+//	dsa  512 bits   0.0016s   0.0020s    613.1    510.5
+//	dsa 1024 bits   0.0045s   0.0054s    221.0    183.9
+//
+//	My code is still way faster, huh:-) And I believe that even
+//	higher performance can be achieved. Note that as keys get
+//	longer, performance gain is larger. Why? According to the
+//	profiler there is another player in the field, namely
+//	BN_from_montgomery consuming larger and larger portion of CPU
+//	time as keysize decreases. I therefore consider putting effort
+//	to assembler implementation of the following routine:
+//
+//	void bn_mul_add_mont (BN_ULONG *rp,BN_ULONG *np,int nl,BN_ULONG n0)
+//	{
+//	int      i,j;
+//	BN_ULONG v;
+//
+//	for (i=0; i<nl; i++)
+//		{
+//		v=bn_mul_add_words(rp,np,nl,(rp[0]*n0)&BN_MASK2);
+//		nrp++;
+//		rp++;
+//		if (((nrp[-1]+=v)&BN_MASK2) < v)
+//			for (j=0; ((++nrp[j])&BN_MASK2) == 0; j++) ;
+//		}
+//	}
+//
+//	It might as well be beneficial to implement even combaX
+//	variants, as it appears as it can literally unleash the
+//	performance (see comment section to bn_mul_comba8 below).
+//
+//	And finally for your reference the output for 0.9.6a compiled
+//	with SGIcc version 0.01.0-12 (keep in mind that for the moment
+//	of this writing it's not possible to convince SGIcc to use
+//	BN_UMULT_HIGH inline assembler macro, yet the code is fast,
+//	i.e. for a compiler generated one:-):
+//
+//	                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+//	rsa  512 bits   0.0022s   0.0002s    452.7   5894.3
+//	rsa 1024 bits   0.0097s   0.0005s    102.7   2002.9
+//	rsa 2048 bits   0.0578s   0.0017s     17.3    600.2
+//	rsa 4096 bits   0.3838s   0.0061s      2.6    164.5
+//	                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+//	dsa  512 bits   0.0018s   0.0022s    547.3    459.6
+//	dsa 1024 bits   0.0051s   0.0062s    196.6    161.3
+//
+//	Oh! Benchmarks were performed on 733MHz Lion-class Itanium
+//	system running Redhat Linux 7.1 (very special thanks to Ray
+//	McCaffity of Williams Communications for providing an account).
+//
+// Q.	What's the heck with 'rum 1<<5' at the end of every function?
+// A.	Well, by clearing the "upper FP registers written" bit of the
+//	User Mask I want to excuse the kernel from preserving upper
+//	(f32-f128) FP register bank over process context switch, thus
+//	minimizing bus bandwidth consumption during the switch (i.e.
+//	after PKI opration completes and the program is off doing
+//	something else like bulk symmetric encryption). Having said
+//	this, I also want to point out that it might be good idea
+//	to compile the whole toolkit (as well as majority of the
+//	programs for that matter) with -mfixed-range=f32-f127 command
+//	line option. No, it doesn't prevent the compiler from writing
+//	to upper bank, but at least discourages to do so. If you don't
+//	like the idea you have the option to compile the module with
+//	-Drum=nop.m in command line.
+//
+
+#if 1
+//
+// bn_[add|sub]_words routines.
+//
+// Loops are spinning in 2*(n+5) ticks on Itanuim (provided that the
+// data reside in L1 cache, i.e. 2 ticks away). It's possible to
+// compress the epilogue and get down to 2*n+6, but at the cost of
+// scalability (the neat feature of this implementation is that it
+// shall automagically spin in n+5 on "wider" IA-64 implementations:-)
+// I consider that the epilogue is short enough as it is to trade tiny
+// performance loss on Itanium for scalability.
+//
+// BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG *bp,int num)
+//
+.global	bn_add_words#
+.proc	bn_add_words#
+.align	64
+.skip	32	// makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary
+bn_add_words:
+	.prologue
+	.fframe	0
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+{ .mii;	alloc		r2=ar.pfs,4,12,0,16
+	cmp4.le		p6,p0=r35,r0	};;
+{ .mfb;	mov		r8=r0			// return value
+(p6)	br.ret.spnt.many	b0	};;
+
+	.save	ar.lc,r3
+{ .mib;	sub		r10=r35,r0,1
+	mov		r3=ar.lc
+	brp.loop.imp	.L_bn_add_words_ctop,.L_bn_add_words_cend-16
+					}
+	.body
+{ .mib;	mov		r14=r32			// rp
+	mov		r9=pr		};;
+{ .mii;	mov		r15=r33			// ap
+	mov		ar.lc=r10
+	mov		ar.ec=6		}
+{ .mib;	mov		r16=r34			// bp
+	mov		pr.rot=1<<16	};;
+
+.L_bn_add_words_ctop:
+{ .mii;	(p16)	ld8		r32=[r16],8	  // b=*(bp++)
+	(p18)	add		r39=r37,r34
+	(p19)	cmp.ltu.unc	p56,p0=r40,r38	}
+{ .mfb;	(p0)	nop.m		0x0
+	(p0)	nop.f		0x0
+	(p0)	nop.b		0x0		}
+{ .mii;	(p16)	ld8		r35=[r15],8	  // a=*(ap++)
+	(p58)	cmp.eq.or	p57,p0=-1,r41	  // (p20)
+	(p58)	add		r41=1,r41	} // (p20)
+{ .mfb;	(p21)	st8		[r14]=r42,8	  // *(rp++)=r
+	(p0)	nop.f		0x0
+	br.ctop.sptk	.L_bn_add_words_ctop	};;
+.L_bn_add_words_cend:
+
+{ .mii;
+(p59)	add		r8=1,r8		// return value
+	mov		pr=r9,-1
+	mov		ar.lc=r3	}
+{ .mbb;	nop.b		0x0
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	bn_add_words#
+
+//
+// BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG *bp,int num)
+//
+.global	bn_sub_words#
+.proc	bn_sub_words#
+.align	64
+.skip	32	// makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary
+bn_sub_words:
+	.prologue
+	.fframe	0
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+{ .mii;	alloc		r2=ar.pfs,4,12,0,16
+	cmp4.le		p6,p0=r35,r0	};;
+{ .mfb;	mov		r8=r0			// return value
+(p6)	br.ret.spnt.many	b0	};;
+
+	.save	ar.lc,r3
+{ .mib;	sub		r10=r35,r0,1
+	mov		r3=ar.lc
+	brp.loop.imp	.L_bn_sub_words_ctop,.L_bn_sub_words_cend-16
+					}
+	.body
+{ .mib;	mov		r14=r32			// rp
+	mov		r9=pr		};;
+{ .mii;	mov		r15=r33			// ap
+	mov		ar.lc=r10
+	mov		ar.ec=6		}
+{ .mib;	mov		r16=r34			// bp
+	mov		pr.rot=1<<16	};;
+
+.L_bn_sub_words_ctop:
+{ .mii;	(p16)	ld8		r32=[r16],8	  // b=*(bp++)
+	(p18)	sub		r39=r37,r34
+	(p19)	cmp.gtu.unc	p56,p0=r40,r38	}
+{ .mfb;	(p0)	nop.m		0x0
+	(p0)	nop.f		0x0
+	(p0)	nop.b		0x0		}
+{ .mii;	(p16)	ld8		r35=[r15],8	  // a=*(ap++)
+	(p58)	cmp.eq.or	p57,p0=0,r41	  // (p20)
+	(p58)	add		r41=-1,r41	} // (p20)
+{ .mbb;	(p21)	st8		[r14]=r42,8	  // *(rp++)=r
+	(p0)	nop.b		0x0
+	br.ctop.sptk	.L_bn_sub_words_ctop	};;
+.L_bn_sub_words_cend:
+
+{ .mii;
+(p59)	add		r8=1,r8		// return value
+	mov		pr=r9,-1
+	mov		ar.lc=r3	}
+{ .mbb;	nop.b		0x0
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	bn_sub_words#
+#endif
+
+#if 0
+#define XMA_TEMPTATION
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+//
+// BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w)
+//
+.global	bn_mul_words#
+.proc	bn_mul_words#
+.align	64
+.skip	32	// makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary
+bn_mul_words:
+	.prologue
+	.fframe	0
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+#ifdef XMA_TEMPTATION
+{ .mfi;	alloc		r2=ar.pfs,4,0,0,0	};;
+#else
+{ .mfi;	alloc		r2=ar.pfs,4,4,0,8	};;
+#endif
+{ .mib;	mov		r8=r0			// return value
+	cmp4.le		p6,p0=r34,r0
+(p6)	br.ret.spnt.many	b0		};;
+
+	.save	ar.lc,r3
+{ .mii;	sub	r10=r34,r0,1
+	mov	r3=ar.lc
+	mov	r9=pr			};;
+
+	.body
+{ .mib;	setf.sig	f8=r35	// w
+	mov		pr.rot=0x400001<<16
+			// ------^----- serves as (p48) at first (p26)
+	brp.loop.imp	.L_bn_mul_words_ctop,.L_bn_mul_words_cend-16
+					}
+
+#ifndef XMA_TEMPTATION
+
+{ .mii;	mov		r14=r32	// rp
+	mov		r15=r33	// ap
+	mov		ar.lc=r10	}
+{ .mii;	mov		r39=0	// serves as r33 at first (p26)
+	mov		ar.ec=12	};;
+
+// This loop spins in 2*(n+11) ticks. It's scheduled for data in L2
+// cache (i.e. 9 ticks away) as floating point load/store instructions
+// bypass L1 cache and L2 latency is actually best-case scenario for
+// ldf8. The loop is not scalable and shall run in 2*(n+11) even on
+// "wider" IA-64 implementations. It's a trade-off here. n+22 loop
+// would give us ~5% in *overall* performance improvement on "wider"
+// IA-64, but would hurt Itanium for about same because of longer
+// epilogue. As it's a matter of few percents in either case I've
+// chosen to trade the scalability for development time (you can see
+// this very instruction sequence in bn_mul_add_words loop which in
+// turn is scalable).
+.L_bn_mul_words_ctop:
+{ .mfi;	(p25)	getf.sig	r36=f49			// low
+	(p21)	xmpy.lu		f45=f37,f8
+	(p27)	cmp.ltu		p52,p48=r39,r38	}
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	ldf8		f32=[r15],8
+	(p21)	xmpy.hu		f38=f37,f8
+	(p0)	nop.i		0x0		};;
+{ .mii;	(p26)	getf.sig	r32=f43			// high
+	.pred.rel	"mutex",p48,p52
+	(p48)	add		r38=r37,r33		// (p26)
+	(p52)	add		r38=r37,r33,1	}	// (p26)
+{ .mfb;	(p27)	st8		[r14]=r39,8
+	(p0)	nop.f		0x0
+	br.ctop.sptk	.L_bn_mul_words_ctop	};;
+.L_bn_mul_words_cend:
+
+{ .mii;	nop.m		0x0
+.pred.rel	"mutex",p49,p53
+(p49)	add		r8=r34,r0
+(p53)	add		r8=r34,r0,1	}
+{ .mfb;	nop.m	0x0
+	nop.f	0x0
+	nop.b	0x0			}
+
+#else	// XMA_TEMPTATION
+
+	setf.sig	f37=r0	// serves as carry at (p18) tick
+	mov		ar.lc=r10
+	mov		ar.ec=5;;
+
+// Most of you examining this code very likely wonder why in the name
+// of Intel the following loop is commented out? Indeed, it looks so
+// neat that you find it hard to believe that it's something wrong
+// with it, right? The catch is that every iteration depends on the
+// result from previous one and the latter isn't available instantly.
+// The loop therefore spins at the latency of xma minus 1, or in other
+// words at 6*(n+4) ticks:-( Compare to the "production" loop above
+// that runs in 2*(n+11) where the low latency problem is worked around
+// by moving the dependency to one-tick latent interger ALU. Note that
+// "distance" between ldf8 and xma is not latency of ldf8, but the
+// *difference* between xma and ldf8 latencies.
+.L_bn_mul_words_ctop:
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	ldf8		f32=[r33],8
+	(p18)	xma.hu		f38=f34,f8,f39	}
+{ .mfb;	(p20)	stf8		[r32]=f37,8
+	(p18)	xma.lu		f35=f34,f8,f39
+	br.ctop.sptk	.L_bn_mul_words_ctop	};;
+.L_bn_mul_words_cend:
+
+	getf.sig	r8=f41		// the return value
+
+#endif	// XMA_TEMPTATION
+
+{ .mii;	nop.m		0x0
+	mov		pr=r9,-1
+	mov		ar.lc=r3	}
+{ .mfb;	rum		1<<5		// clear um.mfh
+	nop.f		0x0
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	bn_mul_words#
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+//
+// BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w)
+//
+.global	bn_mul_add_words#
+.proc	bn_mul_add_words#
+.align	64
+//.skip	0	// makes the loop split at 64-byte boundary
+bn_mul_add_words:
+	.prologue
+	.fframe	0
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+{ .mii;	alloc		r2=ar.pfs,4,12,0,16
+	cmp4.le		p6,p0=r34,r0	};;
+{ .mfb;	mov		r8=r0			// return value
+(p6)	br.ret.spnt.many	b0	};;
+
+	.save	ar.lc,r3
+{ .mii;	sub	r10=r34,r0,1
+	mov	r3=ar.lc
+	mov	r9=pr			};;
+
+	.body
+{ .mib;	setf.sig	f8=r35	// w
+	mov		pr.rot=0x400001<<16
+			// ------^----- serves as (p48) at first (p26)
+	brp.loop.imp	.L_bn_mul_add_words_ctop,.L_bn_mul_add_words_cend-16
+					}
+{ .mii;	mov		r14=r32	// rp
+	mov		r15=r33	// ap
+	mov		ar.lc=r10	}
+{ .mii;	mov		r39=0	// serves as r33 at first (p26)
+	mov		r18=r32	// rp copy
+	mov		ar.ec=14	};;
+
+// This loop spins in 3*(n+13) ticks on Itanium and should spin in
+// 2*(n+13) on "wider" IA-64 implementations (to be verified with new
+// µ-architecture manuals as they become available). As usual it's
+// possible to compress the epilogue, down to 10 in this case, at the
+// cost of scalability. Compressed (and therefore non-scalable) loop
+// running at 3*(n+10) would buy you ~10% on Itanium but take ~35%
+// from "wider" IA-64 so let it be scalable! Special attention was
+// paid for having the loop body split at 64-byte boundary. ld8 is
+// scheduled for L1 cache as the data is more than likely there.
+// Indeed, bn_mul_words has put it there a moment ago:-)
+.L_bn_mul_add_words_ctop:
+{ .mfi;	(p25)	getf.sig	r36=f49			// low
+	(p21)	xmpy.lu		f45=f37,f8
+	(p27)	cmp.ltu		p52,p48=r39,r38	}
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	ldf8		f32=[r15],8
+	(p21)	xmpy.hu		f38=f37,f8
+	(p27)	add		r43=r43,r39	};;
+{ .mii;	(p26)	getf.sig	r32=f43			// high
+	.pred.rel	"mutex",p48,p52
+	(p48)	add		r38=r37,r33		// (p26)
+	(p52)	add		r38=r37,r33,1	}	// (p26)
+{ .mfb;	(p27)	cmp.ltu.unc	p56,p0=r43,r39
+	(p0)	nop.f		0x0
+	(p0)	nop.b		0x0		}
+{ .mii;	(p26)	ld8		r42=[r18],8
+	(p58)	cmp.eq.or	p57,p0=-1,r44
+	(p58)	add		r44=1,r44	}
+{ .mfb;	(p29)	st8		[r14]=r45,8
+	(p0)	nop.f		0x0
+	br.ctop.sptk	.L_bn_mul_add_words_ctop};;
+.L_bn_mul_add_words_cend:
+
+{ .mii;	nop.m		0x0
+.pred.rel	"mutex",p51,p55
+(p51)	add		r8=r36,r0
+(p55)	add		r8=r36,r0,1	}
+{ .mfb;	nop.m	0x0
+	nop.f	0x0
+	nop.b	0x0			};;
+{ .mii;
+(p59)	add		r8=1,r8
+	mov		pr=r9,-1
+	mov		ar.lc=r3	}
+{ .mfb;	rum		1<<5		// clear um.mfh
+	nop.f		0x0
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	bn_mul_add_words#
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+//
+// void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num)
+//
+.global	bn_sqr_words#
+.proc	bn_sqr_words#
+.align	64
+.skip	32	// makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary 
+bn_sqr_words:
+	.prologue
+	.fframe	0
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+{ .mii;	alloc		r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0
+	sxt4		r34=r34		};;
+{ .mii;	cmp.le		p6,p0=r34,r0
+	mov		r8=r0		}	// return value
+{ .mfb;	nop.f		0x0
+(p6)	br.ret.spnt.many	b0	};;
+
+	.save	ar.lc,r3
+{ .mii;	sub	r10=r34,r0,1
+	mov	r3=ar.lc
+	mov	r9=pr			};;
+
+	.body
+{ .mib;
+	mov		pr.rot=1<<16
+	brp.loop.imp	.L_bn_sqr_words_ctop,.L_bn_sqr_words_cend-16
+					}
+{ .mii;	add		r34=8,r32
+	mov		ar.lc=r10
+	mov		ar.ec=18	};;
+
+// 2*(n+17) on Itanium, (n+17) on "wider" IA-64 implementations. It's
+// possible to compress the epilogue (I'm getting tired to write this
+// comment over and over) and get down to 2*n+16 at the cost of
+// scalability. The decision will very likely be reconsidered after the
+// benchmark program is profiled. I.e. if perfomance gain on Itanium
+// will appear larger than loss on "wider" IA-64, then the loop should
+// be explicitely split and the epilogue compressed.
+.L_bn_sqr_words_ctop:
+{ .mfi;	(p16)	ldf8		f32=[r33],8
+	(p25)	xmpy.lu		f42=f41,f41
+	(p0)	nop.i		0x0		}
+{ .mib;	(p33)	stf8		[r32]=f50,16
+	(p0)	nop.i		0x0
+	(p0)	nop.b		0x0		}
+{ .mfi;	(p0)	nop.m		0x0
+	(p25)	xmpy.hu		f52=f41,f41
+	(p0)	nop.i		0x0		}
+{ .mib;	(p33)	stf8		[r34]=f60,16
+	(p0)	nop.i		0x0
+	br.ctop.sptk	.L_bn_sqr_words_ctop	};;
+.L_bn_sqr_words_cend:
+
+{ .mii;	nop.m		0x0
+	mov		pr=r9,-1
+	mov		ar.lc=r3	}
+{ .mfb;	rum		1<<5		// clear um.mfh
+	nop.f		0x0
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	bn_sqr_words#
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+// Apparently we win nothing by implementing special bn_sqr_comba8.
+// Yes, it is possible to reduce the number of multiplications by
+// almost factor of two, but then the amount of additions would
+// increase by factor of two (as we would have to perform those
+// otherwise performed by xma ourselves). Normally we would trade
+// anyway as multiplications are way more expensive, but not this
+// time... Multiplication kernel is fully pipelined and as we drain
+// one 128-bit multiplication result per clock cycle multiplications
+// are effectively as inexpensive as additions. Special implementation
+// might become of interest for "wider" IA-64 implementation as you'll
+// be able to get through the multiplication phase faster (there won't
+// be any stall issues as discussed in the commentary section below and
+// you therefore will be able to employ all 4 FP units)... But these
+// Itanium days it's simply too hard to justify the effort so I just
+// drop down to bn_mul_comba8 code:-)
+//
+// void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a)
+//
+.global	bn_sqr_comba8#
+.proc	bn_sqr_comba8#
+.align	64
+bn_sqr_comba8:
+	.prologue
+	.fframe	0
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+{ .mii;	alloc	r2=ar.pfs,2,1,0,0
+	mov	r34=r33
+	add	r14=8,r33		};;
+	.body
+{ .mii;	add	r17=8,r34
+	add	r15=16,r33
+	add	r18=16,r34		}
+{ .mfb;	add	r16=24,r33
+	br	.L_cheat_entry_point8	};;
+.endp	bn_sqr_comba8#
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+// I've estimated this routine to run in ~120 ticks, but in reality
+// (i.e. according to ar.itc) it takes ~160 ticks. Are those extra
+// cycles consumed for instructions fetch? Or did I misinterpret some
+// clause in Itanium µ-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
+// highly appreciated.
+//
+// However! It should be noted that even 160 ticks is darn good result
+// as it's over 10 (yes, ten, spelled as t-e-n) times faster than the
+// C version (compiled with gcc with inline assembler). I really
+// kicked compiler's butt here, didn't I? Yeah! This brings us to the
+// following statement. It's damn shame that this routine isn't called
+// very often nowadays! According to the profiler most CPU time is
+// consumed by bn_mul_add_words called from BN_from_montgomery. In
+// order to estimate what we're missing, I've compared the performance
+// of this routine against "traditional" implementation, i.e. against
+// following routine:
+//
+// void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+// {	r[ 8]=bn_mul_words(    &(r[0]),a,8,b[0]);
+//	r[ 9]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[1]),a,8,b[1]);
+//	r[10]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[2]),a,8,b[2]);
+//	r[11]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[3]),a,8,b[3]);
+//	r[12]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[4]),a,8,b[4]);
+//	r[13]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[5]),a,8,b[5]);
+//	r[14]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[6]),a,8,b[6]);
+//	r[15]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[7]),a,8,b[7]);
+// }
+//
+// The one below is over 8 times faster than the one above:-( Even
+// more reasons to "combafy" bn_mul_add_mont...
+//
+// And yes, this routine really made me wish there were an optimizing
+// assembler! It also feels like it deserves a dedication.
+//
+//	To my wife for being there and to my kids...
+//
+// void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+//
+#define	carry1	r14
+#define	carry2	r15
+#define	carry3	r34
+.global	bn_mul_comba8#
+.proc	bn_mul_comba8#
+.align	64
+bn_mul_comba8:
+	.prologue
+	.fframe	0
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+{ .mii;	alloc	r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0
+	add	r14=8,r33
+	add	r17=8,r34		}
+	.body
+{ .mii;	add	r15=16,r33
+	add	r18=16,r34
+	add	r16=24,r33		}
+.L_cheat_entry_point8:
+{ .mmi;	add	r19=24,r34
+
+	ldf8	f32=[r33],32		};;
+
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f120=[r34],32
+	ldf8	f121=[r17],32		}
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f122=[r18],32
+	ldf8	f123=[r19],32		};;
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f124=[r34]
+	ldf8	f125=[r17]		}
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f126=[r18]
+	ldf8	f127=[r19]		}
+
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f33=[r14],32
+	ldf8	f34=[r15],32		}
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f35=[r16],32;;
+	ldf8	f36=[r33]		}
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f37=[r14]
+	ldf8	f38=[r15]		}
+{ .mfi;	ldf8	f39=[r16]
+// -------\ Entering multiplier's heaven /-------
+// ------------\                    /------------
+// -----------------\          /-----------------
+// ----------------------\/----------------------
+		xma.hu	f41=f32,f120,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f40=f32,f120,f0		};; // (*)
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f51=f32,f121,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f50=f32,f121,f0		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f61=f32,f122,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f60=f32,f122,f0		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f71=f32,f123,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f70=f32,f123,f0		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f81=f32,f124,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f80=f32,f124,f0		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f91=f32,f125,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f90=f32,f125,f0		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f101=f32,f126,f0	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f100=f32,f126,f0	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f111=f32,f127,f0	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f110=f32,f127,f0	};;//
+// (*)	You can argue that splitting at every second bundle would
+//	prevent "wider" IA-64 implementations from achieving the peak
+//	performance. Well, not really... The catch is that if you
+//	intend to keep 4 FP units busy by splitting at every fourth
+//	bundle and thus perform these 16 multiplications in 4 ticks,
+//	the first bundle *below* would stall because the result from
+//	the first xma bundle *above* won't be available for another 3
+//	ticks (if not more, being an optimist, I assume that "wider"
+//	implementation will have same latency:-). This stall will hold
+//	you back and the performance would be as if every second bundle
+//	were split *anyway*...
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r16=f40
+		xma.hu	f42=f33,f120,f41
+	add		r33=8,r32		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f41=f33,f120,f41	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r24=f50
+		xma.hu	f52=f33,f121,f51	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f51=f33,f121,f51	};;
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r32]=r16,16
+		xma.hu	f62=f33,f122,f61	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f61=f33,f122,f61	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f72=f33,f123,f71	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f71=f33,f123,f71	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f82=f33,f124,f81	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f81=f33,f124,f81	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f92=f33,f125,f91	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f91=f33,f125,f91	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f102=f33,f126,f101	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f101=f33,f126,f101	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f112=f33,f127,f111	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f111=f33,f127,f111	};;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r25=f41
+		xma.hu	f43=f34,f120,f42	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f42=f34,f120,f42	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r16=f60
+		xma.hu	f53=f34,f121,f52	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f52=f34,f121,f52	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r17=f51
+		xma.hu	f63=f34,f122,f62
+	add		r25=r25,r24		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f62=f34,f122,f62
+	mov		carry1=0		};;
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24
+		xma.hu	f73=f34,f123,f72	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f72=f34,f123,f72	};;
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r33]=r25,16
+		xma.hu	f83=f34,f124,f82
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f82=f34,f124,f82	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f93=f34,f125,f92	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f92=f34,f125,f92	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f103=f34,f126,f102	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f102=f34,f126,f102	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f113=f34,f127,f112	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f112=f34,f127,f112	};;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r18=f42
+		xma.hu	f44=f35,f120,f43
+	add		r17=r17,r16		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f43=f35,f120,f43	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r24=f70
+		xma.hu	f54=f35,f121,f53	}
+{ .mfi;	mov		carry2=0
+		xma.lu	f53=f35,f121,f53	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r25=f61
+		xma.hu	f64=f35,f122,f63
+	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16		}
+{ .mfi;	add		r18=r18,r17
+		xma.lu	f63=f35,f122,f63	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r26=f52
+		xma.hu	f74=f35,f123,f73
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,r17
+		xma.lu	f73=f35,f123,f73
+	add		r18=r18,carry1		};;
+{ .mfi;
+		xma.hu	f84=f35,f124,f83
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,carry1
+		xma.lu	f83=f35,f124,f83	};;
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r32]=r18,16
+		xma.hu	f94=f35,f125,f93
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f93=f35,f125,f93	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f104=f35,f126,f103	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f103=f35,f126,f103	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f114=f35,f127,f113	}
+{ .mfi;	mov		carry1=0
