diff options
| author | des <des@FreeBSD.org> | 2002-10-29 09:43:00 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | des <des@FreeBSD.org> | 2002-10-29 09:43:00 +0000 |
| commit | 099d1a58f7bc088a9f71af6d32542ca3949468a3 (patch) | |
| tree | 49cef8938d7beb10016662d15546fa090865073d /crypto/openssh | |
| parent | 1ba793a7c09e24d920de3983a3223770cb37ebff (diff) | |
| download | FreeBSD-src-099d1a58f7bc088a9f71af6d32542ca3949468a3.zip FreeBSD-src-099d1a58f7bc088a9f71af6d32542ca3949468a3.tar.gz | |
Vendor import of OpenSSH-portable 3.5p1.
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssh')
133 files changed, 4911 insertions, 2117 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/CREDITS b/crypto/openssh/CREDITS index ef26753..0c86684 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/CREDITS +++ b/crypto/openssh/CREDITS @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ Phill Camp <P.S.S.Camp@ukc.ac.uk> - login code fix Rip Loomis <loomisg@cist.saic.com> - Solaris package support, fixes SAKAI Kiyotaka <ksakai@kso.netwk.ntt-at.co.jp> - Multiple bugfixes Simon Wilkinson <sxw@dcs.ed.ac.uk> - PAM fixes, Compat with MIT KrbV +Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> - many patches and technical assistance Svante Signell <svante.signell@telia.com> - Bugfixes Thomas Neumann <tom@smart.ruhr.de> - Shadow passwords Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> - Portability & SCO fixes @@ -90,5 +91,5 @@ Apologies to anyone I have missed. Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -$Id: CREDITS,v 1.66 2002/04/13 01:04:40 djm Exp $ +$Id: CREDITS,v 1.67 2002/07/28 20:31:19 stevesk Exp $ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog index 67cd6ca..8760466 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog +++ b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog @@ -1,3 +1,599 @@ +20021003 + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/10/01 20:34:12 + [ssh-agent.c] + allow root to access the agent, since there is no protection from root. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/10/01 13:24:50 + [version.h] + OpenSSH 3.5 + - (djm) Bump RPM spec version numbers + - (djm) Bug #406 s/msg_send/ssh_msh_send/ for Mac OS X 1.2 + +20020930 + - (djm) Tidy contrib/, add Makefile for GNOME passphrase dialogs, + tweak README + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - mickey@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/27 10:42:09 + [compat.c compat.h sshd.c] + add a generic match for a prober, such as sie big brother; + idea from stevesk@; markus@ ok + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/27 15:46:21 + [ssh.1] + clarify compression level protocol 1 only; ok markus@ deraadt@ + +20020927 + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/25 11:17:16 + [sshd_config] + sync LoginGraceTime with default + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/25 15:19:02 + [sshd.c] + typo; pilot@monkey.org + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/26 11:38:43 + [auth1.c auth.h auth-krb4.c monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c] + [monitor_wrap.h] + krb4 + privsep; ok dugsong@, deraadt@ + +20020925 + - (bal) Fix issue where successfull login does not clear failure counts + in AIX. Patch by dtucker@zip.com.au ok by djm + - (tim) Cray fixes (bug 367) based on patch from Wendy Palm @ cray. + This does not include the deattack.c fixes. + +20020923 + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/23 20:46:27 + [canohost.c] + change get_peer_ipaddr() and get_local_ipaddr() to not return NULL for + non-sockets; fixes a problem passing NULL to snprintf(). ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/23 22:11:05 + [monitor.c] + only call auth_krb5 if kerberos is enabled; ok deraadt@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/24 08:46:04 + [monitor.c] + only call kerberos code for authctxt->valid + - todd@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/24 20:59:44 + [sshd.8] + tweak the example $HOME/.ssh/rc script to not show on any cmdline the + sensitive data it handles. This fixes bug # 402 as reported by + kolya@mit.edu (Nickolai Zeldovich). + ok markus@ and stevesk@ + +20020923 + - (tim) [configure.ac] s/return/exit/ patch by dtucker@zip.com.au + +20020922 + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/19 14:53:14 + [compat.c] + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/19 15:51:23 + [ssh-add.c] + typo; cd@kalkatraz.de + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/19 16:03:15 + [serverloop.c] + log IP address also; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/20 18:41:29 + [auth.c] + log illegal user here for missing privsep case (ssh2). + this is executed in the monitor. ok markus@ + +20020919 + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/12 19:11:52 + [ssh-agent.c] + %u for uid print; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/12 19:50:36 + [session.c ssh.1] + add SSH_CONNECTION and deprecate SSH_CLIENT; bug #384. ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/13 19:23:09 + [channels.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] + remove use of SO_LINGER, it should not be needed. error check + SO_REUSEADDR. fixup comments. ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/16 19:55:33 + [session.c] + log when _PATH_NOLOGIN exists; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/16 20:12:11 + [sshd_config.5] + more details on X11Forwarding security issues and threats; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/16 22:03:13 + [sshd.8] + reference moduli(5) in FILES /etc/moduli. + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/17 07:47:02 + [channels.c] + don't quit while creating X11 listening socket. + http://mail-index.netbsd.org/current-users/2002/09/16/0005.html + got from portable. markus ok + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/19 01:58:18 + [ssh.c sshconnect.c] + bugzilla.mindrot.org #223 - ProxyCommands don't exit. + Patch from dtucker@zip.com.au; ok markus@ + +20020912 + - (djm) Made GNOME askpass programs return non-zero if cancel button is + pressed. + - (djm) Added getpeereid() replacement. Properly implemented for systems + with SO_PEERCRED support. Faked for systems which lack it. + - (djm) Sync sys/tree.h with OpenBSD -current. Rename tree.h and + fake-queue.h to sys-tree.h and sys-queue.h + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/08 20:24:08 + [hostfile.h] + no comma at end of enumerator list + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/09 06:48:06 + [auth1.c auth.h auth-krb5.c monitor.c monitor.h] + [monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h] + kerberos support for privsep. confirmed to work by lha@stacken.kth.se + patch from markus + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/09 14:54:15 + [channels.c kex.h key.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c radix.c uuencode.c] + signed vs unsigned from -pedantic; ok henning@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/10 20:24:47 + [ssh-agent.c] + check the euid of the connecting process with getpeereid(2); + ok provos deraadt stevesk + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/11 17:55:03 + [ssh.1] + add agent and X11 forwarding warning text from ssh_config.5; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/11 18:27:26 + [authfd.c authfd.h ssh.c] + don't connect to agent to test for presence if we've previously + connected; ok markus@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/11 22:41:50 + [sftp.1 sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp-common.c sftp-common.h] + [sftp-glob.c sftp-glob.h sftp-int.c sftp-server.c] + support for short/long listings and globbing in "ls"; ok markus@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/12 00:13:06 + [sftp-int.c] + zap unused var introduced in last commit + +20020911 + - (djm) Sync openbsd-compat with OpenBSD -current + +20020910 + - (djm) Bug #365: Read /.ssh/environment properly under CygWin. + Patch from Mark Bradshaw <bradshaw@staff.crosswalk.com> + - (djm) Bug #138: Make protocol 1 blowfish work with old OpenSSL. + Patch from Robert Halubek <rob@adso.com.pl> + +20020905 + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/04 18:52:42 + [servconf.c sshd.8 sshd_config.5] + default LoginGraceTime to 2m; 1m may be too short for slow systems. + ok markus@ + - (djm) Merge openssh-TODO.patch from Redhat (null) beta + - (djm) Add gnome-ssh-askpass2.c (gtk2) by merge with patch from + Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> + - (djm) Add support for building gtk2 password requestor from Redhat beta + +20020903 + - (djm) Patch from itojun@ for Darwin OS: test getaddrinfo, reorder libcrypt + - (djm) Fix Redhat RPM build dependancy test + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/12 10:46:35 + [ssh-agent.c] + make ssh-agent setgid, disallow ptrace. + - espie@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/21 11:20:59 + [sshd.8] + `RSA' updated to refer to `public key', where it matters. + okay markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/21 19:38:06 + [servconf.c sshd.8 sshd_config sshd_config.5] + change LoginGraceTime default to 1 minute; ok mouring@ markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/21 20:10:28 + [ssh-agent.c] + raise listen backlog; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/22 19:27:53 + [ssh-agent.c] + use common close function; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/22 19:38:42 + [clientloop.c] + format with current EscapeChar; bugzilla #388 from wknox@mitre.org. + ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/22 20:57:19 + [ssh-agent.c] + shutdown(SHUT_RDWR) not needed before close here; ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/22 21:33:58 + [auth1.c auth2.c] + auth_root_allowed() is handled by the monitor in the privsep case, + so skip this for use_privsep, ok stevesk@, fixes bugzilla #387/325 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/22 21:45:41 + [session.c] + send signal name (not signal number) in "exit-signal" message; noticed + by galb@vandyke.com + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/27 17:13:56 + [ssh-rsa.c] + RSA_public_decrypt() returns -1 on error so len must be signed; + ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/27 17:18:40 + [ssh_config.5] + some warning text for ForwardAgent and ForwardX11; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/29 15:57:25 + [monitor.c session.