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author | jkim <jkim@FreeBSD.org> | 2015-01-08 23:42:41 +0000 |
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committer | jkim <jkim@FreeBSD.org> | 2015-01-08 23:42:41 +0000 |
commit | 4f9b1cef1a6825f03178937e0feb39a2b2d046c8 (patch) | |
tree | 6c2f3cb14d70e0247fe500835bed3d3588c3025e /crypto/openssl/CHANGES | |
parent | cfd5b20c8bb6e3677ef84152d28058c0ead0de39 (diff) | |
parent | a350427e88bc6ff288594c964ca0f57464062eb0 (diff) | |
download | FreeBSD-src-4f9b1cef1a6825f03178937e0feb39a2b2d046c8.zip FreeBSD-src-4f9b1cef1a6825f03178937e0feb39a2b2d046c8.tar.gz |
Merge OpenSSL 1.0.1k.
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/CHANGES')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/CHANGES | 130 |
1 files changed, 130 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/CHANGES b/crypto/openssl/CHANGES index 277b46f..117ba6d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/CHANGES +++ b/crypto/openssl/CHANGES @@ -2,6 +2,136 @@ OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ + Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015] + + *) Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS + message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer + dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to + Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue. + (CVE-2014-3571) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Fix DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record. A memory leak can occur in the + dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. In particular this + could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS records with the same + sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited + by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory exhaustion. + Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue. + (CVE-2015-0206) + [Matt Caswell] + + *) Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is + built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl + method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer + dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue. + (CVE-2014-3569) + [Kurt Roeckx] + + *) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral + ECDH ciphersuites. + + Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA for + reporting this issue. + (CVE-2014-3572) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code + violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in + non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively + downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server + certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at + INRIA or reporting this issue. + (CVE-2015-0204) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Fixed issue where DH client certificates are accepted without verification. + An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication + without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client to + authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers + which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates + containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered. + Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting + this issue. + (CVE-2015-0205) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its + SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX. + + The session ID context is typically set from the parent SSL_CTX, + and can vary with the CTX. + [Adam Langley] + + *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues. + + By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a + certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature. + Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed + this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the + certificate fingerprint for blacklists. + + 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits. + + If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject + the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits. + + 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency. + + Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the + certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure + errors for some broken certificates. + + Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue. + + 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER. + + Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received + signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch. + + This will reject various cases including garbage after signature + (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS + program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs + (negative or with leading zeroes). + + Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson + of the OpenSSL core team. + + (CVE-2014-8275) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect + results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random + with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any + way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter + Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial + fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and + Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of + the OpenSSL core team. + (CVE-2014-3570) + [Andy Polyakov] + + *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol + version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different + version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable + sanity and breaks all known clients. + [David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper] + + *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject + early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because + renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.) + [Emilia Käsper] + + *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation: + ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends + the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would + reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was + announced in the initial ServerHello. + + Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one + was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would + ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message. + [Emilia Käsper] + Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014] *) SRTP Memory Leak. |