MFH (r263712): upgrade openssh to 6.6p1

MFH (r264308): restore p level in debugging output

123 files changed, 1522 insertions, 2462 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
index c0dab65..38de846 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,224 @@
+20140313
+ - (djm) Release OpenSSH 6.6
+
+20140304
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/03 22:22:30
+     [session.c]
+     ignore enviornment variables with embedded '=' or '\0' characters;
+     spotted by Jann Horn; ok deraadt@
+
+20140301
+ - (djm) [regress/Makefile] Disable dhgex regress test; it breaks when
+   no moduli file exists at the expected location.
+
+20140228
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 00:41:49
+     [bufbn.c]
+     fix unsigned overflow that could lead to reading a short ssh protocol
+     1 bignum value; found by Ben Hawkes; ok deraadt@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 08:25:09
+     [bufbn.c]
+     off by one in range check
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 22:47:07
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     bz#2184 clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple
+     matching Match blocks; ok dtucker@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 22:57:40
+     [version.h]
+     openssh-6.6
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 23:43:02
+     [regress/sftp-chroot.sh]
+     Don't use -q on sftp as it suppresses logging, instead redirect the
+     output to the regress logfile.
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/20 00:00:30
+     [sregress/ftp-chroot.sh]
+     append to rather than truncating the log file
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/25 04:35:32
+     [regress/Makefile regress/dhgex.sh]
+     Add a test for DH GEX sizes
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/26 10:22:10
+     [regress/cert-hostkey.sh]
+     automatically generate revoked keys from listed keys rather than
+     manually specifying each type; from portable
+     (Id sync only)
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/26 10:49:17
+     [scp-ssh-wrapper.sh scp.sh]
+     make sure $SCP is tested on the remote end rather than whichever one
+     happens to be in $PATH; from portable
+     (Id sync only)
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 20:04:16
+     [login-timeout.sh]
+     remove any existing LoginGraceTime from sshd_config before adding
+     a specific one for the test back in
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 21:21:25
+     [agent-ptrace.sh agent.sh]
+     keep return values that are printed in error messages;
+     from portable
+     (Id sync only)
+ - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
+   [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank version numbers
+ - (djm) [regress/host-expand.sh] Add RCS Id
+
+20140227
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 20:18:37
+     [ssh.c]
+     bz#2205: avoid early hostname lookups unless canonicalisation is enabled;
+     ok dtucker@ markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 20:28:44
+     [auth2-gss.c gss-serv.c ssh-gss.h sshd.c]
+     bz#2107 - cache OIDs of supported GSSAPI mechanisms before privsep
+     sandboxing, as running this code in the sandbox can cause violations;
+     ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 20:29:29
+     [channels.c]
+     don't assume that the socks4 username is \0 terminated;
+     spotted by Ben Hawkes; ok markus@
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 21:53:37
+     [sshd.c]
+     ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids needs GSSAPI
+
+20140224
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/07 06:55:54
+     [cipher.c mac.c]
+     remove some logging that makes ssh debugging output very verbose;
+     ok markus
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/15 23:05:36
+     [channels.c]
+     avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" errors in ssh -W;
+     bz#2200, debian#738692 via Colin Watson; ok dtucker@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/22 01:32:19
+     [readconf.c]
+     when processing Match blocks, skip 'exec' clauses if previous predicates
+     failed to match; ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/23 20:03:42
+     [ssh-ed25519.c]
+     check for unsigned overflow; not reachable in OpenSSH but others might
+     copy our code...
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/23 20:11:36
+     [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.c ssh_config.5]
+     reparse ssh_config and ~/.ssh/config if hostname canonicalisation changes
+     the hostname. This allows users to write configurations that always
+     refer to canonical hostnames, e.g.
+     
+     CanonicalizeHostname yes
+     CanonicalDomains int.example.org example.org
+     CanonicalizeFallbackLocal no
+     
+     Host *.int.example.org
+         Compression off
+     Host *.example.org
+         User djm
+     
+     ok markus@
+
+20140213
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.{c,h}]  Add compat
+   code for older OpenSSL versions that don't have EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex.
+
+20140207
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/05 20:13:25
+     [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
+     tweak synopsis: calling ssh-keygen without any arguments is fine; ok jmc@
+     while here, fix ordering in usage(); requested by jmc@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/06 22:21:01
+     [sshconnect.c]
+     in ssh_create_socket(), only do the getaddrinfo for BindAddress when
+     BindAddress is actually specified. Fixes regression in 6.5 for
+     UsePrivilegedPort=yes; patch from Corinna Vinschen
+
+20140206
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c] Don't bother checking for non-NULL
+   before freeing since free(NULL) is a no-op.  ok djm.
+ - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Not all Linux architectures define
+   __NR_shutdown; some go via the socketcall(2) multiplexer.
+
+20140205
+ - (djm) [sandbox-capsicum.c] Don't fatal if Capsicum is offered by
+   headers/libc but not supported by the kernel. Patch from Loganaden
+   Velvindron @ AfriNIC
+
+20140204
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/27 18:58:14
+     [Makefile.in digest.c digest.h hostfile.c kex.h mac.c hmac.c hmac.h]
+     replace openssl HMAC with an implementation based on our ssh_digest_*
+     ok and feedback djm@
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/27 19:18:54
+     [auth-rsa.c cipher.c ssh-agent.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c]
+     replace openssl MD5 with our ssh_digest_*; ok djm@
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/27 20:13:46
+     [digest.c digest-openssl.c digest-libc.c Makefile.in]
+     rename digest.c to digest-openssl.c and add libc variant; ok djm@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/28 14:13:39
+     [ssh-keyscan.1]
+     kill some bad Pa;
+     From: Jan Stary
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 00:19:26
+     [sshd.c]
+     use kill(0, ...) instead of killpg(0, ...); on most operating systems
+     they are equivalent, but SUSv2 describes the latter as having undefined
+     behaviour; from portable; ok dtucker
+     (Id sync only; change is already in portable)
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 06:18:35
+     [Makefile.in auth.h auth2-jpake.c auth2.c jpake.c jpake.h monitor.c]
+     [monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h readconf.c readconf.h]
+     [schnorr.c schnorr.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c]
+     remove experimental, never-enabled JPAKE code; ok markus@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 14:04:51
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     document kbdinteractiveauthentication;
+     requested From: Ross L Richardson
+     
+     dtucker/markus helped explain its workings;
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/30 22:26:14
+     [sandbox-systrace.c]
+     allow shutdown(2) syscall in sandbox - it may be called by packet_close()
+     from portable
+     (Id sync only; change is already in portable)
+   - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/31 16:39:19
+     [auth2-chall.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufec.c canohost.c]
+     [channels.c cipher-chachapoly.c clientloop.c configure.ac hostfile.c]
+     [kexc25519.c krl.c monitor.c sandbox-systrace.c session.c]
+     [sftp-client.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c]
+     [openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h]
+     replace most bzero with explicit_bzero, except a few that cna be memset
+     ok djm dtucker
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/02 03:44:32
+     [auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-passwd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c]
+     [buffer.c cipher-3des1.c cipher.c clientloop.c gss-serv.c kex.c]
+     [kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexecdhc.c kexgexc.c kexecdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c]
+     [monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c readpass.c rsa.c serverloop.c]
+     [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c]
+     [ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c]
+     [sshd.c]
+     convert memset of potentially-private data to explicit_bzero()
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/03 23:28:00
+     [ssh-ecdsa.c]
+     fix memory leak; ECDSA_SIG_new() allocates 'r' and 's' for us, unlike
+     DSA_SIG_new. Reported by Batz Spear; ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/02 03:44:31
+     [digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c]
+     convert memset of potentially-private data to explicit_bzero()
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/04 00:24:29
+     [ssh.c]
+     delay lowercasing of hostname until right before hostname
+     canonicalisation to unbreak case-sensitive matching of ssh_config;
+     reported by Ike Devolder; ok markus@
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in] Add missing explicit_bzero.o
+ - (djm) [regress/setuid-allowed.c] Missing string.h for strerror()
+
+20140131
+ - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c sandbox-systrace.c] Allow shutdown(2)
+   syscall from sandboxes; it may be called by packet_close.
+ - (dtucker) [readconf.c] Include <arpa/inet.h> for the hton macros.  Fixes
+   build with HP-UX's compiler.  Patch from Kevin Brott.
+ - (tim) [Makefile.in] build regress/setuid-allow.
+
 20140130
  - (djm) [configure.ac] Only check for width-specified integer types
    in headers that actually exist. patch from Tom G. Christensen;
@@ -2663,3 +2884,4 @@
    [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update for release 6.0
  - (djm) [README] Update URL to release notes.
  - (djm) Release openssh-6.0
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in b/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in
index a8aa127..28a8ec4 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in
+++ b/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.352 2014/01/27 06:35:04 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.356 2014/02/04 00:12:56 djm Exp $
 
 # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
 #SHELL = @SH@
@@ -73,9 +73,9 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
 	kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
 	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
-	jpake.o schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
+	ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
 	kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
-	ssh-ed25519.o digest.o \
+	ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o hmac.o \
 	sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o
 
 SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
 	auth.o auth1.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \
 	auth-chall.o auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \
 	auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
-	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \
+	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
 	monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \
 	kexc25519s.o auth-krb5.o \
 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c
 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $? \
 	$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
 
-tests interop-tests:	$(TARGETS) regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT)
+tests interop-tests:	$(TARGETS) regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT)
 	BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \
 	TEST_SHELL="@TEST_SHELL@"; \
 	TEST_SSH_SCP="$${BUILDDIR}/scp"; \
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README b/crypto/openssh/README
index 8da9759..368dca5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/README
+++ b/crypto/openssh/README
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.5 for the release notes.
+See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.6 for the release notes.
 
 - A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is
 - available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html
@@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ References -
 [6] http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=style&sektion=9
 [7] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
 
-$Id: README,v 1.85 2014/01/16 07:51:45 djm Exp $
+$Id: README,v 1.86 2014/02/27 23:03:53 djm Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c
index 545aa49..5dad6c3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.85 2013/07/12 00:19:58 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.86 2014/01/27 19:18:54 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
 
 #include <pwd.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -48,6 +47,8 @@
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 
+#include "digest.h"
+
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
 
@@ -91,12 +92,13 @@ int
 auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
 {
 	u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];
-	MD5_CTX md;
+	struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
 	int len;
 
 	/* don't allow short keys */
 	if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
-		error("auth_rsa_verify_response: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
+		error("%s: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
+		    __func__,
 		    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
 		return (0);
 	}
@@ -104,13 +106,15 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
 	/* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
 	len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
 	if (len <= 0 || len > 32)
-		fatal("auth_rsa_verify_response: bad challenge length %d", len);
+		fatal("%s: bad challenge length %d", __func__, len);
 	memset(buf, 0, 32);
 	BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
-	MD5_Init(&md);
-	MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
-	MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
-	MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
+	if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
+	    ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0)
+		fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
+	ssh_digest_free(md);
 
 	/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
 	if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.h b/crypto/openssh/auth.h
index 80f0898..124e597 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.76 2013/07/19 07:37:48 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.77 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ struct Authctxt {
 	char		*style;
 	void		*kbdintctxt;
 	char		*info;		/* Extra info for next auth_log */
-	void		*jpake_ctx;
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
 	auth_session_t	*as;
 #endif
@@ -175,9 +174,6 @@ int	bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
 int	skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
 int	skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
 
-void	auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(Authctxt *, BIGNUM **, char **, char **);
-void	auth2_jpake_stop(Authctxt *);
-
 int	allowed_user(struct passwd *);
 struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user);
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth1.c b/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
index f1ac598..0f870b3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.79 2013/05/19 02:42:42 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.80 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ auth1_process_password(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	/* Try authentication with the password. */
 	authenticated = PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password));
 
-	memset(password, 0, dlen);
+	explicit_bzero(password, dlen);
 	free(password);
 
 	return (authenticated);
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	response = packet_get_string(&dlen);
 	packet_check_eom();
 	authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response);
-	memset(response, 'r', dlen);
+	explicit_bzero(response, dlen);
 	free(response);
 
 	return (authenticated);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
index 031c282..980250a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.39 2013/11/08 00:39:14 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.41 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson.  All rights reserved.
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ kbdint_free(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
 	if (kbdintctxt->device)
 		kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt);
 	free(kbdintctxt->devices);
-	bzero(kbdintctxt, sizeof(*kbdintctxt));
+	explicit_bzero(kbdintctxt, sizeof(*kbdintctxt));
 	free(kbdintctxt);
 }
 /* get next device */
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	res = kbdintctxt->device->respond(kbdintctxt->ctxt, nresp, response);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) {
-		memset(response[i], 'r', strlen(response[i]));
+		explicit_bzero(response[i], strlen(response[i]));
 		free(response[i]);
 	}
 	free(response);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-gss.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-gss.c
index 638d8f8..c28a705 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-gss.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-gss.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.20 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.21 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	gss_OID_desc goid = {0, NULL};
 	Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
 	int mechs;
-	gss_OID_set supported;
 	int present;
 	OM_uint32 ms;
 	u_int len;
@@ -77,7 +76,6 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		return (0);
 	}
 
-	ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
 	do {
 		mechs--;
 
@@ -90,15 +88,12 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		    doid[1] == len - 2) {
 			goid.elements = doid + 2;
 			goid.length   = len - 2;
-			gss_test_oid_set_member(&ms, &goid, supported,
-			    &present);
+			ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(&ms, &goid, &present);
 		} else {
 			logit("Badly formed OID received");
 		}
 	} while (mechs > 0 && !present);
 
-	gss_release_oid_set(&ms, &supported);
-
 	if (!present) {
 		free(doid);
 		authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-jpake.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-jpake.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 78a6b88..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-jpake.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,563 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-jpake.c,v 1.6 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/*
- * Server side of zero-knowledge password auth using J-PAKE protocol
- * as described in:
- *
- * F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling",
- * 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008
- *
- * http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/Research/contributions/hao-ryan-2008.pdf
- */
-
-#ifdef JPAKE
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <login_cap.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-#include "schnorr.h"
-#include "jpake.h"
-
-/*
- * XXX options->permit_empty_passwd (at the moment, they will be refused
- * anyway because they will mismatch on fake salt.
- */
-
-/* Dispatch handlers */
-static void input_userauth_jpake_client_step1(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-static void input_userauth_jpake_client_step2(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-static void input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-
-static int auth2_jpake_start(Authctxt *);
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern u_char *session_id2;
-extern u_int session_id2_len;
-
-/*
- * Attempt J-PAKE authentication.
- */
-static int
-userauth_jpake(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int authenticated = 0;
-
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	debug("jpake-01@openssh.com requested");
-
-	if (authctxt->user != NULL) {
-		if (authctxt->jpake_ctx == NULL)
-			authctxt->jpake_ctx = jpake_new();
-		if (options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
-			authenticated = auth2_jpake_start(authctxt);
-	}
-
-	return authenticated;
-}
-
-Authmethod method_jpake = {
-	"jpake-01@openssh.com",
-	userauth_jpake,
-	&options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication
-};
-
-/* Clear context and callbacks */
-void
-auth2_jpake_stop(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	/* unregister callbacks */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1, NULL);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2, NULL);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM, NULL);
-	if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
-		jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
-		authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
-	}
-}
-
-/* Returns 1 if 'c' is a valid crypt(3) salt character, 0 otherwise */
-static int
-valid_crypt_salt(int c)
-{
-	if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
-		return 1;
-	if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
-		return 1;
-	if (c >= '.' && c <= '9')
-		return 1;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Derive fake salt as H(username || first_private_host_key)
- * This provides relatively stable fake salts for non-existent
- * users and avoids the jpake method becoming an account validity
- * oracle.
- */
-static void
-derive_rawsalt(const char *username, u_char *rawsalt, u_int len)
-{
-	u_char *digest;
-	u_int digest_len;
-	Buffer b;
-	Key *k;
-
-	buffer_init(&b);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, username);
-	if ((k = get_hostkey_by_index(0)) == NULL ||
-	    (k->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT))
-		fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
-	switch (k->type) {
-	case KEY_RSA1:
-	case KEY_RSA:
-		if (k->rsa->p == NULL || k->rsa->q == NULL)
-			fatal("%s: RSA key missing p and/or q", __func__);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->rsa->p);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->rsa->q);
-		break;
-	case KEY_DSA:
-		if (k->dsa->priv_key == NULL)
-			fatal("%s: DSA key missing priv_key", __func__);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->dsa->priv_key);
-		break;
-	case KEY_ECDSA:
-		if (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) == NULL)
-			fatal("%s: ECDSA key missing priv_key", __func__);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa));
-		break;
-	default:
-		fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, k->type);
-	}
-	if (hash_buffer(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), EVP_sha256(),
-	    &digest, &digest_len) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
-	buffer_free(&b);
-	if (len > digest_len)
-		fatal("%s: not enough bytes for rawsalt (want %u have %u)",
-		    __func__, len, digest_len);
-	memcpy(rawsalt, digest, len);
-	bzero(digest, digest_len);
-	free(digest);
-}
-
-/* ASCII an integer [0, 64) for inclusion in a password/salt */
-static char
-pw_encode64(u_int i64)
-{
-	const u_char e64[] =
-	    "./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
-	return e64[i64 % 64];
-}
-
-/* Generate ASCII salt bytes for user */
-static char *
-makesalt(u_int want, const char *user)
-{
-	u_char rawsalt[32];
-	static char ret[33];
-	u_int i;
-
-	if (want > sizeof(ret) - 1)
-		fatal("%s: want %u", __func__, want);
-
-	derive_rawsalt(user, rawsalt, sizeof(rawsalt));
-	bzero(ret, sizeof(ret));
-	for (i = 0; i < want; i++)
-		ret[i] = pw_encode64(rawsalt[i]);
-	bzero(rawsalt, sizeof(rawsalt));
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Select the system's default password hashing scheme and generate
- * a stable fake salt under it for use by a non-existent account.
- * Prevents jpake method being used to infer the validity of accounts.
- */
-static void
-fake_salt_and_scheme(Authctxt *authctxt, char **salt, char **scheme)
-{
-	char *rounds_s, *style;
-	long long rounds;
-	login_cap_t *lc;
-
-
-	if ((lc = login_getclass(authctxt->pw->pw_class)) == NULL &&
-	    (lc = login_getclass(NULL)) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: login_getclass failed", __func__);
-	style = login_getcapstr(lc, "localcipher", NULL, NULL);
-	if (style == NULL)
-		style = xstrdup("blowfish,6");
-	login_close(lc);
-	
-	if ((rounds_s = strchr(style, ',')) != NULL)
-		*rounds_s++ = '\0';
-	rounds = strtonum(rounds_s, 1, 1<<31, NULL);
-	
-	if (strcmp(style, "md5") == 0) {
-		xasprintf(salt, "$1$%s$", makesalt(8, authctxt->user));
-		*scheme = xstrdup("md5");
-	} else if (strcmp(style, "old") == 0) {
-		*salt = xstrdup(makesalt(2, authctxt->user));
-		*scheme = xstrdup("crypt");
-	} else if (strcmp(style, "newsalt") == 0) {
-		rounds = MAX(rounds, 7250);
-		rounds = MIN(rounds, (1<<24) - 1);
-		xasprintf(salt, "_%c%c%c%c%s",
-		    pw_encode64(rounds), pw_encode64(rounds >> 6),
-		    pw_encode64(rounds >> 12), pw_encode64(rounds >> 18),
-		    makesalt(4, authctxt->user));
-		*scheme = xstrdup("crypt-extended");
-	} else {
-		/* Default to blowfish */
-		rounds = MAX(rounds, 3);
-		rounds = MIN(rounds, 31);
-		xasprintf(salt, "$2a$%02lld$%s", rounds,
-		    makesalt(22, authctxt->user));
-		*scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
-	}
-	free(style);
-	debug3("%s: fake %s salt for user %s: %s",
-	    __func__, *scheme, authctxt->user, *salt);
-}
-
-/*
- * Fetch password hashing scheme, password salt and derive shared secret
- * for user. If user does not exist, a fake but stable and user-unique
- * salt will be returned.
- */
-void
-auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM **s,
-    char **hash_scheme, char **salt)
-{
-	char *cp;
-	u_char *secret;
-	u_int secret_len, salt_len;
-
-#ifdef JPAKE_DEBUG
-	debug3("%s: valid %d pw %.5s...", __func__,
-	    authctxt->valid, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd);
-#endif
-
-	*salt = NULL;
-	*hash_scheme = NULL;
-	if (authctxt->valid) {
-		if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$2$", 3) == 0 &&
-		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 28) {
-			/*
-			 * old-variant bcrypt:
-			 *     "$2$", 2 digit rounds, "$", 22 bytes salt
-			 */
-			salt_len = 3 + 2 + 1 + 22 + 1;
-			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
-			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
-			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
-		} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$2a$", 4) == 0 &&
-		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 29) {
-			/*
-			 * current-variant bcrypt:
-			 *     "$2a$", 2 digit rounds, "$", 22 bytes salt
-			 */
-			salt_len = 4 + 2 + 1 + 22 + 1;
-			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
-			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
-			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
-		} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$1$", 3) == 0 &&
-		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 5) {
-			/*
-			 * md5crypt:
-			 *     "$1$", salt until "$"
-			 */
-			cp = strchr(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd + 3, '$');
-			if (cp != NULL) {
-				salt_len = (cp - authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) + 1;
-				*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
-				strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd,
-				    salt_len);
-				*hash_scheme = xstrdup("md5crypt");
-			}
-		} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "_", 1) == 0 &&
-		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 9) {
-			/*
-			 * BSDI extended crypt:
-			 *     "_", 4 digits count, 4 chars salt
-			 */
-			salt_len = 1 + 4 + 4 + 1;
-			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
-			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
-			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("crypt-extended");
-		} else if (strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) == 13  &&
-		    valid_crypt_salt(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd[0]) &&
-		    valid_crypt_salt(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd[1])) {
-			/*
-			 * traditional crypt:
-			 *     2 chars salt
-			 */
-			salt_len = 2 + 1;
-			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
-			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
-			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("crypt");
-		}
-		if (*salt == NULL) {
-			debug("%s: unrecognised crypt scheme for user %s",
-			    __func__, authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-		}
-	}
-	if (*salt == NULL)
-		fake_salt_and_scheme(authctxt, salt, hash_scheme);
-
-	if (hash_buffer(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd,
-	    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd), EVP_sha256(),
-	    &secret, &secret_len) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
-	if ((*s = BN_bin2bn(secret, secret_len, NULL)) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn (secret)", __func__);
-#ifdef JPAKE_DEBUG
-	debug3("%s: salt = %s (len %u)", __func__,
-	    *salt, (u_int)strlen(*salt));
-	debug3("%s: scheme = %s", __func__, *hash_scheme);
-	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((*s, "%s: s = ", __func__));
-#endif
-	bzero(secret, secret_len);
-	free(secret);
-}
-
-/*
- * Begin authentication attempt.
- * Note, sets authctxt->postponed while in subprotocol
- */
-static int
-auth2_jpake_start(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
-	u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
-	u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
-	char *salt, *hash_scheme;
-
-	debug("%s: start", __func__);
-
-	PRIVSEP(jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
-	    &pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
-	    &pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
-	    &x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
-	    &x4_proof, &x4_proof_len));
-
-	PRIVSEP(auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s,
-	    &hash_scheme, &salt));
-
-	if (!use_privsep)
-		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 sending in %s", __func__));
-
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP1);
-	packet_put_cstring(hash_scheme);
-	packet_put_cstring(salt);
-	packet_put_string(pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
-	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x3);
-	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x4);
-	packet_put_string(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
-	packet_put_string(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
-	bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
-	free(hash_scheme);
-	free(salt);
-	bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
-	bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
-	free(x3_proof);
-	free(x4_proof);
-
-	/* Expect step 1 packet from peer */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1,
-	    input_userauth_jpake_client_step1);
-
-	authctxt->postponed = 1;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-input_userauth_jpake_client_step1(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
-	u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
-	u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;
-
-	/* Disable this message */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1, NULL);
-
-	/* Fetch step 1 values */
-	if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-	pctx->client_id = packet_get_string(&pctx->client_id_len);
-	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x1);
-	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x2);
-	x1_proof = packet_get_string(&x1_proof_len);
-	x2_proof = packet_get_string(&x2_proof_len);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	if (!use_privsep)
-		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 received in %s", __func__));
-
-	PRIVSEP(jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
-	    pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
-	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
-	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
-	    x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
-	    x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
-	    &pctx->b,
-	    &x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len));
-
-	bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
-	bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
-	free(x1_proof);
-	free(x2_proof);
-
-	if (!use_privsep)
-		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 sending in %s", __func__));
-
-	/* Send values for step 2 */
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP2);
-	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->b);
-	packet_put_string(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
-	free(x4_s_proof);
-
-	/* Expect step 2 packet from peer */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2,
-	    input_userauth_jpake_client_step2);
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-input_userauth_jpake_client_step2(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
-	u_char *x2_s_proof;
-	u_int x2_s_proof_len;
-
-	/* Disable this message */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2, NULL);
-
-	if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-
-	/* Fetch step 2 values */
-	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->a);
-	x2_s_proof = packet_get_string(&x2_s_proof_len);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	if (!use_privsep)
-		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 received in %s", __func__));
-
-	/* Derive shared key and calculate confirmation hash */
-	PRIVSEP(jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
-	    pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
-	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
-	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
-	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
-	    x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
-	    &pctx->k,
-	    &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len));
-
-	bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
-	free(x2_s_proof);
-
-	if (!use_privsep)
-		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm sending in %s", __func__));
-
-	/* Send key confirmation proof */
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_CONFIRM);
-	packet_put_string(pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	/* Expect confirmation from peer */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM,
-	    input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm);
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
-	int authenticated = 0;
-
-	/* Disable this message */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM, NULL);
-
-	pctx->h_k_cid_sessid = packet_get_string(&pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	if (!use_privsep)
-		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm received in %s", __func__));
-
-	/* Verify expected confirmation hash */
-	if (PRIVSEP(jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
-	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
-	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
-	    pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len)) == 1)
-		authenticated = authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0;
-	else
-		debug("%s: confirmation mismatch", __func__);
-		
-	/* done */
-	authctxt->postponed = 0;
-	jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
-	authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
-	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method_jpake.name, NULL);
-}
-
-#endif /* JPAKE */
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c
index 21bc504..707680c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.10 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.11 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	if (change) {
 		/* discard new password from packet */
 		newpass = packet_get_string(&newlen);
-		memset(newpass, 0, newlen);
+		explicit_bzero(newpass, newlen);
 		free(newpass);
 	}
 	packet_check_eom();
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		logit("password change not supported");
 	else if (PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password)) == 1)
 		authenticated = 1;
-	memset(password, 0, len);
+	explicit_bzero(password, len);
 	free(password);
 	return authenticated;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
index 5a359c7..9747a23 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.129 2013/05/19 02:42:42 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.130 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -73,9 +73,6 @@ extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
 #endif
-#ifdef JPAKE
-extern Authmethod method_jpake;
-#endif
 
 Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
 	&method_none,
@@ -83,9 +80,6 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 	&method_gssapi,
 #endif
-#ifdef JPAKE
-	&method_jpake,
-#endif
 	&method_passwd,
 	&method_kbdint,
 	&method_hostbased,
@@ -300,9 +294,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 
 	/* reset state */
 	auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
-#ifdef JPAKE
-	auth2_jpake_stop(authctxt);
-#endif
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 	/* XXX move to auth2_gssapi_stop() */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
index f963690..cea3f97 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.91 2013/12/29 04:29:25 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.92 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
 	if (!authsocket)
 		return -1;
 
-	bzero(&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr));
+	memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
 	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfile.c b/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
index 7eccbb2..d7eaa9d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.101 2013/12/29 04:35:50 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.103 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ key_private_to_blob2(Key *prv, Buffer *blob, const char *passphrase,
 		buffer_put_int(&kdf, rounds);
 	}
 	cipher_init(&ctx, c, key, keylen, key + keylen , ivlen, 1);
-	memset(key, 0, keylen + ivlen);
+	explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen);
 	free(key);
 
 	buffer_init(&encoded);
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ key_private_to_blob2(Key *prv, Buffer *blob, const char *passphrase,
 	key_to_blob(prv, &cp, &len);			/* public key */
 	buffer_put_string(&encoded, cp, len);
 
-	memset(cp, 0, len);
+	explicit_bzero(cp, len);
 	free(cp);
 
 	buffer_free(&kdf);
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ key_parse_private2(Buffer *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
 	free(salt);
 	free(comment);
 	if (key)
-		memset(key, 0, keylen + ivlen);
+		explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen);
 	free(key);
 	buffer_free(&encoded);
 	buffer_free(&copy);
@@ -496,10 +496,10 @@ key_private_rsa1_to_blob(Key *key, Buffer *blob, const char *passphrase,
 	    buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer), 0, 0) != 0)
 		fatal("%s: cipher_crypt failed", __func__);
 	cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
-	memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext));
+	explicit_bzero(&ciphercontext, sizeof(ciphercontext));
 
 	/* Destroy temporary data. */
-	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
 	buffer_free(&buffer);
 
 	buffer_append(blob, buffer_ptr(&encrypted), buffer_len(&encrypted));
@@ -703,17 +703,17 @@ key_load_file(int fd, const char *filename, Buffer *blob)
 			    __func__, filename == NULL ? "" : filename,
 			    filename == NULL ? "" : " ", strerror(errno));
 			buffer_clear(blob);
-			bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+			explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
 			return 0;
 		}
 		buffer_append(blob, buf, len);
 		if (buffer_len(blob) > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) {
 			buffer_clear(blob);
-			bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+			explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
 			goto toobig;
 		}
 	}
-	bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+	explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
 	if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
 	    st.st_size != buffer_len(blob)) {
 		debug("%s: key file %.200s%schanged size while reading",
@@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ key_parse_private_rsa1(Buffer *blob, const char *passphrase, char **commentp)
 	    buffer_ptr(&copy), buffer_len(&copy), 0, 0) != 0)
 		fatal("%s: cipher_crypt failed", __func__);
 	cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
-	memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext));
+	explicit_bzero(&ciphercontext, sizeof(ciphercontext));
 	buffer_free(&copy);
 
 	check1 = buffer_get_char(&decrypted);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c b/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c
index 9401fe1..e24b5fc 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.54 2014/01/12 08:13:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.56 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ buffer_get_cstring_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
 		if (cp == ret + length - 1)
 			error("buffer_get_cstring_ret: string contains \\0");
 		else {
-			bzero(ret, length);
+			explicit_bzero(ret, length);
 			free(ret);
 			return NULL;
 		}
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ buffer_get_bignum2_as_string_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
 	}
 	ret = xmalloc(len);
 	memcpy(ret, p, len);
-	memset(p, '\0', len);
+	explicit_bzero(p, len);
 	free(bin);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(Buffer *buffer, const u_char *s, u_int l)
 	}
 	memcpy(p, s, l);
 	buffer_put_string(buffer, buf, l + pad);
-	memset(buf, '\0', l + pad);
+	explicit_bzero(buf, l + pad);
 	free(buf);
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/bufbn.c b/crypto/openssh/bufbn.c
index 2ebc80a..1d2e012 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/bufbn.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/bufbn.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: bufbn.c,v 1.8 2013/11/08 11:15:19 dtucker Exp $*/
+/* $OpenBSD: bufbn.c,v 1.11 2014/02/27 08:25:09 djm Exp $*/
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ buffer_put_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
 	/* Store the binary data. */
 	buffer_append(buffer, buf, oi);
 
-	memset(buf, 0, bin_size);
+	explicit_bzero(buf, bin_size);
 	free(buf);
 
 	return (0);
@@ -108,6 +108,11 @@ buffer_get_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
 		return (-1);
 	}
 	bits = get_u16(buf);
+	if (bits > 65535-7) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d",
+		    bits);
+		return (-1);
+	}
 	/* Compute the number of binary bytes that follow. */
 	bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
 	if (bytes > 8 * 1024) {
@@ -173,7 +178,7 @@ buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
 	}
 	hasnohigh = (buf[1] & 0x80) ? 0 : 1;
 	buffer_put_string(buffer, buf+hasnohigh, bytes-hasnohigh);
-	memset(buf, 0, bytes);
+	explicit_bzero(buf, bytes);
 	free(buf);
 	return (0);
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/bufec.c b/crypto/openssh/bufec.c
index 6c00489..89482b9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/bufec.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/bufec.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: bufec.c,v 1.2 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: bufec.c,v 1.3 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
  *
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ buffer_put_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
 	ret = 0;
  out:
 	if (buf != NULL) {
-		bzero(buf, len);
+		explicit_bzero(buf, len);
 		free(buf);
 	}
 	BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ buffer_get_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
 	ret = 0;
  out:
 	BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
-	bzero(buf, len);
+	explicit_bzero(buf, len);
 	free(buf);
 	return ret;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/buffer.c b/crypto/openssh/buffer.c
index eac93da..95bbf0c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/buffer.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/buffer.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: buffer.c,v 1.34 2013/11/08 11:15:19 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: buffer.c,v 1.35 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ void
 buffer_free(Buffer *buffer)
 {
 	if (buffer->alloc > 0) {
-		memset(buffer->buf, 0, buffer->alloc);
+		explicit_bzero(buffer->buf, buffer->alloc);
 		buffer->alloc = 0;
 		free(buffer->buf);
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/canohost.c b/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
index a19a60c..a61a8c9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
 	memcpy(&inaddr, ((char *)&a6->sin6_addr) + 12, sizeof(inaddr));
 	port = a6->sin6_port;
 
-	bzero(a4, sizeof(*a4));
+	memset(a4, 0, sizeof(*a4));
 
 	a4->sin_family = AF_INET;
 	*len = sizeof(*a4);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/channels.c b/crypto/openssh/channels.c
index ffff261..73e8896 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/channels.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.328 2013/12/19 01:04:36 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.331 2014/02/26 20:29:29 djm Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ channel_free(Channel *c)
 		if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL)
 			cc->abandon_cb(c, cc->ctx);
 		TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
-		bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
+		explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
 		free(cc);
 	}
 	if (c->filter_cleanup != NULL && c->filter_ctx != NULL)
@@ -1114,6 +1114,9 @@ channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 	buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_addr, 4);
 	have = buffer_len(&c->input);
 	p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
+	if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL)
+		fatal("channel %d: decode socks4: user not nul terminated",
+		    c->self);
 	len = strlen(p);
 	debug2("channel %d: decode socks4: user %s/%d", c->self, p, len);
 	len++;					/* trailing '\0' */
@@ -1428,7 +1431,7 @@ port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype)
 	int direct;
 	char buf[1024];
 	char *local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(c->sock);
-	int local_port = get_sock_port(c->sock, 1);
+	int local_port = c->sock == -1 ? 65536 : get_sock_port(c->sock, 1);
 	char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock);
 	int remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock);
 
@@ -2724,7 +2727,7 @@ channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		return;
 	cc->cb(type, c, cc->ctx);
 	TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
-	bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
+	explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
 	free(cc);
 }
 
@@ -3373,9 +3376,7 @@ channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx)
 	free(cctx->host);
 	if (cctx->aitop)
 		freeaddrinfo(cctx->aitop);
-	bzero(cctx, sizeof(*cctx));
-	cctx->host = NULL;
-	cctx->ai = cctx->aitop = NULL;
+	memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx));
 }
 
 /* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host, port */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher-3des1.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher-3des1.c
index 56fc777..b282359 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cipher-3des1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher-3des1.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher-3des1.c,v 1.9 2013/11/08 00:39:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-3des1.c,v 1.10 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ ssh1_3des_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
 	if (EVP_CipherInit(&c->k1, EVP_des_cbc(), k1, NULL, enc) == 0 ||
 	    EVP_CipherInit(&c->k2, EVP_des_cbc(), k2, NULL, !enc) == 0 ||
 	    EVP_CipherInit(&c->k3, EVP_des_cbc(), k3, NULL, enc) == 0) {
-		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+		explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c));
 		free(c);
 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
 		return (0);
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ ssh1_3des_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k1);
 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k2);
 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k3);
-		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+		explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c));
 		free(c);
 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly.c
index 91b0830..251b94e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.c,v 1.3 2013/12/15 21:42:35 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.c,v 1.4 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest,
 	 * Run ChaCha20 once to generate the Poly1305 key. The IV is the
 	 * packet sequence number.
 	 */
-	bzero(poly_key, sizeof(poly_key));
+	memset(poly_key, 0, sizeof(poly_key));
 	put_u64(seqbuf, seqnr);
 	chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, NULL);
 	chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->main_ctx,
@@ -90,9 +90,9 @@ chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest,
 	r = 0;
 
  out:
-	bzero(expected_tag, sizeof(expected_tag));
-	bzero(seqbuf, sizeof(seqbuf));
-	bzero(poly_key, sizeof(poly_key));
+	explicit_bzero(expected_tag, sizeof(expected_tag));
+	explicit_bzero(seqbuf, sizeof(seqbuf));
+	explicit_bzero(poly_key, sizeof(poly_key));
 	return r;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
index 2701da3..b1b18a9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.94 2014/01/25 10:12:50 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.97 2014/02/07 06:55:54 djm Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -40,8 +40,6 @@
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -50,6 +48,8 @@
 #include "log.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "digest.h"
 
 /* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
@@ -234,8 +234,6 @@ ciphers_valid(const char *names)
 			debug("bad cipher %s [%s]", p, names);
 			free(cipher_list);
 			return 0;
-		} else {
-			debug3("cipher ok: %s [%s]", p, names);
 		}
 	}
 	debug3("ciphers ok: [%s]", names);
@@ -343,7 +341,7 @@ cipher_init(CipherContext *cc, const Cipher *cipher,
 		if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, discard, junk,
 		    cipher->discard_len) == 0)
 			fatal("evp_crypt: EVP_Cipher failed during discard");
-		memset(discard, 0, cipher->discard_len);
+		explicit_bzero(discard, cipher->discard_len);
 		free(junk);
 		free(discard);
 	}
@@ -428,7 +426,7 @@ void
 cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *cc)
 {
 	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
-		memset(&cc->cp_ctx, 0, sizeof(cc->cp_ctx));
+		explicit_bzero(&cc->cp_ctx, sizeof(cc->cp_ctx));
 	else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cc->evp) == 0)
 		error("cipher_cleanup: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup failed");
 }
@@ -442,17 +440,15 @@ void
 cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, const Cipher *cipher,
     const char *passphrase, int do_encrypt)
 {
-	MD5_CTX md;
 	u_char digest[16];
 
-	MD5_Init(&md);
-	MD5_Update(&md, (const u_char *)passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
-	MD5_Final(digest, &md);
+	if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_MD5, passphrase, strlen(passphrase),
+	    digest, sizeof(digest)) < 0)
+		fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
 
 	cipher_init(cc, cipher, digest, 16, NULL, 0, do_encrypt);
 
-	memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest));
-	memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
+	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
index b7b1bec..7d9f6cd9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.256 2013/11/20 20:54:10 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.258 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		gc->cb(type, seq, gc->ctx);
 	if (--gc->ref_count <= 0) {
 		TAILQ_REMOVE(&global_confirms, gc, entry);
-		bzero(gc, sizeof(*gc));
+		explicit_bzero(gc, sizeof(*gc));
 		free(gc);
 	}
 
@@ -877,7 +877,7 @@ process_cmdline(void)
 	int cancel_port, ok;
 	Forward fwd;
 
-	bzero(&fwd, sizeof(fwd));
+	memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
 	fwd.listen_host = fwd.connect_host = NULL;
 
 	leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
@@ -1762,7 +1762,7 @@ client_input_stdout_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
 	packet_check_eom();
 	buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, data, data_len);
-	memset(data, 0, data_len);
+	explicit_bzero(data, data_len);
 	free(data);
 }
 static void
@@ -1772,7 +1772,7 @@ client_input_stderr_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
 	packet_check_eom();
 	buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, data, data_len);
-	memset(data, 0, data_len);
+	explicit_bzero(data, data_len);
 	free(data);
 }
 static void
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/config.h b/crypto/openssh/config.h
index 3fabb69..af6466e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/config.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/config.h
@@ -415,6 +415,9 @@
 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup' function. */
 #define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_CLEANUP 1
 
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex' function. */
+#define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX 1
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_init' function. */
 #define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT 1
 
@@ -424,6 +427,9 @@
 /* Define if you have ut_exit in utmp.h */
 /* #undef HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP */
 
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `explicit_bzero' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO */
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */
 #define HAVE_FCHMOD 1
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/config.h.in b/crypto/openssh/config.h.in
index 075c619..0401ad1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/config.h.in
+++ b/crypto/openssh/config.h.in
@@ -414,6 +414,9 @@
 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup' function. */
 #undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_CLEANUP
 
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_init' function. */
 #undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT
 
@@ -423,6 +426,9 @@
 /* Define if you have ut_exit in utmp.h */
 #undef HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP
 
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `explicit_bzero' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */
 #undef HAVE_FCHMOD
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/configure b/crypto/openssh/configure
index 2d714ac..d690393 100755
--- a/crypto/openssh/configure
+++ b/crypto/openssh/configure
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 #! /bin/sh
-# From configure.ac Revision: 1.568 .
+# From configure.ac Revision: 1.571 .
 # Guess values for system-dependent variables and create Makefiles.
 # Generated by GNU Autoconf 2.68 for OpenSSH Portable.
 #
@@ -7607,7 +7607,7 @@ $as_echo "#define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1" >>confdefs.h
 	# and will crash if they cannot be opened.
 