+		xma.lu	f113=f35,f127,f113
+	add		r25=r25,r24		};;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r27=f43
+		xma.hu	f45=f36,f120,f44
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f44=f36,f120,f44	
+	add		r26=r26,r25		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r16=f80
+		xma.hu	f55=f36,f121,f54
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f54=f36,f121,f54	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r17=f71
+		xma.hu	f65=f36,f122,f64
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,r25		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f64=f36,f122,f64
+	add		r27=r27,r26		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r18=f62
+		xma.hu	f75=f36,f123,f74
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r27,r26
+		xma.lu	f74=f36,f123,f74
+	add		r27=r27,carry2		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r19=f53
+		xma.hu	f85=f36,f124,f84
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f84=f36,f124,f84
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r27,carry2	};;
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r33]=r27,16
+		xma.hu	f95=f36,f125,f94
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f94=f36,f125,f94	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f105=f36,f126,f104	}
+{ .mfi;	mov		carry2=0
+		xma.lu	f104=f36,f126,f104
+	add		r17=r17,r16		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f115=f36,f127,f114
+	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f114=f36,f127,f114
+	add		r18=r18,r17		};;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r20=f44
+		xma.hu	f46=f37,f120,f45
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,r17
+		xma.lu	f45=f37,f120,f45
+	add		r19=r19,r18		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r24=f90
+		xma.hu	f56=f37,f121,f55	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f55=f37,f121,f55	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r25=f81
+		xma.hu	f66=f37,f122,f65
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r19,r18
+		xma.lu	f65=f37,f122,f65
+	add		r20=r20,r19		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r26=f72
+		xma.hu	f76=f37,f123,f75
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r20,r19
+		xma.lu	f75=f37,f123,f75
+	add		r20=r20,carry1		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r27=f63
+		xma.hu	f86=f37,f124,f85
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f85=f37,f124,f85
+	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r20,carry1	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r28=f54
+		xma.hu	f96=f37,f125,f95
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r32]=r20,16
+		xma.lu	f95=f37,f125,f95	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f106=f37,f126,f105	}
+{ .mfi;	mov		carry1=0
+		xma.lu	f105=f37,f126,f105
+	add		r25=r25,r24		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f116=f37,f127,f115
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f115=f37,f127,f115
+	add		r26=r26,r25		};;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r29=f45
+		xma.hu	f47=f38,f120,f46
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,r25
+		xma.lu	f46=f38,f120,f46
+	add		r27=r27,r26		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r16=f100
+		xma.hu	f57=f38,f121,f56
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r27,r26
+		xma.lu	f56=f38,f121,f56
+	add		r28=r28,r27		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r17=f91
+		xma.hu	f67=f38,f122,f66
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r28,r27
+		xma.lu	f66=f38,f122,f66
+	add		r29=r29,r28		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r18=f82
+		xma.hu	f77=f38,f123,f76
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r29,r28
+		xma.lu	f76=f38,f123,f76
+	add		r29=r29,carry2		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r19=f73
+		xma.hu	f87=f38,f124,f86
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f86=f38,f124,f86
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r29,carry2	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r20=f64
+		xma.hu	f97=f38,f125,f96
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r33]=r29,16
+		xma.lu	f96=f38,f125,f96	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r21=f55
+		xma.hu	f107=f38,f126,f106	}
+{ .mfi;	mov		carry2=0
+		xma.lu	f106=f38,f126,f106
+	add		r17=r17,r16		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f117=f38,f127,f116
+	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f116=f38,f127,f116
+	add		r18=r18,r17		};;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r22=f46
+		xma.hu	f48=f39,f120,f47
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,r17
+		xma.lu	f47=f39,f120,f47
+	add		r19=r19,r18		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r24=f110
+		xma.hu	f58=f39,f121,f57
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r19,r18
+		xma.lu	f57=f39,f121,f57
+	add		r20=r20,r19		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r25=f101
+		xma.hu	f68=f39,f122,f67
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r20,r19
+		xma.lu	f67=f39,f122,f67
+	add		r21=r21,r20		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r26=f92
+		xma.hu	f78=f39,f123,f77
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r21,r20
+		xma.lu	f77=f39,f123,f77
+	add		r22=r22,r21		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r27=f83
+		xma.hu	f88=f39,f124,f87
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r22,r21
+		xma.lu	f87=f39,f124,f87
+	add		r22=r22,carry1		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r28=f74
+		xma.hu	f98=f39,f125,f97
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f97=f39,f125,f97
+	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r22,carry1	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r29=f65
+		xma.hu	f108=f39,f126,f107
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		}
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r32]=r22,16
+		xma.lu	f107=f39,f126,f107	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r30=f56
+		xma.hu	f118=f39,f127,f117	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f117=f39,f127,f117	};;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+// Leaving muliplier's heaven... Quite a ride, huh?
+
+{ .mii;	getf.sig	r31=f47
+	add		r25=r25,r24
+	mov		carry1=0		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r16=f111
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24
+	add		r26=r26,r25		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r17=f102	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,r25
+	add		r27=r27,r26		};;
+{ .mfb;	nop.m	0x0				}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r27,r26
+	add		r28=r28,r27		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r18=f93
+		add		r17=r17,r16
+		mov		carry3=0	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r28,r27
+	add		r29=r29,r28		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r19=f84
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r29,r28
+	add		r30=r30,r29		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r20=f75
+		add		r18=r18,r17	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r30,r29
+	add		r31=r31,r30		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r21=f66		}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,r17
+		add		r19=r19,r18	}
+{ .mfb;	nop.m	0x0				}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r31,r30
+	add		r31=r31,carry2		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r22=f57		}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r19,r18
+		add		r20=r20,r19	}
+{ .mfb;	nop.m	0x0				}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r31,carry2	};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r23=f48		}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r20,r19
+		add		r21=r21,r20	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfb;	st8		[r33]=r31,16		};;
+
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r24=f112		}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r21,r20
+		add		r22=r22,r21	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r25=f103		}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r22,r21
+		add		r23=r23,r22	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r26=f94			}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r23,r22
+		add		r23=r23,carry1	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r27=f85			}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p8=r23,carry1};;
+{ .mii;	getf.sig	r28=f76
+	add		r25=r25,r24
+	mov		carry1=0		}
+{ .mii;		st8		[r32]=r23,16
+	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry3
+	(p8)	add		carry2=0,carry3	};;
+
+{ .mfb;	nop.m	0x0				}
+{ .mii;	getf.sig	r29=f67
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24
+	add		r26=r26,r25		};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r30=f58			}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,r25
+	add		r27=r27,r26		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r16=f113	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r27,r26
+	add		r28=r28,r27		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r17=f104	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r28,r27
+	add		r29=r29,r28		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r18=f95		}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r29,r28
+	add		r30=r30,r29		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r19=f86
+		add		r17=r17,r16
+		mov		carry3=0	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r30,r29
+	add		r30=r30,carry2		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r20=f77
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16
+		add		r18=r18,r17	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r30,carry2	};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r21=f68		}
+{ .mii;	st8		[r33]=r30,16
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		};;
+
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r24=f114		}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,r17
+		add		r19=r19,r18	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r25=f105		}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r19,r18
+		add		r20=r20,r19	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r26=f96			}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r20,r19
+		add		r21=r21,r20	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r27=f87			}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r21,r20
+		add		r21=r21,carry1	};;
+{ .mib;	getf.sig	r28=f78			
+	add		r25=r25,r24		}
+{ .mib;	(p7)	add		carry3=1,carry3
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p8=r21,carry1};;
+{ .mii;		st8		[r32]=r21,16
+	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry3
+	(p8)	add		carry2=0,carry3	}
+
+{ .mii;	mov		carry1=0
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24
+	add		r26=r26,r25		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r16=f115	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,r25
+	add		r27=r27,r26		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r17=f106	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r27,r26
+	add		r28=r28,r27		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r18=f97		}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r28,r27
+	add		r28=r28,carry2		};;
+{ .mib;		getf.sig	r19=f88
+		add		r17=r17,r16	}
+{ .mib;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r28,carry2	};;
+{ .mii;	st8		[r33]=r28,16
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+
+{ .mii;		mov		carry2=0
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16
+		add		r18=r18,r17	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r24=f116		}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,r17
+		add		r19=r19,r18	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r25=f107		}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r19,r18
+		add		r19=r19,carry1	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r26=f98			}
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r19,carry1};;
+{ .mii;		st8		[r32]=r19,16
+	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2	}
+
+{ .mfb;	add		r25=r25,r24		};;
+
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r16=f117	}
+{ .mii;	mov		carry1=0
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24
+	add		r26=r26,r25		};;
+{ .mfb;		getf.sig	r17=f108	}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,r25
+	add		r26=r26,carry2		};;
+{ .mfb;	nop.m	0x0				}
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,carry2	};;
+{ .mii;	st8		[r33]=r26,16
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+
+{ .mfb;		add		r17=r17,r16	};;
+{ .mfb;	getf.sig	r24=f118		}
+{ .mii;		mov		carry2=0
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16
+		add		r17=r17,carry1	};;
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,carry1};;
+{ .mii;		st8		[r32]=r17
+	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2	};;
+{ .mfb;	add		r24=r24,carry2		};;
+{ .mib;	st8		[r33]=r24		}
+
+{ .mib;	rum		1<<5		// clear um.mfh
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	bn_mul_comba8#
+#undef	carry3
+#undef	carry2
+#undef	carry1
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+// It's possible to make it faster (see comment to bn_sqr_comba8), but
+// I reckon it doesn't worth the effort. Basically because the routine
+// (actually both of them) practically never called... So I just play
+// same trick as with bn_sqr_comba8.
+//
+// void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a)
+//
+.global	bn_sqr_comba4#
+.proc	bn_sqr_comba4#
+.align	64
+bn_sqr_comba4:
+	.prologue
+	.fframe	0
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+{ .mii;	alloc	r2=ar.pfs,2,1,0,0
+	mov	r34=r33
+	add	r14=8,r33		};;
+	.body
+{ .mii;	add	r17=8,r34
+	add	r15=16,r33
+	add	r18=16,r34		}
+{ .mfb;	add	r16=24,r33
+	br	.L_cheat_entry_point4	};;
+.endp	bn_sqr_comba4#
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+// Runs in ~115 cycles and ~4.5 times faster than C. Well, whatever...
+//
+// void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+//
+#define	carry1	r14
+#define	carry2	r15
+.global	bn_mul_comba4#
+.proc	bn_mul_comba4#
+.align	64
+bn_mul_comba4:
+	.prologue
+	.fframe	0
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+{ .mii;	alloc	r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0
+	add	r14=8,r33
+	add	r17=8,r34		}
+	.body
+{ .mii;	add	r15=16,r33
+	add	r18=16,r34
+	add	r16=24,r33		};;
+.L_cheat_entry_point4:
+{ .mmi;	add	r19=24,r34
+
+	ldf8	f32=[r33]		}
+
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f120=[r34]
+	ldf8	f121=[r17]		};;
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f122=[r18]
+	ldf8	f123=[r19]		}
+
+{ .mmi;	ldf8	f33=[r14]
+	ldf8	f34=[r15]		}
+{ .mfi;	ldf8	f35=[r16]
+
+		xma.hu	f41=f32,f120,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f40=f32,f120,f0		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f51=f32,f121,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f50=f32,f121,f0		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f61=f32,f122,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f60=f32,f122,f0		};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f71=f32,f123,f0		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f70=f32,f123,f0		};;//
+// Major stall takes place here, and 3 more places below. Result from
+// first xma is not available for another 3 ticks.
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r16=f40
+		xma.hu	f42=f33,f120,f41
+	add		r33=8,r32		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f41=f33,f120,f41	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r24=f50
+		xma.hu	f52=f33,f121,f51	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f51=f33,f121,f51	};;
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r32]=r16,16
+		xma.hu	f62=f33,f122,f61	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f61=f33,f122,f61	};;
+{ .mfi;		xma.hu	f72=f33,f123,f71	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f71=f33,f123,f71	};;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r25=f41
+		xma.hu	f43=f34,f120,f42	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f42=f34,f120,f42	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r16=f60
+		xma.hu	f53=f34,f121,f52	}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f52=f34,f121,f52	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r17=f51
+		xma.hu	f63=f34,f122,f62
+	add		r25=r25,r24		}
+{ .mfi;	mov		carry1=0
+		xma.lu	f62=f34,f122,f62	};;
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r33]=r25,16
+		xma.hu	f73=f34,f123,f72
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f72=f34,f123,f72	};;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r18=f42
+		xma.hu	f44=f35,f120,f43
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+{ .mfi;	add		r17=r17,r16
+		xma.lu	f43=f35,f120,f43
+	mov		carry2=0		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r24=f70
+		xma.hu	f54=f35,f121,f53
+	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f53=f35,f121,f53	};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r25=f61
+		xma.hu	f64=f35,f122,f63
+	add		r18=r18,r17		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f63=f35,f122,f63
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		};;
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r26=f52
+		xma.hu	f74=f35,f123,f73
+	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,r17		}
+{ .mfi;		xma.lu	f73=f35,f123,f73
+	add		r18=r18,carry1		};;
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mii;	st8		[r32]=r18,16
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2
+	cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,carry1	};;
+
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r27=f43	// last major stall
+(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r16=f71
+	add		r25=r25,r24
+	mov		carry1=0		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r17=f62	
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24
+	add		r26=r26,r25		};;
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,r25
+	add		r27=r27,r26		};;
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r27,r26
+	add		r27=r27,carry2		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r18=f53
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r27,carry2	};;
+{ .mfi;	st8		[r33]=r27,16
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r19=f44
+		add		r17=r17,r16
+		mov		carry2=0	};;
+{ .mii;	getf.sig	r24=f72
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16
+		add		r18=r18,r17	};;
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r18,r17
+		add		r19=r19,r18	};;
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r19,r18
+		add		r19=r19,carry1	};;
+{ .mii;	getf.sig	r25=f63
+	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r19,carry1};;
+{ .mii;		st8		[r32]=r19,16
+	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2	}
+
+{ .mii;	getf.sig	r26=f54
+	add		r25=r25,r24
+	mov		carry1=0		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r16=f73
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r25,r24
+	add		r26=r26,r25		};;
+{ .mii;
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,r25
+	add		r26=r26,carry2		};;
+{ .mii;		getf.sig	r17=f64
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1
+	cmp.ltu		p6,p0=r26,carry2	};;
+{ .mii;	st8		[r33]=r26,16
+(p6)	add		carry1=1,carry1		}
+
+{ .mii;	getf.sig	r24=f74
+		add		r17=r17,r16	
+		mov		carry2=0	};;
+{ .mii;		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,r16
+		add		r17=r17,carry1	};;
+
+{ .mii;	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2
+		cmp.ltu		p7,p0=r17,carry1};;
+{ .mii;		st8		[r32]=r17,16
+	(p7)	add		carry2=1,carry2	};;
+
+{ .mii;	add		r24=r24,carry2		};;
+{ .mii;	st8		[r33]=r24		}
+
+{ .mib;	rum		1<<5		// clear um.mfh
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+.endp	bn_mul_comba4#
+#undef	carry2
+#undef	carry1
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+//
+// BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d)
+//
+// In the nutshell it's a port of my MIPS III/IV implementation.
+//
+#define	AT	r14
+#define	H	r16
+#define	HH	r20
+#define	L	r17
+#define	D	r18
+#define	DH	r22
+#define	I	r21
+
+#if 0
+// Some preprocessors (most notably HP-UX) apper to be allergic to
+// macros enclosed to parenthesis as these three will be.
+#define	cont	p16
+#define	break	p0	// p20
+#define	equ	p24
+#else
+cont=p16
+break=p0
+equ=p24
+#endif
+
+.global	abort#
+.global	bn_div_words#
+.proc	bn_div_words#
+.align	64
+bn_div_words:
+	.prologue
+	.fframe	0
+	.save	ar.pfs,r2
+	.save	b0,r3
+{ .mii;	alloc		r2=ar.pfs,3,5,0,8
+	mov		r3=b0
+	mov		r10=pr		};;
+{ .mmb;	cmp.eq		p6,p0=r34,r0
+	mov		r8=-1
+(p6)	br.ret.spnt.many	b0	};;
+
+	.body
+{ .mii;	mov		H=r32		// save h
+	mov		ar.ec=0		// don't rotate at exit
+	mov		pr.rot=0	}
+{ .mii;	mov		L=r33		// save l
+	mov		r36=r0		};;
+
+.L_divw_shift:	// -vv- note signed comparison
+{ .mfi;	(p0)	cmp.lt		p16,p0=r0,r34	// d
+	(p0)	shladd		r33=r34,1,r0	}
+{ .mfb;	(p0)	add		r35=1,r36
+	(p0)	nop.f		0x0
+(p16)	br.wtop.dpnt		.L_divw_shift	};;
+
+{ .mii;	mov		D=r34
+	shr.u		DH=r34,32
+	sub		r35=64,r36		};;
+{ .mii;	setf.sig	f7=DH
+	shr.u		AT=H,r35
+	mov		I=r36			};;
+{ .mib;	cmp.ne		p6,p0=r0,AT
+	shl		H=H,r36
+(p6)	br.call.spnt.clr	b0=abort	};;	// overflow, die...
+
+{ .mfi;	fcvt.xuf.s1	f7=f7
+	shr.u		AT=L,r35		};;
+{ .mii;	shl		L=L,r36
+	or		H=H,AT			};;
+
+{ .mii;	nop.m		0x0
+	cmp.leu		p6,p0=D,H;;
+(p6)	sub		H=H,D			}
+
+{ .mlx;	setf.sig	f14=D
+	movl		AT=0xffffffff		};;
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+{ .mii;	setf.sig	f6=H
+	shr.u		HH=H,32;;
+	cmp.eq		p6,p7=HH,DH		};;
+{ .mfb;
+(p6)	setf.sig	f8=AT
+(p7)	fcvt.xuf.s1	f6=f6
+(p7)	br.call.sptk	b6=.L_udiv64_32_b6	};;
+
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r33=f8				// q
+	xmpy.lu		f9=f8,f14		}
+{ .mfi;	xmpy.hu		f10=f8,f14
+	shrp		H=H,L,32		};;
+
+{ .mmi;	getf.sig	r35=f9				// tl
+	getf.sig	r31=f10			};;	// th
+
+.L_divw_1st_iter:
+{ .mii;	(p0)	add		r32=-1,r33
+	(p0)	cmp.eq		equ,cont=HH,r31		};;
+{ .mii;	(p0)	cmp.ltu		p8,p0=r35,D
+	(p0)	sub		r34=r35,D
+	(equ)	cmp.leu		break,cont=r35,H	};;
+{ .mib;	(cont)	cmp.leu		cont,break=HH,r31
+	(p8)	add		r31=-1,r31
+(cont)	br.wtop.spnt		.L_divw_1st_iter	};;
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+{ .mii;	sub		H=H,r35
+	shl		r8=r33,32
+	shl		L=L,32			};;
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+{ .mii;	setf.sig	f6=H
+	shr.u		HH=H,32;;
+	cmp.eq		p6,p7=HH,DH		};;
+{ .mfb;
+(p6)	setf.sig	f8=AT
+(p7)	fcvt.xuf.s1	f6=f6
+(p7)	br.call.sptk	b6=.L_udiv64_32_b6	};;
+
+{ .mfi;	getf.sig	r33=f8				// q
+	xmpy.lu		f9=f8,f14		}
+{ .mfi;	xmpy.hu		f10=f8,f14
+	shrp		H=H,L,32		};;
+
+{ .mmi;	getf.sig	r35=f9				// tl
+	getf.sig	r31=f10			};;	// th
+
+.L_divw_2nd_iter:
+{ .mii;	(p0)	add		r32=-1,r33
+	(p0)	cmp.eq		equ,cont=HH,r31		};;
+{ .mii;	(p0)	cmp.ltu		p8,p0=r35,D
+	(p0)	sub		r34=r35,D
+	(equ)	cmp.leu		break,cont=r35,H	};;
+{ .mib;	(cont)	cmp.leu		cont,break=HH,r31
+	(p8)	add		r31=-1,r31
+(cont)	br.wtop.spnt		.L_divw_2nd_iter	};;
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+{ .mii;	sub	H=H,r35
+	or	r8=r8,r33
+	mov	ar.pfs=r2		};;
+{ .mii;	shr.u	r9=H,I			// remainder if anybody wants it
+	mov	pr=r10,-1		}
+{ .mfb;	br.ret.sptk.many	b0	};;
+
+// Unsigned 64 by 32 (well, by 64 for the moment) bit integer division
+// procedure.
+//
+// inputs:	f6 = (double)a, f7 = (double)b
+// output:	f8 = (int)(a/b)
+// clobbered:	f8,f9,f10,f11,pred
+pred=p15
+// This procedure is essentially Intel code and therefore is
+// copyrighted to Intel Corporation (I suppose...). It's sligtly
+// modified for specific needs.
+.align	32
+.skip	16
+.L_udiv64_32_b6:
+	frcpa.s1	f8,pred=f6,f7;;		// [0]  y0 = 1 / b
+
+(pred)	fnma.s1		f9=f7,f8,f1		// [5]  e0 = 1 - b * y0
+(pred)	fmpy.s1		f10=f6,f8;;		// [5]  q0 = a * y0
+(pred)	fmpy.s1		f11=f9,f9		// [10] e1 = e0 * e0
+(pred)	fma.s1		f10=f9,f10,f10;;	// [10] q1 = q0 + e0 * q0
+(pred)	fma.s1		f8=f9,f8,f8	//;;	// [15] y1 = y0 + e0 * y0
+(pred)	fma.s1		f9=f11,f10,f10;;	// [15] q2 = q1 + e1 * q1
+(pred)	fma.s1		f8=f11,f8,f8	//;;	// [20] y2 = y1 + e1 * y1
+(pred)	fnma.s1		f10=f7,f9,f6;;		// [20] r2 = a - b * q2
+(pred)	fma.s1		f8=f10,f8,f9;;		// [25] q3 = q2 + r2 * y2
+
+	fcvt.fxu.trunc.s1	f8=f8		// [30] q = trunc(q3)
+	br.ret.sptk.many	b6;;
+.endp	bn_div_words#
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
index b232c2c..7ce9d8c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
@@ -90,7 +90,9 @@ extern "C" {
  * be on.  Again this in only really a problem on machines
  * using "long long's", are 32bit, and are not using my assembler code. */
 #if defined(MSDOS) || defined(WINDOWS) || defined(WIN32) || defined(linux)
-#define BN_DIV2W
+# ifndef BN_DIV2W
+#  define BN_DIV2W
+# endif
 #endif
 