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h] + pass addrlen with sockaddr *; from Hajimu UMEMOTO <ume@FreeBSD.org> + NOTE: there are also p-specific parts to this patch. ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/29 16:02:54 + [ssh.1 ssh.c] + deprecate -P as UsePrivilegedPort defaults to no now; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/29 16:09:02 + [ssh_config.5] + more on UsePrivilegedPort and setuid root; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/29 19:49:42 + [ssh.c] + shrink initial privilege bracket for setuid case; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/29 22:54:10 + [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] + state XAuthLocation is a full pathname + +20020820 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/02 14:43:15 + [monitor.c monitor_mm.c] + Change mm_zalloc() sanity checks to be more in line with what + we do in calloc() and add a check to monitor_mm.c. + OK provos@ and markus@ + - marc@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/02 16:00:07 + [ssh.1 sshd.8] + note that .ssh/environment is only read when + allowed (PermitUserEnvironment in sshd_config). + OK markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/02 21:23:41 + [ssh-rsa.c] + diff is u_int (2x); ok deraadt/provos + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/02 22:20:30 + [ssh-rsa.c] + replace RSA_verify with our own version and avoid the OpenSSL ASN.1 parser + for authentication; ok deraadt/djm + - aaron@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/08 13:50:23 + [sshconnect1.c] + Use & to test if bits are set, not &&; markus@ ok. + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/08 23:54:52 + [auth.c] + typo in comment + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/09 17:21:42 + [sshd_config.5] + use Op for mdoc conformance; from esr@golux.thyrsus.com + ok aaron@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/09 17:41:12 + [sshd_config.5] + proxy vs. fake display + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/12 17:30:35 + [ssh.1 sshd.8 sshd_config.5] + more PermitUserEnvironment; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/17 23:07:14 + [ssh.1] + ForwardAgent has defaulted to no for over 2 years; be more clear here. + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/17 23:55:01 + [ssh_config.5] + ordered list here + - (bal) [defines.h] Some platforms don't have SIZE_T_MAX. So assign + it to ULONG_MAX. + +20020813 + - (tim) [configure.ac] Display OpenSSL header/library version. + Patch by dtucker@zip.com.au + +20020731 + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/24 16:11:18 + [hostfile.c hostfile.h sshconnect.c] + print out all known keys for a host if we get a unknown host key, + see discussion at http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?t=101069210100016&r=1&w=4 + + the ssharp mitm tool attacks users in a similar way, so i'd like to + pointed out again: + A MITM attack is always possible if the ssh client prints: + The authenticity of host 'bla' can't be established. + (protocol version 2 with pubkey authentication allows you to detect + MITM attacks) + - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/25 01:16:59 + [sftp.c] + FallBackToRsh does not exist anywhere else. Remove it from here. + OK deraadt. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/29 18:57:30 + [sshconnect.c] + print file:line + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/30 17:03:55 + [auth-options.c servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd_config sshd_config.5] + add PermitUserEnvironment (off by default!); from dot@dotat.at; + ok provos, deraadt + +20020730 + - (bal) [uidswap.c] SCO compile correction by gert@greenie.muc.de + +20020728 + - (stevesk) [auth-pam.c] should use PAM_MSG_MEMBER(); from solar + - (stevesk) [CREDITS] solar + - (stevesk) [ssh-rand-helper.c] RAND_bytes() and SHA1_Final() unsigned + char arg. + +20020725 + - (djm) Remove some cruft from INSTALL + - (djm) Latest config.guess and config.sub from ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/config/ + +20020723 + - (bal) [bsd-cray.c bsd-cray.h] Part 2 of Cray merger. + - (bal) sync ID w/ ssh-agent.c + - (bal) OpenBSD Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/19 15:43:33 + [log.c log.h session.c sshd.c] + remove fatal cleanups after fork; based on discussions with and code + from solar. + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/19 17:42:40 + [ssh.c] + display a warning from ssh when XAuthLocation does not exist or xauth + returned no authentication data. ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/21 18:32:20 + [auth-options.c] + unneeded includes + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/21 18:34:43 + [auth-options.h] + remove invalid comment + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/22 11:03:06 + [session.c] + fallback to _PATH_STDPATH on setusercontext+LOGIN_SETPATH errors; + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/22 17:32:56 + [monitor.c] + u_int here; ok provos@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/23 16:03:10 + [sshd.c] + utmp_len is unsigned; display error consistent with other options. + ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/15 17:15:31 + [uidswap.c] + little more debugging; ok markus@ + +20020722 + - (bal) AIX tty data limiting patch fix by leigh@solinno.co.uk + - (stevesk) [xmmap.c] missing prototype for fatal() + - (bal) [configure.ac defines.h loginrec.c sshd.c sshpty.c] Partial sync + with Cray (mostly #ifdef renaming). Patch by wendyp@cray.com. + - (bal) [configure.ac] Missing ;; from cray patch. + - (bal) [monitor_mm.c openbsd-compat/xmmap.h] Move xmmap() defines + into it's own header. + - (stevesk) [auth-pam.[ch] session.c] pam_getenvlist() must be + freed by the caller; add free_pam_environment() and use it. + - (stevesk) [auth-pam.c] typo in comment + +20020721 + - (stevesk) [auth-pam.c] merge cosmetic changes from solar's + openssh-3.4p1-owl-password-changing.diff + - (stevesk) [auth-pam.c] merge rest of solar's PAM patch; + PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD remains in #if 0 for now. + - (stevesk) [auth-pam.c] cast to avoid initialization type mismatch + warning on pam_conv struct conversation function. + - (stevesk) [auth-pam.h] license + - (stevesk) [auth-pam.h] unneeded include + - (stevesk) [auth-pam.[ch] ssh.h] move SSHD_PAM_SERVICE to auth-pam.h + +20020720 + - (stevesk) [ssh-keygen.c] bug #231: always init/seed_rng(). + +20020719 + - (tim) [contrib/solaris/buildpkg.sh] create privsep user/group if needed. + Patch by dtucker@zip.com.au + - (tim) [configure.ac] test for libxnet on HP. Patch by dtucker@zip.com.au + +20020718 + - (tim) [defines.h] Bug 313 patch by dirk.meyer@dinoex.sub.org + - (tim) [monitor_mm.c] add missing declaration for xmmap(). Reported + by ayamura@ayamura.org + - (tim) [configure.ac] Bug 267 rework int64_t test. + - (tim) [includes.h] Bug 267 add stdint.h + +20020717 + - (bal) aixbff package updated by dtucker@zip.com.au + - (tim) [configure.ac] change how we do paths in AC_PATH_PROGS tests + for autoconf 2.53. Based on a patch by jrj@purdue.edu + +20020716 + - (tim) [contrib/solaris/opensshd.in] Only kill sshd if .pid file found + +20020715 + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/12 13:29:09 + [sshconnect.c] + print connect failure during debugging mode. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/12 15:50:17 + [cipher.c] + EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV for our own rijndael + - (bal) Remove unused tty defined in do_setusercontext() pointed out by + dtucker@zip.com.au plus a a more KNF since I am near it. + - (bal) Privsep user creation support in Solaris buildpkg.sh by + dtucker@zip.com.au + +20020714 + - (tim) [Makefile.in] replace "id sshd" with "sshd -t" + - (bal/tim) [acconfig.h configure.ac monitor_mm.c servconf.c + openbsd-compat/Makefile.in] support compression on platforms that + have no/broken MAP_ANON. Moved code to openbsd-compat/xmmap.c + Based on patch from nalin@redhat.com of code extracted from Owl's package + - (tim) [ssh_prng_cmds.in] Bug 323 arp -n flag doesn't exist under Solaris. + report by chris@by-design.net + - (tim) [loginrec.c] Bug 347: Fix typo (WTMPX_FILE) report by rodney@bond.net + - (tim) [loginrec.c] Bug 348: add missing found = 1; to wtmpx_islogin() + report by rodney@bond.net + +20020712 + - (tim) [Makefile.in] quiet down install-files: and check-user: + - (tim) [configure.ac] remove unused filepriv line + +20020710 + - (tim) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] explicitely sets the permissions + on /var/empty to 755 Patch by vinschen@redhat.com + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/09 11:56:50 + [sshconnect.c] + silently try next address on connect(2). markus ok + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/09 11:56:27 + [canohost.c] + suppress log on reverse lookup failiure, as there's no real value in + doing so. + markus ok + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/09 12:04:02 + [sshconnect.c] + ed static function (less warnings) + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/09 17:46:25 + [sshd_config.5] + clarify no preference ordering in protocol list; ok markus@ + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/10 10:28:15 + [sshconnect.c] + bark if all connection attempt fails. + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/10 17:53:54 + [rijndael.c] + use right sizeof in memcpy; markus ok + +20020709 + - (bal) NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT used instead of CYGWIN so other platforms + lacking that concept can share it. Patch by vinschen@redhat.com + +20020708 + - (tim) [openssh/contrib/solaris/buildpkg.sh] add PKG_INSTALL_ROOT to + work in a jumpstart