 $as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE 1" >>confdefs.h
-],
+
 	;;
 *-*-bsdi*)
 	$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
@@ -10366,6 +10366,7 @@ for ac_func in  \
 	closefrom \
 	dirfd \
 	endgrent \
+	explicit_bzero \
 	fchmod \
 	fchown \
 	freeaddrinfo \
@@ -12113,6 +12114,7 @@ for ac_func in  \
 	EVP_DigestFinal_ex \
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init \
 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \
+	EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \
 	HMAC_CTX_init \
 	RSA_generate_key_ex \
 	RSA_get_default_method \
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/configure.ac b/crypto/openssh/configure.ac
index dfd32cd..7c6ce08 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/configure.ac
+++ b/crypto/openssh/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.568 2014/01/30 00:26:46 djm Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.571 2014/02/21 17:09:34 tim Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.568 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.571 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -785,7 +785,7 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	# Preauth crypto occasionally uses file descriptors for crypto offload
 	# and will crash if they cannot be opened.
 	AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE], [1],
-	    [define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things])],
+	    [define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things])
 	;;
 *-*-bsdi*)
 	AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
@@ -1649,6 +1649,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
 	closefrom \
 	dirfd \
 	endgrent \
+	explicit_bzero \
 	fchmod \
 	fchown \
 	freeaddrinfo \
@@ -2429,6 +2430,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
 	EVP_DigestFinal_ex \
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init \
 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \
+	EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \
 	HMAC_CTX_init \
 	RSA_generate_key_ex \
 	RSA_get_default_method \
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/caldera/openssh.spec b/crypto/openssh/contrib/caldera/openssh.spec
index 3c417bb..0061fe9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/caldera/openssh.spec
+++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/caldera/openssh.spec
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 
 #old cvs stuff.  please update before use.  may be deprecated.
 %define use_stable	1
-%define version 	6.5p1
+%define version 	6.6p1
 %if %{use_stable}
   %define cvs		%{nil}
   %define release 	1
@@ -363,4 +363,4 @@ fi
 * Mon Jan 01 1998 ...
 Template Version: 1.31
 
-$Id: openssh.spec,v 1.82 2014/01/16 07:51:10 djm Exp $
+$Id: openssh.spec,v 1.83 2014/02/27 23:03:55 djm Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec b/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
index d47cf38..96401c6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
+++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-%define ver 6.5p1
+%define ver 6.6p1
 %define rel 1
 
 # OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec b/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
index 6693fe2..0515d6d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
+++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 
 Summary:	OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation
 Name:		openssh
-Version:	6.5p1
+Version:	6.6p1
 URL:		http://www.openssh.com/
 Release:	1
 Source0:	openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/digest-libc.c b/crypto/openssh/digest-libc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1804b06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/digest-libc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.2 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <md5.h>
+#include <rmd160.h>
+#include <sha1.h>
+#include <sha2.h>
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+typedef void md_init_fn(void *mdctx);
+typedef void md_update_fn(void *mdctx, const u_int8_t *m, size_t mlen);
+typedef void md_final_fn(u_int8_t[], void *mdctx);
+
+struct ssh_digest_ctx {
+	int alg;
+	void *mdctx;
+};
+
+struct ssh_digest {
+	int id;
+	const char *name;
+	size_t block_len;
+	size_t digest_len;
+	size_t ctx_len;
+	md_init_fn *md_init;
+	md_update_fn *md_update;
+	md_final_fn *md_final;
+};
+
+/* NB. Indexed directly by algorithm number */
+const struct ssh_digest digests[SSH_DIGEST_MAX] = {
+	{
+		SSH_DIGEST_MD5,
+		"MD5",
+		MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH,
+		MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+		sizeof(MD5_CTX),
+		(md_init_fn *) MD5Init,
+		(md_update_fn *) MD5Update,
+		(md_final_fn *) MD5Final
+	},
+	{
+		SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160,
+		"RIPEMD160",
+		RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH,
+		RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+		sizeof(RMD160_CTX),
+		(md_init_fn *) RMD160Init,
+		(md_update_fn *) RMD160Update,
+		(md_final_fn *) RMD160Final
+	},
+	{
+		SSH_DIGEST_SHA1,
+		"SHA1",
+		SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH,
+		SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+		sizeof(SHA1_CTX),
+		(md_init_fn *) SHA1Init,
+		(md_update_fn *) SHA1Update,
+		(md_final_fn *) SHA1Final
+	},
+	{
+		SSH_DIGEST_SHA256,
+		"SHA256",
+		SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH,
+		SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+		sizeof(SHA2_CTX),
+		(md_init_fn *) SHA256Init,
+		(md_update_fn *) SHA256Update,
+		(md_final_fn *) SHA256Final
+	},
+	{
+		SSH_DIGEST_SHA384,
+		"SHA384",
+		SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH,
+		SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+		sizeof(SHA2_CTX),
+		(md_init_fn *) SHA384Init,
+		(md_update_fn *) SHA384Update,
+		(md_final_fn *) SHA384Final
+	},
+	{
+		SSH_DIGEST_SHA512,
+		"SHA512",
+		SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH,
+		SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+		sizeof(SHA2_CTX),
+		(md_init_fn *) SHA512Init,
+		(md_update_fn *) SHA512Update,
+		(md_final_fn *) SHA512Final
+	}
+};
+
+static const struct ssh_digest *
+ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
+{
+	if (alg < 0 || alg >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX)
+		return NULL;
+	if (digests[alg].id != alg) /* sanity */
+		return NULL;
+	return &(digests[alg]);
+}
+
+size_t
+ssh_digest_bytes(int alg)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
+
+	return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->digest_len;
+}
+
+size_t
+ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
+
+	return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->block_len;
+}
+
+struct ssh_digest_ctx *
+ssh_digest_start(int alg)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
+	struct ssh_digest_ctx *ret;
+
+	if (digest == NULL || (ret = calloc(1, sizeof(ret))) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	if ((ret->mdctx = calloc(1, digest->ctx_len)) == NULL) {
+		free(ret);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	ret->alg = alg;
+	digest->md_init(ret->mdctx);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(from->alg);
+
+	if (digest == NULL || from->alg != to->alg)
+		return -1;
+	memcpy(to->mdctx, from->mdctx, digest->ctx_len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
+
+	if (digest == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	digest->md_update(ctx->mdctx, m, mlen);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const Buffer *b)
+{
+	return ssh_digest_update(ctx, buffer_ptr(b), buffer_len(b));
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
+
+	if (digest == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
+		return -1;
+	if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
+		return -1;
+	digest->md_final(d, ctx->mdctx);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest;
+
+	if (ctx != NULL) {
+		digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
+		if (digest) {
+			explicit_bzero(ctx->mdctx, digest->ctx_len);
+			free(ctx->mdctx);
+			explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+			free(ctx);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+	struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx = ssh_digest_start(alg);
+
+	if (ctx == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, m, mlen) != 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_final(ctx, d, dlen) != 0)
+		return -1;
+	ssh_digest_free(ctx);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const Buffer *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+	return ssh_digest_memory(alg, buffer_ptr(b), buffer_len(b), d, dlen);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/digest.c b/crypto/openssh/digest-openssl.c
index a221819..863d37d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/digest.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/digest-openssl.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: digest.c,v 1.3 2014/01/20 00:08:48 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.2 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
  *
@@ -72,6 +72,12 @@ ssh_digest_bytes(int alg)
 	return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->digest_len;
 }
 
+size_t
+ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(&ctx->mdctx);
+}
+
 struct ssh_digest_ctx *
 ssh_digest_start(int alg)
 {
@@ -90,6 +96,15 @@ ssh_digest_start(int alg)
 }
 
 int
+ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to)
+{
+	/* we have bcopy-style order while openssl has memcpy-style */
+	if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&to->mdctx, &from->mdctx))
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
 ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
 {
 	if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->mdctx, m, mlen) != 1)
@@ -123,9 +138,11 @@ ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
 void
 ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
 {
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->mdctx);
-	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
-	free(ctx);
+	if (ctx != NULL) {
+		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->mdctx);
+		explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+		free(ctx);
+	}
 }
 
 int
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/digest.h b/crypto/openssh/digest.h
index faefda3..0fb207f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/digest.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/digest.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: digest.h,v 1.1 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: digest.h,v 1.2 2014/01/27 18:58:14 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
  *
@@ -30,9 +30,18 @@
 #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA512	5
 #define SSH_DIGEST_MAX		6
 
+struct ssh_digest_ctx;
+
 /* Returns the algorithm's digest length in bytes or 0 for invalid algorithm */
 size_t ssh_digest_bytes(int alg);
 
+/* Returns the block size of the digest, e.g. for implementing HMAC */
+size_t ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx);
+
+/* Copies internal state of digest of 'from' to 'to' */
+int ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from,
+    struct ssh_digest_ctx *to);
+
 /* One-shot API */
 int ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen,
     u_char *d, size_t dlen)
@@ -42,7 +51,6 @@ int ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const Buffer *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 3, 4)));
 
 /* Update API */
-struct ssh_digest_ctx;
 struct ssh_digest_ctx *ssh_digest_start(int alg);
 int ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c b/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c
index 95348e2..e61b37b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.24 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.26 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -66,6 +66,25 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech* supported_mechs[]= {
 	&gssapi_null_mech,
 };
 
+/*
+ * ssh_gssapi_supported_oids() can cause sandbox violations, so prepare the
+ * list of supported mechanisms before privsep is set up.
+ */
+static gss_OID_set supported_oids;
+
+void
+ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(void)
+{
+	ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported_oids);
+}
+
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *ms, gss_OID member, int *present)
+{
+	if (supported_oids == NULL)
+		ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
+	return gss_test_oid_set_member(ms, member, supported_oids, present);
+}
 
 /*
  * Acquire credentials for a server running on the current host.
@@ -346,7 +365,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
 			gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
-			memset(&gssapi_client, 0, sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
+			explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client,
+			    sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
 			return 0;
 		}
 	else
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/hmac.c b/crypto/openssh/hmac.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..99317b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/hmac.c
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: hmac.c,v 1.10 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "hmac.h"
+
+struct ssh_hmac_ctx {
+	int			 alg;
+	struct ssh_digest_ctx	*ictx;
+	struct ssh_digest_ctx	*octx;
+	struct ssh_digest_ctx	*digest;
+	u_char			*buf;
+	size_t			 buf_len;
+};
+
+size_t
+ssh_hmac_bytes(int alg)
+{
+	return ssh_digest_bytes(alg);
+}
+
+struct ssh_hmac_ctx *
+ssh_hmac_start(int alg)
+{
+	struct ssh_hmac_ctx	*ret;
+
+	if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	ret->alg = alg;
+	if ((ret->ictx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL ||
+	    (ret->octx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL ||
+	    (ret->digest = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL)
+		goto fail;
+	ret->buf_len = ssh_digest_blocksize(ret->ictx);
+	if ((ret->buf = calloc(1, ret->buf_len)) == NULL)
+		goto fail;
+	return ret;
+fail:
+	ssh_hmac_free(ret);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_hmac_init(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *key, size_t klen)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	/* reset ictx and octx if no is key given */
+	if (key != NULL) {
+		/* truncate long keys */
+		if (klen <= ctx->buf_len)
+			memcpy(ctx->buf, key, klen);
+		else if (ssh_digest_memory(ctx->alg, key, klen, ctx->buf,
+		    ctx->buf_len) < 0)
+			return -1;
+		for (i = 0; i < ctx->buf_len; i++)
+			ctx->buf[i] ^= 0x36;
+		if (ssh_digest_update(ctx->ictx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len) < 0)
+			return -1;
+		for (i = 0; i < ctx->buf_len; i++)
+			ctx->buf[i] ^= 0x36 ^ 0x5c;
+		if (ssh_digest_update(ctx->octx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len) < 0)
+			return -1;
+		explicit_bzero(ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len);
+	}
+	/* start with ictx */
+	if (ssh_digest_copy_state(ctx->ictx, ctx->digest) < 0)
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_hmac_update(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
+{
+	return ssh_digest_update(ctx->digest, m, mlen);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const Buffer *b)
+{
+	return ssh_digest_update_buffer(ctx->digest, b);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_hmac_final(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+	size_t len;
+
+	len = ssh_digest_bytes(ctx->alg);
+	if (dlen < len ||
+	    ssh_digest_final(ctx->digest, ctx->buf, len))
+		return -1;
+	/* switch to octx */
+	if (ssh_digest_copy_state(ctx->octx, ctx->digest) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_update(ctx->digest, ctx->buf, len) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_final(ctx->digest, d, dlen) < 0)
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_hmac_free(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx != NULL) {
+		ssh_digest_free(ctx->ictx);
+		ssh_digest_free(ctx->octx);
+		ssh_digest_free(ctx->digest);
+		if (ctx->buf) {
+			explicit_bzero(ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len);
+			free(ctx->buf);
+		}
+		explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+		free(ctx);
+	}
+}
+
+#ifdef TEST
+
+/* cc -DTEST hmac.c digest.c buffer.c cleanup.c fatal.c log.c xmalloc.c -lcrypto */
+static void
+hmac_test(void *key, size_t klen, void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *e, size_t elen)
+{
+	struct ssh_hmac_ctx	*ctx;
+	size_t			 i;
+	u_char			 digest[16];
+
+	if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL)
+		printf("ssh_hmac_start failed");
+	if (ssh_hmac_init(ctx, key, klen) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_hmac_update(ctx, m, mlen) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_hmac_final(ctx, digest, sizeof(digest)) < 0)
+		printf("ssh_hmac_xxx failed");
+	ssh_hmac_free(ctx);
+
+	if (memcmp(e, digest, elen)) {
+		for (i = 0; i < elen; i++)
+			printf("[%zd] %2.2x %2.2x\n", i, e[i], digest[i]);
+		printf("mismatch\n");
+	} else
+		printf("ok\n");
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	/* try test vectors from RFC 2104 */
+
+	u_char key1[16] = {
+	    0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb,
+	    0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb };
+	u_char *data1 = "Hi There";
+	u_char dig1[16] = {
+	    0x92, 0x94, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x36, 0x38, 0xbb, 0x1c,
+	    0x13, 0xf4, 0x8e, 0xf8, 0x15, 0x8b, 0xfc, 0x9d };
+
+	u_char *key2 = "Jefe";
+	u_char *data2 = "what do ya want for nothing?";
+	u_char dig2[16] = {
+	    0x75, 0x0c, 0x78, 0x3e, 0x6a, 0xb0, 0xb5, 0x03,
+	    0xea, 0xa8, 0x6e, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x5d, 0xb7, 0x38 };
+
+	u_char key3[16];
+	u_char data3[50];
+	u_char dig3[16] = {
+	    0x56, 0xbe, 0x34, 0x52, 0x1d, 0x14, 0x4c, 0x88,
+	    0xdb, 0xb8, 0xc7, 0x33, 0xf0, 0xe8, 0xb3, 0xf6 };
+	memset(key3, 0xaa, sizeof(key3));
+	memset(data3, 0xdd, sizeof(data3));
+
+	hmac_test(key1, sizeof(key1), data1, strlen(data1), dig1, sizeof(dig1));
+	hmac_test(key2, strlen(key2), data2, strlen(data2), dig2, sizeof(dig2));
+	hmac_test(key3, sizeof(key3), data3, sizeof(data3), dig3, sizeof(dig3));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/hmac.h b/crypto/openssh/hmac.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2374a69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/hmac.h
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: hmac.h,v 1.6 2014/01/27 18:58:14 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _HMAC_H
+#define _HMAC_H
+
+/* Returns the algorithm's digest length in bytes or 0 for invalid algorithm */
+size_t ssh_hmac_bytes(int alg);
+
+struct ssh_hmac_ctx;
+struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ssh_hmac_start(int alg);
+
+/* Sets the state of the HMAC or resets the state if key == NULL */
+int ssh_hmac_init(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *key, size_t klen)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
+int ssh_hmac_update(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
+int ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const Buffer *b);
+int ssh_hmac_final(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
+void ssh_hmac_free(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx);
+
+#endif /* _HMAC_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c
index 2778fb5..8bc9540 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.53 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.55 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -42,9 +42,6 @@
 
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-
 #include <resolv.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -58,6 +55,7 @@
 #include "log.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "digest.h"
+#include "hmac.h"
 
 struct hostkeys {
 	struct hostkey_entry *entries;
@@ -102,9 +100,9 @@ extract_salt(const char *s, u_int l, u_char *salt, size_t salt_len)
 		debug2("extract_salt: salt decode error");
 		return (-1);
 	}
-	if (ret != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
-		debug2("extract_salt: expected salt len %d, got %d",
-		    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, ret);
+	if (ret != (int)ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) {
+		debug2("extract_salt: expected salt len %zd, got %d",
+		    ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1), ret);
 		return (-1);
 	}
 
@@ -114,14 +112,13 @@ extract_salt(const char *s, u_int l, u_char *salt, size_t salt_len)
 char *
 host_hash(const char *host, const char *name_from_hostfile, u_int src_len)
 {
-	const EVP_MD *md = EVP_sha1();
-	HMAC_CTX mac_ctx;
+	struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx;
 	u_char salt[256], result[256];
 	char uu_salt[512], uu_result[512];
 	static char encoded[1024];
 	u_int i, len;
 
-	len = EVP_MD_size(md);
+	len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
 
 	if (name_from_hostfile == NULL) {
 		/* Create new salt */
@@ -134,14 +131,16 @@ host_hash(const char *host, const char *name_from_hostfile, u_int src_len)
 			return (NULL);
 	}
 
-	HMAC_Init(&mac_ctx, salt, len, md);
-	HMAC_Update(&mac_ctx, (u_char *)host, strlen(host));
-	HMAC_Final(&mac_ctx, result, NULL);
-	HMAC_cleanup(&mac_ctx);
+	if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL ||
+	    ssh_hmac_init(ctx, salt, len) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_hmac_update(ctx, host, strlen(host)) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_hmac_final(ctx, result, sizeof(result)))
+		fatal("%s: ssh_hmac failed", __func__);
+	ssh_hmac_free(ctx);
 
 	if (__b64_ntop(salt, len, uu_salt, sizeof(uu_salt)) == -1 ||
 	    __b64_ntop(result, len, uu_result, sizeof(uu_result)) == -1)
-		fatal("host_hash: __b64_ntop failed");
+		fatal("%s: __b64_ntop failed", __func__);
 