 /* assuming long is 64bit - this is the DEC Alpha
@@ -329,6 +331,7 @@ void	BN_CTX_end(BN_CTX *ctx);
 int     BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top,int bottom);
 int     BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top,int bottom);
 int	BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range);
+int	BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range);
 int	BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a);
 int	BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG);
 BIGNUM *BN_new(void);
@@ -403,7 +406,6 @@ int	BN_is_prime(const BIGNUM *p,int nchecks,
 int	BN_is_prime_fasttest(const BIGNUM *p,int nchecks,
 		void (*callback)(int,int,void *),BN_CTX *ctx,void *cb_arg,
 		int do_trial_division);
-void	ERR_load_BN_strings(void );
 
 BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void );
 void BN_MONT_CTX_init(BN_MONT_CTX *ctx);
@@ -474,6 +476,7 @@ int BN_bntest_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top,int bottom);
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+void ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the BN functions. */
 
@@ -517,4 +520,3 @@ int BN_bntest_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top,int bottom);
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_div.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
index c328b5b..613a268 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d,
 
 #if !defined(NO_ASM) && !defined(NO_INLINE_ASM) && !defined(PEDANTIC) && !defined(BN_DIV3W)
 # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
-#  if defined(__i386)
+#  if defined(__i386) || defined (__i386__)
    /*
     * There were two reasons for implementing this template:
     * - GNU C generates a call to a function (__udivdi3 to be exact)
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
index a5f01b9..8b782fa 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
@@ -225,12 +225,15 @@ int BN_is_prime_fasttest(const BIGNUM *a, int checks,
 	BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
 	const BIGNUM *A = NULL;
 
+	if (BN_cmp(a, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
+		return 0;
+	
 	if (checks == BN_prime_checks)
 		checks = BN_prime_checks_for_size(BN_num_bits(a));
 
 	/* first look for small factors */
 	if (!BN_is_odd(a))
-		return(0);
+		return 0;
 	if (do_trial_division)
 		{
 		for (i = 1; i < NUMPRIMES; i++)
@@ -289,11 +292,8 @@ int BN_is_prime_fasttest(const BIGNUM *a, int checks,
 	
 	for (i = 0; i < checks; i++)
 		{
-		if (!BN_pseudo_rand(check, BN_num_bits(A1), 0, 0))
+		if (!BN_pseudo_rand_range(check, A1))
 			goto err;
-		if (BN_cmp(check, A1) >= 0)
-			if (!BN_sub(check, check, A1))
-				goto err;
 		if (!BN_add_word(check, 1))
 			goto err;
 		/* now 1 <= check < A */
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
index acd0619..4944ffb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
@@ -55,6 +55,59 @@
  * copied and put under another distribution licence
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <time.h>
@@ -172,8 +225,9 @@ int     BN_bntest_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
 #endif
 
 /* random number r:  0 <= r < range */
-int	BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *range)
+static int bn_rand_range(int pseudo, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *range)
 	{
+	int (*bn_rand)(BIGNUM *, int, int, int) = pseudo ? BN_pseudo_rand : BN_rand;
 	int n;
 
 	if (range->neg || BN_is_zero(range))
@@ -184,26 +238,19 @@ int	BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *range)
 
 	n = BN_num_bits(range); /* n > 0 */
 
+	/* BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 1) always holds */
+
 	if (n == 1)
 		{
 		if (!BN_zero(r)) return 0;
 		}
-	else if (BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 2))
+	else if (!BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 2) && !BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 3))
 		{
-		do
-			{
-			/* range = 11..._2, so each iteration succeeds with probability >= .75 */
-			if (!BN_rand(r, n, -1, 0)) return 0;
-			}
-		while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		/* range = 10..._2,
+		/* range = 100..._2,
 		 * so  3*range (= 11..._2)  is exactly one bit longer than  range */
 		do
 			{
-			if (!BN_rand(r, n + 1, -1, 0)) return 0;
+			if (!bn_rand(r, n + 1, -1, 0)) return 0;
 			/* If  r < 3*range,  use  r := r MOD range
 			 * (which is either  r, r - range,  or  r - 2*range).
 			 * Otherwise, iterate once more.
@@ -218,6 +265,26 @@ int	BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *range)
 			}
 		while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0);
 		}
+	else
+		{
+		do
+			{
+			/* range = 11..._2  or  range = 101..._2 */
+			if (!bn_rand(r, n, -1, 0)) return 0;
+			}
+		while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0);
+		}
 
 	return 1;
 	}
+
+
+int	BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *range)
+	{
+	return bn_rand_range(0, r, range);
+	}
+
+int	BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *range)
+	{
+	return bn_rand_range(1, r, range);
+	}
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
index 75f4f38..09bd337 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ printf(" bn_sqr_recursive %d * %d\n",n2,n2);
 	if (!zero)
 		bn_sqr_recursive(&(t[n2]),t,n,p);
 	else
-		memset(&(t[n2]),0,n*sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+		memset(&(t[n2]),0,n2*sizeof(BN_ULONG));
 	bn_sqr_recursive(r,a,n,p);
 	bn_sqr_recursive(&(r[n2]),&(a[n]),n,p);
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.h
index bff26bf..11e2d035 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.h
@@ -75,12 +75,11 @@ void	BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a);
 int	BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, int len);
 char *	BUF_strdup(const char *str);
 