environment. patch by kbrint@rufus.net + - (tim) [Makefile.in] workaround for broken pakadd on some systems. + - (tim) [configure.ac] fix libc89 utimes test. Mention default path for + --with-privsep-path= + +20020707 + - (tim) [Makefile.in] use umask instead of chmod on $(PRIVSEP_PATH) + - (tim) [acconfig.h configure.ac sshd.c] + s/BROKEN_FD_PASSING/DISABLE_FD_PASSING/ + - (tim) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] sshd account creation fixes + patch from vinschen@redhat.com + - (bal) [realpath.c] Updated with OpenBSD tree. + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/04 04:15:33 + [key.c monitor_wrap.c sftp-glob.c ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c] + patch memory leaks; grendel@zeitbombe.org + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/04 08:12:15 + [channels.c packet.c] + blah blah minor nothing as i read and re-read and re-read... + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/04 10:41:47 + [key.c monitor_wrap.c ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c] + don't allocate, copy, and discard if there is not interested in the data; + ok deraadt@ + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/06 01:00:49 + [log.c] + KNF + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/06 01:01:26 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + KNF, realloc fix, and clean usage + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/06 17:47:58 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + unused variable + - (bal) Minor KNF on ssh-keyscan.c + +20020705 + - (tim) [configure.ac] AIX 4.2.1 has authenticate() in libs. + Reported by Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> + - (tim) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] double slash corrction + from vinschen@redhat.com + +20020704 + - (bal) Limit data to TTY for AIX only (Newer versions can't handle the + faster data rate) Bug #124 + - (bal) glob.c defines TILDE and AIX also defines it. #undef it first. + bug #265 + - (bal) One too many nulls in ports-aix.c + +20020703 + - (bal) Updated contrib/cygwin/ patch by vinschen@redhat.com + - (bal) minor correction to utimes() replacement. Patch by + onoe@sm.sony.co.jp + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/27 08:49:44 + [dh.c ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect.c] + more checks for NULL pointers; from grendel@zeitbombe.org; ok deraadt@ + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/27 09:08:00 + [monitor.c] + improve mm_zalloc check; markus ok + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/27 10:35:47 + [auth2-none.c monitor.c sftp-client.c] + use xfree() + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/27 19:49:08 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + use convtime(); ok markus@ + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/28 01:49:31 + [monitor_mm.c] + tree(3) wants an int return value for its compare functions and + the difference between two pointers is not an int. Just do the + safest thing and store the result in a long and then return 0, + -1, or 1 based on that result. + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/28 01:50:37 + [monitor_wrap.c] + use ssize_t + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/28 10:08:25 + [sshd.c] + range check -u option at invocation + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/28 23:05:06 + [sshd.c] + gidset[2] -> gidset[1]; markus ok + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/30 21:54:16 + [auth2.c session.c sshd.c] + lint asks that we use names that do not overlap + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/30 21:59:45 + [auth-bsdauth.c auth-skey.c auth2-chall.c clientloop.c key.c + monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h scard.h session.h sftp-glob.c ssh.c + sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + minor KNF + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/01 16:15:25 + [msg.c] + %u + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/01 19:48:46 + [sshconnect2.c] + for compression=yes, we fallback to no-compression if the server does + not support compression, vice versa for compression=no. ok mouring@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/03 09:55:38 + [ssh-keysign.c] + use RSA_blinding_on() for rsa hostkeys (suggested by Bill Sommerfeld) + in order to avoid a possible Kocher timing attack pointed out by Charles + Hannum; ok provos@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/03 14:21:05 + [ssh-keysign.8 ssh-keysign.c ssh.c ssh_config] + re-enable ssh-keysign's sbit, but make ssh-keysign read + /etc/ssh/ssh_config and exit if HostbasedAuthentication is disabled + globally. based on discussions with deraadt, itojun and sommerfeld; + ok itojun@ + - (bal) Failed password attempts don't increment counter on AIX. Bug #145 + - (bal) Missed Makefile.in change. keysign needs readconf.o + - (bal) Clean up aix_usrinfo(). Ignore TTY= period I guess. + +20020702 + - (djm) Use PAM_MSG_MEMBER for PAM_TEXT_INFO messages, use xmalloc & + friends consistently. Spotted by Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> + +20020629 + - (bal) fix to auth2-pam.c to swap fatal() arguments, A bit of style + clean up while I'm near it. + +20020628 + - (stevesk) [sshd_config] PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt no; commented + options should contain default value. from solar. + - (bal) Cygwin uid0 fix by vinschen@redhat.com + - (bal) s/config.h/includes.h/ in openbsd-compat/ for *.c. Otherwise wise + have issues of our fixes not propogating right (ie bcopy instead of + memmove). OK tim + - (bal) FreeBSD needs <sys/types.h> to detect if mmap() is supported. + Bug #303 + +20020627 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/26 14:49:36 + [monitor.c] + correct %u + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/26 14:50:04 + [monitor_fdpass.c] + use ssize_t for recvmsg() and sendmsg() return + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/26 14:51:33 + [ssh-add.c] + fix exit code for -X/-x + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/26 15:00:32 + [monitor_wrap.c] + more %u + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/26 22:27:32 + [ssh-keysign.c] + bug #304, xfree(data) called to early; openssh@sigint.cs.purdue.edu + 20020626 - (stevesk) [monitor.c] remove duplicate proto15 dispatch entry for PAM - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync @@ -68,6 +664,8 @@ - (djm) Update spec files for release - (djm) Fix int overflow in auth2-pam.c, similar to one discovered by ISS - (djm) Release 3.4p1 + - (tim) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec] remove 2 configure options I put in + by mistake 20020625 - (stevesk) [INSTALL acconfig.h configure.ac defines.h] remove --with-rsh @@ -159,1012 +757,4 @@ save auth method before monitor_reset_key_state(); bugzilla bug #284; ok provos@ -20020622 - - (djm) Update README.privsep; spotted by fries@ - - (djm) Release 3.3p1 - - (bal) getopt now can be staticly compiled on those platforms missing - optreset. Patch by binder@arago.de - -20020621 - - (djm) Sync: - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/21 05:50:51 - [monitor.c] - Don't initialise compression buffers when compression=no in sshd_config; - ok Niels@ - - ID sync for auth-passwd.c - - (djm) Warn and disable compression on platforms which can't handle both - useprivilegeseparation=yes and compression=yes - - (djm) contrib/redhat/openssh.spec hacking: - - Merge in spec changes from seba@iq.pl (Sebastian Pachuta) - - Add new {ssh,sshd}_config.5 manpages - - Add new ssh-keysign program and remove setuid from ssh client - -20020620 - - (bal) Fixed AIX environment handling, use setpcred() instead of existing - code. (Bugzilla Bug 261) - - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync - - todd@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/14 21:35:00 - [monitor_wrap.c] - spelling; from Brian Poole <raj@cerias.purdue.edu> - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/15 00:01:36 - [authfd.c authfd.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] - break agent key lifetime protocol and allow other contraints for key - usage. - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/15 00:07:38 - [authfd.c authfd.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] - fix stupid typo - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/15 01:27:48 - [authfd.c authfd.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] - remove the CONSTRAIN_IDENTITY messages and introduce a new - ADD_ID message with contraints instead. contraints can be - only added together with the private key. - - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/16 21:30:58 - [ssh-keyscan.c] - use TAILQ_xx macro. from lukem@netbsd. markus ok - - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/17 06:05:56 - [scp.c] - make usage like man page - - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/19 00:27:55 - [auth-bsdauth.c auth-skey.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-none.c authfd.c - authfd.h monitor_wrap.c msg.c nchan.c radix.c readconf.c scp.c sftp.1 - ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c - ssh-keysign.c ssh.1 sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect2.c ttymodes.c - xmalloc.h] - KNF done automatically while reading.... - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/19 18:01:00 - [cipher.