 	snprintf(encoded, sizeof(encoded), "%s%s%c%s", HASH_MAGIC, uu_salt,
 	    HASH_DELIM, uu_result);
@@ -334,10 +333,10 @@ free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys)
 		free(hostkeys->entries[i].host);
 		free(hostkeys->entries[i].file);
 		key_free(hostkeys->entries[i].key);
-		bzero(hostkeys->entries + i, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries));
+		explicit_bzero(hostkeys->entries + i, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries));
 	}
 	free(hostkeys->entries);
-	bzero(hostkeys, sizeof(*hostkeys));
+	explicit_bzero(hostkeys, sizeof(*hostkeys));
 	free(hostkeys);
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/jpake.c b/crypto/openssh/jpake.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 3dd8791..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/jpake.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,456 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: jpake.c,v 1.8 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/*
- * Shared components of zero-knowledge password auth using J-PAKE protocol
- * as described in:
- *
- * F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling",
- * 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008
- *
- * http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/Research/contributions/hao-ryan-2008.pdf
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-#include "jpake.h"
-#include "schnorr.h"
-
-#ifdef JPAKE
-
-/* RFC3526 group 5, 1536 bits */
-#define JPAKE_GROUP_G "2"
-#define JPAKE_GROUP_P \
-	"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74" \
-	"020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F1437" \
-	"4FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \
-	"EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3DC2007CB8A163BF05" \
-	"98DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB" \
-	"9ED529077096966D670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA237327FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
-
-struct modp_group *
-jpake_default_group(void)
-{
-	return modp_group_from_g_and_safe_p(JPAKE_GROUP_G, JPAKE_GROUP_P);
-}
-
-struct jpake_ctx *
-jpake_new(void)
-{
-	struct jpake_ctx *ret;
-
-	ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
-
-	ret->grp = jpake_default_group();
-
-	ret->s = ret->k = NULL;
-	ret->x1 = ret->x2 = ret->x3 = ret->x4 = NULL;
-	ret->g_x1 = ret->g_x2 = ret->g_x3 = ret->g_x4 = NULL;
-	ret->a = ret->b = NULL;
-
-	ret->client_id = ret->server_id = NULL;
-	ret->h_k_cid_sessid = ret->h_k_sid_sessid = NULL;
-
-	debug3("%s: alloc %p", __func__, ret);
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-void
-jpake_free(struct jpake_ctx *pctx)
-{
-	debug3("%s: free %p", __func__, pctx);
-
-#define JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(v)			\
-	do {					\
-		if ((v) != NULL) {		\
-			BN_clear_free(v);	\
-			(v) = NULL;		\
-		}				\
-	} while (0)
-#define JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(v, l)		\
-	do {					\
-		if ((v) != NULL) {		\
-			bzero((v), (l));	\
-			free(v);		\
-			(v) = NULL;		\
-			(l) = 0;		\
-		}				\
-	} while (0)
-
-	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->s);
-	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->k);
-	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->x1);
-	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->x2);
-	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->x3);
-	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->x4);
-	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->g_x1);
-	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->g_x2);
-	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->g_x3);
-	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->g_x4);
-	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->a);
-	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->b);
-
-	JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len);
-	JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
-	JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
-	JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
-
-#undef JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE
-#undef JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE
-
-	bzero(pctx, sizeof(*pctx));
-	free(pctx);
-}
-
-/* dump entire jpake_ctx. NB. includes private values! */
-void
-jpake_dump(struct jpake_ctx *pctx, const char *fmt, ...)
-{
-	char *out;
-	va_list args;
-
-	out = NULL;
-	va_start(args, fmt);
-	vasprintf(&out, fmt, args);
-	va_end(args);
-	if (out == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
-
-	debug3("%s: %s (ctx at %p)", __func__, out, pctx);
-	if (pctx == NULL) {
-		free(out);
-		return;
-	}
-
-#define JPAKE_DUMP_BN(a)	do { \
-		if ((a) != NULL) \
-			JPAKE_DEBUG_BN(((a), "%s = ", #a)); \
-	} while (0)
-#define JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(a, b)	do { \
-		if ((a) != NULL) \
-			JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF((a, b, "%s", #a)); \
-	} while (0)
-
-	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->s);
-	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->k);
-	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->x1);
-	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->x2);
-	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->x3);
-	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->x4);
-	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->g_x1);
-	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->g_x2);
-	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->g_x3);
-	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->g_x4);
-	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->a);
-	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->b);
-
-	JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len);
-	JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
-	JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
-	JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
-
-	debug3("%s: %s done", __func__, out);
-	free(out);
-}
-
-/* Shared parts of step 1 exchange calculation */
-void
-jpake_step1(struct modp_group *grp,
-    u_char **id, u_int *id_len,
-    BIGNUM **priv1, BIGNUM **priv2, BIGNUM **g_priv1, BIGNUM **g_priv2,
-    u_char **priv1_proof, u_int *priv1_proof_len,
-    u_char **priv2_proof, u_int *priv2_proof_len)
-{
-	BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
-
-	if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
-
-	/* Random nonce to prevent replay */
-	*id = xmalloc(KZP_ID_LEN);
-	*id_len = KZP_ID_LEN;
-	arc4random_buf(*id, *id_len);
-
-	/*
-	 * x1/x3 is a random element of Zq
-	 * x2/x4 is a random element of Z*q
-	 * We also exclude [1] from x1/x3 candidates and [0, 1] from
-	 * x2/x4 candiates to avoid possible degeneracy (i.e. g^0, g^1).
-	 */
-	if ((*priv1 = bn_rand_range_gt_one(grp->q)) == NULL ||
-	    (*priv2 = bn_rand_range_gt_one(grp->q)) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: bn_rand_range_gt_one", __func__);
-
-	/*
-	 * client: g_x1 = g^x1 mod p / server: g_x3 = g^x3 mod p
-	 * client: g_x2 = g^x2 mod p / server: g_x4 = g^x4 mod p
-	 */
-	if ((*g_priv1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (*g_priv2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-	if (BN_mod_exp(*g_priv1, grp->g, *priv1, grp->p, bn_ctx) == -1)
-		fatal("%s: BN_mod_exp", __func__);
-	if (BN_mod_exp(*g_priv2, grp->g, *priv2, grp->p, bn_ctx) == -1)
-		fatal("%s: BN_mod_exp", __func__);
-
-	/* Generate proofs for holding x1/x3 and x2/x4 */
-	if (schnorr_sign_buf(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g,
-	    *priv1, *g_priv1, *id, *id_len,
-	    priv1_proof, priv1_proof_len) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: schnorr_sign", __func__);
-	if (schnorr_sign_buf(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g,
-	    *priv2, *g_priv2, *id, *id_len,
-	    priv2_proof, priv2_proof_len) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: schnorr_sign", __func__);
-
-	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-}
-
-/* Shared parts of step 2 exchange calculation */
-void
-jpake_step2(struct modp_group *grp, BIGNUM *s,
-    BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2, BIGNUM *mypriv2,
-    const u_char *theirid, u_int theirid_len,
-    const u_char *myid, u_int myid_len,
-    const u_char *theirpub1_proof, u_int theirpub1_proof_len,
-    const u_char *theirpub2_proof, u_int theirpub2_proof_len,
-    BIGNUM **newpub,
-    u_char **newpub_exponent_proof, u_int *newpub_exponent_proof_len)
-{
-	BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
-	BIGNUM *tmp, *exponent;
-
-	/* Validate peer's step 1 values */
-	if (BN_cmp(theirpub1, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
-		fatal("%s: theirpub1 <= 1", __func__);
-	if (BN_cmp(theirpub1, grp->p) >= 0)
-		fatal("%s: theirpub1 >= p", __func__);
-	if (BN_cmp(theirpub2, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
-		fatal("%s: theirpub2 <= 1", __func__);
-	if (BN_cmp(theirpub2, grp->p) >= 0)
-		fatal("%s: theirpub2 >= p", __func__);
-
-	if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g, theirpub1,
-	    theirid, theirid_len, theirpub1_proof, theirpub1_proof_len) != 1)
-		fatal("%s: schnorr_verify theirpub1 failed", __func__);
-	if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g, theirpub2,
-	    theirid, theirid_len, theirpub2_proof, theirpub2_proof_len) != 1)
-		fatal("%s: schnorr_verify theirpub2 failed", __func__);
-
-	if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
-
-	if ((*newpub = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (exponent = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-
-	/*
-	 * client: exponent = x2 * s mod p
-	 * server: exponent = x4 * s mod p
-	 */
-	if (BN_mod_mul(exponent, mypriv2, s, grp->q, bn_ctx) != 1)
-		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (exponent = mypriv2 * s mod p)",
-		    __func__);
-
-	/*
-	 * client: tmp = g^(x1 + x3 + x4) mod p
-	 * server: tmp = g^(x1 + x2 + x3) mod p
-	 */
-	if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, mypub1, theirpub1, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
-		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = mypub1 * theirpub1 mod p)",
-		    __func__);
-	if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, theirpub2, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
-		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = tmp * theirpub2 mod p)", __func__);
-
-	/*
-	 * client: a = tmp^exponent = g^((x1+x3+x4) * x2 * s) mod p
-	 * server: b = tmp^exponent = g^((x1+x2+x3) * x4 * s) mod p
-	 */
-	if (BN_mod_exp(*newpub, tmp, exponent, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
-		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (newpub = tmp^exponent mod p)", __func__);
-
-	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((tmp, "%s: tmp = ", __func__));
-	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((exponent, "%s: exponent = ", __func__));
-
-	/* Note the generator here is 'tmp', not g */
-	if (schnorr_sign_buf(grp->p, grp->q, tmp, exponent, *newpub,
-	    myid, myid_len,
-	    newpub_exponent_proof, newpub_exponent_proof_len) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: schnorr_sign newpub", __func__);
-
-	BN_clear_free(tmp); /* XXX stash for later use? */
-	BN_clear_free(exponent); /* XXX stash for later use? (yes, in conf) */
-
-	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-}
-
-/* Confirmation hash calculation */
-void
-jpake_confirm_hash(const BIGNUM *k,
-    const u_char *endpoint_id, u_int endpoint_id_len,
-    const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
-    u_char **confirm_hash, u_int *confirm_hash_len)
-{
-	Buffer b;
-
-	/*
-	 * Calculate confirmation proof:
-	 *     client: H(k || client_id || session_id)
-	 *     server: H(k || server_id || session_id)
-	 */
-	buffer_init(&b);
-	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k);
-	buffer_put_string(&b, endpoint_id, endpoint_id_len);
-	buffer_put_string(&b, sess_id, sess_id_len);
-	if (hash_buffer(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), EVP_sha256(),
-	    confirm_hash, confirm_hash_len) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
-	buffer_free(&b);
-}
-
-/* Shared parts of key derivation and confirmation calculation */
-void
-jpake_key_confirm(struct modp_group *grp, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *step2_val,
-    BIGNUM *mypriv2, BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *mypub2,
-    BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2,
-    const u_char *my_id, u_int my_id_len,
-    const u_char *their_id, u_int their_id_len,
-    const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
-    const u_char *theirpriv2_s_proof, u_int theirpriv2_s_proof_len,
-    BIGNUM **k,
-    u_char **confirm_hash, u_int *confirm_hash_len)
-{
-	BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
-	BIGNUM *tmp;
-
-	if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
-	if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (*k = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-
-	/* Validate step 2 values */
-	if (BN_cmp(step2_val, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
-		fatal("%s: step2_val <= 1", __func__);
-	if (BN_cmp(step2_val, grp->p) >= 0)
-		fatal("%s: step2_val >= p", __func__);
-
-	/*
-	 * theirpriv2_s_proof is calculated with a different generator:
-	 * tmp = g^(mypriv1+mypriv2+theirpub1) = g^mypub1*g^mypub2*g^theirpub1
-	 * Calculate it here so we can check the signature.
-	 */
-	if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, mypub1, mypub2, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
-		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = mypub1 * mypub2 mod p)", __func__);
-	if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, theirpub1, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
-		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = tmp * theirpub1 mod p)", __func__);
-
-	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((tmp, "%s: tmp = ", __func__));
-
-	if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp->p, grp->q, tmp, step2_val, 
-	    their_id, their_id_len,
-	    theirpriv2_s_proof, theirpriv2_s_proof_len) != 1)
-		fatal("%s: schnorr_verify theirpriv2_s_proof failed", __func__);
-
-	/*
-	 * Derive shared key:
-	 *     client: k = (b / g^(x2*x4*s))^x2 = g^((x1+x3)*x2*x4*s)
-	 *     server: k = (a / g^(x2*x4*s))^x4 = g^((x1+x3)*x2*x4*s)
-	 *
-	 * Computed as:
-	 *     client: k = (g_x4^(q - (x2 * s)) * b)^x2 mod p
-	 *     server: k = (g_x2^(q - (x4 * s)) * b)^x4 mod p
-	 */
-	if (BN_mul(tmp, mypriv2, s, bn_ctx) != 1)
-		fatal("%s: BN_mul (tmp = mypriv2 * s)", __func__);
-	if (BN_mod_sub(tmp, grp->q, tmp, grp->q, bn_ctx) != 1)
-		fatal("%s: BN_mod_sub (tmp = q - tmp mod q)", __func__);
-	if (BN_mod_exp(tmp, theirpub2, tmp, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
-		fatal("%s: BN_mod_exp (tmp = theirpub2^tmp) mod p", __func__);
-	if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, step2_val, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
-		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = tmp * step2_val) mod p", __func__);
-	if (BN_mod_exp(*k, tmp, mypriv2, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
-		fatal("%s: BN_mod_exp (k = tmp^mypriv2) mod p", __func__);
-	
-	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-	BN_clear_free(tmp);
-
-	jpake_confirm_hash(*k, my_id, my_id_len, sess_id, sess_id_len,
-	    confirm_hash, confirm_hash_len);
-}
-
-/*
- * Calculate and check confirmation hash from peer. Returns 1 on success
- * 0 on failure/mismatch.
- */
-int
-jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *k,
-    const u_char *peer_id, u_int peer_id_len,
-    const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
-    const u_char *peer_confirm_hash, u_int peer_confirm_hash_len)
-{
-	u_char *expected_confirm_hash;
-	u_int expected_confirm_hash_len;
-	int success = 0;
-
-	/* Calculate and verify expected confirmation hash */
-	jpake_confirm_hash(k, peer_id, peer_id_len, sess_id, sess_id_len,
-	    &expected_confirm_hash, &expected_confirm_hash_len);
-
-	JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF((expected_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash_len,
-	    "%s: expected confirm hash", __func__));
-	JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF((peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len,
-	    "%s: received confirm hash", __func__));
-
-	if (peer_confirm_hash_len != expected_confirm_hash_len)
-		error("%s: confirmation length mismatch (my %u them %u)",
-		    __func__, expected_confirm_hash_len, peer_confirm_hash_len);
-	else if (timingsafe_bcmp(peer_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash,
-	    expected_confirm_hash_len) == 0)
-		success = 1;
-	bzero(expected_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash_len);
-	free(expected_confirm_hash);
-	debug3("%s: success = %d", __func__, success);
-	return success;
-}
-
-/* XXX main() function with tests */
-
-#endif /* JPAKE */
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/jpake.h b/crypto/openssh/jpake.h
deleted file mode 100644
index a3f2cf0..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/jpake.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: jpake.h,v 1.2 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#ifndef JPAKE_H
-#define JPAKE_H
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-/* Set JPAKE_DEBUG in CFLAGS for privacy-violating debugging */
-#ifndef JPAKE_DEBUG
-# define JPAKE_DEBUG_BN(a)
-# define JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF(a)
-# define JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX(a)
-#else
-# define JPAKE_DEBUG_BN(a)	debug3_bn a
-# define JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF(a)	debug3_buf a
-# define JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX(a)	jpake_dump a
-#endif /* JPAKE_DEBUG */
-
-#define KZP_ID_LEN	16	/* Length of client and server IDs */
-
-struct jpake_ctx {
-	/* Parameters */
-	struct modp_group *grp;
-
-	/* Private values shared by client and server */
-	BIGNUM *s;			/* Secret (salted, crypted password) */
-	BIGNUM *k;			/* Derived key */
-
-	/* Client private values (NULL for server) */
-	BIGNUM *x1;			/* random in Zq */
-	BIGNUM *x2;			/* random in Z*q */
-
-	/* Server private values (NULL for server) */
-	BIGNUM *x3;			/* random in Zq */
-	BIGNUM *x4;			/* random in Z*q */
-
-	/* Step 1: C->S */
-	u_char *client_id;		/* Anti-replay nonce */
-	u_int client_id_len;
-	BIGNUM *g_x1;			/* g^x1 */
-	BIGNUM *g_x2;			/* g^x2 */
-
-	/* Step 1: S->C */
-	u_char *server_id;		/* Anti-replay nonce */
-	u_int server_id_len;
-	BIGNUM *g_x3;			/* g^x3 */
-	BIGNUM *g_x4;			/* g^x4 */
-
-	/* Step 2: C->S */
-	BIGNUM *a;			/* g^((x1+x3+x4)*x2*s) */
-
-	/* Step 2: S->C */
-	BIGNUM *b;			/* g^((x1+x2+x3)*x4*s) */
-
-	/* Confirmation: C->S */
-	u_char *h_k_cid_sessid;		/* H(k || client_id || session_id) */
-	u_int h_k_cid_sessid_len;
-
-	/* Confirmation: S->C */
-	u_char *h_k_sid_sessid;		/* H(k || server_id || session_id) */
-	u_int h_k_sid_sessid_len;
-};
-
-/* jpake.c */
-struct modp_group *jpake_default_group(void);
-void jpake_dump(struct jpake_ctx *, const char *, ...)
-    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)))
-    __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
-struct jpake_ctx *jpake_new(void);
-void jpake_free(struct jpake_ctx *);
-
-void jpake_step1(struct modp_group *, u_char **, u_int *,
-    BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **,
-    u_char **, u_int *, u_char **, u_int *);
-
-void jpake_step2(struct modp_group *, BIGNUM *,
-    BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
-    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
-    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
-    BIGNUM **, u_char **, u_int *);
-
-void jpake_confirm_hash(const BIGNUM *,
-    const u_char *, u_int,
-    const u_char *, u_int,
-    u_char **, u_int *);
-
-void jpake_key_confirm(struct modp_group *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
-    BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
-    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
-    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
-    BIGNUM **, u_char **, u_int *);
-
-int jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, u_int,
-    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
-
-#endif /* JPAKE_H */
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kex.c b/crypto/openssh/kex.c
index 8280b80..6c7b20c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kex.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kex.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.97 2014/01/25 20:35:37 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.98 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -690,8 +690,8 @@ derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *host_modulus, BIGNUM *server_modulus,
 		fatal("%s: ssh_digest_final failed", __func__);
 	memcpy(id, obuf, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5));
 
-	memset(nbuf, 0, sizeof(nbuf));
-	memset(obuf, 0, sizeof(obuf));
+	explicit_bzero(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf));
+	explicit_bzero(obuf, sizeof(obuf));
 }
 
 #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kex.h b/crypto/openssh/kex.h
index 8c842c9..0d5c362 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kex.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kex.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.61 2014/01/25 10:12:50 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.62 2014/01/27 18:58:14 markus Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 
 /*
@@ -106,9 +106,8 @@ struct Mac {
 	u_int	key_len;
 	int	type;
 	int	etm;		/* Encrypt-then-MAC */
-	const EVP_MD	*evp_md;
-	HMAC_CTX	evp_ctx;
-	struct umac_ctx *umac_ctx;
+	struct ssh_hmac_ctx	*hmac_ctx;
+	struct umac_ctx		*umac_ctx;
 };
 struct Comp {
 	int	type;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexc25519.c b/crypto/openssh/kexc25519.c
index 48ca4aa..ee79b43 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexc25519.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexc25519.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.4 2014/01/12 08:13:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.5 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001, 2013 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
 #endif
 	buffer_clear(out);
 	buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(out, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
-	memset(shared_key, 0, CURVE25519_SIZE);	/* XXX explicit_bzero() */
+	explicit_bzero(shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
 }
 
 void
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexdhc.c b/crypto/openssh/kexdhc.c
index 78509af..f7a19fc 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexdhc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexdhc.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexdhc.c,v 1.14 2014/01/12 08:13:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdhc.c,v 1.15 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ kexdh_client(Kex *kex)
 		fatal("kexdh_client: BN_new failed");
 	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
 		fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
-	memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+	explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
 	free(kbuf);
 
 	/* calc and verify H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c b/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c
index d2c7adc..c3011f7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.17 2014/01/12 08:13:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.18 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ kexdh_server(Kex *kex)
 		fatal("kexdh_server: BN_new failed");
 	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
 		fatal("kexdh_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
-	memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+	explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
 	free(kbuf);
 
 	key_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexecdhc.c b/crypto/openssh/kexecdhc.c
index e3d1cf5..2f7629c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexecdhc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexecdhc.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhc.c,v 1.6 2014/01/12 08:13:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhc.c,v 1.7 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ kexecdh_client(Kex *kex)
 		fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
 	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__);
-	memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+	explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
 	free(kbuf);
 
 	/* calc and verify H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexecdhs.c b/crypto/openssh/kexecdhs.c
index 6fbb79c..2700b72 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexecdhs.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexecdhs.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhs.c,v 1.9 2014/01/12 08:13:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhs.c,v 1.10 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ kexecdh_server(Kex *kex)
 		fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
 	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__);
-	memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+	explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
 	free(kbuf);
 
 	/* calc H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c b/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c
index 629b5fb..355b7ba 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.16 2014/01/25 10:12:50 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.17 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ kexgex_client(Kex *kex)
 		fatal("kexgex_client: BN_new failed");
 	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
 		fatal("kexgex_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
-	memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+	explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
 	free(kbuf);
 
 	if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c b/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c
index 8773778..770ad28 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.18 2014/01/12 08:13:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.19 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ kexgex_server(Kex *kex)
 		fatal("kexgex_server: BN_new failed");
 	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
 		fatal("kexgex_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
-	memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+	explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
 	free(kbuf);
 
 	key_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/key.c b/crypto/openssh/key.c
index 9142338..168e1b7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/key.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/key.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.115 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.116 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * read_bignum():
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -242,12 +242,12 @@ key_free(Key *k)
 	case KEY_ED25519:
 	case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
 		if (k->ed25519_pk) {
-			memset(k->ed25519_pk, 0, ED25519_PK_SZ);
+			explicit_bzero(k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
 			free(k->ed25519_pk);
 			k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
 		}
 		if (k->ed25519_sk) {
-			memset(k->ed25519_sk, 0, ED25519_SK_SZ);
+			explicit_bzero(k->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ);
 			free(k->ed25519_sk);
 			k->ed25519_sk = NULL;
 		}
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type,
 		if ((ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, blob, len,
 		    retval, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0)
 			fatal("%s: digest_memory failed", __func__);
-		memset(blob, 0, len);
+		explicit_bzero(blob, len);
 		free(blob);
 		*dgst_raw_length = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
 	} else {
@@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)
 		    dgst_rep);
 		break;
 	}
-	memset(dgst_raw, 0, dgst_raw_len);
+	explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
 	free(dgst_raw);
 	return retval;
 }
@@ -1744,7 +1744,7 @@ to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp, int force_plain)
 		*blobp = xmalloc(len);
 		memcpy(*blobp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
 	}
-	memset(buffer_ptr(&b), 0, len);
+	explicit_bzero(buffer_ptr(&b), len);
 	buffer_free(&b);
 	return len;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/krl.c b/crypto/openssh/krl.c
index b2d0354..3b4cded 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/krl.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/krl.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
-/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.13 2013/07/20 22:20:42 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.14 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
 	struct revoked_serial rs, *ers, *crs, *irs;
 
 	KRL_DBG(("%s: insert %llu:%llu", __func__, lo, hi));
-	bzero(&rs, sizeof(rs));
+	memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs));
 	rs.lo = lo;
 	rs.hi = hi;
 	ers = RB_NFIND(revoked_serial_tree, rt, &rs);
@@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
 	struct revoked_certs *rc;
 
 	/* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */
-	bzero(&rb, sizeof(rb));
+	memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
 	if ((rb.blob = key_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_FP_SHA1, &rb.len)) == NULL)
 		return -1;
 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
@@ -1126,7 +1126,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
 	}
 
 	/* Next, explicit keys */
-	bzero(&rb, sizeof(rb));
+	memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
 	if (plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len) != 0)
 		return -1;
 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
@@ -1147,7 +1147,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
 		return 0; /* No entry for this CA */
 
 	/* Check revocation by cert key ID */
-	bzero(&rki, sizeof(rki));
+	memset(&rki, 0, sizeof(rki));
 	rki.key_id = key->cert->key_id;
 	erki = RB_FIND(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, &rki);
 	if (erki != NULL) {
@@ -1162,7 +1162,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
 	if (key_cert_is_legacy(key) || key->cert->serial == 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	bzero(&rs, sizeof(rs));
+	memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs));
 	rs.lo = rs.hi = key->cert->serial;
 	ers = RB_FIND(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, &rs);
 	if (ers != NULL) {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/mac.c b/crypto/openssh/mac.c
index d3a0b93..0977572 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/mac.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/mac.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.26 2014/01/04 17:50:55 tedu Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.28 2014/02/07 06:55:54 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <signal.h>
@@ -42,18 +40,20 @@
 #include "mac.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "hmac.h"
 #include "umac.h"
 
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
 
-#define SSH_EVP		1	/* OpenSSL EVP-based MAC */
+#define SSH_DIGEST	1	/* SSH_DIGEST_XXX */
 #define SSH_UMAC	2	/* UMAC (not integrated with OpenSSL) */
 #define SSH_UMAC128	3
 
 struct macalg {
 	char		*name;
 	int		type;
-	const EVP_MD *	(*mdfunc)(void);
+	int		alg;
 	int		truncatebits;	/* truncate digest if != 0 */
 	int		key_len;	/* just for UMAC */
 	int		len;		/* just for UMAC */
@@ -62,33 +62,33 @@ struct macalg {
 
 static const struct macalg macs[] = {
 	/* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */
-	{ "hmac-sha1",				SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
-	{ "hmac-sha1-96",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "hmac-sha1",				SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "hmac-sha1-96",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
 #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-	{ "hmac-sha2-256",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha256, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
-	{ "hmac-sha2-512",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha512, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "hmac-sha2-256",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "hmac-sha2-512",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
 #endif
-	{ "hmac-md5",				SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
-	{ "hmac-md5-96",			SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
-	{ "hmac-ripemd160",			SSH_EVP, EVP_ripemd160, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
-	{ "hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com",		SSH_EVP, EVP_ripemd160, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
-	{ "umac-64@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC, NULL, 0, 128, 64, 0 },
-	{ "umac-128@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC128, NULL, 0, 128, 128, 0 },
+	{ "hmac-md5",				SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "hmac-md5-96",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "hmac-ripemd160",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com",		SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "umac-64@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 0 },
+	{ "umac-128@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 0 },
 
 	/* Encrypt-then-MAC variants */
-	{ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
-	{ "hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 96, 0, 0, 1 },
+	{ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+	{ "hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 1 },
 #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-	{ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_sha256, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
-	{ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_sha512, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+	{ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+	{ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
 #endif
-	{ "hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
-	{ "hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 96, 0, 0, 1 },
-	{ "hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_ripemd160, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
-	{ "umac-64-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC, NULL, 0, 128, 64, 1 },
-	{ "umac-128-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC128, NULL, 0, 128, 128, 1 },
+	{ "hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+	{ "hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 1 },
+	{ "hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+	{ "umac-64-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 1 },
+	{ "umac-128-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 1 },
 
-	{ NULL,					0, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+	{ NULL,					0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
 };
 