-void ERR_load_BUF_strings(void );
-
 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+void ERR_load_BUF_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the BUF functions. */
 
@@ -95,4 +94,3 @@ void ERR_load_BUF_strings(void );
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/comp/Makefile.ssl b/crypto/openssl/crypto/comp/Makefile.ssl
index ba705c2..a61c7de 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/comp/Makefile.ssl
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/comp/Makefile.ssl
@@ -22,10 +22,10 @@ TEST=
 APPS=
 
 LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a
-LIBSRC= comp_lib.c \
+LIBSRC= comp_lib.c comp_err.c \
 	c_rle.c c_zlib.c
 
-LIBOBJ=	comp_lib.o \
+LIBOBJ=	comp_lib.o comp_err.o \
 	c_rle.o c_zlib.o
 
 SRC= $(LIBSRC)
@@ -94,6 +94,11 @@ c_zlib.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
 c_zlib.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
 c_zlib.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
 c_zlib.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+comp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/comp.h
+comp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+comp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+comp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+comp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
 comp_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
 comp_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/comp.h
 comp_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/comp/comp.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/comp/comp.h
index 0922609..c26c209 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/comp/comp.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/comp/comp.h
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ COMP_METHOD *COMP_zlib(void );
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+void ERR_load_COMP_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the COMP functions. */
 
@@ -58,4 +59,3 @@ COMP_METHOD *COMP_zlib(void );
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/conf/conf.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/conf/conf.h
index cd40a0d..31e4005 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/conf/conf.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/conf/conf.h
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ long CONF_get_number(LHASH *conf,char *group,char *name);
 void CONF_free(LHASH *conf);
 int CONF_dump_fp(LHASH *conf, FILE *out);
 int CONF_dump_bio(LHASH *conf, BIO *out);
-void ERR_load_CONF_strings(void );
 
 /* New conf code.  The semantics are different from the functions above.
    If that wasn't the case, the above functions would have been replaced */
@@ -145,6 +144,7 @@ int NCONF_dump_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *out);
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+void ERR_load_CONF_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the CONF functions. */
 
@@ -176,4 +176,3 @@ int NCONF_dump_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *out);
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
index fdb416d..8fd2d4d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ static const char* lock_names[CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS] =
 	"ssl_sess_cert",
 	"ssl",
 	"rand",
+	"rand2",
 	"debug_malloc",
 	"BIO",
 	"gethostbyname",
@@ -100,7 +101,7 @@ static const char* lock_names[CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS] =
 	"debug_malloc2",
 	"dso",
 	"dynlock",
-#if CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS != 28
+#if CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS != 29
 # error "Inconsistency between crypto.h and cryptlib.c"
 #endif
 	};
@@ -227,7 +228,10 @@ void CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid(int i)
 	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
 
 	if (dyn_locks == NULL || i >= sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_num(dyn_locks))
+		{
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
 		return;
+		}
 	pointer = sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_value(dyn_locks, i);
 	if (pointer != NULL)
 		{
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/crypto.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/crypto.h
index 09ae4cb..8fba871 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/crypto.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/crypto.h
@@ -112,17 +112,18 @@ extern "C" {
 #define	CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT	15
 #define	CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL			16
 #define	CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND		17
-#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_MALLOC		18
-#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO			19
-#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_GETHOSTBYNAME	20
-#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_GETSERVBYNAME	21
-#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR		22
-#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING	23
-#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_DH			24
-#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_MALLOC2		25
-#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_DSO			26
-#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK		27
-#define	CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS		28
+#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2		18
+#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_MALLOC		19
+#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO			20
+#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_GETHOSTBYNAME	21
+#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_GETSERVBYNAME	22
+#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR		23
+#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING	24
+#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_DH			25
+#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_MALLOC2		26
+#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_DSO			27
+#define	CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK		28
+#define	CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS		29
 
 #define CRYPTO_LOCK		1
 #define CRYPTO_UNLOCK		2
@@ -350,6 +351,9 @@ int CRYPTO_push_info_(const char *info, const char *file, int line);
 int CRYPTO_pop_info(void);
 int CRYPTO_remove_all_info(void);
 
+
+/* Default debugging functions (enabled by CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init() macro;
+ * used as default in CRYPTO_MDEBUG compilations): */
 /* The last argument has the following significance:
  *
  * 0:	called before the actual memory allocation has taken place
@@ -358,18 +362,18 @@ int CRYPTO_remove_all_info(void);
 void CRYPTO_dbg_malloc(void *addr,int num,const char *file,int line,int before_p);
 void CRYPTO_dbg_realloc(void *addr1,void *addr2,int num,const char *file,int line,int before_p);
 void CRYPTO_dbg_free(void *addr,int before_p);
-
 /* Tell the debugging code about options.  By default, the following values
  * apply:
  *
- * 0:	Clear all options.
- * 1:	Set the "Show Time" option.
- * 2:	Set the "Show Thread Number" option.
- * 3:	1 + 2
+ * 0:                           Clear all options.
+ * V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_TIME (1):    Set the "Show Time" option.
+ * V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_THREAD (2):  Set the "Show Thread Number" option.
+ * V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL (3):     1 + 2
  */
 void CRYPTO_dbg_set_options(long bits);
 long CRYPTO_dbg_get_options(void);
 
+
 #ifndef NO_FP_API
 void CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(FILE *);
 #endif
@@ -377,12 +381,11 @@ void CRYPTO_mem_leaks(struct bio_st *bio);
 /* unsigned long order, char *file, int line, int num_bytes, char *addr */
 void CRYPTO_mem_leaks_cb(void (*cb)(unsigned long, const char *, int, int, void *));
 
-void ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings(void);
-
 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+void ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the CRYPTO functions. */
 
@@ -399,4 +402,3 @@ void ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings(void);
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/dh/dh.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/dh/dh.h
index a15fc1c..3fdd39f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/dh/dh.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/dh/dh.h
@@ -177,12 +177,12 @@ int	DHparams_print(BIO *bp, DH *x);
 #else
 int	DHparams_print(char *bp, DH *x);
 #endif
-void	ERR_load_DH_strings(void );
 
 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+void ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the DH functions. */
 
@@ -201,4 +201,3 @@ void	ERR_load_DH_strings(void );
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
index a6469ca..17b267f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
@@ -99,6 +99,8 @@ DH_METHOD *DH_OpenSSL(void)
 static int generate_key(DH *dh)
 	{
 	int ok=0;
+	int generate_new_key=0;
+	unsigned l;
 	BN_CTX ctx;
 	BN_MONT_CTX *mont;
 	BIGNUM *pub_key=NULL,*priv_key=NULL;
@@ -109,9 +111,7 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
 		{
 		priv_key=BN_new();
 		if (priv_key == NULL) goto err;
-		do
-			if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, dh->p)) goto err;
-		while (BN_is_zero(priv_key));
+		generate_new_key=1;
 		}
 	else
 		priv_key=dh->priv_key;
@@ -132,8 +132,12 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
 		}
 	mont=(BN_MONT_CTX *)dh->method_mont_p;
 
-	if (!dh->meth->bn_mod_exp(dh, pub_key,dh->g,priv_key,dh->p,&ctx,mont))
-								goto err;
+	if (generate_new_key)
+		{
+		l = dh->length ? dh->length : BN_num_bits(dh->p)-1; /* secret exponent length */
+		if (!BN_rand(priv_key, l, 0, 0)) goto err;
+		}
+	if (!dh->meth->bn_mod_exp(dh, pub_key,dh->g,priv_key,dh->p,&ctx,mont)) goto err;
 		
 	dh->pub_key=pub_key;
 	dh->priv_key=priv_key;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_lib.c
index 8516bda..a462707 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_lib.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
 
 const char *DH_version="Diffie-Hellman" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 
-static DH_METHOD *default_DH_method;
+static DH_METHOD *default_DH_method = NULL;
 static int dh_meth_num = 0;
 static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *dh_meth = NULL;
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa.h
index e98fa389..c486689 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa.h
@@ -178,8 +178,6 @@ int DSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
 int DSA_set_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx, void *arg);
 void *DSA_get_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx);
 
-void	ERR_load_DSA_strings(void );
-
 DSA *	d2i_DSAPublicKey(DSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
 DSA *	d2i_DSAPrivateKey(DSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
 DSA * 	d2i_DSAparams(DSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
@@ -216,6 +214,7 @@ DH *DSA_dup_DH(DSA *r);
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+void ERR_load_DSA_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the DSA functions. */
 
@@ -242,4 +241,3 @@ DH *DSA_dup_DH(DSA *r);
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c
index 5dfc0ee..8920c3f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
 
 const char *DSA_version="DSA" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 
-static DSA_METHOD *default_DSA_method;
+static DSA_METHOD *default_DSA_method = NULL;
 static int dsa_meth_num = 0;
 static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *dsa_meth = NULL;
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/dso/dso.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/dso/dso.h
index bed7c46..c1136ec 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/dso/dso.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/dso/dso.h
@@ -194,12 +194,11 @@ DSO_METHOD *DSO_METHOD_win32(void);
 /* If VMS is defined, use shared images. If not, return NULL. */
 DSO_METHOD *DSO_METHOD_vms(void);
 
-void ERR_load_DSO_strings(void);
-
 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+void ERR_load_DSO_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the DSO functions. */
 
@@ -247,4 +246,3 @@ void ERR_load_DSO_strings(void);
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/err/err.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/err/err.c
index be4a71e..94a2838 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/err/err.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/err/err.c
@@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ void ERR_add_error_data(int num, ...)
 				if (p == NULL)
 					{
 					OPENSSL_free(str);
-					return;
+					goto err;
 					}
 				else
 					str=p;
@@ -794,6 +794,7 @@ void ERR_add_error_data(int num, ...)
 		}
 	ERR_set_error_data(str,ERR_TXT_MALLOCED|ERR_TXT_STRING);
 
+err:
 	va_end(args);
 	}
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/err/err.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/err/err.h
index 2c3d39c..af6c4d4 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/err/err.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/err/err.h
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ typedef struct err_state_st
 #define ERR_LIB_PKCS12		35
 #define ERR_LIB_RAND		36
 #define ERR_LIB_DSO		37
+#define ERR_LIB_COMP		41
 
 #define ERR_LIB_USER		128
 
@@ -161,6 +162,7 @@ typedef struct err_state_st
 #define PKCS12err(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_PKCS12,(f),(r),ERR_file_name,__LINE__)
 #define RANDerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_RAND,(f),(r),ERR_file_name,__LINE__)
 #define DSOerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_DSO,(f),(r),ERR_file_name,__LINE__)
+#define COMPerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_COMP,(f),(r),ERR_file_name,__LINE__)
 
 /* Borland C seems too stupid to be able to shift and do longs in
  * the pre-processor :-( */
@@ -210,6 +212,7 @@ typedef struct err_state_st
 #define ERR_R_PKCS7_LIB	ERR_LIB_PKCS7
 #define ERR_R_PKCS12_LIB ERR_LIB_PKCS12
 #define ERR_R_DSO_LIB	ERR_LIB_DSO
+#define ERR_R_COMP_LIB	ERR_LIB_COMP
 
 /* fatal error */
 #define	ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE			(1|ERR_R_FATAL)
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
index af6fa2a..f12eac1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
@@ -465,7 +465,8 @@ static long b64_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: /* More to write in buffer */
 		ret=ctx->buf_len-ctx->buf_off;
-		if ((ret == 0) && (ctx->base64.num != 0))
+		if ((ret == 0) && (ctx->encode != B64_NONE)
+			&& (ctx->base64.num != 0))
 			ret=1;
 		else if (ret <= 0)
 			ret=BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio,cmd,num,ptr);
@@ -500,7 +501,7 @@ again:
 				goto again;
 				}
 			}
-		else if (ctx->base64.num != 0)
+		else if (ctx->encode != B64_NONE && ctx->base64.num != 0)
 			{
 			ctx->buf_off=0;
 			EVP_EncodeFinal(&(ctx->base64),
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/evp.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/evp.h
index 0f27df4..a61e46b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/evp.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/evp.h
@@ -603,8 +603,6 @@ int	EVP_DecodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned
 		char *out, int *outl);
 int	EVP_DecodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int n);
 
-void	ERR_load_EVP_strings(void );
-
 void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *a);
 int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *a);
 int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *x, int keylen);
@@ -777,6 +775,7 @@ void EVP_PBE_cleanup(void);
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the EVP functions. */
 
@@ -849,4 +848,3 @@ void EVP_PBE_cleanup(void);
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/m_md4.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/m_md4.c
index 6a24ceb..e5005ab 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/m_md4.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/m_md4.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
 static EVP_MD md4_md=
 	{
 	NID_md4,
-	0,
+	NID_md4WithRSAEncryption,
 	MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH,
 	MD4_Init,
 	MD4_Update,
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/md32_common.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/md32_common.h
index 1a404a4..ad7c419 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/md32_common.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/md32_common.h
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@
    *
    * 					<appro@fy.chalmers.se>
    */
-#  if defined(__i386)
+#  if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__)
 #   define ROTATE(a,n)	({ register unsigned int ret;	\
 				asm (			\
 				"roll %1,%0"		\
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@
  */
 # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(NO_ASM) && !defined(NO_INLINE_ASM)
   /* some GNU C inline assembler templates by <appro@fy.chalmers.se> */
-#  if defined(__i386) && !defined(I386_ONLY)
+#  if (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__)) && !defined(I386_ONLY)
 #   define BE_FETCH32(a)	({ register unsigned int l=(a);\
 				asm (			\
 				"bswapl %0"		\
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/md4/md4_locl.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/md4/md4_locl.h
index 0a2b390..a8d31d7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/md4/md4_locl.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/md4/md4_locl.h
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@
 void md4_block_host_order (MD4_CTX *c, const void *p,int num);
 void md4_block_data_order (MD4_CTX *c, const void *p,int num);
 
-#if defined(__i386) || defined(_M_IX86) || defined(__INTEL__)
+#if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || defined(__INTEL__)
 /*
  * *_block_host_order is expected to handle aligned data while
  * *_block_data_order - unaligned. As algorithm and host (x86)
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/md5/md5_locl.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/md5/md5_locl.h
index c912484..f35d6f1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/md5/md5_locl.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/md5/md5_locl.h
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
 #endif
 
 #ifdef MD5_ASM
-# if defined(__i386) || defined(_M_IX86) || defined(__INTEL__)
+# if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || defined(__INTEL__)
 #  define md5_block_host_order md5_block_asm_host_order
 # elif defined(__sparc) && defined(ULTRASPARC)
    void md5_block_asm_data_order_aligned (MD5_CTX *c, const MD5_LONG *p,int num);
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@
 void md5_block_host_order (MD5_CTX *c, const void *p,int num);
 void md5_block_data_order (MD5_CTX *c, const void *p,int num);
 
-#if defined(__i386) || defined(_M_IX86) || defined(__INTEL__)
+#if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || defined(__INTEL__)
 /*
  * *_block_host_order is expected to handle aligned data while
  * *_block_data_order - unaligned. As algorithm and host (x86)
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/Makefile.ssl b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/Makefile.ssl
index 1b43d80..c4cbc50 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/Makefile.ssl
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/Makefile.ssl
@@ -43,6 +43,13 @@ lib:	$(LIBOBJ)
 	- $(RANLIB) $(LIB)
 	@touch lib
 
+obj_dat.h: obj_dat.pl obj_mac.h
+	perl obj_dat.pl obj_mac.h obj_dat.h
+
+# objects.pl both reads and writes obj_mac.num
+obj_mac.h: objects.pl objects.txt obj_mac.num
+	perl objects.pl objects.txt obj_mac.num obj_mac.h
+
 files:
 	$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile.ssl >> $(TOP)/MINFO
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
index f0d8241..47c6b9a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
-/* lib/obj/obj_dat.h */
+/* crypto/objects/obj_dat.h */
+
+/* THIS FILE IS GENERATED FROM objects.h by obj_dat.pl via the
+ * following command:
+ * perl obj_dat.pl objects.h obj_dat.h
+ */
+
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -56,17 +62,12 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 
-/* THIS FILE IS GENERATED FROM Objects.h by obj_dat.pl via the
- * following command:
- * perl obj_dat.pl objects.h obj_dat.h
- */
+#define NUM_NID 404
+#define NUM_SN 402
+#define NUM_LN 402
+#define NUM_OBJ 376
 