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c packet.h] - make the monitor sync the transfer ssh1 session key; - transfer keycontext only for RC4 (this is still depends on EVP - implementation details and is broken). - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/20 19:56:07 - [ssh.1 sshd.8] - move configuration file options from ssh.1/sshd.8 to - ssh_config.5/sshd_config.5; ok deraadt@ millert@ - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/20 20:00:05 - [scp.1 sftp.1] - ssh_config(5) - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/20 20:03:34 - [ssh_config sshd_config] - refer to config file man page - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/20 23:05:56 - [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.c] - allow Compression=yes/no in sshd_config - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/20 23:37:12 - [sshd_config] - add Compression - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/25 20:40:08 - [LICENCE] - missed Per Allansson (auth2-chall.c) - - (bal) Cygwin special handling of empty passwords wrong. Patch by - vinschen@redhat.com - - (bal) Missed integrating ssh_config.5 and sshd_config.5 - - (bal) Still more Makefile.in updates for ssh{d}_config.5 - -20020613 - - (bal) typo of setgroup for cygwin. Patch by vinschen@redhat.com - -20020612 - - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/11 23:03:54 - [ssh.c] - remove unused cruft. - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/12 01:09:52 - [ssh.c] - ssh_connect returns 0 on success - - (bal) Build noop setgroups() for cygwin to clean up code (For other - platforms without the setgroups() requirement, you MUST define - SETGROUPS_NOOP in the configure.ac) Based on patch by vinschen@redhat.com - - (bal) Some platforms don't have ONLCR (Notable Mint) - -20020611 - - (bal) ssh-agent.c RCSD fix (|unexpand already done) - - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/09 22:15:15 - [ssh.1] - update for no setuid root and ssh-keysign; ok deraadt@ - - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/09 22:17:21 - [sshconnect.c] - pass salen to sockaddr_ntop so that we are happy on linux/solaris - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/10 16:53:06 - [auth-rsa.c ssh-rsa.c] - display minimum RSA modulus in error(); ok markus@ - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/10 16:56:30 - [ssh-keysign.8] - merge in stuff from my man page; ok markus@ - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/10 17:36:23 - [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c] - use convtime() to parse and validate key lifetime. can now - use '-t 2h' etc. ok markus@ provos@ - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/10 17:45:20 - [readconf.c ssh.1] - change RhostsRSAAuthentication and RhostsAuthentication default to no - since ssh is no longer setuid root by default; ok markus@ - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/10 21:21:10 - [ssh_config] - update defaults for RhostsRSAAuthentication and RhostsAuthentication - here too (all options commented out with default value). - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/10 22:28:41 - [channels.c channels.h session.c] - move creation of agent socket to session.c; no need for uidswapping - in channel.c. - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/11 04:14:26 - [ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h] - no longer use uidswap.[ch] from the ssh client - run less code with euid==0 if ssh is installed setuid root - just switch the euid, don't switch the complete set of groups - (this is only needed by sshd). ok provos@ - - mpech@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/11 05:46:20 - [auth-krb4.c monitor.h serverloop.c session.c ssh-agent.c sshd.c] - pid_t cleanup. Markus need this now to keep hacking. - markus@, millert@ ok - - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/11 08:11:45 - [canohost.c] - use "ntop" only after initialized - - (bal) Cygwin fix up from swap uid clean up in ssh.c patch by - vinschen@redhat.com - -20020609 - - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/08 05:07:56 - [ssh.c] - nuke ptrace comment - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/08 05:07:09 - [ssh-keysign.c] - only accept 20 byte session ids - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/08 05:17:01 - [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 ssh.c] - deprecate FallBackToRsh and UseRsh; patch from djm@ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/08 05:40:01 - [readconf.c] - just warn about Deprecated options for now - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/08 05:41:18 - [ssh_config] - remove FallBackToRsh/UseRsh - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/08 12:36:53 - [scp.c] - remove FallBackToRsh - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/08 12:46:14 - [readconf.c] - silently ignore deprecated options, since FallBackToRsh might be passed - by remote scp commands. - - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/08 21:15:27 - [sshconnect.c] - always use getnameinfo. (diag message only) - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/09 04:33:27 - [sshconnect.c] - abort() - > fatal() - - (bal) RCSID tag updates on channels.c, clientloop.c, nchan.c, - sftp-client.c, ssh-agenet.c, ssh-keygen.c and connect.h (we did unexpand - independant of them) - -20020607 - - (bal) Removed --{enable/disable}-suid-ssh - - (bal) Missed __progname in ssh-keysign.c patch by dtucker@zip.com.au - - (bal) use 'LOGIN_PROGRAM' not '/usr/bin/login' in session.c patch by - Bertrand.Velle@apogee-com.fr - -20020606 - - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/15 21:56:38 - [servconf.c sshd.8 sshd_config] - re-enable privsep and disable setuid for post-3.2.2 - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/16 22:02:50 - [cipher.c kex.h mac.c] - fix warnings (openssl 0.9.7 requires const) - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/16 22:09:59 - [session.c ssh.c] - don't limit xauth pathlen on client side and longer print length on - server when debug; ok markus@ - - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/19 20:54:52 - [log.h] - extra commas in enum not 100% portable - - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/22 23:18:25 - [ssh.c sshd.c] - spelling; abishoff@arc.nasa.gov - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/23 19:24:30 - [authfile.c authfile.h pathnames.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h - sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh-keysign.c Makefile.in] - add /usr/libexec/ssh-keysign: a setuid helper program for hostbased - authentication in protocol v2 (needs to access the hostkeys). - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/23 19:39:34 - [ssh.c] - add comment about ssh-keysign - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/24 08:45:14 - [sshconnect2.c] - stat ssh-keysign first, print error if stat fails; - some debug->error; fix comment - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/25 08:50:39 - [sshconnect2.c] - execlp->execl; from stevesk - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/25 18:51:07 - [auth.h auth2.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c - auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c Makefile.in] - split auth2.c into one file per method; ok provos@/deraadt@ - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/26 20:35:10 - [ssh.1] - sort ChallengeResponseAuthentication; ok markus@ - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/28 16:45:27 - [monitor_mm.c] - print strerror(errno) on mmap/munmap error; ok markus@ - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/28 17:28:02 - [uidswap.c] - format spec change/casts and some KNF; ok markus@ - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/28 21:24:00 - [uidswap.c] - use correct function name in fatal() - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/29 03:06:30 - [ssh.1 sshd.8] - spelling - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/29 11:21:57 - [sshd.c] - don't start if privsep is enabled and SSH_PRIVSEP_USER or - _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR are missing; ok deraadt@ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/30 08:07:31 - [cipher.c] - use rijndael/aes from libcrypto (openssl >= 0.9.7) instead of - our own implementation. allow use of AES hardware via libcrypto, - ok deraadt@ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/31 10:30:33 - [sshconnect2.c] - extent ssh-keysign protocol: - pass # of socket-fd to ssh-keysign, keysign verfies locally used - ip-address using this socket-fd, restricts fake local hostnames - to actual local hostnames; ok stevesk@ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/31 11:35:15 - [auth.h auth2.c] - move Authmethod definitons to per-method file. - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/31 13:16:48 - [key.c] - add comment: - key_verify returns 1 for a correct signature, 0 for an incorrect signature - and -1 on error. - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/31 13:20:50 - [ssh-rsa.c] - pad received signature with leading zeros, because RSA_verify expects - a signature of RSA_size. the drafts says the signature is transmitted - unpadded (e.g. putty does not pad), reported by anakin@pobox.com - - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/03 12:04:07 - [ssh.h] - compatiblity -> compatibility - decriptor -> descriptor - authentciated -> authenticated - transmition -> transmission - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/04 19:42:35 - [monitor.c] - only allow enabled authentication methods; ok provos@ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/04 19:53:40 - [monitor.c] - save the session id (hash) for ssh2 (it will be passed with the - initial sign request) and verify that this value is used during - authentication; ok provos@ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/04 23:02:06 - [packet.c] - remove __FUNCTION__ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/04 23:05:49 - [cipher.c monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c] - __FUNCTION__ -> __func__ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/05 16:08:07 - [ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c] - '-a bind_address' binds the agent to user-specified unix-domain - socket instead of /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX/agent.<pid>; ok djm@ (some time ago). - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/05 16:08:07 - [ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c] - '-a bind_address' binds the agent to user-specified unix-domain - socket instead of /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX/agent.