 /* Returns a list of supported MACs separated by the specified char. */
@@ -113,14 +113,11 @@ mac_alg_list(char sep)
 static void
 mac_setup_by_alg(Mac *mac, const struct macalg *macalg)
 {
-	int evp_len;
-
 	mac->type = macalg->type;
-	if (mac->type == SSH_EVP) {
-		mac->evp_md = macalg->mdfunc();
-		if ((evp_len = EVP_MD_size(mac->evp_md)) <= 0)
-			fatal("mac %s len %d", mac->name, evp_len);
-		mac->key_len = mac->mac_len = (u_int)evp_len;
+	if (mac->type == SSH_DIGEST) {
+		if ((mac->hmac_ctx = ssh_hmac_start(macalg->alg)) == NULL)
+			fatal("ssh_hmac_start(alg=%d) failed", macalg->alg);
+		mac->key_len = mac->mac_len = ssh_hmac_bytes(macalg->alg);
 	} else {
 		mac->mac_len = macalg->len / 8;
 		mac->key_len = macalg->key_len / 8;
@@ -139,9 +136,10 @@ mac_setup(Mac *mac, char *name)
 	for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
 		if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0)
 			continue;
-		if (mac != NULL)
+		if (mac != NULL) {
 			mac_setup_by_alg(mac, m);
-		debug2("mac_setup: found %s", name);
+			debug2("mac_setup: setup %s", name);
+		}
 		return (0);
 	}
 	debug2("mac_setup: unknown %s", name);
@@ -152,13 +150,12 @@ int
 mac_init(Mac *mac)
 {
 	if (mac->key == NULL)
-		fatal("mac_init: no key");
+		fatal("%s: no key", __func__);
 	switch (mac->type) {
-	case SSH_EVP:
-		if (mac->evp_md == NULL)
+	case SSH_DIGEST:
+		if (mac->hmac_ctx == NULL ||
+		    ssh_hmac_init(mac->hmac_ctx, mac->key, mac->key_len) < 0)
 			return -1;
-		HMAC_CTX_init(&mac->evp_ctx);
-		HMAC_Init(&mac->evp_ctx, mac->key, mac->key_len, mac->evp_md);
 		return 0;
 	case SSH_UMAC:
 		mac->umac_ctx = umac_new(mac->key);
@@ -185,13 +182,14 @@ mac_compute(Mac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, u_char *data, int datalen)
 		    mac->mac_len, sizeof(u));
 
 	switch (mac->type) {
-	case SSH_EVP:
+	case SSH_DIGEST:
 		put_u32(b, seqno);
 		/* reset HMAC context */
-		HMAC_Init(&mac->evp_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL);
-		HMAC_Update(&mac->evp_ctx, b, sizeof(b));
-		HMAC_Update(&mac->evp_ctx, data, datalen);
-		HMAC_Final(&mac->evp_ctx, u.m, NULL);
+		if (ssh_hmac_init(mac->hmac_ctx, NULL, 0) < 0 ||
+		    ssh_hmac_update(mac->hmac_ctx, b, sizeof(b)) < 0 ||
+		    ssh_hmac_update(mac->hmac_ctx, data, datalen) < 0 ||
+		    ssh_hmac_final(mac->hmac_ctx, u.m, sizeof(u.m)) < 0)
+			fatal("ssh_hmac failed");
 		break;
 	case SSH_UMAC:
 		put_u64(nonce, seqno);
@@ -218,9 +216,9 @@ mac_clear(Mac *mac)
 	} else if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC128) {
 		if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL)
 			umac128_delete(mac->umac_ctx);
-	} else if (mac->evp_md != NULL)
-		HMAC_cleanup(&mac->evp_ctx);
-	mac->evp_md = NULL;
+	} else if (mac->hmac_ctx != NULL)
+		ssh_hmac_free(mac->hmac_ctx);
+	mac->hmac_ctx = NULL;
 	mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
 }
 
@@ -240,8 +238,6 @@ mac_valid(const char *names)
 			debug("bad mac %s [%s]", p, names);
 			free(maclist);
 			return (0);
-		} else {
-			debug3("mac ok: %s [%s]", p, names);
 		}
 	}
 	debug3("macs ok: [%s]", names);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/moduli.0 b/crypto/openssh/moduli.0
index 7dc2cd5..7d678b4 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/moduli.0
+++ b/crypto/openssh/moduli.0
@@ -71,4 +71,4 @@ STANDARDS
      the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006,
      2006.
 
-OpenBSD 5.4                   September 26, 2012                   OpenBSD 5.4
+OpenBSD 5.5                   September 26, 2012                   OpenBSD 5.5
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
index 03baf1e..531c4f9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.128 2013/11/04 11:51:16 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.131 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -95,7 +95,6 @@
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
-#include "jpake.h"
 #include "roaming.h"
 #include "authfd.h"
 
@@ -161,11 +160,6 @@ int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_jpake_step1(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_jpake_step2(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int, Buffer *);
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *);
@@ -254,13 +248,6 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
 #endif
-#ifdef JPAKE
-    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_jpake_step1},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_step2},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm},
-#endif
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -427,15 +414,6 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 			if (!authenticated)
 				authctxt->failures++;
 		}
-#ifdef JPAKE
-		/* Cleanup JPAKE context after authentication */
-		if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
-			if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
-				jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
-				authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
-			}
-		}
-#endif
 	}
 
 	if (!authctxt->valid)
@@ -566,7 +544,7 @@ monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
 	struct pollfd pfd[2];
 
 	for (;;) {
-		bzero(&pfd, sizeof(pfd));
+		memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
 		pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
 		pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
 		pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
@@ -880,7 +858,7 @@ mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
 	authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
 	    auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
-	memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
+	explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
 	free(passwd);
 
 	buffer_clear(m);
@@ -1822,13 +1800,13 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
 	/* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */
 	buffer_clear(packet_get_input());
 	buffer_append(packet_get_input(), child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
-	memset(child_state.input, 0, child_state.ilen);
+	explicit_bzero(child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
 	free(child_state.input);
 
 	buffer_clear(packet_get_output());
 	buffer_append(packet_get_output(), child_state.output,
 		      child_state.olen);
-	memset(child_state.output, 0, child_state.olen);
+	explicit_bzero(child_state.output, child_state.olen);
 	free(child_state.output);
 
 	/* Roaming */
@@ -2159,205 +2137,3 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
 }
 #endif /* GSSAPI */
 
-#ifdef JPAKE
-int
-mm_answer_jpake_step1(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
-	struct jpake_ctx *pctx;
-	u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
-	u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
-
-	if (!options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
-		fatal("zero_knowledge_password_authentication disabled");
-
-	if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL)
-		fatal("%s: authctxt->jpake_ctx already set (%p)",
-		    __func__, authctxt->jpake_ctx);
-	authctxt->jpake_ctx = pctx = jpake_new();
-
-	jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
-	    &pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
-	    &pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
-	    &x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
-	    &x4_proof, &x4_proof_len);
-
-	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step1 done in %s", __func__));
-
-	buffer_clear(m);
-
-	buffer_put_string(m, pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
-	buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x3);
-	buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x4);
-	buffer_put_string(m, x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
-	buffer_put_string(m, x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
-
-	debug3("%s: sending step1", __func__);
-	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1, m);
-
-	bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
-	bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
-	free(x3_proof);
-	free(x4_proof);
-
-	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, 1);
-	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 0);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
-	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
-	char *hash_scheme, *salt;
-
-	if (pctx == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
-
-	auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s, &hash_scheme, &salt);
-
-	buffer_clear(m);
-	/* pctx->s is sensitive, not returned to slave */
-	buffer_put_cstring(m, hash_scheme);
-	buffer_put_cstring(m, salt);
-
-	debug3("%s: sending pwdata", __func__);
-	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, m);
-
-	bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
-	bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
-	free(hash_scheme);
-	free(salt);
-
-	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, 1);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_jpake_step2(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
-	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
-	u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
-	u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;
-
-	if (pctx == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
-
-	if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-	buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x1);
-	buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x2);
-	pctx->client_id = buffer_get_string(m, &pctx->client_id_len);
-	x1_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x1_proof_len);
-	x2_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_proof_len);
-
-	jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
-	    pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
-	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
-	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
-	    x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
-	    x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
-	    &pctx->b,
-	    &x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len);
-
-	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step2 done in %s", __func__));
-
-	bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
-	bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
-	free(x1_proof);
-	free(x2_proof);
-
-	buffer_clear(m);
-
-	buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->b);
-	buffer_put_string(m, x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
-
-	debug3("%s: sending step2", __func__);
-	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2, m);
-
-	bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
-	free(x4_s_proof);
-
-	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, 1);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
-	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
-	u_char *x2_s_proof;
-	u_int x2_s_proof_len;
-
-	if (pctx == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
-
-	if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-	buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->a);
-	x2_s_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_s_proof_len);
-
-	jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
-	    pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
-	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
-	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
-	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
-	    x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
-	    &pctx->k,
-	    &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
-
-	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "key_confirm done in %s", __func__));
-
-	bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
-	buffer_clear(m);
-
-	/* pctx->k is sensitive, not sent */
-	buffer_put_string(m, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
-
-	debug3("%s: sending confirmation hash", __func__);
-	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, m);
-
-	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, 1);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
-	int authenticated = 0;
-	u_char *peer_confirm_hash;
-	u_int peer_confirm_hash_len;
-	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
-
-	if (pctx == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
-
-	peer_confirm_hash = buffer_get_string(m, &peer_confirm_hash_len);
-
-	authenticated = jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
-	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
-	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
-	    peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len) && authctxt->valid;
-
-	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "check_confirm done in %s", __func__));
-
-	bzero(peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len);
-	free(peer_confirm_hash);
-
-	buffer_clear(m);
-	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
-
-	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
-	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, m);
-
-	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 1);
-
-	auth_method = "jpake-01@openssh.com";
-	return authenticated;
-}
-
-#endif /* JPAKE */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor.h
index 2caa469..5bc41b5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.17 2012/12/02 20:34:10 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.18 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
@@ -56,11 +56,6 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK = 46, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK = 47,
 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
-	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1 = 52, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1 = 53,
-	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA = 54, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA = 55,
-	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2 = 56, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2 = 57,
-	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM = 58, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM = 59,
-	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM = 60, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM = 61,
 
 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c
index 4ce4696..1a47e41 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.77 2013/11/06 16:52:11 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.79 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -71,8 +71,6 @@
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
 #include "misc.h"
-#include "schnorr.h"
-#include "jpake.h"
 #include "uuencode.h"
 
 #include "channels.h"
@@ -574,7 +572,7 @@ mm_newkeys_to_blob(int mode, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
 		*blobp = xmalloc(len);
 		memcpy(*blobp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
 	}
-	memset(buffer_ptr(&b), 0, len);
+	explicit_bzero(buffer_ptr(&b), len);
 	buffer_free(&b);
 	return len;
 }
@@ -618,7 +616,7 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor)
 		key = xmalloc(keylen+1);	/* add 1 if keylen == 0 */
 		keylen = packet_get_encryption_key(key);
 		buffer_put_string(&m, key, keylen);
-		memset(key, 0, keylen);
+		explicit_bzero(key, keylen);
 		free(key);
 
 		ivlen = packet_get_keyiv_len(MODE_OUT);
@@ -1292,164 +1290,3 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
 }
 #endif /* GSSAPI */
 
-#ifdef JPAKE
-void
-mm_auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM **s,
-    char **hash_scheme, char **salt)
-{
-	Buffer m;
-
-	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
-	buffer_init(&m);
-	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
-	    MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, &m);
-
-	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA", __func__);
-	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
-	    MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, &m);
-
-	*hash_scheme = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
-	*salt = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
-
-	buffer_free(&m);
-}
-
-void
-mm_jpake_step1(struct modp_group *grp,
-    u_char **id, u_int *id_len,
-    BIGNUM **priv1, BIGNUM **priv2, BIGNUM **g_priv1, BIGNUM **g_priv2,
-    u_char **priv1_proof, u_int *priv1_proof_len,
-    u_char **priv2_proof, u_int *priv2_proof_len)
-{
-	Buffer m;
-
-	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
-	buffer_init(&m);
-	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
-	    MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, &m);
-
-	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1", __func__);
-	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
-	    MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1, &m);
-
-	if ((*priv1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (*priv2 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (*g_priv1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (*g_priv2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-
-	*id = buffer_get_string(&m, id_len);
-	/* priv1 and priv2 are, well, private */
-	buffer_get_bignum2(&m, *g_priv1);
-	buffer_get_bignum2(&m, *g_priv2);
-	*priv1_proof = buffer_get_string(&m, priv1_proof_len);
-	*priv2_proof = buffer_get_string(&m, priv2_proof_len);
-
-	buffer_free(&m);
-}
-
-void
-mm_jpake_step2(struct modp_group *grp, BIGNUM *s,
-    BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2, BIGNUM *mypriv2,
-    const u_char *theirid, u_int theirid_len,
-    const u_char *myid, u_int myid_len,
-    const u_char *theirpub1_proof, u_int theirpub1_proof_len,
-    const u_char *theirpub2_proof, u_int theirpub2_proof_len,
-    BIGNUM **newpub,
-    u_char **newpub_exponent_proof, u_int *newpub_exponent_proof_len)
-{
-	Buffer m;
-
-	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
-	buffer_init(&m);
-	/* monitor already has all bignums except theirpub1, theirpub2 */
-	buffer_put_bignum2(&m, theirpub1);
-	buffer_put_bignum2(&m, theirpub2);
-	/* monitor already knows our id */
-	buffer_put_string(&m, theirid, theirid_len);
-	buffer_put_string(&m, theirpub1_proof, theirpub1_proof_len);
-	buffer_put_string(&m, theirpub2_proof, theirpub2_proof_len);
-
-	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
-	    MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, &m);
-
-	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2", __func__);
-	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
-	    MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2, &m);
-
-	if ((*newpub = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-
-	buffer_get_bignum2(&m, *newpub);
-	*newpub_exponent_proof = buffer_get_string(&m,
-	    newpub_exponent_proof_len);
-
-	buffer_free(&m);
-}
-
-void
-mm_jpake_key_confirm(struct modp_group *grp, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *step2_val,
-    BIGNUM *mypriv2, BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *mypub2,
-    BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2,
-    const u_char *my_id, u_int my_id_len,
-    const u_char *their_id, u_int their_id_len,
-    const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
-    const u_char *theirpriv2_s_proof, u_int theirpriv2_s_proof_len,
-    BIGNUM **k,
-    u_char **confirm_hash, u_int *confirm_hash_len)
-{
-	Buffer m;
-
-	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
-	buffer_init(&m);
-	/* monitor already has all bignums except step2_val */
-	buffer_put_bignum2(&m, step2_val);
-	/* monitor already knows all the ids */
-	buffer_put_string(&m, theirpriv2_s_proof, theirpriv2_s_proof_len);
-
-	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
-	    MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, &m);
-
-	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM", __func__);
-	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
-	    MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, &m);
-
-	/* 'k' is sensitive and stays in the monitor */
-	*confirm_hash = buffer_get_string(&m, confirm_hash_len);
-
-	buffer_free(&m);
-}
-
-int
-mm_jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *k,
-    const u_char *peer_id, u_int peer_id_len,
-    const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
-    const u_char *peer_confirm_hash, u_int peer_confirm_hash_len)
-{
-	Buffer m;
-	int success = 0;
-
-	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
-	buffer_init(&m);
-	/* k is dummy in slave, ignored */
-	/* monitor knows all the ids */
-	buffer_put_string(&m, peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len);
-	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
-	    MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, &m);
-
-	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM", __func__);
-	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
-	    MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, &m);
-
-	success = buffer_get_int(&m);
-	buffer_free(&m);
-
-	debug3("%s: success = %d", __func__, success);
-	return success;
-}
-#endif /* JPAKE */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h
index 0c7f2e3..18c2501 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.23 2011/06/17 21:44:31 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.24 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
@@ -102,26 +102,6 @@ int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
 int mm_skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
 int mm_skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
 
-/* jpake */
-struct modp_group;
-void mm_auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(struct Authctxt *, BIGNUM **, char **, char **);
-void mm_jpake_step1(struct modp_group *, u_char **, u_int *,
-    BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **,
-    u_char **, u_int *, u_char **, u_int *);
-void mm_jpake_step2(struct modp_group *, BIGNUM *,
-    BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
-    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
-    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
-    BIGNUM **, u_char **, u_int *);
-void mm_jpake_key_confirm(struct modp_group *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
-    BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
-    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
-    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
-    BIGNUM **, u_char **, u_int *);
-int mm_jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *,
-    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
-
-
 /* zlib allocation hooks */
 
 void *mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *, u_int, u_int);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
index 276646f..6ecfb93 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.54 2013/12/07 01:37:54 djm Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.55 2014/02/04 00:37:50 djm Exp $
 
 sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
 piddir=@piddir@
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ RANLIB=@RANLIB@
 INSTALL=@INSTALL@
 LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
 
-OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt_long.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha2.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o strtoull.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o blowfish.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o
+OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt_long.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha2.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o strtoull.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o blowfish.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o explicit_bzero.o
 
 COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c
index c7ef827..73a8524 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: bsd-poll.c,v 1.5 2013/11/08 10:12:58 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: bsd-poll.c,v 1.6 2014/02/05 23:44:13 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005, 2007 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au).
@@ -109,12 +109,9 @@ poll(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds, int timeout)
 	}
 
 out:
-	if (readfds != NULL)
-		free(readfds);
-	if (writefds != NULL)
-		free(writefds);
-	if (exceptfds != NULL)
-		free(exceptfds);
+	free(readfds);
+	free(writefds);
+	free(exceptfds);
 	if (ret == -1)
 		errno = saved_errno;
 	return ret;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b106741
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/explicit_bzero.c */
+/*	$OpenBSD: explicit_bzero.c,v 1.1 2014/01/22 21:06:45 tedu Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Public domain.
+ * Written by Ted Unangst
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
+
+/*
+ * explicit_bzero - don't let the compiler optimize away bzero
+ */
+void
+explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n)
+{
+	bzero(p, n);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
index f34619e..bc9888e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.60 2013/12/07 00:51:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.61 2014/02/04 00:18:23 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -246,6 +246,10 @@ int	bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *, size_t, const u_int8_t *, size_t,
     u_int8_t *, size_t, unsigned int);
 #endif
 
+#ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
+void explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n);
+#endif
+
 void *xmmap(size_t size);
 char *xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt);
 char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
index 60eac4b..885c121 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: openssl-compat.c,v 1.16 2014/01/17 07:00:41 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: openssl-compat.c,v 1.17 2014/02/13 05:38:33 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
@@ -96,6 +96,14 @@ ssh_EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX
+int
+EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in)
+{
+	return EVP_MD_CTX_copy(out, in);
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifndef HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX
 int
 BN_is_prime_ex(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
index 021ea98..276b970 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.25 2014/01/17 06:32:31 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.26 2014/02/13 05:38:33 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
@@ -156,6 +156,10 @@ int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *, const EVP_MD *, void *);
 int EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *, unsigned char *, unsigned int *);
 # endif
 
+# ifndef EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX
+int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *, const EVP_MD_CTX *);
+# endif
+
 int ssh_EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, const EVP_CIPHER *, unsigned char *,
     unsigned char *, int);
 int ssh_EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, char *, char *, int);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/packet.c b/crypto/openssh/packet.c
index 2393689..f5fe989 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/packet.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/packet.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.191 2013/12/06 13:34:54 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.192 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -767,9 +767,9 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
 		mac  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
 		comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
 		mac_clear(mac);
-		memset(enc->iv,  0, enc->iv_len);
-		memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
-		memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
+		explicit_bzero(enc->iv,  enc->iv_len);
+		explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len);
+		explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len);
 		free(enc->name);
 		free(enc->iv);
 		free(enc->key);
@@ -790,9 +790,9 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
 	cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
 	    enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type);
 	/* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
-	/* memset(enc->iv,  0, enc->block_size);
-	   memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
-	   memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len); */
+	/* explicit_bzero(enc->iv,  enc->block_size);
+	   explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len);
+	   explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len); */
 	if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB ||
 	    (comp->type == COMP_DELAYED &&
 	     active_state->after_authentication)) && comp->enabled == 0) {
@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
 		}
 	} else {
 		/* clear padding */
-		memset(cp, 0, padlen);
+		explicit_bzero(cp, padlen);
 	}
 	/* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload + padding) */
 	len = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
index 06eb033..9145b46 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.215 2013/12/06 13:39:49 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.218 2014/02/23 20:11:36 djm Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <netinet/in_systm.h>
 #include <netinet/ip.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
 
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <errno.h>
@@ -148,7 +149,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
 	oHashKnownHosts,
 	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
-	oVisualHostKey, oUseRoaming, oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
+	oVisualHostKey, oUseRoaming,
 	oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
 	oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
 	oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
@@ -260,12 +261,6 @@ static struct {
 	{ "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
 	{ "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
 	{ "useroaming", oUseRoaming },
-#ifdef JPAKE
-	{ "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication",
-	    oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication },
-#else
-	{ "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication", oUnsupported },
-#endif
 	{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
 	{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
 	{ "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
@@ -572,16 +567,27 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw,
 			    "r", ruser,
 			    "u", pw->pw_name,
 			    (char *)NULL);
-			r = execute_in_shell(cmd);
-			if (r == -1) {
-				fatal("%.200s line %d: match exec '%.100s' "
-				    "error", filename, linenum, cmd);
-			} else if (r == 0) {
-				debug("%.200s line %d: matched "
-				    "'exec \"%.100s\"' ",
+			if (result != 1) {
+				/* skip execution if prior predicate failed */
+				debug("%.200s line %d: skipped exec \"%.100s\"",
 				    filename, linenum, cmd);
-			} else
-				result = 0;
+			} else {
+				r = execute_in_shell(cmd);
+				if (r == -1) {
+					fatal("%.200s line %d: match exec "
+					    "'%.100s' error", filename,
+					    linenum, cmd);
+				} else if (r == 0) {
+					debug("%.200s line %d: matched "
+					    "'exec \"%.100s\"'", filename,
+					    linenum, cmd);
+				} else {
+					debug("%.200s line %d: no match "
+					    "'exec \"%.100s\"'", filename,
+					    linenum, cmd);
+					result = 0;
+				}
+			}
 			free(cmd);
 		} else {
 			error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib);
@@ -833,10 +839,6 @@ parse_time:
 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
 
-	case oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication:
-		intptr = &options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication;
-		goto parse_flag;
-
 	case oKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
 		intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
@@ -1552,6 +1554,13 @@ read_config_file(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
 	return 1;
 }
 
+/* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
+int
+option_clear_or_none(const char *o)
+{
+	return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet
  * been set.  Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options
@@ -1636,7 +1645,6 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
 	options->permit_local_command = -1;
 	options->use_roaming = -1;
 	options->visual_host_key = -1;
-	options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
 	options->request_tty = -1;
@@ -1659,10 +1667,24 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
 }
 