-#define NUM_NID 393
-#define NUM_SN 392
-#define NUM_LN 392
-#define NUM_OBJ 366
-
-static unsigned char lvalues[2896]={
+static unsigned char lvalues[2941]={
 0x00,                                        /* [  0] OBJ_undef */
 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,               /* [  1] OBJ_rsadsi */
 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,          /* [  7] OBJ_pkcs */
@@ -390,49 +391,59 @@ static unsigned char lvalues[2896]={
 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x08,0x01,     /* [2583] OBJ_id_on_personalData */
 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x01,     /* [2591] OBJ_id_pda_dateOfBirth */
 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x02,     /* [2599] OBJ_id_pda_placeOfBirth */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x03,     /* [2607] OBJ_id_pda_pseudonym */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x04,     /* [2615] OBJ_id_pda_gender */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x05,     /* [2623] OBJ_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x06,     /* [2631] OBJ_id_pda_countryOfResidence */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x01,     /* [2639] OBJ_id_aca_authenticationInfo */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x02,     /* [2647] OBJ_id_aca_accessIdentity */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x03,     /* [2655] OBJ_id_aca_chargingIdentity */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x04,     /* [2663] OBJ_id_aca_group */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x05,     /* [2671] OBJ_id_aca_role */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0B,0x01,     /* [2679] OBJ_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1 */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0C,0x01,     /* [2687] OBJ_id_cct_crs */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0C,0x02,     /* [2695] OBJ_id_cct_PKIData */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0C,0x03,     /* [2703] OBJ_id_cct_PKIResponse */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x03,     /* [2711] OBJ_ad_timeStamping */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x04,     /* [2719] OBJ_ad_dvcs */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x01,/* [2727] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_basic */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x02,/* [2736] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x03,/* [2745] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x04,/* [2754] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x05,/* [2763] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x06,/* [2772] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x07,/* [2781] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x08,/* [2790] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x09,/* [2799] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_valid */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x0A,/* [2808] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_path */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x0B,/* [2817] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot */
-0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,                         /* [2826] OBJ_algorithm */
-0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x0B,                    /* [2830] OBJ_rsaSignature */
-0x55,0x08,                                   /* [2835] OBJ_X500algorithms */
-0x2B,                                        /* [2837] OBJ_org */
-0x2B,0x06,                                   /* [2838] OBJ_dod */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,                              /* [2840] OBJ_iana */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x01,                         /* [2843] OBJ_Directory */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x02,                         /* [2847] OBJ_Management */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x03,                         /* [2851] OBJ_Experimental */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,                         /* [2855] OBJ_Private */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,                         /* [2859] OBJ_Security */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x06,                         /* [2863] OBJ_SNMPv2 */
-0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07,                         /* [2867] OBJ_Mail */
-0x01,                                        /* [2871] OBJ_Enterprises */
-0xBA,0x82,0x58,                              /* [2872] OBJ_dcObject */
-0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x19,/* [2875] OBJ_domainComponent */
-0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x0D,/* [2885] OBJ_Domain */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x03,     /* [2607] OBJ_id_pda_gender */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x04,     /* [2615] OBJ_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x05,     /* [2623] OBJ_id_pda_countryOfResidence */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x01,     /* [2631] OBJ_id_aca_authenticationInfo */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x02,     /* [2639] OBJ_id_aca_accessIdentity */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x03,     /* [2647] OBJ_id_aca_chargingIdentity */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x04,     /* [2655] OBJ_id_aca_group */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x05,     /* [2663] OBJ_id_aca_role */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0B,0x01,     /* [2671] OBJ_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1 */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0C,0x01,     /* [2679] OBJ_id_cct_crs */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0C,0x02,     /* [2687] OBJ_id_cct_PKIData */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0C,0x03,     /* [2695] OBJ_id_cct_PKIResponse */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x03,     /* [2703] OBJ_ad_timeStamping */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x04,     /* [2711] OBJ_ad_dvcs */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x01,/* [2719] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_basic */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x02,/* [2728] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x03,/* [2737] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x04,/* [2746] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x05,/* [2755] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x06,/* [2764] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x07,/* [2773] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x08,/* [2782] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x09,/* [2791] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_valid */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x0A,/* [2800] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_path */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x0B,/* [2809] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot */
+0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,                         /* [2818] OBJ_algorithm */
+0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x0B,                    /* [2822] OBJ_rsaSignature */
+0x55,0x08,                                   /* [2827] OBJ_X500algorithms */
+0x2B,                                        /* [2829] OBJ_org */
+0x2B,0x06,                                   /* [2830] OBJ_dod */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,                              /* [2832] OBJ_iana */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x01,                         /* [2835] OBJ_Directory */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x02,                         /* [2839] OBJ_Management */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x03,                         /* [2843] OBJ_Experimental */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,                         /* [2847] OBJ_Private */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,                         /* [2851] OBJ_Security */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x06,                         /* [2855] OBJ_SNMPv2 */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07,                         /* [2859] OBJ_Mail */
+0x01,                                        /* [2863] OBJ_Enterprises */
+0xBA,0x82,0x58,                              /* [2864] OBJ_dcObject */
+0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x19,/* [2867] OBJ_domainComponent */
+0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x0D,/* [2877] OBJ_Domain */
+0x50,                                        /* [2887] OBJ_joint_iso_ccitt */
+0x55,0x01,0x05,                              /* [2888] OBJ_selected_attribute_types */
+0x55,0x01,0x05,0x37,                         /* [2891] OBJ_clearance */
+0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x03,/* [2895] OBJ_md4WithRSAEncryption */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x0A,     /* [2904] OBJ_ac_proxying */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x0B,     /* [2912] OBJ_sinfo_access */
+0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x06,     /* [2920] OBJ_id_aca_encAttrs */
+0x55,0x04,0x48,                              /* [2928] OBJ_role */
+0x55,0x1D,0x24,                              /* [2931] OBJ_policy_constraints */
+0x55,0x1D,0x37,                              /* [2934] OBJ_target_information */
+0x55,0x1D,0x38,                              /* [2937] OBJ_no_rev_avail */
 };
 
 static ASN1_OBJECT nid_objs[NUM_NID]={
@@ -576,7 +587,8 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT nid_objs[NUM_NID]={
 {"G","givenName",NID_givenName,3,&(lvalues[535]),0},
 {"S","surname",NID_surname,3,&(lvalues[538]),0},
 {"I","initials",NID_initials,3,&(lvalues[541]),0},
-{"UID","uniqueIdentifier",NID_uniqueIdentifier,3,&(lvalues[544]),0},
+{"uniqueIdentifier","uniqueIdentifier",NID_uniqueIdentifier,3,
+	&(lvalues[544]),0},
 {"crlDistributionPoints","X509v3 CRL Distribution Points",
 	NID_crl_distribution_points,3,&(lvalues[547]),0},
 {"RSA-NP-MD5","md5WithRSA",NID_md5WithRSA,5,&(lvalues[550]),0},
@@ -985,66 +997,84 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT nid_objs[NUM_NID]={
 	&(lvalues[2591]),0},
 {"id-pda-placeOfBirth","id-pda-placeOfBirth",NID_id_pda_placeOfBirth,
 	8,&(lvalues[2599]),0},
-{"id-pda-pseudonym","id-pda-pseudonym",NID_id_pda_pseudonym,8,
-	&(lvalues[2607]),0},
-{"id-pda-gender","id-pda-gender",NID_id_pda_gender,8,&(lvalues[2615]),0},
+{NULL,NULL,NID_undef,0,NULL},
+{"id-pda-gender","id-pda-gender",NID_id_pda_gender,8,&(lvalues[2607]),0},
 {"id-pda-countryOfCitizenship","id-pda-countryOfCitizenship",
-	NID_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship,8,&(lvalues[2623]),0},
+	NID_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship,8,&(lvalues[2615]),0},
 {"id-pda-countryOfResidence","id-pda-countryOfResidence",
-	NID_id_pda_countryOfResidence,8,&(lvalues[2631]),0},
+	NID_id_pda_countryOfResidence,8,&(lvalues[2623]),0},
 {"id-aca-authenticationInfo","id-aca-authenticationInfo",
-	NID_id_aca_authenticationInfo,8,&(lvalues[2639]),0},
+	NID_id_aca_authenticationInfo,8,&(lvalues[2631]),0},
 {"id-aca-accessIdentity","id-aca-accessIdentity",
-	NID_id_aca_accessIdentity,8,&(lvalues[2647]),0},
+	NID_id_aca_accessIdentity,8,&(lvalues[2639]),0},
 {"id-aca-chargingIdentity","id-aca-chargingIdentity",
-	NID_id_aca_chargingIdentity,8,&(lvalues[2655]),0},
-{"id-aca-group","id-aca-group",NID_id_aca_group,8,&(lvalues[2663]),0},
-{"id-aca-role","id-aca-role",NID_id_aca_role,8,&(lvalues[2671]),0},
+	NID_id_aca_chargingIdentity,8,&(lvalues[2647]),0},
+{"id-aca-group","id-aca-group",NID_id_aca_group,8,&(lvalues[2655]),0},
+{"id-aca-role","id-aca-role",NID_id_aca_role,8,&(lvalues[2663]),0},
 {"id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1","id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1",
-	NID_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1,8,&(lvalues[2679]),0},
-{"id-cct-crs","id-cct-crs",NID_id_cct_crs,8,&(lvalues[2687]),0},
+	NID_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1,8,&(lvalues[2671]),0},
+{"id-cct-crs","id-cct-crs",NID_id_cct_crs,8,&(lvalues[2679]),0},
 {"id-cct-PKIData","id-cct-PKIData",NID_id_cct_PKIData,8,
-	&(lvalues[2695]),0},
+	&(lvalues[2687]),0},
 {"id-cct-PKIResponse","id-cct-PKIResponse",NID_id_cct_PKIResponse,8,
-	&(lvalues[2703]),0},
+	&(lvalues[2695]),0},
 {"ad_timestamping","AD Time Stamping",NID_ad_timeStamping,8,
-	&(lvalues[2711]),0},
-{"AD_DVCS","ad dvcs",NID_ad_dvcs,8,&(lvalues[2719]),0},
+	&(lvalues[2703]),0},
+{"AD_DVCS","ad dvcs",NID_ad_dvcs,8,&(lvalues[2711]),0},
 {"basicOCSPResponse","Basic OCSP Response",NID_id_pkix_OCSP_basic,9,
-	&(lvalues[2727]),0},
-{"Nonce","OCSP Nonce",NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce,9,&(lvalues[2736]),0},
-{"CrlID","OCSP CRL ID",NID_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID,9,&(lvalues[2745]),0},
+	&(lvalues[2719]),0},
+{"Nonce","OCSP Nonce",NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce,9,&(lvalues[2728]),0},
+{"CrlID","OCSP CRL ID",NID_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID,9,&(lvalues[2737]),0},
 {"acceptableResponses","Acceptable OCSP Responses",
-	NID_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses,9,&(lvalues[2754]),0},
-{"noCheck","noCheck",NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck,9,&(lvalues[2763]),0},
+	NID_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses,9,&(lvalues[2746]),0},
+{"noCheck","noCheck",NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck,9,&(lvalues[2755]),0},
 {"archiveCutoff","OCSP Archive Cutoff",NID_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff,
-	9,&(lvalues[2772]),0},
+	9,&(lvalues[2764]),0},
 {"serviceLocator","OCSP Service Locator",
-	NID_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator,9,&(lvalues[2781]),0},
+	NID_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator,9,&(lvalues[2773]),0},
 {"extendedStatus","Extended OCSP Status",
-	NID_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus,9,&(lvalues[2790]),0},
-{"valid","valid",NID_id_pkix_OCSP_valid,9,&(lvalues[2799]),0},
-{"path","path",NID_id_pkix_OCSP_path,9,&(lvalues[2808]),0},
+	NID_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus,9,&(lvalues[2782]),0},
+{"valid","valid",NID_id_pkix_OCSP_valid,9,&(lvalues[2791]),0},
+{"path","path",NID_id_pkix_OCSP_path,9,&(lvalues[2800]),0},
 {"trustRoot","Trust Root",NID_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot,9,
-	&(lvalues[2817]),0},
-{"algorithm","algorithm",NID_algorithm,4,&(lvalues[2826]),0},
-{"rsaSignature","rsaSignature",NID_rsaSignature,5,&(lvalues[2830]),0},
+	&(lvalues[2809]),0},
+{"algorithm","algorithm",NID_algorithm,4,&(lvalues[2818]),0},
+{"rsaSignature","rsaSignature",NID_rsaSignature,5,&(lvalues[2822]),0},
 {"X500algorithms","directory services - algorithms",
-	NID_X500algorithms,2,&(lvalues[2835]),0},
-{"ORG","org",NID_org,1,&(lvalues[2837]),0},
-{"DOD","dod",NID_dod,2,&(lvalues[2838]),0},
-{"IANA","iana",NID_iana,3,&(lvalues[2840]),0},
-{"directory","Directory",NID_Directory,4,&(lvalues[2843]),0},
-{"mgmt","Management",NID_Management,4,&(lvalues[2847]),0},
-{"experimental","Experimental",NID_Experimental,4,&(lvalues[2851]),0},
-{"private","Private",NID_Private,4,&(lvalues[2855]),0},
-{"security","Security",NID_Security,4,&(lvalues[2859]),0},
-{"snmpv2","SNMPv2",NID_SNMPv2,4,&(lvalues[2863]),0},
-{"mail","Mail",NID_Mail,4,&(lvalues[2867]),0},
-{"enterprises","Enterprises",NID_Enterprises,1,&(lvalues[2871]),0},
-{"dcobject","dcObject",NID_dcObject,3,&(lvalues[2872]),0},
-{"DC","domainComponent",NID_domainComponent,10,&(lvalues[2875]),0},
-{"domain","Domain",NID_Domain,10,&(lvalues[2885]),0},
+	NID_X500algorithms,2,&(lvalues[2827]),0},
+{"ORG","org",NID_org,1,&(lvalues[2829]),0},
+{"DOD","dod",NID_dod,2,&(lvalues[2830]),0},
+{"IANA","iana",NID_iana,3,&(lvalues[2832]),0},
+{"directory","Directory",NID_Directory,4,&(lvalues[2835]),0},
+{"mgmt","Management",NID_Management,4,&(lvalues[2839]),0},
+{"experimental","Experimental",NID_Experimental,4,&(lvalues[2843]),0},
+{"private","Private",NID_Private,4,&(lvalues[2847]),0},
+{"security","Security",NID_Security,4,&(lvalues[2851]),0},
+{"snmpv2","SNMPv2",NID_SNMPv2,4,&(lvalues[2855]),0},
+{"mail","Mail",NID_Mail,4,&(lvalues[2859]),0},
+{"enterprises","Enterprises",NID_Enterprises,1,&(lvalues[2863]),0},
+{"dcobject","dcObject",NID_dcObject,3,&(lvalues[2864]),0},
+{"DC","domainComponent",NID_domainComponent,10,&(lvalues[2867]),0},
+{"domain","Domain",NID_Domain,10,&(lvalues[2877]),0},
+{"JOINT-ISO-CCITT","joint-iso-ccitt",NID_joint_iso_ccitt,1,
+	&(lvalues[2887]),0},
+{"selected-attribute-types","Selected Attribute Types",
+	NID_selected_attribute_types,3,&(lvalues[2888]),0},
+{"clearance","clearance",NID_clearance,4,&(lvalues[2891]),0},
+{"RSA-MD4","md4WithRSAEncryption",NID_md4WithRSAEncryption,9,
+	&(lvalues[2895]),0},
+{"ac-proxying","ac-proxying",NID_ac_proxying,8,&(lvalues[2904]),0},
+{"subjectInfoAccess","Subject Information Access",NID_sinfo_access,8,
+	&(lvalues[2912]),0},
+{"id-aca-encAttrs","id-aca-encAttrs",NID_id_aca_encAttrs,8,
+	&(lvalues[2920]),0},
+{"role","role",NID_role,3,&(lvalues[2928]),0},
+{"policyConstraints","X509v3 Policy Constraints",
+	NID_policy_constraints,3,&(lvalues[2931]),0},
+{"targetInformation","X509v3 AC Targeting",NID_target_information,3,
+	&(lvalues[2934]),0},
+{"noRevAvail","X509v3 No Revocation Available",NID_no_rev_avail,3,
+	&(lvalues[2937]),0},
 };
 