<pid>; ok djm@ (some time ago). - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/05 16:48:54 - [ssh-agent.c] - copy current request into an extra buffer and just flush this - request on errors, ok provos@ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/05 19:57:12 - [authfd.c authfd.h ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] - ssh-add -x for lock and -X for unlocking the agent. - todo: encrypt private keys with locked... - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/05 20:56:39 - [ssh-add.c] - add -x/-X to usage - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/05 21:55:44 - [authfd.c authfd.h ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] - ssh-add -t life, Set lifetime (in seconds) when adding identities; - ok provos@ - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/06 01:09:41 - [monitor.h] - no trailing comma in enum; china@thewrittenword.com - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/06 17:12:44 - [sftp-server.c] - discard remaining bytes of current request; ok provos@ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/06 17:30:11 - [sftp-server.c] - use get_int() macro (hide iqueue) - - (bal) Missed msg.[ch] in merge. Required for ssh-keysign. - - (bal) Forgot to add msg.c Makefile.in. - - (bal) monitor_mm.c typos. - - (bal) Refixed auth2.c. It was never fully commited while spliting out - authentication to different files. - - (bal) ssh-keysign should build and install correctly now. Phase two - would be to clean out any dead wood and disable ssh setuid on install. - - (bal) Reverse logic, use __func__ first since it's C99 - -20020604 - - (stevesk) [channels.c] bug #164 patch from YOSHIFUJI Hideaki (changed - setsockopt from debug to error for now). - -20020527 - - (tim) [configure.ac.orig monitor_fdpass.c] Enahnce msghdr tests to address - build problem on Irix reported by Dave Love <d.love@dl.ac.uk>. Back out - last monitor_fdpass.c changes that are no longer needed with new tests. - Patch tested on Irix by Jan-Frode Myklebust <janfrode@parallab.uib.no> - -20020522 - - (djm) Fix spelling mistakes, spotted by Solar Designer i - <solar@openwall.com> - - Sync scard/ (not sure when it drifted) - - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync: - [auth.c] - Fix typo/thinko. Pass in as to auth_approval(), not NULL. - Closes PR 2659. - - Crank version - - Crank RPM spec versions - -20020521 - - (stevesk) [sshd.c] bug 245; disable setsid() for now - - (stevesk) [sshd.c] #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN for setgroups() - -20020517 - - (tim) [configure.ac] remove extra MD5_MSG="no" line. - -20020515 - - (bal) CVS ID fix up on auth-passwd.c - - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync - - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/07 19:54:36 - [ssh.h] - use ssh uid - - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/08 21:06:34 - [ssh.h] - move to sshd.sshd instead - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/11 20:24:48 - [ssh.h] - typo in comment - - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/13 02:37:39 - [auth-skey.c auth2.c] - less warnings. skey_{respond,query} are public (in auth.h) - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/13 20:44:58 - [auth-options.c auth.c auth.h] - move the packet_send_debug handling from auth-options.c to auth.c; - ok provos@ - - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/13 15:53:19 - [sshd.c] - Call setsid() in the child after sshd accepts the connection and forks. - This is needed for privsep which calls setlogin() when it changes uids. - Without this, there is a race where the login name of an existing - connection, as returned by getlogin(), may be changed to the privsep - user (sshd). markus@ OK - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/13 21:26:49 - [auth-rhosts.c] - handle debug messages during rhosts-rsa and hostbased authentication; - ok provos@ - - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/15 15:47:49 - [kex.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c sshd.c] - 'monitor' variable clashes with at least one lame platform (NeXT). i - Renamed to 'pmonitor'. provos@ - - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/04 02:39:35 - [servconf.c sshd.8 sshd_config] - enable privsep by default; provos ok - - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/06 23:34:33 - [ssh.1 sshd.8] - Kill/adjust r(login|exec)d? references now that those are no longer in - the tree. - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/15 21:02:53 - [servconf.c sshd.8 sshd_config] - disable privsep and enable setuid for the 3.2.2 release - - (bal) Fixed up PAM case. I think. - - (bal) Clarified openbsd-compat/*-cray.* Licence provided by Wendy - - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/15 21:05:29 - [version.h] - enter OpenSSH_3.2.2 - - (bal) Caldara, Suse, and Redhat openssh.specs updated. - -20020514 - - (stevesk) [README.privsep] PAM+privsep works with Solaris 8. - - (tim) [sshpty.c] set tty modes when allocating old style bsd ptys to - match what newer style ptys have when allocated. Based on a patch by - Roger Cornelius <rac@tenzing.org> - - (tim) [README.privsep] UnixWare 7 and OpenUNIX 8 work. - - (tim) [README.privsep] remove reference to UnixWare 7 and OpenUNIX 8 - from PAM-enabled pragraph. UnixWare has no PAM. - - (tim) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec] update version. - -20020513 - - (stevesk) add initial README.privsep - - (stevesk) [configure.ac] nicer message: --with-privsep-user=user - - (djm) Add --with-superuser-path=xxx configure option to specify - what $PATH the superuser receives. - - (djm) Bug #231: UsePrivilegeSeparation turns off Banner. - - (djm) Add --with-privsep-path configure option - - (djm) Update RPM spec file: different superuser path, use - /var/empty/sshd for privsep - - (djm) Bug #234: missing readpassphrase declaration and defines - - (djm) Add INSTALL warning about SSH protocol 1 blowfish w/ - OpenSSL < 0.9.6 - -20020511 - - (tim) [configure.ac] applied a rework of djm's OpenSSL search cleanup patch. - Now only searches system and /usr/local/ssl (OpenSSL's default install path) - Others must use --with-ssl-dir=.... - - (tim) [monitor_fdpass.c] fix for systems that have both - HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR and HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR. Ie. sys/socket.h - has #define msg_accrights msg_control - -20020510 - - (stevesk) [auth.c] Shadow account and expiration cleanup. Now - check for root forced expire. Still don't check for inactive. - - (djm) Rework RedHat RPM files. Based on spec from Nalin - Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> and patches from - Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi> - - (djm) Try to drop supplemental groups at daemon startup. Patch from - RedHat - - (bal) Back all the way out of auth-passwd.c changes. Breaks too many - things that don't set pw->pw_passwd. - -20020509 - - (tim) [Makefile.in] Unbreak make -f Makefile.in distprep - -20020508 - - (tim) [openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c] fix logic on when seed_rng() is - called. Report by Chris Maxwell <maxwell@cs.dal.ca> - - (tim) [Makefile.in configure.ac] set SHELL variable in Makefile - - (djm) Disable PAM kbd-int auth if privsep is turned on (it doesn't work) - -20020507 - - (tim) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h] - Add truncate() emulation to address Bug 208 - -20020506 - - (djm) Unbreak auth-passwd.c for PAM and SIA - - (djm) Unbreak PAM auth for protocol 1. Report from Pekka Savola - <pekkas@netcore.fi> - - (djm) Don't reinitialise PAM credentials before we have started PAM. - Report from Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi> - -20020506 - - (bal) Fixed auth-passwd.c to resolve PermitEmptyPassword issue - -20020501 - - (djm) Import OpenBSD regression tests. Requires BSD make to run - - (djm) Fix readpassphase compilation for systems which have it - -20020429 - - (tim) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec] update fixUP to reflect changes in - sshd_config. - - (tim) [contrib/cygwin/README] remove reference to regex. - patch from Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com> - -20020426 - - (djm) Bug #137, #209: fix make problems for scard/Ssh.bin, do uudecode - during distprep only - - (djm) Disable PAM password expiry until a complete fix for bug #188 - exists - - (djm) Bug #180: Set ToS bits on IPv4-in-IPv6 mapped addresses. Based on - patch from openssh@misc.tecq.org - -20020425 - - (stevesk) [defines.h] remove USE_TIMEVAL; unused - - (stevesk) [acconfig.h auth-passwd.c configure.ac sshd.c] HP-UX 10.26 - support. bug #184. most from dcole@keysoftsys.com. - -20020424 - - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/23 12:54:10 - [version.h] - 3.2.1 - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/23 22:16:29 - [sshd.c] - Improve error message; ok markus@ stevesk@ - -20020423 - - (stevesk) [acconfig.h configure.ac session.c] LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT for HP-UX - - (stevesk) [acconfig.h] NEED_IN_SYSTM_H unused - - (markus) OpenBSD CVS Sync - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/23 12:58:26 - [radix.c] - send complete ticket; semerad@ss1000.ms.mff.cuni.cz - - (djm) Trim ChangeLog to include only post-3.1 changes - - (djm) Update RPM spec file versions - - (djm) Redhat spec enables KrbV by default - - (djm) Applied OpenSC smartcard updates from Markus & - Antti Tapaninen <aet@cc.hut.fi> - - (djm) Define BROKEN_REALPATH for AIX, patch from - Antti Tapaninen <aet@cc.hut.fi> - - (djm) Bug #214: Fix utmp for Irix (don't strip "tty"). Patch from - Kevin Taylor <no@nowhere.org> (??) via Philipp Grau - <phgrau@zedat.fu-berlin.de> - - (djm) Bug #213: Simplify CMSG_ALIGN macros to avoid symbol clashes. - Reported by Doug Manton <dmanton@emea.att.com> - - (djm) Bug #222: Fix tests for getaddrinfo on OSF/1. Spotted by - Robert Urban <urban@spielwiese.de> - - (djm) Bug #206 - blibpath isn't always needed for AIX ld, avoid - sizeof(long long int) == 4 breakage. Patch from Matthew Clarke - <Matthew_Clarke@mindlink.bc.ca> - - (djm) Make privsep work with PAM (still experimental) - - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/20 