 /*
+ * A petite version of fill_default_options() that just fills the options
+ * needed for hostname canonicalization to proceed.
+ */
+void
+fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *options)
+{
+	if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1)
+		options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1;
+	if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1)
+		options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1;
+	if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1)
+		options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO;
+}
+
+/*
  * Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those
  * options for which no value has been specified with their default values.
  */
-
 void
 fill_default_options(Options * options)
 {
@@ -1807,8 +1829,6 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 		options->use_roaming = 1;
 	if (options->visual_host_key == -1)
 		options->visual_host_key = 0;
-	if (options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication == -1)
-		options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = 0;
 	if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
 		options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_LOWDELAY;
 	if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
@@ -1825,7 +1845,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 		options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO;
 #define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \
 	do { \
-		if (v != NULL && strcasecmp(v, "none") == 0) { \
+		if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \
 			free(v); \
 			v = NULL; \
 		} \
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readconf.h b/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
index adfc070..17a6003 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.99 2013/10/16 22:49:38 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.101 2014/02/23 20:11:36 djm Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 
 /*
@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@ typedef struct {
 						 * authentication. */
 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
 	char	*kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */
-	int     zero_knowledge_password_authentication;	/* Try jpake */
 	int     batch_mode;	/* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */
 	int     check_host_ip;	/* Also keep track of keys for IP address */
 	int     strict_host_key_checking;	/* Strict host key checking. */
@@ -192,12 +191,14 @@ typedef struct {
 
 void     initialize_options(Options *);
 void     fill_default_options(Options *);
+void	 fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *);
 int	 process_config_line(Options *, struct passwd *, const char *, char *,
     const char *, int, int *, int);
 int	 read_config_file(const char *, struct passwd *, const char *,
     Options *, int);
 int	 parse_forward(Forward *, const char *, int, int);
 int	 default_ssh_port(void);
+int	 option_clear_or_none(const char *);
 
 void	 add_local_forward(Options *, const Forward *);
 void	 add_remote_forward(Options *, const Forward *);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readpass.c b/crypto/openssh/readpass.c
index e37d311..869d864 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/readpass.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/readpass.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.49 2013/05/17 00:13:14 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.50 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -99,13 +99,13 @@ ssh_askpass(char *askpass, const char *msg)
 			break;
 	signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
 	if (ret == -1 || !WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
-		memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+		explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
 	buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0';
 	pass = xstrdup(buf);
-	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
 	return pass;
 }
 
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ read_passphrase(const char *prompt, int flags)
 	}
 
 	ret = xstrdup(buf);
-	memset(buf, 'x', sizeof buf);
+	explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
 	return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile b/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile
index 0c66b17..6e3b8d6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.67 2013/12/06 13:52:46 markus Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.68 2014/01/25 04:35:32 dtucker Exp $
 
 REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t-exec
 tests:		$(REGRESS_TARGETS)
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ LTESTS= 	connect \
 		forward-control \
 		integrity \
 		krl
+#		dhgex \
 
 INTEROP_TESTS=	putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers
 #INTEROP_TESTS+=ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-ptrace.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-ptrace.sh
index ae15064..1912ca8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-ptrace.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-ptrace.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: agent-ptrace.sh,v 1.1 2002/12/09 15:38:30 markus Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: agent-ptrace.sh,v 1.2 2014/02/27 21:21:25 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="disallow agent ptrace attach"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent.sh
index cf1a45f..caad3c8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: agent.sh,v 1.9 2013/12/06 13:52:46 markus Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: agent.sh,v 1.10 2014/02/27 21:21:25 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="simple agent test"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-hostkey.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
index a1318cd..1d9e0ed 100755
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: cert-hostkey.sh,v 1.8 2013/12/06 13:52:46 markus Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: cert-hostkey.sh,v 1.9 2014/01/26 10:22:10 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="certified host keys"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/dhgex.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/dhgex.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..4c1a3d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/dhgex.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: dhgex.sh,v 1.1 2014/01/25 04:35:32 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="dhgex"
+
+LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE}
+rm -f ${LOG}
+
+kexs=`${SSH} -Q kex | grep diffie-hellman-group-exchange`
+
+ssh_test_dhgex()
+{
+	bits="$1"; shift
+	cipher="$1"; shift
+	kex="$1"; shift
+
+	rm -f ${LOG}
+	opts="-oKexAlgorithms=$kex -oCiphers=$cipher"
+	groupsz="1024<$bits<8192"
+	verbose "$tid bits $bits $kex $cipher"
+	${SSH} ${opts} $@ -vvv -F ${OBJ}/ssh_proxy somehost true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh failed ($@)"
+	fi
+	# check what we request
+	grep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST($groupsz) sent" ${LOG} >/dev/null
+	if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+		got=`egrep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(.*) sent" ${LOG}`
+		fail "$tid unexpected GEX sizes, expected $groupsz, got $got"
+	fi
+	# check what we got (depends on contents of system moduli file)
+	gotbits="`awk '/bits set:/{print $4}' ${LOG} | head -1 | cut -f2 -d/`"
+	if [ "$gotbits" -lt "$bits" ]; then
+		fatal "$tid expected $bits bit group, got $gotbits"
+	fi
+}
+
+check()
+{
+	bits="$1"; shift
+
+	for c in $@; do
+		for k in $kexs; do
+			ssh_test_dhgex $bits $c $k
+		done
+	done
+}
+
+#check 2048 3des-cbc
+check 3072 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 128`
+check 3072 arcfour blowfish-cbc
+check 7680 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 192`
+check 8192 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 256`
+check 8192 rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/host-expand.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/host-expand.sh
index a018836..6cc0e60 100755
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/host-expand.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/host-expand.sh
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: host-expand.sh,v 1.3 2014/02/27 23:17:41 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="expand %h and %n"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/login-timeout.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/login-timeout.sh
index d73923b..d9b48f3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/login-timeout.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/login-timeout.sh
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: login-timeout.sh,v 1.5 2013/05/17 10:23:52 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: login-timeout.sh,v 1.6 2014/02/27 20:04:16 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="connect after login grace timeout"
 
 trace "test login grace with privsep"
+cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_config.orig
+grep -vi LoginGraceTime $OBJ/sshd_config.orig > $OBJ/sshd_config
 echo "LoginGraceTime 10s" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
 echo "MaxStartups 1" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
 start_sshd
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
index c63bc2b..59f1ff6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-#       $OpenBSD: scp-ssh-wrapper.sh,v 1.2 2005/12/14 04:36:39 dtucker Exp $
+#       $OpenBSD: scp-ssh-wrapper.sh,v 1.3 2014/01/26 10:49:17 djm Exp $
 #       Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 printname () {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/scp.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/scp.sh
index c2da2a8..57cc770 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/scp.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/scp.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: scp.sh,v 1.9 2013/05/17 10:35:43 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: scp.sh,v 1.10 2014/01/26 10:49:17 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="scp"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/setuid-allowed.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/setuid-allowed.c
index 37b7dc8..676d266 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/setuid-allowed.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/setuid-allowed.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 # include <sys/statvfs.h>
 #endif
 #include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 
 void
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-chroot.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-chroot.sh
index 03b9bc6..23f7456 100755
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-chroot.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-chroot.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: sftp-chroot.sh,v 1.2 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: sftp-chroot.sh,v 1.4 2014/01/20 00:00:30 dtucker Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="sftp in chroot"
@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ $SUDO sh -c "echo mekmitastdigoat > $PRIVDATA" || \
 start_sshd -oChrootDirectory=$CHROOT -oForceCommand="internal-sftp -d /"
 
 verbose "test $tid: get"
-${SFTP} -qS "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config host:/${FILENAME} $COPY || \
+${SFTP} -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config host:/${FILENAME} $COPY \
+    >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 || \
 	fatal "Fetch ${FILENAME} failed"
 cmp $PRIVDATA $COPY || fail "$PRIVDATA $COPY differ"
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/rsa.c b/crypto/openssh/rsa.c
index a9ee6b0..d0b5bbf 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/rsa.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: rsa.c,v 1.30 2013/05/17 00:13:14 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: rsa.c,v 1.31 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -94,8 +94,8 @@ rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
 	if (BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out) == NULL)
 		fatal("rsa_public_encrypt: BN_bin2bn failed");
 
-	memset(outbuf, 0, olen);
-	memset(inbuf, 0, ilen);
+	explicit_bzero(outbuf, olen);
+	explicit_bzero(inbuf, ilen);
 	free(outbuf);
 	free(inbuf);
 }
@@ -120,8 +120,8 @@ rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
 		if (BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out) == NULL)
 			fatal("rsa_private_decrypt: BN_bin2bn failed");
 	}
-	memset(outbuf, 0, olen);
-	memset(inbuf, 0, ilen);
+	explicit_bzero(outbuf, olen);
+	explicit_bzero(inbuf, ilen);
 	free(outbuf);
 	free(inbuf);
 	return len;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-capsicum.c b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-capsicum.c
index 6064514..fd88de0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-capsicum.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-capsicum.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
+__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #ifdef SANDBOX_CAPSICUM
 
@@ -94,11 +95,11 @@ ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
 		fatal("can't limit stderr: %m");
 
 	cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE);
-	if (cap_rights_limit(box->monitor->m_recvfd, &rights) == -1 &&
+	if (cap_rights_limit(box->monitor->m_recvfd, &rights) < 0 &&
 	    errno != ENOSYS)
 		fatal("%s: failed to limit the network socket", __func__);
 	cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_WRITE);
-	if (cap_rights_limit(box->monitor->m_log_sendfd, &rights) == -1 &&
+	if (cap_rights_limit(box->monitor->m_log_sendfd, &rights) < 0 &&
 	    errno != ENOSYS)
 		fatal("%s: failed to limit the logging socket", __func__);
 	if (cap_enter() < 0 && errno != ENOSYS)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
index 2f73067..c0c17c2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -98,6 +98,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
 	SC_ALLOW(read),
 	SC_ALLOW(write),
 	SC_ALLOW(close),
+#ifdef __NR_shutdown /* not defined on archs that go via socketcall(2) */
+	SC_ALLOW(shutdown),
+#endif
 	SC_ALLOW(brk),
 	SC_ALLOW(poll),
 #ifdef __NR__newselect
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-systrace.c b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-systrace.c
index 53fbd47..6706c9a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-systrace.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-systrace.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-systrace.c,v 1.7 2013/06/01 13:15:52 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-systrace.c,v 1.9 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
  *
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ static const struct sandbox_policy preauth_policy[] = {
 	{ SYS_munmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
 	{ SYS_read, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
 	{ SYS_select, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+	{ SYS_shutdown, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
 	{ SYS_sigprocmask, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
 	{ SYS_write, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
 	{ -1, -1 }
@@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ ssh_sandbox_parent(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid,
 		    box->systrace_fd, child_pid, strerror(errno));
 
 	/* Allocate and assign policy */
-	bzero(&policy, sizeof(policy));
+	memset(&policy, 0, sizeof(policy));
 	policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_NEW;
 	policy.strp_maxents = SYS_MAXSYSCALL;
 	if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/schnorr.h b/crypto/openssh/schnorr.h
deleted file mode 100644
index e2405c1..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/schnorr.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: schnorr.h,v 1.2 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2009 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#ifndef SCHNORR_H
-#define SCHNORR_H
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-struct modp_group {
-	BIGNUM *p, *q, *g;
-};
-
-BIGNUM *bn_rand_range_gt_one(const BIGNUM *high);
-int hash_buffer(const u_char *, u_int, int, u_char **, u_int *);
-void debug3_bn(const BIGNUM *, const char *, ...)
-    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)))
-    __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
-void debug3_buf(const u_char *, u_int, const char *, ...)
-    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (3)))
-    __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)));
-struct modp_group *modp_group_from_g_and_safe_p(const char *, const char *);
-void modp_group_free(struct modp_group *);
-
-/* Signature and verification functions */
-int
-schnorr_sign(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
-    int hash_alg, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *g_x,
-    const u_char *id, u_int idlen, BIGNUM **r_p, BIGNUM **e_p);
-int
-schnorr_sign_buf(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
-    const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
-    u_char **sig, u_int *siglen);
-int
-schnorr_verify(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
-    int hash_alg, const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
-    const BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *e);
-int
-schnorr_verify_buf(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q,
-    const BIGNUM *grp_g,
-    const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
-    const u_char *sig, u_int siglen);
-
-#endif /* JPAKE_H */
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scp.0 b/crypto/openssh/scp.0
index ced7154..b9eeffc 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/scp.0
+++ b/crypto/openssh/scp.0
@@ -160,4 +160,4 @@ AUTHORS
      Timo Rinne <tri@iki.fi>
      Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 
-OpenBSD 5.4                    October 20, 2013                    OpenBSD 5.4
+OpenBSD 5.5                    October 20, 2013                    OpenBSD 5.5
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
index 3748d80..42f5e4b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.248 2013/12/06 13:39:49 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.249 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -150,7 +150,6 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	options->chroot_directory = NULL;
 	options->authorized_keys_command = NULL;
 	options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL;
-	options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
 	options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
 	options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
 	options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
@@ -304,8 +303,6 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	}
 	if (options->permit_tun == -1)
 		options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
-	if (options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication == -1)
-		options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = 0;
 	if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
 		options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_LOWDELAY;
 	if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
@@ -387,7 +384,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
-	sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
+	sHostCertificate,
 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
 	sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
 	sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
@@ -463,11 +460,6 @@ static struct {
 	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
-#ifdef JPAKE
-	{ "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication", sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
-#else
-	{ "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
-#endif
 	{ "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -1153,10 +1145,6 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
 
-	case sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication:
-		intptr = &options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication;
-		goto parse_flag;
-
 	case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
 		intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
@@ -1836,7 +1824,6 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
 	M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication);
 	M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
 	M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication);
-	M_CP_INTOPT(zero_knowledge_password_authentication);
 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login);
 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd);
 
@@ -2079,10 +2066,6 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
 #endif
-#ifdef JPAKE
-	dump_cfg_fmtint(sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
-	    o->zero_knowledge_password_authentication);
-#endif
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
 	    o->kbd_interactive_authentication);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.h b/crypto/openssh/servconf.h
index 5240fe4..36d9966 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/servconf.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.111 2013/12/05 01:16:41 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.112 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 
 /*
@@ -118,8 +118,6 @@ typedef struct {
 						 * authentication. */
 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication;	/* If true, permit */
 	int     challenge_response_authentication;
-	int     zero_knowledge_password_authentication;
-					/* If true, permit jpake auth */
 	int     permit_empty_passwd;	/* If false, do not permit empty
 					 * passwords. */
 	int     permit_user_env;	/* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
index 3224818..769bfec 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.169 2013/12/19 00:19:12 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.170 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ server_input_stdin_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
 	packet_check_eom();
 	buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, data, data_len);
-	memset(data, 0, data_len);
+	explicit_bzero(data, data_len);
 	free(data);
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/session.c b/crypto/openssh/session.c
index e4c58fb..9fe6a1a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/session.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/session.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.269 2014/01/18 09:36:26 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.270 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -983,6 +983,11 @@ child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
 	u_int envsize;
 	u_int i, namelen;
 
+	if (strchr(name, '=') != NULL) {
+		error("Invalid environment variable \"%.100s\"", name);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null
 	 * entry before continuing.
@@ -1905,7 +1910,7 @@ session_unused(int id)
 		fatal("%s: insane session id %d (max %d nalloc %d)",
 		    __func__, id, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc);
 	}
-	bzero(&sessions[id], sizeof(*sessions));
+	memset(&sessions[id], 0, sizeof(*sessions));
 	sessions[id].self = id;
 	sessions[id].used = 0;
 	sessions[id].chanid = -1;
@@ -2241,8 +2246,8 @@ session_env_req(Session *s)
 	char *name, *val;
 	u_int name_len, val_len, i;
 
-	name = packet_get_string(&name_len);
-	val = packet_get_string(&val_len);
+	name = packet_get_cstring(&name_len);
+	val = packet_get_cstring(&val_len);
 	packet_check_eom();
 
 	/* Don't set too many environment variables */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c
index fc035f2..2f5907c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.113 2014/01/17 00:21:06 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.114 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ get_decode_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sftp_statvfs *st,
 		    SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type);
 	}
 
-	bzero(st, sizeof(*st));
+	memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
 	st->f_bsize = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
 	st->f_frsize = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
 	st->f_blocks = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.0 b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.0
index 5bf8da6..ce7ddc0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.0
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.0
@@ -92,4 +92,4 @@ HISTORY
 AUTHORS
      Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
 
-OpenBSD 5.4                    October 14, 2013                    OpenBSD 5.4
+OpenBSD 5.5                    October 14, 2013                    OpenBSD 5.5
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp.0 b/crypto/openssh/sftp.0
index 2487370..7139aac 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp.0
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp.0
@@ -367,4 +367,4 @@ SEE ALSO
      T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh-
      filexfer-00.txt, January 2001, work in progress material.
 
-OpenBSD 5.4                    October 20, 2013                    OpenBSD 5.4
+OpenBSD 5.5                    October 20, 2013                    OpenBSD 5.5
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.0 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.0
index 8d10f7f..ba43fee 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.0
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.0
@@ -120,4 +120,4 @@ AUTHORS
      created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
      versions 1.5 and 2.0.
 
-OpenBSD 5.4                    December 7, 2013                    OpenBSD 5.4
+OpenBSD 5.5                    December 7, 2013                    OpenBSD 5.5
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c
index 63ce720..3421452 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.108 2013/12/19 00:10:30 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.109 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ static void
 clear_pass(void)
 {
 	if (pass) {
-		memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass));
+		explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass));
 		free(pass);
 		pass = NULL;
 	}
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int lock)
 			fprintf(stderr, "Passwords do not match.\n");
 			passok = 0;
 		}
-		memset(p2, 0, strlen(p2));
+		explicit_bzero(p2, strlen(p2));
 		free(p2);
 	}
 	if (passok && ssh_lock_agent(ac, lock, p1)) {
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int lock)
 		ret = 0;
 	} else
 		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to %slock agent.\n", lock ? "" : "un");
-	memset(p1, 0, strlen(p1));
+	explicit_bzero(p1, strlen(p1));
 	free(p1);
 	return (ret);
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.0 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.0
index c4c53ef..c11523d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.0
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.0
@@ -125,4 +125,4 @@ AUTHORS
      created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
      versions 1.5 and 2.0.
 
-OpenBSD 5.4                    December 7, 2013                    OpenBSD 5.4
+OpenBSD 5.5                    December 7, 2013                    OpenBSD 5.5
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
index e149850..9c3e4cc 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.181 2013/12/19 01:19:41 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.183 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
 
 #include <errno.h>
@@ -76,6 +75,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "misc.h"
+#include "digest.h"
 
 #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
 #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e)
 	Identity *id;
 	int i, len;
 	Buffer msg;
-	MD5_CTX md;
+	struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
 	Key *key;
 
 	buffer_init(&msg);
@@ -304,10 +304,12 @@ process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e)
 		}
 		memset(buf, 0, 32);
 		BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
-		MD5_Init(&md);
-		MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
-		MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
-		MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
+		if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
+		    ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 ||
+		    ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 ||
+		    ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0)
+			fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
+		ssh_digest_free(md);
 
 		/* Send the response. */
 		buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE);
@@ -572,7 +574,7 @@ process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock)
 	passwd = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
 	if (locked && !lock && strcmp(passwd, lock_passwd) == 0) {
 		locked = 0;
-		memset(lock_passwd, 0, strlen(lock_passwd));
+		explicit_bzero(lock_passwd, strlen(lock_passwd));
 		free(lock_passwd);
 		lock_passwd = NULL;
 		success = 1;
@@ -581,7 +583,7 @@ process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock)
 		lock_passwd = xstrdup(passwd);
 		success = 1;
 	}
-	memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
+	explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
 	free(passwd);
 
 	buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c
index 7b89747..6b4abcb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.30 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.31 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
 	}
 
 	sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa);
-	memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
+	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
 
 	if (sig == NULL) {
 		error("ssh_dss_sign: sign failed");
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
 		DSA_SIG_free(sig);
 		return -1;
 	}
-	memset(sigblob, 0, SIGBLOB_LEN);
+	explicit_bzero(sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN);
 	BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen);
 	BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - slen);
 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
 		fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__);
 
 	/* clean up */
-	memset(sigblob, 0, len);
+	explicit_bzero(sigblob, len);
 	free(sigblob);
 
 	/* sha1 the data */
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
 	}
 
 	ret = DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa);
-	memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
+	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
 
 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa.c
index 10ad9da..551c9c4 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa.c,v 1.8 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa.c,v 1.10 2014/02/03 23:28:00 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
 	}
 
 	sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa);
-	memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
+	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
 
 	if (sig == NULL) {
 		error("%s: sign failed", __func__);
@@ -140,9 +140,6 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
 	/* parse signature */
 	if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: ECDSA_SIG_new failed", __func__);
-	if ((sig->r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (sig->s = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
 
 	buffer_init(&bb);
 	buffer_append(&bb, sigblob, len);
@@ -153,7 +150,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
 	buffer_free(&bb);
 
 	/* clean up */
-	memset(sigblob, 0, len);
+	explicit_bzero(sigblob, len);
 	free(sigblob);
 
 	/* hash the data */
@@ -169,7 +166,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
 	}
 
 	ret = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa);
-	memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
+	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
 
 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-ed25519.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-ed25519.c
index 1aedcf8..160d1f2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-ed25519.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-ed25519.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ed25519.c,v 1.1 2013/12/06 13:39:49 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ed25519.c,v 1.3 2014/02/23 20:03:42 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2013 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 
 #include "crypto_api.h"
 
+#include <limits.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 
@@ -45,6 +46,11 @@ ssh_ed25519_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
 		error("%s: no ED25519 key", __func__);
 		return -1;
 	}
+
+	if (datalen >= UINT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) {
+		error("%s: datalen %u too long", __func__, datalen);
+		return -1;
+	}
 	smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES;
 	sig = xmalloc(slen);
 
@@ -66,7 +72,7 @@ ssh_ed25519_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
 		memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
 	}
 	buffer_free(&b);
-	memset(sig, 's', slen);
+	explicit_bzero(sig, slen);
 	free(sig);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -130,9 +136,9 @@ ssh_ed25519_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
 	}
 	/* XXX compare 'm' and 'data' ? */
 
-	memset(sigblob, 's', len);
-	memset(sm, 'S', smlen);
-	memset(m, 'm', smlen); /* NB. mlen may be invalid if ret != 0 */
+	explicit_bzero(sigblob, len);
+	explicit_bzero(sm, smlen);
+	explicit_bzero(m, smlen); /* NB. mlen may be invalid if ret != 0 */
 	free(sigblob);
 	free(sm);
 	free(m);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-gss.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh-gss.h
index 3fcc2d1..a2f556c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-gss.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-gss.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.11 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
 void ssh_gssapi_set_oid(Gssctxt *, gss_OID);
 void ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *);
 ssh_gssapi_mech *ssh_gssapi_get_ctype(Gssctxt *);
+void ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(void);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *, gss_OID, int *);
 
 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *, const char *);
 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *, int,
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.0 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.0
index a69b37d..c43678f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.0
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.0
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NAME
      ssh-keygen - authentication key generation, management and conversion
 
 SYNOPSIS
-     ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] -t type [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment]
+     ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t type] [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment]
                 [-f output_keyfile]
      ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile]
      ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]
@@ -559,4 +559,4 @@ AUTHORS
      created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
      versions 1.5 and 2.0.
 