 static ASN1_OBJECT *sn_objs[NUM_SN]={
@@ -1093,6 +1123,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *sn_objs[NUM_SN]={
 &(nid_objs[46]),/* "IDEA-OFB" */
 &(nid_objs[181]),/* "ISO" */
 &(nid_objs[183]),/* "ISO-US" */
+&(nid_objs[393]),/* "JOINT-ISO-CCITT" */
 &(nid_objs[15]),/* "L" */
 &(nid_objs[ 3]),/* "MD2" */
 &(nid_objs[257]),/* "MD4" */
@@ -1138,6 +1169,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *sn_objs[NUM_SN]={
 &(nid_objs[124]),/* "RLE" */
 &(nid_objs[19]),/* "RSA" */
 &(nid_objs[ 7]),/* "RSA-MD2" */
+&(nid_objs[396]),/* "RSA-MD4" */
 &(nid_objs[ 8]),/* "RSA-MD5" */
 &(nid_objs[96]),/* "RSA-MDC2" */
 &(nid_objs[104]),/* "RSA-NP-MD5" */
@@ -1154,7 +1186,6 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *sn_objs[NUM_SN]={
 &(nid_objs[16]),/* "ST" */
 &(nid_objs[143]),/* "SXNetID" */
 &(nid_objs[106]),/* "T" */
-&(nid_objs[102]),/* "UID" */
 &(nid_objs[ 0]),/* "UNDEF" */
 &(nid_objs[11]),/* "X500" */
 &(nid_objs[378]),/* "X500algorithms" */
@@ -1164,6 +1195,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *sn_objs[NUM_SN]={
 &(nid_objs[125]),/* "ZLIB" */
 &(nid_objs[289]),/* "aaControls" */
 &(nid_objs[287]),/* "ac-auditEntity" */
+&(nid_objs[397]),/* "ac-proxying" */
 &(nid_objs[288]),/* "ac-targeting" */
 &(nid_objs[368]),/* "acceptableResponses" */
 &(nid_objs[363]),/* "ad_timestamping" */
@@ -1178,6 +1210,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *sn_objs[NUM_SN]={
 &(nid_objs[152]),/* "certBag" */
 &(nid_objs[89]),/* "certificatePolicies" */
 &(nid_objs[54]),/* "challengePassword" */
+&(nid_objs[395]),/* "clearance" */
 &(nid_objs[130]),/* "clientAuth" */
 &(nid_objs[131]),/* "codeSigning" */
 &(nid_objs[50]),/* "contentType" */
@@ -1204,6 +1237,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *sn_objs[NUM_SN]={
 &(nid_objs[355]),/* "id-aca-accessIdentity" */
 &(nid_objs[354]),/* "id-aca-authenticationInfo" */
 &(nid_objs[356]),/* "id-aca-chargingIdentity" */
+&(nid_objs[399]),/* "id-aca-encAttrs" */
 &(nid_objs[357]),/* "id-aca-group" */
 &(nid_objs[358]),/* "id-aca-role" */
 &(nid_objs[176]),/* "id-ad" */
@@ -1275,7 +1309,6 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *sn_objs[NUM_SN]={
 &(nid_objs[348]),/* "id-pda-dateOfBirth" */
 &(nid_objs[351]),/* "id-pda-gender" */
 &(nid_objs[349]),/* "id-pda-placeOfBirth" */
-&(nid_objs[350]),/* "id-pda-pseudonym" */
 &(nid_objs[175]),/* "id-pe" */
 &(nid_objs[261]),/* "id-pkip" */
 &(nid_objs[258]),/* "id-pkix-mod" */
@@ -1386,6 +1419,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *sn_objs[NUM_SN]={
 &(nid_objs[137]),/* "msSGC" */
 &(nid_objs[173]),/* "name" */
 &(nid_objs[369]),/* "noCheck" */
+&(nid_objs[403]),/* "noRevAvail" */
 &(nid_objs[72]),/* "nsBaseUrl" */
 &(nid_objs[76]),/* "nsCaPolicyUrl" */
 &(nid_objs[74]),/* "nsCaRevocationUrl" */
@@ -1413,9 +1447,11 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *sn_objs[NUM_SN]={
 &(nid_objs[22]),/* "pkcs7-signedData" */
 &(nid_objs[151]),/* "pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag" */
 &(nid_objs[47]),/* "pkcs9" */
+&(nid_objs[401]),/* "policyConstraints" */
 &(nid_objs[385]),/* "private" */
 &(nid_objs[84]),/* "privateKeyUsagePeriod" */
 &(nid_objs[286]),/* "qcStatements" */
+&(nid_objs[400]),/* "role" */
 &(nid_objs[ 6]),/* "rsaEncryption" */
 &(nid_objs[377]),/* "rsaSignature" */
 &(nid_objs[ 1]),/* "rsadsi" */
@@ -1426,15 +1462,19 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *sn_objs[NUM_SN]={
 &(nid_objs[159]),/* "sdsiCertificate" */
 &(nid_objs[154]),/* "secretBag" */
 &(nid_objs[386]),/* "security" */
+&(nid_objs[394]),/* "selected-attribute-types" */
 &(nid_objs[129]),/* "serverAuth" */
 &(nid_objs[371]),/* "serviceLocator" */
 &(nid_objs[52]),/* "signingTime" */
 &(nid_objs[387]),/* "snmpv2" */
 &(nid_objs[85]),/* "subjectAltName" */
+&(nid_objs[398]),/* "subjectInfoAccess" */
 &(nid_objs[82]),/* "subjectKeyIdentifier" */
+&(nid_objs[402]),/* "targetInformation" */
 &(nid_objs[293]),/* "textNotice" */
 &(nid_objs[133]),/* "timeStamping" */
 &(nid_objs[375]),/* "trustRoot" */
+&(nid_objs[102]),/* "uniqueIdentifier" */
 &(nid_objs[55]),/* "unstructuredAddress" */
 &(nid_objs[49]),/* "unstructuredName" */
 &(nid_objs[373]),/* "valid" */
@@ -1503,12 +1543,15 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *ln_objs[NUM_LN]={
 &(nid_objs[167]),/* "S/MIME Capabilities" */
 &(nid_objs[387]),/* "SNMPv2" */
 &(nid_objs[386]),/* "Security" */
+&(nid_objs[394]),/* "Selected Attribute Types" */
 &(nid_objs[143]),/* "Strong Extranet ID" */
+&(nid_objs[398]),/* "Subject Information Access" */
 &(nid_objs[130]),/* "TLS Web Client Authentication" */
 &(nid_objs[129]),/* "TLS Web Server Authentication" */
 &(nid_objs[133]),/* "Time Stamping" */
 &(nid_objs[375]),/* "Trust Root" */
 &(nid_objs[12]),/* "X509" */
+&(nid_objs[402]),/* "X509v3 AC Targeting" */
 &(nid_objs[90]),/* "X509v3 Authority Key Identifier" */
 &(nid_objs[87]),/* "X509v3 Basic Constraints" */
 &(nid_objs[103]),/* "X509v3 CRL Distribution Points" */
@@ -1519,6 +1562,8 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *ln_objs[NUM_LN]={
 &(nid_objs[126]),/* "X509v3 Extended Key Usage" */
 &(nid_objs[86]),/* "X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name" */
 &(nid_objs[83]),/* "X509v3 Key Usage" */
+&(nid_objs[403]),/* "X509v3 No Revocation Available" */
+&(nid_objs[401]),/* "X509v3 Policy Constraints" */
 &(nid_objs[84]),/* "X509v3 Private Key Usage Period" */
 &(nid_objs[85]),/* "X509v3 Subject Alternative Name" */
 &(nid_objs[82]),/* "X509v3 Subject Key Identifier" */
@@ -1526,6 +1571,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *ln_objs[NUM_LN]={
 &(nid_objs[185]),/* "X9.57 CM ?" */
 &(nid_objs[289]),/* "aaControls" */
 &(nid_objs[287]),/* "ac-auditEntity" */
+&(nid_objs[397]),/* "ac-proxying" */
 &(nid_objs[288]),/* "ac-targeting" */
 &(nid_objs[364]),/* "ad dvcs" */
 &(nid_objs[376]),/* "algorithm" */
@@ -1539,6 +1585,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *ln_objs[NUM_LN]={
 &(nid_objs[111]),/* "cast5-ofb" */
 &(nid_objs[152]),/* "certBag" */
 &(nid_objs[54]),/* "challengePassword" */
+&(nid_objs[395]),/* "clearance" */
 &(nid_objs[13]),/* "commonName" */
 &(nid_objs[50]),/* "contentType" */
 &(nid_objs[53]),/* "countersignature" */
@@ -1581,6 +1628,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *ln_objs[NUM_LN]={
 &(nid_objs[355]),/* "id-aca-accessIdentity" */
 &(nid_objs[354]),/* "id-aca-authenticationInfo" */
 &(nid_objs[356]),/* "id-aca-chargingIdentity" */
+&(nid_objs[399]),/* "id-aca-encAttrs" */
 &(nid_objs[357]),/* "id-aca-group" */
 &(nid_objs[358]),/* "id-aca-role" */
 &(nid_objs[176]),/* "id-ad" */
@@ -1652,7 +1700,6 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *ln_objs[NUM_LN]={
 &(nid_objs[348]),/* "id-pda-dateOfBirth" */
 &(nid_objs[351]),/* "id-pda-gender" */
 &(nid_objs[349]),/* "id-pda-placeOfBirth" */
-&(nid_objs[350]),/* "id-pda-pseudonym" */
 &(nid_objs[175]),/* "id-pe" */
 &(nid_objs[261]),/* "id-pkip" */
 &(nid_objs[258]),/* "id-pkix-mod" */
@@ -1747,12 +1794,14 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *ln_objs[NUM_LN]={
 &(nid_objs[46]),/* "idea-ofb" */
 &(nid_objs[101]),/* "initials" */
 &(nid_objs[181]),/* "iso" */
+&(nid_objs[393]),/* "joint-iso-ccitt" */
 &(nid_objs[150]),/* "keyBag" */
 &(nid_objs[157]),/* "localKeyID" */
 &(nid_objs[15]),/* "localityName" */
 &(nid_objs[ 3]),/* "md2" */
 &(nid_objs[ 7]),/* "md2WithRSAEncryption" */
 &(nid_objs[257]),/* "md4" */
+&(nid_objs[396]),/* "md4WithRSAEncryption" */
 &(nid_objs[ 4]),/* "md5" */
 &(nid_objs[114]),/* "md5-sha1" */
 &(nid_objs[104]),/* "md5WithRSA" */
@@ -1806,6 +1855,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *ln_objs[NUM_LN]={
 &(nid_objs[123]),/* "rc5-ofb" */
 &(nid_objs[117]),/* "ripemd160" */
 &(nid_objs[119]),/* "ripemd160WithRSA" */
+&(nid_objs[400]),/* "role" */
 &(nid_objs[19]),/* "rsa" */
 &(nid_objs[ 6]),/* "rsaEncryption" */
 &(nid_objs[377]),/* "rsaSignature" */
@@ -1843,6 +1893,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *obj_objs[NUM_OBJ]={
 &(nid_objs[181]),/* OBJ_iso                          1 */
 &(nid_objs[182]),/* OBJ_member_body                  1 2 */
 &(nid_objs[379]),/* OBJ_org                          1 3 */
+&(nid_objs[393]),/* OBJ_joint_iso_ccitt              2 */
 &(nid_objs[11]),/* OBJ_X500                         2 5 */
 &(nid_objs[380]),/* OBJ_dod                          1 3 6 */
 &(nid_objs[12]),/* OBJ_X509                         2 5 4 */
@@ -1850,6 +1901,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *obj_objs[NUM_OBJ]={
 &(nid_objs[81]),/* OBJ_id_ce                        2 5 29 */
 &(nid_objs[183]),/* OBJ_ISO_US                       1 2 840 */
 &(nid_objs[381]),/* OBJ_iana                         1 3 6 1 */
+&(nid_objs[394]),/* OBJ_selected_attribute_types     2 5 1 5 */
 &(nid_objs[13]),/* OBJ_commonName                   2 5 4 3 */
 &(nid_objs[100]),/* OBJ_surname                      2 5 4 4 */
 &(nid_objs[105]),/* OBJ_serialNumber                 2 5 4 5 */
@@ -1865,6 +1917,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *obj_objs[NUM_OBJ]={
 &(nid_objs[101]),/* OBJ_initials                     2 5 4 43 */
 &(nid_objs[102]),/* OBJ_uniqueIdentifier             2 5 4 45 */
 &(nid_objs[174]),/* OBJ_dnQualifier                  2 5 4 46 */
+&(nid_objs[400]),/* OBJ_role                         2 5 4 72 */
 &(nid_objs[82]),/* OBJ_subject_key_identifier       2 5 29 14 */
 &(nid_objs[83]),/* OBJ_key_usage                    2 5 29 15 */
 &(nid_objs[84]),/* OBJ_private_key_usage_period     2 5 29 16 */
@@ -1878,7 +1931,10 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *obj_objs[NUM_OBJ]={
 &(nid_objs[103]),/* OBJ_crl_distribution_points      2 5 29 31 */
 &(nid_objs[89]),/* OBJ_certificate_policies         2 5 29 32 */
 &(nid_objs[90]),/* OBJ_authority_key_identifier     2 5 29 35 */
+&(nid_objs[401]),/* OBJ_policy_constraints           2 5 29 36 */
 &(nid_objs[126]),/* OBJ_ext_key_usage                2 5 29 37 */
+&(nid_objs[402]),/* OBJ_target_information           2 5 29 55 */
+&(nid_objs[403]),/* OBJ_no_rev_avail                 2 5 29 56 */
 &(nid_objs[390]),/* OBJ_dcObject                      1466 344 */
 &(nid_objs[382]),/* OBJ_Directory                    1 3 6 1 1 */
 &(nid_objs[383]),/* OBJ_Management                   1 3 6 1 2 */
@@ -1888,6 +1944,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *obj_objs[NUM_OBJ]={
 &(nid_objs[387]),/* OBJ_SNMPv2                       1 3 6 1 6 */
 &(nid_objs[388]),/* OBJ_Mail                         1 3 6 1 7 */
 &(nid_objs[376]),/* OBJ_algorithm                    1 3 14 3 2 */
+&(nid_objs[395]),/* OBJ_clearance                    2 5 1 5 55 */
 &(nid_objs[19]),/* OBJ_rsa                          2 5 8 1 1 */
 &(nid_objs[96]),/* OBJ_mdc2WithRSA                  2 5 8 3 100 */
 &(nid_objs[95]),/* OBJ_mdc2                         2 5 8 3 101 */
@@ -1970,6 +2027,8 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *obj_objs[NUM_OBJ]={
 &(nid_objs[290]),/* OBJ_sbqp_ipAddrBlock             1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7 */
 &(nid_objs[291]),/* OBJ_sbqp_autonomousSysNum        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 8 */
 &(nid_objs[292]),/* OBJ_sbqp_routerIdentifier        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 9 */
+&(nid_objs[397]),/* OBJ_ac_proxying                  1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 10 */
+&(nid_objs[398]),/* OBJ_sinfo_access                 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 11 */
 &(nid_objs[164]),/* OBJ_id_qt_cps                    1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 1 */
 &(nid_objs[165]),/* OBJ_id_qt_unotice                1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 2 */
 &(nid_objs[293]),/* OBJ_textNotice                   1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 3 */
@@ -2027,15 +2086,15 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *obj_objs[NUM_OBJ]={
 &(nid_objs[347]),/* OBJ_id_on_personalData           1 3 6 1 5 5 7 8 1 */
 &(nid_objs[348]),/* OBJ_id_pda_dateOfBirth           1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 1 */
 &(nid_objs[349]),/* OBJ_id_pda_placeOfBirth          1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 2 */
-&(nid_objs[350]),/* OBJ_id_pda_pseudonym             1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 3 */
-&(nid_objs[351]),/* OBJ_id_pda_gender                1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 4 */
-&(nid_objs[352]),/* OBJ_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship  1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 5 */
-&(nid_objs[353]),/* OBJ_id_pda_countryOfResidence    1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 6 */
+&(nid_objs[351]),/* OBJ_id_pda_gender                1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 3 */
+&(nid_objs[352]),/* OBJ_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship  1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 4 */
+&(nid_objs[353]),/* OBJ_id_pda_countryOfResidence    1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 5 */
 &(nid_objs[354]),/* OBJ_id_aca_authenticationInfo    1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 1 */
 &(nid_objs[355]),/* OBJ_id_aca_accessIdentity        1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 2 */
 &(nid_objs[356]),/* OBJ_id_aca_chargingIdentity      1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 3 */
 &(nid_objs[357]),/* OBJ_id_aca_group                 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 4 */
 &(nid_objs[358]),/* OBJ_id_aca_role                  1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 5 */
+&(nid_objs[399]),/* OBJ_id_aca_encAttrs              1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 6 */
 &(nid_objs[359]),/* OBJ_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1       1 3 6 1 5 5 7 11 1 */
 &(nid_objs[360]),/* OBJ_id_cct_crs                   1 3 6 1 5 5 7 12 1 */
 &(nid_objs[361]),/* OBJ_id_cct_PKIData               1 3 6 1 5 5 7 12 2 */
@@ -2050,6 +2109,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *obj_objs[NUM_OBJ]={
 &(nid_objs[112]),/* OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC       1 2 840 113533 7 66 12 */
 &(nid_objs[ 6]),/* OBJ_rsaEncryption                1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 */
 &(nid_objs[ 7]),/* OBJ_md2WithRSAEncryption         1 2 840 113549 1 1 2 */
+&(nid_objs[396]),/* OBJ_md4WithRSAEncryption         1 2 840 113549 1 1 3 */
 &(nid_objs[ 8]),/* OBJ_md5WithRSAEncryption         1 2 840 113549 1 1 4 */
 &(nid_objs[65]),/* OBJ_sha1WithRSAEncryption        1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 */
 &(nid_objs[28]),/* OBJ_dhKeyAgreement               1 2 840 113549 1 3 1 */
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl
index 11066df..be92f18 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl
@@ -164,7 +164,13 @@ foreach (sort obj_cmp @a)
 	}
 
 print OUT <<'EOF';
-/* lib/obj/obj_dat.h */
+/* crypto/objects/obj_dat.h */
+
+/* THIS FILE IS GENERATED FROM objects.h by obj_dat.pl via the
+ * following command:
+ * perl obj_dat.pl objects.h obj_dat.h
+ */
+
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -222,11 +228,6 @@ print OUT <<'EOF';
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 
-/* THIS FILE IS GENERATED FROM Objects.h by obj_dat.pl via the
- * following command:
- * perl obj_dat.pl objects.h obj_dat.h
- */
-
 EOF
 
 printf OUT "#define NUM_NID %d\n",$n;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_mac.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_mac.h
index 401b1e5..ad2e423 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_mac.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_mac.h
@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
-/* lib/obj/obj_mac.h */
+/* crypto/objects/obj_mac.h */
+
+/* THIS FILE IS GENERATED FROM objects.txt by objects.pl via the
+ * following command:
+ * perl objects.pl objects.txt obj_mac.num obj_mac.h
+ */
+
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -56,11 +62,6 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 
-/* THIS FILE IS GENERATED FROM objects.txt by objects.pl via the
- * following command:
- * perl objects.pl objects.txt obj_mac.num obj_mac.h
- */
-
 #define SN_undef			"UNDEF"
 #define LN_undef			"undefined"
 #define NID_undef			0
@@ -71,11 +72,25 @@
 #define NID_iso		181
 #define OBJ_iso		1L
 
+#define SN_joint_iso_ccitt		"JOINT-ISO-CCITT"
+#define LN_joint_iso_ccitt		"joint-iso-ccitt"
+#define NID_joint_iso_ccitt		393
+#define OBJ_joint_iso_ccitt		2L
+
 #define SN_member_body		"member-body"
 #define LN_member_body		"ISO Member Body"
 #define NID_member_body		182
 #define OBJ_member_body		OBJ_iso,2L
 
+#define SN_selected_attribute_types		"selected-attribute-types"
+#define LN_selected_attribute_types		"Selected Attribute Types"
+#define NID_selected_attribute_types		394
+#define OBJ_selected_attribute_types		OBJ_joint_iso_ccitt,5L,1L,5L
+
+#define SN_clearance		"clearance"
+#define NID_clearance		395
+#define OBJ_clearance		OBJ_selected_attribute_types,55L
+
 #define SN_ISO_US		"ISO-US"
 #define LN_ISO_US		"ISO US Member Body"
 #define NID_ISO_US		183
@@ -145,6 +160,11 @@
 #define NID_md2WithRSAEncryption		7
 #define OBJ_md2WithRSAEncryption		OBJ_pkcs1,2L
 
+#define SN_md4WithRSAEncryption		"RSA-MD4"
+#define LN_md4WithRSAEncryption		"md4WithRSAEncryption"
+#define NID_md4WithRSAEncryption		396
+#define OBJ_md4WithRSAEncryption		OBJ_pkcs1,3L
+
 #define SN_md5WithRSAEncryption		"RSA-MD5"
 #define LN_md5WithRSAEncryption		"md5WithRSAEncryption"
 #define NID_md5WithRSAEncryption		8
@@ -956,6 +976,15 @@
 #define NID_sbqp_routerIdentifier		292
 #define OBJ_sbqp_routerIdentifier		OBJ_id_pe,9L
 