09:02:03 - [servconf.c] - No, afs requires explicit enabling - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/20 09:14:58 - [bufaux.c bufaux.h] - add buffer_{get,put}_short - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/20 09:17:19 - [radix.c] - rewrite using the buffer_* API, fixes overflow; ok deraadt@ - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/21 16:19:27 - [sshd.8 sshd_config] - document default AFSTokenPassing no; ok deraadt@ - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/21 16:25:06 - [sshconnect1.c] - spelling in error message; ok markus@ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/22 06:15:47 - [radix.c] - fix check for overflow - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/22 16:16:53 - [servconf.c sshd.8 sshd_config] - do not auto-enable KerberosAuthentication; ok djm@, provos@, deraadt@ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/22 21:04:52 - [channels.c clientloop.c clientloop.h ssh.c] - request reply (success/failure) for -R style fwd in protocol v2, - depends on ordered replies. - fixes http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215; ok provos@ - -20020421 - - (tim) [entropy.c.] Portability fix for SCO Unix 3.2v4.x (SCO OSR 3.0). - entropy.c needs seteuid(getuid()) for the setuid(original_uid) to - succeed. Patch by gert@greenie.muc.de. This fixes one part of Bug 208 - -20020418 - - (djm) Avoid SIGCHLD breakage when run from rsync. Fix from - Sturle Sunde <sturle.sunde@usit.uio.no> - -20020417 - - (djm) Tell users to configure /dev/random support into OpenSSL in - INSTALL - - (djm) Fix .Nm in mdoc2man.pl from pspencer@fields.utoronto.ca - - (tim) [configure.ac] Issue warning on --with-default-path=/some_path - if LOGIN_CAP is enabled. Report & testing by Tuc <tuc@ttsg.com> - -20020415 - - (djm) Unbreak "make install". Fix from Darren Tucker - <dtucker@zip.com.au> - - (stevesk) bsd-cygwin_util.[ch] BSD license from Corinna Vinschen - - (tim) [configure.ac] add tests for recvmsg and sendmsg. - [monitor_fdpass.c] add checks for HAVE_SENDMSG and HAVE_RECVMSG for - systems that HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR but no recvmsg or sendmsg. - -20020414 - - (djm) ssh-rand-helper improvements - - Add commandline debugging options - - Don't write binary data if stdout is a tty (use hex instead) - - Give it a manpage - - (djm) Random number collection doc fixes from Ben - -20020413 - - (djm) Add KrbV support patch from Simon Wilkinson <simon@sxw.org.uk> - -20020412 - - (stevesk) [auth-sia.[ch]] add BSD license from Chris Adams - - (tim) [configure.ac] add <sys/types.h> to msghdr tests. Change -L - to -h on testing for /bin being symbolic link - - (bal) Mistaken in Cygwin scripts for ssh starting. Patch by - Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com> - - (bal) disable privsep if no MAP_ANON. We can re-enable it - after the release when we can do more testing. - -20020411 - - (stevesk) [auth-sia.c] cleanup - - (tim) [acconfig.h defines.h includes.h] put includes in includes.h and - defines in defines.h [rijndael.c openbsd-compat/fake-socket.h - openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c] include "includes.h" instead of "config.h" - ok stevesk@ - -20020410 - - (stevesk) [configure.ac monitor.c] HAVE_SOCKETPAIR - - (stevesk) [auth-sia.c] compile fix Chris Adams <cmadams@hiwaay.net> - - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/10 08:21:47 - [auth1.c compat.c compat.h] - strip '@' from username only for KerbV and known broken clients, - bug #204 - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/10 08:56:01 - [version.h] - OpenSSH_3.2 - - Added p1 to idenify Portable release version. - -20020408 - - (bal) Minor OpenSC updates. Fix up header locations and update - README.smartcard provided by Juha Yrjölä <jyrjola@cc.hut.fi> - -20020407 - - (stevesk) HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR; not used right now. - Future: we may want to test if fd passing works correctly. - - (stevesk) [monitor_fdpass.c] fatal() for UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes - and no fd passing support. - - (stevesk) HAVE_MMAP and HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H and use them in - monitor_mm.c - - (stevesk) remove configure support for poll.h; it was removed - from sshd.c a long time ago. - - (stevesk) --with-privsep-user; default sshd - - (stevesk) wrap munmap() with HAVE_MMAP also. - -20020406 - - (djm) Typo in Suse SPEC file. Fix from Carsten Grohmann - <carsten.grohmann@dr-baldeweg.de> - - (bal) Added MAP_FAILED to allow AIX and Trusted HP to compile. - - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/06 00:30:08 - [sftp-client.c] - Fix occasional corruption on upload due to bad reuse of request - id, spotted by chombier@mac.com; ok markus@ - - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/06 18:24:09 - [scp.c] - Fixes potental double // within path. - http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=76 - - (bal) Slight update to OpenSC support. Better version checking. patch - by Juha Yrjölä <jyrjola@cc.hut.fi> - - (bal) Revered out of runtime IRIX detection of joblimits. Code is - incomplete. - - (bal) Quiet down configure.ac if /bin/test does not exist. - - (bal) We no longer use atexit()/xatexit()/on_exit() - -20020405 - - (bal) Patch for OpenSC SmartCard library; ok markus@; patch by - Juha Yrjölä <jyrjola@cc.hut.fi> - - (bal) Minor documentation update to reflect smartcard library - support changes. - - (bal) Too many <sys/queue.h> issues. Remove all workarounds and - using internal version only. - - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/05 20:56:21 - [sshd.8] - clarify sshrc some and handle X11UseLocalhost=yes; ok markus@ - -20020404 - - (stevesk) [auth-pam.c auth-pam.h auth-passwd.c auth-sia.c auth-sia.h - auth1.c auth2.c] PAM, OSF_SIA password auth cleanup; from djm. - - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/03 09:26:11 - [cipher.c myproposal.h] - re-add rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se for MacSSH; ash@lab.poc.net - -20020402 - - (bal) Hand Sync of scp.c (reverted to upstream code) - - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/30 17:45:46 - [scp.c] - stretch banners - - (bal) CVS ID sync of uidswap.c - - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync (now for the real sync) - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/27 22:21:45 - [ssh-keygen.c] - try to import keys with extra trailing === (seen with ssh.com < - 2.0.12) - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/28 15:34:51 - [session.c] - do not call record_login twice (for use_privsep) - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/29 18:59:32 - [session.c session.h] - retrieve last login time before the pty is allocated, store per - session - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/29 19:16:22 - [sshd.8] - RSA key modulus size minimum 768; ok markus@ - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/29 19:18:33 - [auth-rsa.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.h] - make RSA modulus minimum #define; ok markus@ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/30 18:51:15 - [monitor.c serverloop.c sftp-int.c sftp.c sshd.c] - check waitpid for EINTR; based on patch from peter@ifm.liu.se - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/01 22:02:16 - [sftp-client.c] - 20480 is an upper limit for older server - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/01 22:07:17 - [sftp-client.c] - fallback to stat if server does not support lstat - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/02 11:49:39 - [ssh-agent.c] - check $SHELL for -k and -d, too; - http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199 - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/02 17:37:48 - [sftp.c] - always call log_init() - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/04/02 20:11:38 - [ssh-rsa.c] - ignore SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB for ssh-rsa; #187 - - (bal) mispelling in uidswap.c (portable only) - -20020401 - - (stevesk) [monitor.c] PAM should work again; will *not* work with - UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes. - - (stevesk) [auth1.c] fix password auth for protocol 1 when - !USE_PAM && !HAVE_OSF_SIA; merge issue. - -20020331 - - (tim) [configure.ac] use /bin/test -L to work around broken builtin on - Solaris 8 - - (tim) [sshconnect2.c] change uint32_t to u_int32_t - -20020330 - - (stevesk) [configure.ac] remove header check for sys/ttcompat.h - bug 167 - -20020327 - - (bal) 'pw' should be 'authctxt->pw' in auth1.c spotted by - kent@lysator.liu.se - - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/26 11:34:49 - [ssh.1 sshd.8] - update to recent drafts - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/26 11:37:05 - [ssh.c] - update Copyright - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/26 15:23:40 - [bufaux.c] - do not talk about packets in bufaux - - rees@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/26 18:46:59 - [scard.c] - try_AUT0 in read_pubkey too, for those paranoid few who want to - acl 'sh' - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/26 22:50:39 - [channels.h] - CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE is false for CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD, too - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/26 23:13:03 - [auth-rsa.c] - disallow RSA keys < 768 for protocol 1, too (rhosts-rsa and rsa auth) - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/26 23:14:51 - [kex.c] - generate a new cookie for each SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT message we send out - - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/27 11:45:42 - [monitor.c] - monitor_allowed_key() returns int instead of pointer. ok markus@ - -20020325 - - (stevesk) import OpenBSD <sys/tree.h> as "openbsd-compat/tree.h" - - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/23 20:57:26 - [sshd.c] - setproctitle() after preauth child; ok markus@ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/24 16:00:27 - [serverloop.c] - remove