-OpenBSD 5.4                    December 21, 2013                   OpenBSD 5.4
+OpenBSD 5.5                    February 5, 2014                    OpenBSD 5.5
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.1
index 82b4eef..6adb202 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.119 2013/12/21 07:10:47 tedu Exp $
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.120 2014/02/05 20:13:25 naddy Exp $
 .\"	$FreeBSD$
 .\"
 .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.Dd December 21, 2013
+.Dd February 5, 2014
 .Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
 .Nm ssh-keygen
 .Op Fl q
 .Op Fl b Ar bits
-.Fl t Ar type
+.Op Fl t Ar type
 .Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
 .Op Fl C Ar comment
 .Op Fl f Ar output_keyfile
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c
index eae83a4..2a316bc 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.238 2013/12/06 13:39:49 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.241 2014/02/05 20:13:25 naddy Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ load_identity(char *filename)
 			pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ",
 			    RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
 		prv = key_load_private(filename, pass, NULL);
-		memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass));
+		explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass));
 		free(pass);
 	}
 	return prv;
@@ -1258,7 +1258,7 @@ do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
 			    RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
 		private = key_load_private(identity_file, old_passphrase,
 		    &comment);
-		memset(old_passphrase, 0, strlen(old_passphrase));
+		explicit_bzero(old_passphrase, strlen(old_passphrase));
 		free(old_passphrase);
 		if (private == NULL) {
 			printf("Bad passphrase.\n");
@@ -1280,15 +1280,15 @@ do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
 
 		/* Verify that they are the same. */
 		if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) {
-			memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1));
-			memset(passphrase2, 0, strlen(passphrase2));
+			explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
+			explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
 			free(passphrase1);
 			free(passphrase2);
 			printf("Pass phrases do not match.  Try again.\n");
 			exit(1);
 		}
 		/* Destroy the other copy. */
-		memset(passphrase2, 0, strlen(passphrase2));
+		explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
 		free(passphrase2);
 	}
 
@@ -1296,14 +1296,14 @@ do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
 	if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment,
 	    use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) {
 		printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file);
-		memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1));
+		explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
 		free(passphrase1);
 		key_free(private);
 		free(comment);
 		exit(1);
 	}
 	/* Destroy the passphrase and the copy of the key in memory. */
-	memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1));
+	explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
 	free(passphrase1);
 	key_free(private);		 /* Destroys contents */
 	free(comment);
@@ -1375,7 +1375,7 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw)
 		/* Try to load using the passphrase. */
 		private = key_load_private(identity_file, passphrase, &comment);
 		if (private == NULL) {
-			memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+			explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
 			free(passphrase);
 			printf("Bad passphrase.\n");
 			exit(1);
@@ -1396,7 +1396,7 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw)
 		printf("Enter new comment: ");
 		fflush(stdout);
 		if (!fgets(new_comment, sizeof(new_comment), stdin)) {
-			memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+			explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
 			key_free(private);
 			exit(1);
 		}
@@ -1407,13 +1407,13 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw)
 	if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase, new_comment,
 	    use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) {
 		printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file);
-		memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+		explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
 		free(passphrase);
 		key_free(private);
 		free(comment);
 		exit(1);
 	}
-	memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+	explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
 	free(passphrase);
 	public = key_from_private(private);
 	key_free(private);
@@ -1716,7 +1716,7 @@ parse_absolute_time(const char *s)
 		fatal("Invalid certificate time format %s", s);
 	}
 
-	bzero(&tm, sizeof(tm));
+	memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm));
 	if (strptime(buf, fmt, &tm) == NULL)
 		fatal("Invalid certificate time %s", s);
 	if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0)
@@ -2196,8 +2196,8 @@ usage(void)
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -v          Verbose.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -W gen      Generator to use for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -y          Read private key file and print public key.\n");
-	fprintf(stderr, "  -z serial   Specify a serial number.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -Z cipher   Specify a cipher for new private key format.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -z serial   Specify a serial number.\n");
 
 	exit(1);
 }
@@ -2632,15 +2632,15 @@ passphrase_again:
 			 * The passphrases do not match.  Clear them and
 			 * retry.
 			 */
-			memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1));
-			memset(passphrase2, 0, strlen(passphrase2));
+			explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
+			explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
 			free(passphrase1);
 			free(passphrase2);
 			printf("Passphrases do not match.  Try again.\n");
 			goto passphrase_again;
 		}
 		/* Clear the other copy of the passphrase. */
-		memset(passphrase2, 0, strlen(passphrase2));
+		explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
 		free(passphrase2);
 	}
 
@@ -2655,12 +2655,12 @@ passphrase_again:
 	if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment,
 	    use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) {
 		printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file);
-		memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1));
+		explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
 		free(passphrase1);
 		exit(1);
 	}
 	/* Clear the passphrase. */
-	memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1));
+	explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
 	free(passphrase1);
 
 	/* Clear the private key and the random number generator. */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.0 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.0
index 09cfa0a..638c19b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.0
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.0
@@ -27,9 +27,10 @@ DESCRIPTION
      -6      Forces ssh-keyscan to use IPv6 addresses only.
 
      -f file
-             Read hosts or addrlist namelist pairs from this file, one per
+             Read hosts or ``addrlist namelist'' pairs from file, one per
              line.  If - is supplied instead of a filename, ssh-keyscan will
-             read hosts or addrlist namelist pairs from the standard input.
+             read hosts or ``addrlist namelist'' pairs from the standard
+             input.
 
      -H      Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output.  Hashed names may
              be used normally by ssh and sshd, but they do not reveal
@@ -106,4 +107,4 @@ BUGS
      This is because it opens a connection to the ssh port, reads the public
      key, and drops the connection as soon as it gets the key.
 
-OpenBSD 5.4                    December 7, 2013                    OpenBSD 5.4
+OpenBSD 5.5                    January 28, 2014                    OpenBSD 5.5
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1
index 9118e11..1b2fd40 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.33 2013/12/07 11:58:46 naddy Exp $
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.34 2014/01/28 14:13:39 jmc Exp $
 .\"	$FreeBSD$
 .\"
 .\" Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 .\" permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
 .\" OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
 .\"
-.Dd December 7, 2013
+.Dd January 28, 2014
 .Dt SSH-KEYSCAN 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -57,14 +57,16 @@ Forces
 to use IPv6 addresses only.
 .It Fl f Ar file
 Read hosts or
-.Pa addrlist namelist
-pairs from this file, one per line.
+.Dq addrlist namelist
+pairs from
+.Ar file ,
+one per line.
 If
 .Pa -
 is supplied instead of a filename,
 .Nm
 will read hosts or
-.Pa addrlist namelist
+.Dq addrlist namelist
 pairs from the standard input.
 .It Fl H
 Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output.
@@ -79,7 +81,7 @@ Port to connect to on the remote host.
 .It Fl T Ar timeout
 Set the timeout for connection attempts.
 If
-.Pa timeout
+.Ar timeout
 seconds have elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the
 last time anything was read from that host, then the connection is
 closed and the host in question considered unavailable.
@@ -118,23 +120,23 @@ On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk,
 can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the middle
 attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was created.
 .Sh FILES
-.Pa Input format:
+Input format:
 .Bd -literal
 1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4
 .Ed
 .Pp
-.Pa Output format for rsa1 keys:
+Output format for rsa1 keys:
 .Bd -literal
 host-or-namelist bits exponent modulus
 .Ed
 .Pp
-.Pa Output format for rsa, dsa and ecdsa keys:
+Output format for rsa, dsa and ecdsa keys:
 .Bd -literal
 host-or-namelist keytype base64-encoded-key
 .Ed
 .Pp
 Where
-.Pa keytype
+.Ar keytype
 is either
 .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 ,
 .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 ,
@@ -146,10 +148,8 @@ or
 .Pp
 .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
 .Sh EXAMPLES
-Print the
-.Pa rsa
-host key for machine
-.Pa hostname :
+Print the rsa host key for machine
+.Ar hostname :
 .Bd -literal
 $ ssh-keyscan hostname
 .Ed
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.0 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.0
index 78a20e8..5f18b54 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.0
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.0
@@ -50,4 +50,4 @@ HISTORY
 AUTHORS
      Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
 
-OpenBSD 5.4                    December 7, 2013                    OpenBSD 5.4
+OpenBSD 5.5                    December 7, 2013                    OpenBSD 5.5
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0
index d9ea342..20d62f7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0
@@ -22,4 +22,4 @@ HISTORY
 AUTHORS
      Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
 
-OpenBSD 5.4                      July 16, 2013                     OpenBSD 5.4
+OpenBSD 5.5                      July 16, 2013                     OpenBSD 5.5
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c
index a2112d0..c6f25b3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.50 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.51 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
 	sig = xmalloc(slen);
 
 	ok = RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa);
-	memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
+	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
 
 	if (ok != 1) {
 		int ecode = ERR_get_error();
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
 		u_int diff = slen - len;
 		debug("slen %u > len %u", slen, len);
 		memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
-		memset(sig, 0, diff);
+		explicit_bzero(sig, diff);
 	} else if (len > slen) {
 		error("%s: slen %u slen2 %u", __func__, slen, len);
 		free(sig);
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
 		memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
 	}
 	buffer_free(&b);
-	memset(sig, 's', slen);
+	explicit_bzero(sig, slen);
 	free(sig);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
 		    modlen, len);
 		sigblob = xrealloc(sigblob, 1, modlen);
 		memmove(sigblob + diff, sigblob, len);
-		memset(sigblob, 0, diff);
+		explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff);
 		len = modlen;
 	}
 	/* hash the data */
@@ -178,8 +178,8 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
 
 	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len,
 	    key->rsa);
-	memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
-	memset(sigblob, 's', len);
+	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+	explicit_bzero(sigblob, len);
 	free(sigblob);
 	debug("%s: signature %scorrect", __func__, (ret == 0) ? "in" : "");
 	return ret;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.0 b/crypto/openssh/ssh.0
index 3a6a046..16868cf 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.0
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.0
@@ -943,4 +943,4 @@ AUTHORS
      created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
      versions 1.5 and 2.0.
 
-OpenBSD 5.4                    December 7, 2013                    OpenBSD 5.4
+OpenBSD 5.5                    December 7, 2013                    OpenBSD 5.5
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
index a286823..eb69b72 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.397 2013/12/29 05:42:16 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.401 2014/02/26 20:18:37 djm Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -233,16 +233,26 @@ tilde_expand_paths(char **paths, u_int num_paths)
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * Attempt to resolve a host name / port to a set of addresses and
+ * optionally return any CNAMEs encountered along the way.
+ * Returns NULL on failure.
+ * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
+ */
 static struct addrinfo *
-resolve_host(const char *name, u_int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen)
+resolve_host(const char *name, int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen)
 {
 	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
 	struct addrinfo hints, *res;
 	int gaierr, loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
 
+	if (port <= 0)
+		port = default_ssh_port();
+
 	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
-	bzero(&hints, sizeof(hints));
-	hints.ai_family = options.address_family;
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ?
+	    AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family;
 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
 	if (cname != NULL)
 		hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
@@ -267,6 +277,7 @@ resolve_host(const char *name, u_int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen)
 /*
  * Check whether the cname is a permitted replacement for the hostname
  * and perform the replacement if it is.
+ * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
  */
 static int
 check_follow_cname(char **namep, const char *cname)
@@ -283,7 +294,7 @@ check_follow_cname(char **namep, const char *cname)
 	 * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by
 	 * a proxy unless the user specifically requests so.
 	 */
-	if (options.proxy_command != NULL &&
+	if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) &&
 	    options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)
 		return 0;
 	debug3("%s: check \"%s\" CNAME \"%s\"", __func__, *namep, cname);
@@ -307,9 +318,10 @@ check_follow_cname(char **namep, const char *cname)
  * Attempt to resolve the supplied hostname after applying the user's
  * canonicalization rules. Returns the address list for the host or NULL
  * if no name was found after canonicalization.
+ * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
  */
 static struct addrinfo *
-resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, u_int port)
+resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port)
 {
 	int i, ndots;
 	char *cp, *fullhost, cname_target[NI_MAXHOST];
@@ -317,13 +329,15 @@ resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, u_int port)
 
 	if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
 		return NULL;
+
 	/*
 	 * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by
 	 * a proxy unless the user specifically requests so.
 	 */
-	if (options.proxy_command != NULL &&
+	if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) &&
 	    options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)
 		return NULL;
+
 	/* Don't apply canonicalization to sufficiently-qualified hostnames */
 	ndots = 0;
 	for (cp = *hostp; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
@@ -340,7 +354,9 @@ resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, u_int port)
 		*cname_target = '\0';
 		xasprintf(&fullhost, "%s.%s.", *hostp,
 		    options.canonical_domains[i]);
-		if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, options.port, 0,
+		debug3("%s: attempting \"%s\" => \"%s\"", __func__,
+		    *hostp, fullhost);
+		if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0,
 		    cname_target, sizeof(cname_target))) == NULL) {
 			free(fullhost);
 			continue;
@@ -357,11 +373,41 @@ resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, u_int port)
 		return addrs;
 	}
 	if (!options.canonicalize_fallback_local)
-		fatal("%s: Could not resolve host \"%s\"", __progname, host);
+		fatal("%s: Could not resolve host \"%s\"", __progname, *hostp);
+	debug2("%s: host %s not found in any suffix", __func__, *hostp);
 	return NULL;
 }
 
 /*
+ * Read per-user configuration file.  Ignore the system wide config
+ * file if the user specifies a config file on the command line.
+ */
+static void
+process_config_files(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+	int r;
+
+	if (config != NULL) {
+		if (strcasecmp(config, "none") != 0 &&
+		    !read_config_file(config, pw, host, &options,
+		    SSHCONF_USERCONF))
+			fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: "
+			    "%.100s", config, strerror(errno));
+	} else {
+		r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
+		    _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
+		if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
+			(void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, &options,
+			     SSHCONF_CHECKPERM|SSHCONF_USERCONF);
+
+		/* Read systemwide configuration file after user config. */
+		(void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, host,
+		    &options, 0);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
  * Main program for the ssh client.
  */
 int
@@ -799,7 +845,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	if (!host)
 		usage();
 
-	lowercase(host);
 	host_arg = xstrdup(host);
 
 	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
@@ -850,33 +895,64 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	    SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog);
 
 	if (debug_flag)
-		logit("%s, %s", SSH_VERSION, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
+		logit("%s, %s", SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
+
+	/* Parse the configuration files */
+	process_config_files(pw);
+
+	/* Hostname canonicalisation needs a few options filled. */
+	fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(&options);
+
+	/* If the user has replaced the hostname then take it into use now */
+	if (options.hostname != NULL) {
+		/* NB. Please keep in sync with readconf.c:match_cfg_line() */
+		cp = percent_expand(options.hostname,
+		    "h", host, (char *)NULL);
+		free(host);
+		host = cp;
+	}
+
+	/* If canonicalization requested then try to apply it */
+	lowercase(host);
+	if (options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
+		addrs = resolve_canonicalize(&host, options.port);
 
 	/*
-	 * Read per-user configuration file.  Ignore the system wide config
-	 * file if the user specifies a config file on the command line.
+	 * If CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs have been specified but
+	 * other canonicalization did not happen (by not being requested
+	 * or by failing with fallback) then the hostname may still be changed
+	 * as a result of CNAME following. 
+	 *
+	 * Try to resolve the bare hostname name using the system resolver's
+	 * usual search rules and then apply the CNAME follow rules.
+	 *
+	 * Skip the lookup if a ProxyCommand is being used unless the user
+	 * has specifically requested canonicalisation for this case via
+	 * CanonicalizeHostname=always
 	 */
-	if (config != NULL) {
-		if (strcasecmp(config, "none") != 0 &&
-		    !read_config_file(config, pw, host, &options,
-		    SSHCONF_USERCONF))
-			fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: "
-			    "%.100s", config, strerror(errno));
-	} else {
-		r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
-		    _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
-		if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
-			(void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, &options,
-			     SSHCONF_CHECKPERM|SSHCONF_USERCONF);
+	if (addrs == NULL && options.num_permitted_cnames != 0 &&
+	    (option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) ||
+            options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)) {
+		if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1,
+		    cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL)
+			cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */
+		check_follow_cname(&host, cname);
+	}
 
-		/* Read systemwide configuration file after user config. */
-		(void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, host,
-		    &options, 0);
+	/*
+	 * If the target hostname has changed as a result of canonicalisation
+	 * then re-parse the configuration files as new stanzas may match.
+	 */
+	if (strcasecmp(host_arg, host) != 0) {
+		debug("Hostname has changed; re-reading configuration");
+		process_config_files(pw);
 	}
 
 	/* Fill configuration defaults. */
 	fill_default_options(&options);
 
+	if (options.port == 0)
+		options.port = default_ssh_port();
 	channel_set_af(options.address_family);
 
 	/* Tidy and check options */
@@ -919,36 +995,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	if (options.user == NULL)
 		options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
 
-	/* Get default port if port has not been set. */
-	if (options.port == 0)
-		options.port = default_ssh_port();
-
-	/* preserve host name given on command line for %n expansion */
-	if (options.hostname != NULL) {
-		/* NB. Please keep in sync with readconf.c:match_cfg_line() */
-		cp = percent_expand(options.hostname,
-		    "h", host, (char *)NULL);
-		free(host);
-		host = cp;
-	}
-
-	/* If canonicalization requested then try to apply it */
-	if (options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
-		addrs = resolve_canonicalize(&host, options.port);
-	/*
-	 * If canonicalization not requested, or if it failed then try to
-	 * resolve the bare hostname name using the system resolver's usual
-	 * search rules. Skip the lookup if a ProxyCommand is being used
-	 * unless the user has specifically requested canonicalisation.
-	 */
-	if (addrs == NULL && (options.proxy_command == NULL ||
-            options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)) {
-		if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1,
-		    cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL)
-			cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */
-		check_follow_cname(&host, cname);
-	}
-
 	if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
 		fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
 	strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost));
@@ -981,6 +1027,16 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	if (options.control_path != NULL)
 		muxclient(options.control_path);
 
+	/*
+	 * If hostname canonicalisation was not enabled, then we may not
+	 * have yet resolved the hostname. Do so now.
+	 */
+	if (addrs == NULL && options.proxy_command == NULL) {
+		if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1,
+		    cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL)
+			cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */
+	}
+
 	timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
 
 	/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
@@ -1757,8 +1813,8 @@ load_public_identity_files(void)
 #endif /* PKCS11 */
 
 	n_ids = 0;
-	bzero(identity_files, sizeof(identity_files));
-	bzero(identity_keys, sizeof(identity_keys));
+	memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files));
+	memset(identity_keys, 0, sizeof(identity_keys));
 
 #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
 	if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL &&
@@ -1833,9 +1889,9 @@ load_public_identity_files(void)
 	memcpy(options.identity_files, identity_files, sizeof(identity_files));
 	memcpy(options.identity_keys, identity_keys, sizeof(identity_keys));
 
-	bzero(pwname, strlen(pwname));
+	explicit_bzero(pwname, strlen(pwname));
 	free(pwname);
-	bzero(pwdir, strlen(pwdir));
+	explicit_bzero(pwdir, strlen(pwdir));
 	free(pwdir);
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh2.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh2.h
index 51a963c..59417e6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh2.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh2.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.14 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.15 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -115,12 +115,6 @@
 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ		60
 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST			60
 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE			61
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1		60
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP1		61
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2		62
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP2		63
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM		64
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_CONFIRM		65
 
 /* connection protocol: generic */
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
index e3645d7..a0337f6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
@@ -48,4 +48,4 @@
 #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
 #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
 #   VerifyHostKeyDNS yes
-#   VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20140130
+#   VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20140324
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.0 b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.0
index e9ac54b..6fbd10d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.0
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.0
@@ -128,6 +128,11 @@ DESCRIPTION
              set to ``always'', then canonicalization is applied to proxied
              connections too.
 
+             If this option is enabled and canonicalisation results in the
+             target hostname changing, then the configuration files are
+             processed again using the new target name to pick up any new
+             configuration in matching Host stanzas.
+
      CanonicalizeMaxDots
              Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname
              before canonicalization is disabled.  The default, ``1'', allows
@@ -881,4 +886,4 @@ AUTHORS
      created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
      versions 1.5 and 2.0.
 