+#define SN_ac_proxying		"ac-proxying"
+#define NID_ac_proxying		397
+#define OBJ_ac_proxying		OBJ_id_pe,10L
+
+#define SN_sinfo_access		"subjectInfoAccess"
+#define LN_sinfo_access		"Subject Information Access"
+#define NID_sinfo_access		398
+#define OBJ_sinfo_access		OBJ_id_pe,11L
+
 #define SN_id_qt_cps		"id-qt-cps"
 #define LN_id_qt_cps		"Policy Qualifier CPS"
 #define NID_id_qt_cps		164
@@ -1228,21 +1257,17 @@
 #define NID_id_pda_placeOfBirth		349
 #define OBJ_id_pda_placeOfBirth		OBJ_id_pda,2L
 
-#define SN_id_pda_pseudonym		"id-pda-pseudonym"
-#define NID_id_pda_pseudonym		350
-#define OBJ_id_pda_pseudonym		OBJ_id_pda,3L
-
 #define SN_id_pda_gender		"id-pda-gender"
 #define NID_id_pda_gender		351
-#define OBJ_id_pda_gender		OBJ_id_pda,4L
+#define OBJ_id_pda_gender		OBJ_id_pda,3L
 
 #define SN_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship		"id-pda-countryOfCitizenship"
 #define NID_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship		352
-#define OBJ_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship		OBJ_id_pda,5L
+#define OBJ_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship		OBJ_id_pda,4L
 
 #define SN_id_pda_countryOfResidence		"id-pda-countryOfResidence"
 #define NID_id_pda_countryOfResidence		353
-#define OBJ_id_pda_countryOfResidence		OBJ_id_pda,6L
+#define OBJ_id_pda_countryOfResidence		OBJ_id_pda,5L
 
 #define SN_id_aca_authenticationInfo		"id-aca-authenticationInfo"
 #define NID_id_aca_authenticationInfo		354
@@ -1264,6 +1289,10 @@
 #define NID_id_aca_role		358
 #define OBJ_id_aca_role		OBJ_id_aca,5L
 
+#define SN_id_aca_encAttrs		"id-aca-encAttrs"
+#define NID_id_aca_encAttrs		399
+#define OBJ_id_aca_encAttrs		OBJ_id_aca,6L
+
 #define SN_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1		"id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1"
 #define NID_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1		359
 #define OBJ_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1		OBJ_id_qcs,1L
@@ -1545,7 +1574,6 @@
 #define NID_initials		101
 #define OBJ_initials		OBJ_X509,43L
 
-#define SN_uniqueIdentifier		"UID"
 #define LN_uniqueIdentifier		"uniqueIdentifier"
 #define NID_uniqueIdentifier		102
 #define OBJ_uniqueIdentifier		OBJ_X509,45L
@@ -1555,6 +1583,11 @@
 #define NID_dnQualifier		174
 #define OBJ_dnQualifier		OBJ_X509,46L
 
+#define SN_role		"role"
+#define LN_role		"role"
+#define NID_role		400
+#define OBJ_role		OBJ_X509,72L
+
 #define SN_X500algorithms		"X500algorithms"
 #define LN_X500algorithms		"directory services - algorithms"
 #define NID_X500algorithms		378
@@ -1644,11 +1677,26 @@
 #define NID_authority_key_identifier		90
 #define OBJ_authority_key_identifier		OBJ_id_ce,35L
 
+#define SN_policy_constraints		"policyConstraints"
+#define LN_policy_constraints		"X509v3 Policy Constraints"
+#define NID_policy_constraints		401
+#define OBJ_policy_constraints		OBJ_id_ce,36L
+
 #define SN_ext_key_usage		"extendedKeyUsage"
 #define LN_ext_key_usage		"X509v3 Extended Key Usage"
 #define NID_ext_key_usage		126
 #define OBJ_ext_key_usage		OBJ_id_ce,37L
 
+#define SN_target_information		"targetInformation"
+#define LN_target_information		"X509v3 AC Targeting"
+#define NID_target_information		402
+#define OBJ_target_information		OBJ_id_ce,55L
+
+#define SN_no_rev_avail		"noRevAvail"
+#define LN_no_rev_avail		"X509v3 No Revocation Available"
+#define NID_no_rev_avail		403
+#define OBJ_no_rev_avail		OBJ_id_ce,56L
+
 #define SN_netscape		"Netscape"
 #define LN_netscape		"Netscape Communications Corp."
 #define NID_netscape		57
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
index d73a513..a6baa8c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
@@ -390,3 +390,14 @@ Enterprises		389
 dcObject		390
 domainComponent		391
 Domain		392
+joint_iso_ccitt		393
+selected_attribute_types		394
+clearance		395
+md4WithRSAEncryption		396
+ac_proxying		397
+sinfo_access		398
+id_aca_encAttrs		399
+role		400
+policy_constraints		401
+target_information		402
+no_rev_avail		403
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.h
index c099e2e..990a6b8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.h
@@ -452,54 +452,54 @@
 #define LN_desx_cbc			"desx-cbc"
 #define NID_desx_cbc			80
 
-#define SN_ld_ce			"ld-ce"
-#define NID_ld_ce			81
-#define OBJ_ld_ce			2L,5L,29L
+#define SN_id_ce			"id-ce"
+#define NID_id_ce			81
+#define OBJ_id_ce			2L,5L,29L
 
 #define SN_subject_key_identifier	"subjectKeyIdentifier"
 #define LN_subject_key_identifier	"X509v3 Subject Key Identifier"
 #define NID_subject_key_identifier	82
-#define OBJ_subject_key_identifier	OBJ_ld_ce,14L
+#define OBJ_subject_key_identifier	OBJ_id_ce,14L
 
 #define SN_key_usage			"keyUsage"
 #define LN_key_usage			"X509v3 Key Usage"
 #define NID_key_usage			83
-#define OBJ_key_usage			OBJ_ld_ce,15L
+#define OBJ_key_usage			OBJ_id_ce,15L
 
 #define SN_private_key_usage_period	"privateKeyUsagePeriod"
 #define LN_private_key_usage_period	"X509v3 Private Key Usage Period"
 #define NID_private_key_usage_period	84
-#define OBJ_private_key_usage_period	OBJ_ld_ce,16L
+#define OBJ_private_key_usage_period	OBJ_id_ce,16L
 
 #define SN_subject_alt_name		"subjectAltName"
 #define LN_subject_alt_name		"X509v3 Subject Alternative Name"
 #define NID_subject_alt_name		85
-#define OBJ_subject_alt_name		OBJ_ld_ce,17L
+#define OBJ_subject_alt_name		OBJ_id_ce,17L
 
 #define SN_issuer_alt_name		"issuerAltName"
 #define LN_issuer_alt_name		"X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name"
 #define NID_issuer_alt_name		86
-#define OBJ_issuer_alt_name		OBJ_ld_ce,18L
+#define OBJ_issuer_alt_name		OBJ_id_ce,18L
 
 #define SN_basic_constraints		"basicConstraints"
 #define LN_basic_constraints		"X509v3 Basic Constraints"
 #define NID_basic_constraints		87
-#define OBJ_basic_constraints		OBJ_ld_ce,19L
+#define OBJ_basic_constraints		OBJ_id_ce,19L
 
 #define SN_crl_number			"crlNumber"
 #define LN_crl_number			"X509v3 CRL Number"
 #define NID_crl_number			88
-#define OBJ_crl_number			OBJ_ld_ce,20L
+#define OBJ_crl_number			OBJ_id_ce,20L
 
 #define SN_certificate_policies		"certificatePolicies"
 #define LN_certificate_policies		"X509v3 Certificate Policies"
 #define NID_certificate_policies	89
-#define OBJ_certificate_policies	OBJ_ld_ce,32L
+#define OBJ_certificate_policies	OBJ_id_ce,32L
 
 #define SN_authority_key_identifier	"authorityKeyIdentifier"
 #define LN_authority_key_identifier	"X509v3 Authority Key Identifier"
 #define NID_authority_key_identifier	90
-#define OBJ_authority_key_identifier	OBJ_ld_ce,35L
+#define OBJ_authority_key_identifier	OBJ_id_ce,35L
 
 #define SN_bf_cbc			"BF-CBC"
 #define LN_bf_cbc			"bf-cbc"
@@ -560,7 +560,7 @@
 #define SN_crl_distribution_points	"crlDistributionPoints"
 #define LN_crl_distribution_points	"X509v3 CRL Distribution Points"
 #define NID_crl_distribution_points	103
-#define OBJ_crl_distribution_points	OBJ_ld_ce,31L
+#define OBJ_crl_distribution_points	OBJ_id_ce,31L
 
 #define SN_md5WithRSA			"RSA-NP-MD5"
 #define LN_md5WithRSA			"md5WithRSA"
@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@
 #define SN_ext_key_usage		"extendedKeyUsage"
 #define LN_ext_key_usage		"X509v3 Extended Key Usage"
 #define NID_ext_key_usage		126
-#define OBJ_ext_key_usage		OBJ_ld_ce,37
+#define OBJ_ext_key_usage		OBJ_id_ce,37
 
 #define SN_id_pkix			"PKIX"
 #define NID_id_pkix			127
@@ -751,17 +751,17 @@
 #define SN_delta_crl			"deltaCRL"
 #define LN_delta_crl			"X509v3 Delta CRL Indicator"
 #define NID_delta_crl			140
-#define OBJ_delta_crl			OBJ_ld_ce,27L
+#define OBJ_delta_crl			OBJ_id_ce,27L
 
 #define SN_crl_reason			"CRLReason"
 #define LN_crl_reason			"CRL Reason Code"
 #define NID_crl_reason			141
-#define OBJ_crl_reason			OBJ_ld_ce,21L
+#define OBJ_crl_reason			OBJ_id_ce,21L
 
 #define SN_invalidity_date		"invalidityDate"
 #define LN_invalidity_date		"Invalidity Date"
 #define NID_invalidity_date		142
-#define OBJ_invalidity_date		OBJ_ld_ce,24L
+#define OBJ_invalidity_date		OBJ_id_ce,24L
 
 #define SN_sxnet			"SXNetID"
 #define LN_sxnet			"Strong Extranet ID"
@@ -1005,8 +1005,6 @@ int		OBJ_sn2nid(const char *s);
 int		OBJ_cmp(ASN1_OBJECT *a,ASN1_OBJECT *b);
 char *		OBJ_bsearch(char *key,char *base,int num,int size,int (*cmp)(const void *, const void *));
 
-void		ERR_load_OBJ_strings(void );
-
 int		OBJ_new_nid(int num);
 int		OBJ_add_object(ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
 int		OBJ_create(char *oid,char *sn,char *ln);
@@ -1017,6 +1015,7 @@ int		OBJ_create_objects(BIO *in);
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+void ERR_load_OBJ_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the OBJ functions. */
 
@@ -1035,4 +1034,3 @@ int		OBJ_create_objects(BIO *in);
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl
index c956bbb..2b8106e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl
@@ -114,7 +114,13 @@ close NUMOUT;
 
 open (OUT,">$ARGV[2]") || die "Can't open output file $ARGV[2]";
 print OUT <<'EOF';
-/* lib/obj/obj_mac.h */
+/* crypto/objects/obj_mac.h */
+
+/* THIS FILE IS GENERATED FROM objects.txt by objects.pl via the
+ * following command:
+ * perl objects.pl objects.txt obj_mac.num obj_mac.h
+ */
+
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -172,11 +178,6 @@ print OUT <<'EOF';
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 
-/* THIS FILE IS GENERATED FROM objects.txt by objects.pl via the
- * following command:
- * perl objects.pl objects.txt obj_mac.num obj_mac.h
- */
-
 #define SN_undef			"UNDEF"
 #define LN_undef			"undefined"
 #define NID_undef			0
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.txt b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.txt
index 3d443cf..5f179a5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.txt
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.txt
@@ -1,7 +1,13 @@
 1			: ISO			: iso
 
+2			: JOINT-ISO-CCITT	: joint-iso-ccitt
+
 iso 2			: member-body		: ISO Member Body
 
+joint-iso-ccitt 5 1 5	: selected-attribute-types	: Selected Attribute Types
+
+selected-attribute-types 55	: clearance
+
 member-body 840		: ISO-US		: ISO US Member Body
 ISO-US 10040		: X9-57			: X9.57
 X9-57 4			: X9cm			: X9.57 CM ?
@@ -26,6 +32,7 @@ rsadsi 1		: pkcs			: RSA Data Security, Inc. PKCS
 pkcs 1			: pkcs1
 pkcs1 1			:			: rsaEncryption
 pkcs1 2			: RSA-MD2		: md2WithRSAEncryption
+pkcs1 3			: RSA-MD4		: md4WithRSAEncryption
 pkcs1 4			: RSA-MD5		: md5WithRSAEncryption
 pkcs1 5			: RSA-SHA1		: sha1WithRSAEncryption
 
@@ -302,6 +309,9 @@ id-pe 6			: aaControls
 id-pe 7			: sbqp-ipAddrBlock
 id-pe 8			: sbqp-autonomousSysNum
 id-pe 9			: sbqp-routerIdentifier
+id-pe 10		: ac-proxying
+!Cname sinfo-access
+id-pe 11		: subjectInfoAccess	: Subject Information Access
 
 # PKIX policyQualifiers for Internet policy qualifiers
 id-qt 1			: id-qt-cps		: Policy Qualifier CPS
@@ -406,7 +416,9 @@ id-aca 1		: id-aca-authenticationInfo
 id-aca 2		: id-aca-accessIdentity
 id-aca 3		: id-aca-chargingIdentity
 id-aca 4		: id-aca-group
+# attention : the following seems to be obsolete, replace by 'role'
 id-aca 5		: id-aca-role
+id-aca 6		: id-aca-encAttrs
 
 # qualified certificate statements
 id-qcs 1		: id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1
@@ -496,8 +508,9 @@ X509 13			: D			: description
 X509 41			: name			: name
 X509 42			: G			: givenName
 X509 43			: I			: initials
-X509 45			: UID			: uniqueIdentifier
+X509 45			: 			: uniqueIdentifier
 X509 46			: dnQualifier		: dnQualifier
+X509 72			: role			: role
 
 X500 8			: X500algorithms	: directory services - algorithms
 X500algorithms 1 1	: RSA			: rsa
@@ -531,8 +544,14 @@ id-ce 31		: crlDistributionPoints	: X509v3 CRL Distribution Points
 id-ce 32		: certificatePolicies	: X509v3 Certificate Policies
 !Cname authority-key-identifier
 id-ce 35		: authorityKeyIdentifier : X509v3 Authority Key Identifier
+!Cname policy-constraints
+id-ce 36		: policyConstraints	: X509v3 Policy Constraints
 !Cname ext-key-usage
 id-ce 37		: extendedKeyUsage	: X509v3 Extended Key Usage
+!Cname target-information
+id-ce 55		: targetInformation	: X509v3 AC Targeting
+!Cname no-rev-avail
+id-ce 56		: noRevAvail		: X509v3 No Revocation Available
 
 !Cname netscape
 2 16 840 1 113730	: Netscape		: Netscape Communications Corp.
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
index 45c7dc8..4436e3d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x0090602fL
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 0.9.6b 9 Jul 2001"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x0090603fL
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 0.9.6c 21 dec 2001"
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT	" part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 
 
@@ -44,13 +44,13 @@
  *
  *	libcrypto.so.0
  *
- * On True64 it works a little bit differently.  There, the shared library
- * version is stored in the file, and is actually a series of versions,
- * separated by colons.  The rightmost version present in the library when
- * linking an application is stored in the application to be matched at
- * run time.  When the application is run, a check is done to see if the
- * library version stored in the application matches any of the versions
- * in the version string of the library itself.
+ * On Tru64 and IRIX 6.x it works a little bit differently.  There, the
+ * shared library version is stored in the file, and is actually a series
+ * of versions, separated by colons.  The rightmost version present in the
+ * library when linking an application is stored in the application to be
+ * matched at run time.  When the application is run, a check is done to
+ * see if the library version stored in the application matches any of the
+ * versions in the version string of the library itself.
  * This version string can be constructed in any way, depending on what
  * kind of matching is desired.  However, to implement the same scheme as
  * the one used in the other unixen, all compatible versions, from lowest
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@
  * However, it's nice and more understandable if it actually does.
  * The current library version is stored in the macro SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER,
  * which is just a piece of text in the format "M.m.e" (Major, minor, edit).
- * For the sake of True64 and any other OS that behaves in similar ways,
+ * For the sake of Tru64, IRIX, and any other OS that behaves in similar ways,
  * we need to keep a history of version numbers, which is done in the
  * macro SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY.  The numbers are separated by colons and
  * should only keep the versions that are binary compatible with the current.
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pem/pem.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pem/pem.h
index 6d3c446..3867b2b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pem/pem.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pem/pem.h
@@ -524,8 +524,6 @@ void    PEM_SignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,unsigned char *d,unsigned int cnt);
 int	PEM_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
 		unsigned int *siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
 
-void	ERR_load_PEM_strings(void);
-
 void	PEM_proc_type(char *buf, int type);
 void	PEM_dek_info(char *buf, const char *type, int len, char *str);
 
@@ -614,6 +612,7 @@ int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey(FILE *fp,EVP_PKEY *x,const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+void ERR_load_PEM_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the PEM functions. */
 
@@ -664,4 +663,3 @@ int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey(FILE *fp,EVP_PKEY *x,const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/pkcs12.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/pkcs12.h
index e529154..fefa1a6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/pkcs12.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/pkcs12.h
@@ -267,7 +267,6 @@ PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new(void);
 PKCS12_SAFEBAG *d2i_PKCS12_SAFEBAG(PKCS12_SAFEBAG **a, unsigned char **pp,
 								 long length);
 void PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *a);
-void ERR_load_PKCS12_strings(void);
 void PKCS12_PBE_add(void);
 int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
 		 STACK_OF(X509) **ca);
@@ -284,6 +283,7 @@ int PKCS12_newpass(PKCS12 *p12, char *oldpass, char *newpass);
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+void ERR_load_PKCS12_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the PKCS12 functions. */
 