unused debug - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/24 16:01:13 - [packet.c] - debug->debug3 for extra padding - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/24 17:27:03 - [kexgex.c] - typo; ok markus@ - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/24 17:53:16 - [monitor_fdpass.c] - minor cleanup and more error checking; ok markus@ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/24 18:05:29 - [scard.c] - we need to figure out AUT0 for sc_private_encrypt, too - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/24 23:20:00 - [monitor.c] - remove "\n" from fatal() - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/25 09:21:13 - [auth-rsa.c] - return 0 (not NULL); tomh@po.crl.go.jp - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/25 09:25:06 - [auth-rh-rsa.c] - rm bogus comment - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/25 17:34:27 - [scard.c scard.h ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] - change sc_get_key to sc_get_keys and hide smartcard details in scard.c - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/25 20:12:10 - [monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c] - ssize_t args use "%ld" and cast to (long) - size_t args use "%lu" and cast to (u_long) - ok markus@ and thanks millert@ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/25 21:04:02 - [ssh.c] - simplify num_identity_files handling - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/25 21:13:51 - [channels.c channels.h compat.c compat.h nchan.c] - don't send stderr data after EOF, accept this from older known - (broken) sshd servers only, fixes - http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=179 - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/26 03:24:01 - [monitor.h monitor_fdpass.h monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.h] - $OpenBSD$ - -20020324 - - (stevesk) [session.c] disable LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM until we are sure - it can be removed. only used on solaris. will no longer compile with - privsep shuffling. - -20020322 - - (stevesk) HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR configure support - - (stevesk) [monitor.c monitor_wrap.c] #ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD - - (stevesk) configure and cpp __FUNCTION__ gymnastics to handle nielsisms - - (stevesk) [monitor_fdpass.c] support for access rights style file - descriptor passing - - (stevesk) [auth2.c] merge cleanup/sync - - (stevesk) [defines.h] hp-ux 11 has ancillary data style fd passing, but - is missing CMSG_LEN() and CMSG_SPACE() macros. - - (stevesk) [defines.h] #define MAP_ANON MAP_ANONYMOUS for HP-UX; other - platforms may need this--I'm not sure. mmap() issues will need to be - addressed further. - - (tim) [cipher.c] fix problem with OpenBSD sync - - (stevesk) [LICENCE] OpenBSD sync - -20020321 - - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync - - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/08 06:10:16 - [sftp-client.c] - printf type mismatch - - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/11 03:18:49 - [sftp-client.c] - correct type mismatches (u_int64_t != unsigned long long) - - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/11 03:19:53 - [sftp-client.c] - indent - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/14 15:24:27 - [sshconnect1.c] - don't trust size sent by (rogue) server; noted by - s.esser@e-matters.de - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/14 16:38:26 - [sshd.c] - split out ssh1 session key decryption; ok provos@ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/14 16:56:33 - [auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c auth.h] - split auth_rsa() for better readability and privsep; ok provos@ - - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/15 11:00:38 - [auth.c] - fix file type checking (use S_ISREG). ok by markus - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/16 11:24:53 - [compress.c] - skip inflateEnd if inflate fails; ok provos@ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/16 17:22:09 - [auth-rh-rsa.c auth.h] - split auth_rhosts_rsa(), ok provos@ - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/16 17:41:25 - [auth-krb5.c] - BSD license. from Daniel Kouril via Dug Song. ok markus@ - - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/17 20:25:56 - [auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c] - getpwnamallow returns struct passwd * only if user valid; - okay markus@ - - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/18 01:12:14 - [auth.h auth1.c auth2.c sshd.c] - have the authentication functions return the authentication context - and then do_authenticated; okay millert@ - - dugsong@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/18 01:30:10 - [auth-krb4.c] - set client to NULL after xfree(), from Rolf Braun - <rbraun+ssh@andrew.cmu.edu> - - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/18 03:41:08 - [auth.c session.c] - move auth_approval into getpwnamallow with help from millert@ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/18 17:13:15 - [cipher.c cipher.h] - export/import cipher states; needed by ssh-privsep - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/18 17:16:38 - [packet.c packet.h] - export/import cipher state, iv and ssh2 seqnr; needed by ssh-privsep - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/18 17:23:31 - [key.c key.h] - add key_demote() for ssh-privsep - - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/18 17:25:29 - [bufaux.c bufaux.h] - buffer_skip_string and extra sanity checking; needed by ssh-privsep - - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/18 17:31:54 - [compress.c] - export compression streams for ssh-privsep - - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/18 17:50:31 - [auth-bsdauth.c auth-options.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c] - [auth-skey.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2.c kex.c kex.h kexdh.c] - [kexgex.c servconf.c] - [session.h servconf.h serverloop.c session.c sshd.c] - integrate privilege separated openssh; its turned off by default - for now. work done by me and markus@ - - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/18 17:53:08 - [sshd.8] - credits for privsep - - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/18 17:59:09 - [sshd.8] - document UsePrivilegeSeparation - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/18 23:52:51 - [servconf.c] - UnprivUser/UnprivGroup usable now--specify numeric user/group; ok - provos@ - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/19 03:03:43 - [pathnames.h servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c] - _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR; ok provos@ - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/19 05:23:08 - [sshd.8] - Banner has no default. - - mpech@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/19 06:32:56 - [sftp-int.c] - use xfree() after xstrdup(). - - markus@ ok - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/19 10:35:39 - [auth-options.c auth.h session.c session.h sshd.c] - clean up prototypes - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/19 10:49:35 - [auth-krb5.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth.c cipher.c key.c misc.h] - [packet.c session.c sftp-client.c sftp-glob.h sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh.c] - [sshconnect2.c sshd.c ttymodes.c] - KNF whitespace - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/19 14:27:39 - [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c] - make getpwnamallow() allways call pwcopy() - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/19 15:31:47 - [auth.c] - check for NULL; from provos@ - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/20 19:12:25 - [servconf.c servconf.h ssh.h sshd.c] - for unprivileged user, group do: - pw=getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER); do_setusercontext(pw). ok provos@ - - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/20 21:08:08 - [sshd.c] - strerror() on chdir() fail; ok provos@ - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/21 10:21:20 - [ssh-add.c] - ignore errors for nonexisting default keys in ssh-add, - fixes http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=158 - - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/21 15:17:26 - [clientloop.c ssh.1] - add built-in command line for adding new port forwardings on the fly. - based on a patch from brian wellington. ok markus@. - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/21 16:38:06 - [scard.c] - make compile w/ openssl 0.9.7 - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/21 16:54:53 - [scard.c scard.h ssh-keygen.c] - move key upload to scard.[ch] - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/21 16:57:15 - [scard.c] - remove const - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/21 16:58:13 - [clientloop.c] - remove unused - - rees@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/21 18:08:15 - [scard.c] - In sc_put_key(), sc_reader_id should be id. - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/21 20:51:12 - [sshd_config] - add privsep (off) - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/21 21:23:34 - [sshd.c] - add privsep_preauth() and remove 1 goto; ok provos@ - - rees@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/21 21:54:34 - [scard.c scard.h ssh-keygen.c] - Add PIN-protection for secret key. - - rees@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/21 22:44:05 - [authfd.c authfd.