-OpenBSD 5.4                    January 19, 2014                    OpenBSD 5.4
+OpenBSD 5.5                    February 23, 2014                   OpenBSD 5.5
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5
index a7728ca..1c681f3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5
@@ -33,9 +33,9 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.184 2014/01/19 04:48:08 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.185 2014/02/23 20:11:36 djm Exp $
 .\" $FreeBSD$
-.Dd January 19, 2014
+.Dd February 23, 2014
 .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -264,6 +264,12 @@ If
 is set to
 .Dq always ,
 then canonicalization is applied to proxied connections too.
+.Pp
+If this option is enabled and canonicalisation results in the target hostname
+changing, then the configuration files are processed again using the new
+target name to pick up any new configuration in matching
+.Cm Host
+stanzas.
 .It Cm CanonicalizeMaxDots
 Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname before
 canonicalization is disabled.
@@ -1417,7 +1423,7 @@ See also VERIFYING HOST KEYS in
 Specifies a string to append to the regular version string to identify
 OS- or site-specific modifications.
 The default is
-.Dq FreeBSD-20140130 .
+.Dq FreeBSD-20140324 .
 .It Cm VisualHostKey
 If this flag is set to
 .Dq yes ,
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h
index ec474aa..50f9b18 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h
@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@
 #define error					ssh_error
 #define evp_ssh1_3des				ssh_evp_ssh1_3des
 #define evp_ssh1_bf				ssh_evp_ssh1_bf
+#define explicit_bzero				ssh_explicit_bzero
 #define export_dns_rr				ssh_export_dns_rr
 #define fatal					ssh_fatal
 #define fmt_scaled				ssh_fmt_scaled
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
index 1157b84..60916a1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.244 2014/01/09 23:26:48 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.246 2014/02/06 22:21:01 djm Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static int
 ssh_create_socket(int privileged, struct addrinfo *ai)
 {
 	int sock, r, gaierr;
-	struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+	struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL;
 
 	sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
 	if (sock < 0) {
@@ -310,17 +310,19 @@ ssh_create_socket(int privileged, struct addrinfo *ai)
 	if (options.bind_address == NULL && !privileged)
 		return sock;
 
-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
-	hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family;
-	hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype;
-	hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol;
-	hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
-	gaierr = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, NULL, &hints, &res);
-	if (gaierr) {
-		error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address,
-		    ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
-		close(sock);
-		return -1;
+	if (options.bind_address) {
+		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+		hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family;
+		hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype;
+		hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol;
+		hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+		gaierr = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, NULL, &hints, &res);
+		if (gaierr) {
+			error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address,
+			    ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+			close(sock);
+			return -1;
+		}
 	}
 	/*
 	 * If we are running as root and want to connect to a privileged
@@ -328,7 +330,7 @@ ssh_create_socket(int privileged, struct addrinfo *ai)
 	 */
 	if (privileged) {
 		PRIV_START;
-		r = bindresvport_sa(sock, res->ai_addr);
+		r = bindresvport_sa(sock, res ? res->ai_addr : NULL);
 		PRIV_END;
 		if (r < 0) {
 			error("bindresvport_sa: af=%d %s", ai->ai_family,
@@ -345,7 +347,8 @@ ssh_create_socket(int privileged, struct addrinfo *ai)
 			return -1;
 		}
 	}
-	freeaddrinfo(res);
+	if (res != NULL)
+		freeaddrinfo(res);
 	return sock;
 }
 
@@ -1326,7 +1329,7 @@ ssh_put_password(char *password)
 	padded = xcalloc(1, size);
 	strlcpy(padded, password, size);
 	packet_put_string(padded, size);
-	memset(padded, 0, size);
+	explicit_bzero(padded, size);
 	free(padded);
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
index 7bd6cb0..921408e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.72 2013/09/02 22:00:34 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.74 2014/02/02 03:44:32 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
 
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -47,6 +46,7 @@
 #include "canohost.h"
 #include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
+#include "digest.h"
 
 /* Session id for the current session. */
 u_char session_id[16];
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ try_agent_authentication(void)
 			 * return a wrong value.
 			 */
 			logit("Authentication agent failed to decrypt challenge.");
-			memset(response, 0, sizeof(response));
+			explicit_bzero(response, sizeof(response));
 		}
 		key_free(key);
 		debug("Sending response to RSA challenge.");
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static void
 respond_to_rsa_challenge(BIGNUM * challenge, RSA * prv)
 {
 	u_char buf[32], response[16];
-	MD5_CTX md;
+	struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
 	int i, len;
 
 	/* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */
@@ -179,10 +179,12 @@ respond_to_rsa_challenge(BIGNUM * challenge, RSA * prv)
 
 	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
 	BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + sizeof(buf) - len);
-	MD5_Init(&md);
-	MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
-	MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
-	MD5_Final(response, &md);
+	if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
+	    ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_final(md, response, sizeof(response)) < 0)
+		fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
+	ssh_digest_free(md);
 
 	debug("Sending response to host key RSA challenge.");
 
@@ -193,9 +195,9 @@ respond_to_rsa_challenge(BIGNUM * challenge, RSA * prv)
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();
 
-	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
-	memset(response, 0, sizeof(response));
-	memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
+	explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+	explicit_bzero(response, sizeof(response));
+	explicit_bzero(&md, sizeof(md));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -269,7 +271,7 @@ try_rsa_authentication(int idx)
 				debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
 				quit = 1;
 			}
-			memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+			explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
 			free(passphrase);
 			if (private != NULL || quit)
 				break;
@@ -425,7 +427,7 @@ try_challenge_response_authentication(void)
 		}
 		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
 		ssh_put_password(response);
-		memset(response, 0, strlen(response));
+		explicit_bzero(response, strlen(response));
 		free(response);
 		packet_send();
 		packet_write_wait();
@@ -458,7 +460,7 @@ try_password_authentication(char *prompt)
 		password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
 		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
 		ssh_put_password(password);
-		memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
+		explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password));
 		free(password);
 		packet_send();
 		packet_write_wait();
@@ -650,8 +652,11 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 	/* Set the encryption key. */
 	packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, options.cipher);
 
-	/* We will no longer need the session key here.  Destroy any extra copies. */
-	memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
+	/*
+	 * We will no longer need the session key here.
+	 * Destroy any extra copies.
+	 */
+	explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key));
 
 	/*
 	 * Expect a success message from the server.  Note that this message
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
index 9a97875..dc7ec5b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.201 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.204 2014/02/02 03:44:32 djm Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -71,8 +71,6 @@
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
 #include "hostfile.h"
-#include "schnorr.h"
-#include "jpake.h"
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 #include "ssh-gss.h"
@@ -300,18 +298,12 @@ void	input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 void	input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 void	input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 void	input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void	input_userauth_jpake_server_step1(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void	input_userauth_jpake_server_step2(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void	input_userauth_jpake_server_confirm(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 
 int	userauth_none(Authctxt *);
 int	userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *);
 int	userauth_passwd(Authctxt *);
 int	userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *);
 int	userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *);
-int	userauth_jpake(Authctxt *);
-
-void	userauth_jpake_cleanup(Authctxt *);
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 int	userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt);
@@ -351,13 +343,6 @@ Authmethod authmethods[] = {
 		NULL,
 		&options.pubkey_authentication,
 		NULL},
-#ifdef JPAKE
-	{"jpake-01@openssh.com",
-		userauth_jpake,
-		userauth_jpake_cleanup,
-		&options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication,
-		&options.batch_mode},
-#endif
 	{"keyboard-interactive",
 		userauth_kbdint,
 		NULL,
@@ -918,7 +903,7 @@ userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
 	packet_put_char(0);
 	packet_put_cstring(password);
-	memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
+	explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password));
 	free(password);
 	packet_add_padding(64);
 	packet_send();
@@ -964,7 +949,7 @@ input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
 	    authctxt->server_user, host);
 	password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
 	packet_put_cstring(password);
-	memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
+	explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password));
 	free(password);
 	password = NULL;
 	while (password == NULL) {
@@ -981,16 +966,16 @@ input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
 		    authctxt->server_user, host);
 		retype = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
 		if (strcmp(password, retype) != 0) {
-			memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
+			explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password));
 			free(password);
 			logit("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit.");
 			password = NULL;
 		}
-		memset(retype, 0, strlen(retype));
+		explicit_bzero(retype, strlen(retype));
 		free(retype);
 	}
 	packet_put_cstring(password);
-	memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
+	explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password));
 	free(password);
 	packet_add_padding(64);
 	packet_send();
@@ -999,209 +984,6 @@ input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
 	    &input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
 }
 
-#ifdef JPAKE
-static char *
-pw_encrypt(const char *password, const char *crypt_scheme, const char *salt)
-{
-	/* OpenBSD crypt(3) handles all of these */
-	if (strcmp(crypt_scheme, "crypt") == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(crypt_scheme, "bcrypt") == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(crypt_scheme, "md5crypt") == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(crypt_scheme, "crypt-extended") == 0)
-		return xstrdup(crypt(password, salt));
-	error("%s: unsupported password encryption scheme \"%.100s\"",
-	    __func__, crypt_scheme);
-	return NULL;
-}
-
-static BIGNUM *
-jpake_password_to_secret(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *crypt_scheme,
-    const char *salt)
-{
-	char prompt[256], *password, *crypted;
-	u_char *secret;
-	u_int secret_len;
-	BIGNUM *ret;
-
-	snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password (JPAKE): ",
-	    authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host);
-	password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
-
-	if ((crypted = pw_encrypt(password, crypt_scheme, salt)) == NULL) {
-		logit("Disabling %s authentication", authctxt->method->name);
-		authctxt->method->enabled = NULL;
-		/* Continue with an empty password to fail gracefully */
-		crypted = xstrdup("");
-	}
-
-#ifdef JPAKE_DEBUG
-	debug3("%s: salt = %s", __func__, salt);
-	debug3("%s: scheme = %s", __func__, crypt_scheme);
-	debug3("%s: crypted = %s", __func__, crypted);
-#endif
-
-	if (hash_buffer(crypted, strlen(crypted), SSH_DIGEST_SHA1,
-	    &secret, &secret_len) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
-
-	bzero(password, strlen(password));
-	bzero(crypted, strlen(crypted));
-	free(password);
-	free(crypted);
-
-	if ((ret = BN_bin2bn(secret, secret_len, NULL)) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn (secret)", __func__);
-	bzero(secret, secret_len);
-	free(secret);
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-input_userauth_jpake_server_step1(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->methoddata;
-	u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof, *x2_s_proof;
-	u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len, x2_s_proof_len;
-	char *crypt_scheme, *salt;
-
-	/* Disable this message */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP1, NULL);
-
-	if ((pctx->g_x3 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (pctx->g_x4 = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-
-	/* Fetch step 1 values */
-	crypt_scheme = packet_get_string(NULL);
-	salt = packet_get_string(NULL);
-	pctx->server_id = packet_get_string(&pctx->server_id_len);
-	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x3);
-	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x4);
-	x3_proof = packet_get_string(&x3_proof_len);
-	x4_proof = packet_get_string(&x4_proof_len);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 received in %s", __func__));
-
-	/* Obtain password and derive secret */
-	pctx->s = jpake_password_to_secret(authctxt, crypt_scheme, salt);
-	bzero(crypt_scheme, strlen(crypt_scheme));
-	bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
-	free(crypt_scheme);
-	free(salt);
-	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((pctx->s, "%s: s = ", __func__));
-
-	/* Calculate step 2 values */
-	jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x1,
-	    pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->x2,
-	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
-	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
-	    x3_proof, x3_proof_len,
-	    x4_proof, x4_proof_len,
-	    &pctx->a,
-	    &x2_s_proof, &x2_s_proof_len);
-
-	bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
-	bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
-	free(x3_proof);
-	free(x4_proof);
-
-	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 sending in %s", __func__));
-
-	/* Send values for step 2 */
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2);
-	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->a);
-	packet_put_string(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
-	packet_send();
-
-	bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
-	free(x2_s_proof);
-
-	/* Expect step 2 packet from peer */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP2,
-	    input_userauth_jpake_server_step2);
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-input_userauth_jpake_server_step2(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->methoddata;
-	u_char *x4_s_proof;
-	u_int x4_s_proof_len;
-
-	/* Disable this message */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP2, NULL);
-
-	if ((pctx->b = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-
-	/* Fetch step 2 values */
-	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->b);
-	x4_s_proof = packet_get_string(&x4_s_proof_len);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 received in %s", __func__));
-
-	/* Derive shared key and calculate confirmation hash */
-	jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->b,
-	    pctx->x2, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4,
-	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
-	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
-	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
-	    x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len,
-	    &pctx->k,
-	    &pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
-
-	bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
-	free(x4_s_proof);
-
-	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm sending in %s", __func__));
-
-	/* Send key confirmation proof */
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM);
-	packet_put_string(pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
-	packet_send();
-
-	/* Expect confirmation from peer */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_CONFIRM,
-	    input_userauth_jpake_server_confirm);
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-input_userauth_jpake_server_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->methoddata;
-
-	/* Disable this message */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_CONFIRM, NULL);
-
-	pctx->h_k_sid_sessid = packet_get_string(&pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm received in %s", __func__));
-
-	/* Verify expected confirmation hash */
-	if (jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
-	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
-	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
-	    pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len) == 1)
-		debug("%s: %s success", __func__, authctxt->method->name);
-	else {
-		debug("%s: confirmation mismatch", __func__);
-		/* XXX stash this so if auth succeeds then we can warn/kill */
-	}
-
-	userauth_jpake_cleanup(authctxt);
-}
-#endif /* JPAKE */
-
 static int
 identity_sign(Identity *id, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
     u_char *data, u_int datalen)
@@ -1378,7 +1160,7 @@ load_identity_file(char *filename, int userprovided)
 				debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
 				quit = 1;
 			}
-			memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+			explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
 			free(passphrase);
 			if (private != NULL || quit)
 				break;
@@ -1442,7 +1224,7 @@ pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		/* If IdentitiesOnly set and key not found then don't use it */
 		if (!found && options.identities_only) {
 			TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
-			bzero(id, sizeof(*id));
+			explicit_bzero(id, sizeof(*id));
 			free(id);
 		}
 	}
@@ -1637,7 +1419,7 @@ input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		response = read_passphrase(prompt, echo ? RP_ECHO : 0);
 
 		packet_put_cstring(response);
-		memset(response, 0, strlen(response));
+		explicit_bzero(response, strlen(response));
 		free(response);
 		free(prompt);
 	}
@@ -1807,7 +1589,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	packet_put_cstring(chost);
 	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->local_user);
 	packet_put_string(signature, slen);
-	memset(signature, 's', slen);
+	explicit_bzero(signature, slen);
 	free(signature);
 	free(chost);
 	free(pkalg);
@@ -1817,79 +1599,6 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	return 1;
 }
 
-#ifdef JPAKE
-int
-userauth_jpake(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	struct jpake_ctx *pctx;
-	u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof;
-	u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len;
-	static int attempt = 0; /* XXX share with userauth_password's? */
-
-	if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
-		return 0;
-	if (attempt != 1)
-		error("Permission denied, please try again.");
-
-	if (authctxt->methoddata != NULL)
-		fatal("%s: authctxt->methoddata already set (%p)",
-		    __func__, authctxt->methoddata);
-
-	authctxt->methoddata = pctx = jpake_new();
-
-	/*
-	 * Send request immediately, to get the protocol going while
-	 * we do the initial computations.
-	 */
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
-	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
-	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
-	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
-	    &pctx->client_id, &pctx->client_id_len,
-	    &pctx->x1, &pctx->x2, &pctx->g_x1, &pctx->g_x2,
-	    &x1_proof, &x1_proof_len,
-	    &x2_proof, &x2_proof_len);
-
-	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 sending in %s", __func__));
-
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1);
-	packet_put_string(pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len);
-	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x1);
-	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x2);
-	packet_put_string(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
-	packet_put_string(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
-	packet_send();
-
-	bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
-	bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
-	free(x1_proof);
-	free(x2_proof);
-
-	/* Expect step 1 packet from peer */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP1,
-	    input_userauth_jpake_server_step1);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS,
-	    &input_userauth_success_unexpected);
-
-	return 1;
-}
-
-void
-userauth_jpake_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	debug3("%s: clean up", __func__);
-	if (authctxt->methoddata != NULL) {
-		jpake_free(authctxt->methoddata);
-		authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
-	}
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success);
-}
-#endif /* JPAKE */
-
 /* find auth method */
 
 /*
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.0 b/crypto/openssh/sshd.0
index 154009c..c61d515 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.0
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.0
@@ -640,4 +640,4 @@ CAVEATS
      System security is not improved unless rshd, rlogind, and rexecd are
      disabled (thus completely disabling rlogin and rsh into the machine).
 
-OpenBSD 5.4                    December 7, 2013                    OpenBSD 5.4
+OpenBSD 5.5                    December 7, 2013                    OpenBSD 5.5
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
index 732d317..ce7fa65 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.414 2014/01/09 23:26:48 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.420 2014/02/26 21:53:37 markus Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
 
@@ -108,6 +107,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "uidswap.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "dh.h"
@@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void)
 		}
 	}
 	sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
-	memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
+	explicit_bzero(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
 }
 
 /* Demote private to public keys for network child */
@@ -631,10 +631,16 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
 	/* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
 	privsep_challenge_enable();
 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	/* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
+	if (options.gss_authentication)
+		ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
+#endif
+
 	arc4random_stir();
 	arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
 	RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-	bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+	explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
 
 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
 	demote_sensitive_data();
@@ -769,7 +775,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	arc4random_stir();
 	arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
 	RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-	bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+	explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
 
 	/* Drop privileges */
 	do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
@@ -1381,7 +1387,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
 			arc4random_stir();
 			arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
 			RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-			bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+			explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
 		}
 
 		/* child process check (or debug mode) */
@@ -1687,7 +1693,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
 			    SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
 	} else {
-		memset(privsep_pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd));
+		explicit_bzero(privsep_pw->pw_passwd,
+		    strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd));
 		privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw);
 		free(privsep_pw->pw_passwd);
 		privsep_pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup("*");
@@ -2401,7 +2408,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
 			    get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
 			rsafail++;
 		} else {
-			memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
+			explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key));
 			BN_bn2bin(session_key_int,
 			    session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
 
@@ -2420,20 +2427,26 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
 	if (rsafail) {
 		int bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
 		u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
-		MD5_CTX md;
+		struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
 
 		logit("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key");
 		BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf);
-		MD5_Init(&md);
-		MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
-		MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
-		MD5_Final(session_key, &md);
-		MD5_Init(&md);
-		MD5_Update(&md, session_key, 16);
-		MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
-		MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
-		MD5_Final(session_key + 16, &md);
-		memset(buf, 0, bytes);
+		if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
+		    ssh_digest_update(md, buf, bytes) < 0 ||
+		    ssh_digest_update(md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie,
+		    SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH) < 0 ||
+		    ssh_digest_final(md, session_key, sizeof(session_key)) < 0)
+			fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
+		ssh_digest_free(md);
+		if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
+		    ssh_digest_update(md, session_key, 16) < 0 ||
+		    ssh_digest_update(md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie,
+		    SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH) < 0 ||
+		    ssh_digest_final(md, session_key + 16,
+		    sizeof(session_key) - 16) < 0)
+			fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
+		ssh_digest_free(md);
+		explicit_bzero(buf, bytes);
 		free(buf);
 		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
 			session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
@@ -2451,7 +2464,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
 	packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type);
 
 	/* Destroy our copy of the session key.  It is no longer needed. */
-	memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
+	explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key));
 
 	debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
index 513764e..3654a37 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@
 #MaxStartups 10:30:100
 #PermitTunnel no
 #ChrootDirectory none
-#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20140130
+#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20140324
 
 # no default banner path
 #Banner none
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.0 b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.0
index 5962b02..413c260 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.0
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.0
@@ -374,6 +374,12 @@ DESCRIPTION
              interactive sessions and ``throughput'' for non-interactive
              sessions.
 
+     KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+             Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication.
+             The argument to this keyword must be ``yes'' or ``no''.  The
+             default is to use whatever value ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+             is set to (by default ``yes'').
+
      KerberosAuthentication
              Specifies whether the password provided by the user for
              PasswordAuthentication will be validated through the Kerberos
@@ -460,7 +466,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
      Match   Introduces a conditional block.  If all of the criteria on the
              Match line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines
              override those set in the global section of the config file,
-             until either another Match line or the end of the file.
+             until either another Match line or the end of the file.  If a
+             keyword appears in multiple Match blocks that are satisified,
+             only the first instance of the keyword is applied.
 
              The arguments to Match are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or
              the single token All which matches all criteria.  The available
@@ -824,4 +832,4 @@ AUTHORS
      versions 1.5 and 2.0.  Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
      for privilege separation.
 
-OpenBSD 5.4                    December 8, 2013                    OpenBSD 5.4
+OpenBSD 5.5                    February 27, 2014                   OpenBSD 5.5
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
index e33b39a..a1dea3a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
@@ -33,9 +33,9 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.170 2013/12/08 09:53:27 dtucker Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.172 2014/02/27 22:47:07 djm Exp $
 .\" $FreeBSD$
-.Dd December 8, 2013
+.Dd February 27, 2014
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -634,6 +634,17 @@ The default is
 for interactive sessions and
 .Dq throughput
 for non-interactive sessions.
+.It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is to use whatever value
+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+is set to
+(by default
+.Dq yes ) .
 .It Cm KerberosAuthentication
 Specifies whether the password provided by the user for
 .Cm PasswordAuthentication
@@ -760,6 +771,10 @@ line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those
 set in the global section of the config file, until either another
 .Cm Match
 line or the end of the file.
+If a keyword appears in multiple
+.Cm Match
+blocks that are satisified, only the first instance of the keyword is
+applied.
 .Pp
 The arguments to
 .Cm Match
@@ -1238,7 +1253,7 @@ restrictions.
 Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner
 sent by the server upon connection.
 The default is
-.Dq FreeBSD-20140130 .
+.Dq FreeBSD-20140324 .
 .It Cm X11DisplayOffset
 Specifies the first display number available for
 .Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
index 2688d8d..e79ca9b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.27 2011/01/11 06:06:09 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.28 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/version.h b/crypto/openssh/version.h
index ef6be1d..adad6a7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/version.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/version.h
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.69 2014/01/16 07:32:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.70 2014/02/27 22:57:40 djm Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 
-#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_6.5"
+#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_6.6"
 
 #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
 #define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
 
-#define SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD	"FreeBSD-20140130"
+#define SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD	"FreeBSD-20140324"
 #define SSH_VERSION_HPN		"_hpn13v11"