Prevent cross-site forgery attacks on lukemftpd(8) due to splitting

long commands into multiple requests. [09:01]

Fix incorrect OpenSSL checks for malformed signatures due to invalid
check of return value from EVP_VerifyFinal(), DSA_verify, and
DSA_do_verify. [09:02]

Security:	FreeBSD-SA-09:01.lukemftpd
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-09:02.openssl
Obtained from:	NetBSD [SA-09:01]
Obtained from:	OpenSSL Project [SA-09:02]
Approved by:	so (simon)

4 files changed, 4 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/apps/speed.c b/crypto/openssl/apps/speed.c
index 7858aee..4af171d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/apps/speed.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/apps/speed.c
@@ -2038,7 +2038,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 				{
 				ret=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, buf,36, buf2,
 					rsa_num, rsa_key[j]);
-				if (ret == 0)
+				if (ret <= 0)
 					{
 					BIO_printf(bio_err,
 						"RSA verify failure\n");
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/apps/spkac.c b/crypto/openssl/apps/spkac.c
index 0191d0a..01fe406 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/apps/spkac.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/apps/spkac.c
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ bad:
 	pkey = NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey(spki);
 	if(verify) {
 		i = NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(spki, pkey);
-		if(i) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature OK\n");
+		if (i > 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature OK\n");
 		else {
 			BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature Failure\n");
 			ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/apps/verify.c b/crypto/openssl/apps/verify.c
index 9ff32cb..20cc9e3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/apps/verify.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/apps/verify.c
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, char *file, STACK_OF(X509) *uchain, STACK_OF(X
 
 	ret=0;
 end:
-	if (i)
+	if (i > 0)
 		{
 		fprintf(stdout,"OK\n");
 		ret=1;
@@ -367,4 +367,3 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 		ERR_clear_error();
 	return(ok);
 	}
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/apps/x509.c b/crypto/openssl/apps/x509.c
index 5f61eb5..f0fa9d7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/apps/x509.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/apps/x509.c
@@ -1144,7 +1144,7 @@ static int x509_certify(X509_STORE *ctx, char *CAfile, const EVP_MD *digest,
 	/* NOTE: this certificate can/should be self signed, unless it was
 	 * a certificate request in which case it is not. */
 	X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(&xsc,x);
-	if (!reqfile && !X509_verify_cert(&xsc))
+	if (!reqfile && X509_verify_cert(&xsc) <= 0)
 		goto end;
 
 	if (!X509_check_private_key(xca,pkey))