@@ -342,4 +342,3 @@ int PKCS12_newpass(PKCS12 *p12, char *oldpass, char *newpass);
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_attr.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_attr.c
index 6ae264c..5ff5a88 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_attr.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_attr.c
@@ -1,9 +1,59 @@
 /* pk7_attr.c */
-/* S/MIME code.
- * Copyright (C) 1997-8 Dr S N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) 
- * All Rights Reserved. 
- * Redistribution of this code without the authors permission is expressly
- * prohibited.
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 2001.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
index bf43d030..2b60cab 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
@@ -558,11 +558,15 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
 				ASN1_UTCTIME *sign_time;
 				const EVP_MD *md_tmp;
 
-				/* Add signing time */
-				sign_time=X509_gmtime_adj(NULL,0);
-				PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si,
-					NID_pkcs9_signingTime,
-					V_ASN1_UTCTIME,sign_time);
+				/* Add signing time if not already present */
+				if (!PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si,
+							NID_pkcs9_signingTime))
+					{
+					sign_time=X509_gmtime_adj(NULL,0);
+					PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si,
+						NID_pkcs9_signingTime,
+						V_ASN1_UTCTIME,sign_time);
+					}
 
 				/* Add digest */
 				md_tmp=EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx_tmp);
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.h
index 1b817e6..5baaa78 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.h
@@ -353,8 +353,6 @@ int 			i2d_PKCS7(PKCS7 *a,
 PKCS7			*d2i_PKCS7(PKCS7 **a,
 				unsigned char **pp,long length);
 
-void ERR_load_PKCS7_strings(void);
-
 
 long PKCS7_ctrl(PKCS7 *p7, int cmd, long larg, char *parg);
 
@@ -422,6 +420,7 @@ int SMIME_text(BIO *in, BIO *out);
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+void ERR_load_PKCS7_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the PKCS7 functions. */
 
@@ -502,4 +501,3 @@ int SMIME_text(BIO *in, BIO *out);
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index 04b9d69..349629c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ static int initialized=0;
 static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread
                                            * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND
                                            * (to prevent double locking) */
+/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
 static unsigned long locking_thread = 0; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
 
 
@@ -210,7 +211,14 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
 	 */
 
 	/* check if we already have the lock */
-	do_not_lock = crypto_lock_rand && (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+	if (crypto_lock_rand)
+		{
+		CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+		do_not_lock = (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+		}
+	else
+		do_not_lock = 0;
 
 	if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
 	st_idx=state_index;
@@ -361,8 +369,10 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
 
 	/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
-	crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
 	locking_thread = CRYPTO_thread_id();
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+	crypto_lock_rand = 1;
 
 	if (!initialized)
 		{
@@ -435,7 +445,6 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 
 	/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
 	crypto_lock_rand = 0;
-	locking_thread = 0;
 	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
 
 	while (num > 0)
@@ -521,15 +530,24 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
 
 	/* check if we already have the lock
 	 * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */
-	do_not_lock = crypto_lock_rand && (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+	if (crypto_lock_rand)
+		{
+		CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+		do_not_lock = (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+		}
+	else
+		do_not_lock = 0;
 	
 	if (!do_not_lock)
 		{
 		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
 		
 		/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
-		crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
 		locking_thread = CRYPTO_thread_id();
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+		crypto_lock_rand = 1;
 		}
 	
 	if (!initialized)
@@ -544,7 +562,6 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
 		{
 		/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
 		crypto_lock_rand = 0;
-		locking_thread = 0;
 		
 		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
 		}
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/rand.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/rand.h
index 918f865..b00d972 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/rand.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/rand.h
@@ -93,7 +93,6 @@ const char *RAND_file_name(char *file,size_t num);
 int RAND_status(void);
 int RAND_egd(const char *path);
 int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path,int bytes);
-void ERR_load_RAND_strings(void);
 int RAND_poll(void);
 
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
@@ -115,10 +114,15 @@ int RAND_event(UINT, WPARAM, LPARAM);
 #endif
 #endif
 
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+void ERR_load_RAND_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the RAND functions. */
 
@@ -128,5 +132,7 @@ int RAND_event(UINT, WPARAM, LPARAM);
 /* Reason codes. */
 #define RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED				 100
 
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
 #endif
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ripemd/rmd_locl.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ripemd/rmd_locl.h
index f537b88..7b835df 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ripemd/rmd_locl.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ripemd/rmd_locl.h
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
  *					<appro@fy.chalmers.se>
  */
 #ifdef RMD160_ASM
-# if defined(__i386) || defined(_M_IX86) || defined(__INTEL__)
+# if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || defined(__INTEL__)
 #  define ripemd160_block_host_order ripemd160_block_asm_host_order
 # endif
 #endif
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
 void ripemd160_block_host_order (RIPEMD160_CTX *c, const void *p,int num);
 void ripemd160_block_data_order (RIPEMD160_CTX *c, const void *p,int num);
 
-#if defined(__i386) || defined(_M_IX86) || defined(__INTEL__)
+#if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || defined(__INTEL__)
 #define ripemd160_block_data_order ripemd160_block_host_order
 #endif
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
index fef4ef5..28912b3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
@@ -202,8 +202,6 @@ RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void);
 
 RSA_METHOD *RSA_null_method(void);
 
-void	ERR_load_RSA_strings(void );
-
 RSA *	d2i_RSAPublicKey(RSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
 int	i2d_RSAPublicKey(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp);
 RSA *	d2i_RSAPrivateKey(RSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
@@ -275,6 +273,7 @@ void *RSA_get_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx);
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the RSA functions. */
 
@@ -316,6 +315,7 @@ void *RSA_get_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx);
 #define RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN			 108
 #define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE				 109
 #define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE		 110
+#define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS		 132
 #define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL				 111
 #define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE		 122
 #define RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY		 112
@@ -342,4 +342,3 @@ void *RSA_get_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx);
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index 3e38320..cafdc41 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
 static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
 	"Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
 	RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
-	RSA_eay_public_decrypt,
-	RSA_eay_private_encrypt,
+	RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
+	RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
 	RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
 	RSA_eay_mod_exp,
 	BN_mod_exp_mont,
@@ -136,6 +136,13 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
 
 	if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
 	
+	if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+		{	
+		/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 	if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
 		{
 		BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
@@ -183,6 +190,7 @@ err:
 	return(r);
 	}
 
+/* signing */
 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
 	{
@@ -218,6 +226,13 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
 	if (i <= 0) goto err;
 
 	if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+	
+	if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+		{	
+		/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+		goto err;
+		}
 
 	if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
 		RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
@@ -292,6 +307,12 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
 	/* make data into a big number */
 	if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
 
+	if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 	if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
 		RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
 	if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
@@ -352,6 +373,7 @@ err:
 	return(r);
 	}
 
+/* signature verification */
 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
 	{
@@ -383,6 +405,13 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
 		}
 
 	if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+
+	if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 	/* do the decrypt */
 	if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
 		{
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
index 1cde7c0..bff7cf5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]=
 {RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN         ,"data greater than mod len"},
 {RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE                    ,"data too large"},
 {RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE       ,"data too large for key size"},
+{RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS        ,"data too large for modulus"},
 {RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL                    ,"data too small"},
 {RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE       ,"data too small for key size"},
 {RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY        ,"digest too big for rsa key"},
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index 1849e55..4f0bbab 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -2,7 +2,22 @@
 /* Written by Ulf Moeller. This software is distributed on an "AS IS"
    basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. */
 
-/* EME_OAEP as defined in RFC 2437 (PKCS #1 v2.0) */
+/* EME-OAEP as defined in RFC 2437 (PKCS #1 v2.0) */
+
+/* See Victor Shoup, "OAEP reconsidered," Nov. 2000,
+ * <URL: http://www.shoup.net/papers/oaep.ps.Z>
+ * for problems with the security proof for the
+ * original OAEP scheme, which EME-OAEP is based on.
+ * 
+ * A new proof can be found in E. Fujisaki, T. Okamoto,
+ * D. Pointcheval, J. Stern, "RSA-OEAP is Still Alive!",
+ * Dec. 2000, <URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/061/>.
+ * The new proof has stronger requirements for the
+ * underlying permutation: "partial-one-wayness" instead
+ * of one-wayness.  For the RSA function, this is
+ * an equivalent notion.
+ */
+
 
 #if !defined(NO_SHA) && !defined(NO_SHA1)
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -12,157 +27,174 @@
 #include <openssl/sha.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 
-int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, unsigned char *seed, long seedlen);
+int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
+	unsigned char *seed, long seedlen);
 
 int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
-	     unsigned char *from, int flen, unsigned char *param, int plen)
-    {
-    int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
-    unsigned char *db, *seed;
-    unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
-    if (flen > emlen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1)
+	unsigned char *from, int flen,
+	unsigned char *param, int plen)
 	{
-	RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP,
-	       RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
-	return (0);
-	}
+	int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
+	unsigned char *db, *seed;
+	unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 
-    if (emlen < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
-	{
-	RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
-	return (0);
-	}
-    
-    dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-    if (dbmask == NULL)
-	{
-	RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-	return (0);
-	}
+	if (flen > emlen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP,
+		   RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	if (emlen < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+		return 0;
+		}
 
-    to[0] = 0;
-    seed = to + 1;
-    db = to + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1;
-
-    SHA1(param, plen, db);
-    memset(db + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0,
-	   emlen - flen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1);
-    db[emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1] = 0x01;
-    memcpy(db + emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, from, (unsigned int) flen);
-    if (RAND_bytes(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
-    	return (0);
+	dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+	if (dbmask == NULL)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	to[0] = 0;
+	seed = to + 1;
+	db = to + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1;
+
+	SHA1(param, plen, db);
+	memset(db + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0,
+		emlen - flen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1);
+	db[emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1] = 0x01;
+	memcpy(db + emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, from, (unsigned int) flen);
+	if (RAND_bytes(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
+		return 0;
 #ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT
-    memcpy(seed,
+	memcpy(seed,
 	   "\xaa\xfd\x12\xf6\x59\xca\xe6\x34\x89\xb4\x79\xe5\x07\x6d\xde\xc2\xf0\x6c\xb5\x8f",
 	   20);
 #endif
 
-    MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-    for (i = 0; i < emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
-	db[i] ^= dbmask[i];
+	MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+	for (i = 0; i < emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+		db[i] ^= dbmask[i];
 
-    MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-    for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
-	seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
+	MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+	for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+		seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
 
-    OPENSSL_free(dbmask);
-    return (1);
-    }
+	OPENSSL_free(dbmask);
+	return 1;
+	}
 
 int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 	     unsigned char *from, int flen, int num, unsigned char *param,
 	     int plen)
-    {
-    int i, dblen, mlen = -1;
-    unsigned char *maskeddb;
-    int lzero;
-    unsigned char *db = NULL, seed[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], phash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
-    if (--num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
-	goto decoding_err;
-
-    lzero = num - flen;
-    if (lzero < 0)
-	goto decoding_err;
-    maskeddb = from - lzero + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-    
-    dblen = num - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-    db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
-    if (db == NULL)
 	{
-	RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-	return (-1);
-	}
+	int i, dblen, mlen = -1;
+	unsigned char *maskeddb;
+	int lzero;
+	unsigned char *db = NULL, seed[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], phash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	int bad = 0;
+
+	if (--num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
+		/* 'num' is the length of the modulus, i.e. does not depend on the
+		 * particular ciphertext. */
+		goto decoding_err;
+
+	lzero = num - flen;
+	if (lzero < 0)
+		{
+		/* lzero == -1 */
+
+		/* signalling this error immediately after detection might allow
+		 * for side-channel attacks (e.g. timing if 'plen' is huge
+		 * -- cf. James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal
+		 * Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001),
+		 * so we use a 'bad' flag */
+		bad = 1;
+		lzero = 0;
+		}
+	maskeddb = from - lzero + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+	dblen = num - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+	db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
+	if (db == NULL)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return -1;
+		}
 
-    MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen);
-    for (i = lzero; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
-	seed[i] ^= from[i - lzero];
-  
-    MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-    for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
-	db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];
+	MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen);
+	for (i = lzero; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+		seed[i] ^= from[i - lzero];
 
-    SHA1(param, plen, phash);
+	MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+	for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
+		db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];
 
-    if (memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0)
-	goto decoding_err;
-    else
-	{
-	for (i = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i < dblen; i++)
-	    if (db[i] != 0x00)
-		break;
-	if (db[i] != 0x01 || i++ >= dblen)
-	  goto decoding_err;
+	SHA1(param, plen, phash);
+
+	if (memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
+		goto decoding_err;
 	else
-	    {
-	    mlen = dblen - i;
-	    if (tlen < mlen)
 		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
-		mlen = -1;
+		for (i = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i < dblen; i++)
+			if (db[i] != 0x00)
+				break;
+		if (db[i] != 0x01 || i++ >= dblen)
+			goto decoding_err;
+		else
+			{
+			/* everything looks OK */
+
+			mlen = dblen - i;
+			if (tlen < mlen)
+				{
+				RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+				mlen = -1;
+				}
+			else
+				memcpy(to, db + i, mlen);
+			}
 		}
-	    else
-		memcpy(to, db + i, mlen);
-	    }
-	}
-    OPENSSL_free(db);
-    return (mlen);
+	OPENSSL_free(db);
+	return mlen;
 
 decoding_err:
-    /* to avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not reveal
-     * which kind of decoding error happened */
-    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
-    if (db != NULL) OPENSSL_free(db);
-    return -1;
-    }
+	/* to avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not reveal
+	 * which kind of decoding error happened */
+	RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
+	if (db != NULL) OPENSSL_free(db);
+	return -1;
+	}
 
 int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, unsigned char *seed, long seedlen)
-    {
-    long i, outlen = 0;
-    unsigned char cnt[4];
-    SHA_CTX c;
-    unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
-    for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++)
 	{
-	cnt[0] = (i >> 24) & 255, cnt[1] = (i >> 16) & 255,
-	  cnt[2] = (i >> 8) & 255, cnt[3] = i & 255;
-	SHA1_Init(&c);
-	SHA1_Update(&c, seed, seedlen);
-	SHA1_Update(&c, cnt, 4);
-	if (outlen + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH <= len)
-	    {
-	    SHA1_Final(mask + outlen, &c);
-	    outlen += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-	    }
-	else
-	    {
-	    SHA1_Final(md, &c);
-	    memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen);
-	    outlen = len;
-	    }
+	long i, outlen = 0;
+	unsigned char cnt[4];
+	SHA_CTX c;
+	unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+	for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++)
+		{
+		cnt[0] = (i >> 24) & 255, cnt[1] = (i >> 16) & 255,
+			cnt[2] = (i >> 8) & 255, cnt[3] = i & 255;
+		SHA1_Init(&c);
+		SHA1_Update(&c, seed, seedlen);
+		SHA1_Update(&c, cnt, 4);
+		if (outlen + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH <= len)
+			{
+			SHA1_Final(mask + outlen, &c);
+			outlen += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			SHA1_Final(md, &c);
+			memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen);
+			outlen = len;
+			}
+		}
+	return 0;
 	}
-    return (0);
-    }
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/sha/sha_locl.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/sha/sha_locl.h
index 2f8aef8..631ba73 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/sha/sha_locl.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/sha/sha_locl.h
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@
 # endif
 
 # ifdef SHA1_ASM
-#  if defined(__i386) || defined(_M_IX86) || defined(__INTEL__)
+#  if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || defined(__INTEL__)
 #   define sha1_block_host_order		sha1_block_asm_host_order
 #   define DONT_IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_HOST_ORDER
 #   define sha1_block_data_order		sha1_block_asm_data_order
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509.h
index 813c8ad..385c2e1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509.h
@@ -810,7 +810,6 @@ const char *	X509_get_default_private_dir(void );
 
 X509_REQ *	X509_to_X509_REQ(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md);
 X509 *		X509_REQ_to_X509(X509_REQ *r, int days,EVP_PKEY *pkey);
-void ERR_load_X509_strings(void );
 
 X509_ALGOR *	X509_ALGOR_new(void );
 void		X509_ALGOR_free(X509_ALGOR *a);
@@ -1220,6 +1219,7 @@ int X509_TRUST_get_trust(X509_TRUST *xp);
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+void ERR_load_X509_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the X509 functions. */
 
@@ -1291,4 +1291,3 @@ int X509_TRUST_get_trust(X509_TRUST *xp);
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
index 86b3b79..934e541 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int (*default_trust)(int id, X509 *x, int flags) = obj_trust;
 static X509_TRUST trstandard[] = {
 {X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, trust_compat, "compatible", 0, NULL},
 {X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Client", NID_client_auth, NULL},
-{X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Client", NID_server_auth, NULL},
+{X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Server", NID_server_auth, NULL},
 {X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, trust_1oidany, "S/MIME email", NID_email_protect, NULL},
 };
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
index cfb478d..ac04d41 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n)
 	case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
 		return("CRL is not yet valid");
 	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
-		return("Certificate has expired");
+		return("certificate has expired");
 	case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
 		return("CRL has expired");
 	case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 0f4110c..7a30092 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -911,6 +911,12 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags, time_t t)
 	ctx->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME;
 	}
 
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+				  int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
+	{
+	ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
+	}
+
 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
index e289d53..4215102 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
@@ -382,6 +382,8 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
 				int purpose, int trust);
 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags);
 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags, time_t t);
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+				  int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *));
 
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/x509v3.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/x509v3.h
index 0453b12..f810d46 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/x509v3.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/x509v3.h
@@ -354,7 +354,6 @@ typedef struct x509_purpose_st {
 
 DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE)
 
-void ERR_load_X509V3_strings(void);
 int i2d_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *a, unsigned char **pp);
 BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *d2i_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
 BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_new(void);
@@ -555,6 +554,7 @@ void X509_email_free(STACK *sk);
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+void ERR_load_X509V3_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the X509V3 functions. */
 
@@ -650,4 +650,3 @@ void X509_email_free(STACK *sk);
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-