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh.c] - Add PIN-protection for secret key. - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/21 23:07:37 - [clientloop.c] - remove unused, sync w/ cmdline patch in my tree. - -20020317 - - (tim) [configure.ac] Assume path given with --with-pid-dir=PATH is - wanted, warn if directory does not exist. Put system directories in - front of PATH for finding entorpy commands. - - (tim) [contrib/aix/buildbff.sh contrib/aix/inventory.sh] AIX package - build fixes. Patch by Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> - [contrib/solaris/buildpkg.sh] add missing dirs to SYSTEM_DIR. Have - postinstall check for $piddir and add if necessary. - -20020311 - - (tim) [contrib/solaris/buildpkg.sh, contrib/solaris/README] Updated to - build on all platforms that support SVR4 style package tools. Now runs - from build dir. Parts are based on patches from Antonio Navarro, and - Darren Tucker. - -20020308 - - (djm) Revert bits of Markus' OpenSSL compat patch which was - accidentally committed. - - (djm) Add Markus' patch for compat wih OpenSSL < 0.9.6. - Known issue: Blowfish for SSH1 does not work - - (stevesk) entropy.c: typo in debug message - - (djm) ssh-keygen -i needs seeded RNG; report from markus@ - -$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.2301 2002/06/26 13:59:10 djm Exp $ +$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.2491.2.1 2002/10/03 05:45:53 djm Exp $ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/INSTALL b/crypto/openssh/INSTALL index 07da06b..f5ab0db 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/INSTALL +++ b/crypto/openssh/INSTALL @@ -10,11 +10,7 @@ OpenSSL 0.9.6 or greater: http://www.openssl.org/ (OpenSSL 0.9.5a is partially supported, but some ciphers (SSH protocol 1 -Blowfish included) do not work correctly.) - -RPMs of OpenSSL are available at http://violet.ibs.com.au/openssh/files/support. -For Red Hat Linux 6.2, they have been released as errata. RHL7 includes -these. +Blowfish) do not work correctly.) OpenSSH can utilise Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) if your system supports it. PAM is standard on Redhat and Debian Linux, Solaris and @@ -221,4 +217,4 @@ Please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at http://www.openssh.com/ -$Id: INSTALL,v 1.54 2002/06/24 16:26:49 stevesk Exp $ +$Id: INSTALL,v 1.55 2002/07/25 04:36:25 djm Exp $ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in b/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in index e7faa15..89d02c9 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in +++ b/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.217 2002/06/25 23:45:42 tim Exp $ +# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.222 2002/07/14 17:02:21 tim Exp $ # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh #SHELL = @SH@ @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o - $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) @@ -198,12 +198,11 @@ distprep: catman-do $(AUTORECONF) (cd scard && $(MAKE) -f Makefile.in distprep) -install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files host-key check-user +install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files host-key check-config install-nokeys: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files -check-user: - id $(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER) || \ - echo "WARNING: Privilege separation user \"$(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)\" does not exist" +check-config: + -$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd -t -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config scard-install: (cd scard && $(MAKE) DESTDIR=$(DESTDIR) install) @@ -217,8 +216,7 @@ install-files: scard-install $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5 $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8 $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir) - $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH) - chmod 0700 $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH) + (umask 022 ; $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH)) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s ssh $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s scp $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s ssh-add $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add @@ -248,23 +246,23 @@ install-files: scard-install @NO_SFTP@$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin - ln -s ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin + ln -s ./ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1 - ln -s ssh.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1 + ln -s ./ssh.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1 if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) ]; then \ $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir); \ fi - if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \ + @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config; \ else \ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ fi - if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config ]; then \ + @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config ]; then \ $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config; \ else \ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ fi - if [ -f ssh_prng_cmds -a ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS)" ]; then \ + @if [ -f ssh_prng_cmds -a ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS)" ]; then \ $(PERL) $(srcdir)/fixprogs ssh_prng_cmds $(ENT); \ if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_prng_cmds ] ; then \ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_prng_cmds.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_prng_cmds; \ @@ -272,7 +270,7 @@ install-files: scard-install echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_prng_cmds already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ fi ; \ fi - if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli ]; then \ + @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli ]; then \ if [ -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes ]; then \ echo "moving $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes to $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \ mv "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes" "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \ @@ -284,7 +282,7 @@ install-files: scard-install fi host-key: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) - if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \ + @if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \ if [ -f "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key" ] ; then \ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key already exists, skipping." ; \ else \ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/TODO b/crypto/openssh/TODO index 4331a13..f667d59 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/TODO +++ b/crypto/openssh/TODO @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Programming: - Handle changing passwords for the non-PAM expired password case - Improve PAM support (a pam_lastlog module will cause sshd to exit) - and maybe support alternate forms of authenications like OPIE via + and maybe support alternate forms of authentications like OPIE via pam? - Rework PAM ChallengeResponseAuthentication @@ -42,8 +42,38 @@ Programming: solutions break scp or leaves processes hanging around after the ssh connection has ended. It seems to be linked to two things. One select() under Linux is not as nice as others, and two the children - of the shell are not killed on exiting the shell. Redhat have an excellent - description of this in their RPM package. + of the shell are not killed on exiting the shell. + A short run-down of what happens: + - The shell starts up, and starts its own session. As a side-effect, it + gets its own process group. + - The child forks off sleep, and because it's in the background, puts it + into its own process group. The sleep command inherits a copy of the + shell's descriptor for the tty as its stdout. + - The shell exits, but doesn't SIGHUP all of its child PIDs like it probably + should(?) + - The sshd server attempts to read from the master side of the pty, and + while there are still process with the pty open, no EOF is produced. + - The sleep command exits, closes its descriptor, sshd detects the EOF, and + the connection gets closed. + Ways we've tried fixing this in sshd, and why they didn't work out: + - SIGHUP the sshd's process group. + - The shell is in its own process group. + - Track process group IDs of all children before we reap them (via an extra + field in Session structures which holds the pgid for each child pid), and + SIGHUP the pgid when we reap. + - Background commands are in yet another process group. + - Close the connection when the child dies. + - Background commands may need to write data to the connection. Also + prematurely truncates output from some commands (scp server, the + famous "dd if=/dev/zero bs=1000 count=100" case). + Known workarounds: + - bash: shopt huponexit on + - tcsh: none + - zsh: setopt HUP (usually the default setting) + (taken from email from Jason Stone to openssh-unix-dev, 5 May 2001) + - pdksh: ? + This appears to affect NetKit rsh under Linux as well: it behaves the same + with 'sleep 20 & exit'. - Build an automated test suite @@ -103,4 +133,4 @@ PrivSep Issues: - Cygwin + Privsep for Pre-auth only (no fd passing) -$Id: TODO,v 1.50 2002/06/25 17:12:27 mouring Exp $ +$Id: TODO,v 1.51 2002/09/05 06:32:03 djm Exp $ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/acconfig.h b/crypto/openssh/acconfig.h index 3e51d61..3e058f3 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/acconfig.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/acconfig.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $Id: acconfig.h,v 1.141 2002/06/25 22:35:16 tim Exp $ */ +/* $Id: acconfig.h,v 1.145 2002/09/26 00:38:48 tim Exp $ */ #ifndef _CONFIG_H #define _CONFIG_H @@ -150,6 +150,9 @@ /* Define if you don't want to use lastlog */ #undef DISABLE_LASTLOG +/* Define if you don't want to use lastlog in session.c */ +#undef NO_SSH_LASTLOG + /* Define if you don't want to use utmp */ #undef DISABLE_UTMP @@ -310,6 +313,9 @@ /* Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system */ #undef NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS +/* Define if the concept of ports only accessible to superusers isn't known */ +#undef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT + /* Needed for SCO and NeXT */ #undef BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS @@ -355,11 +361,8 @@ /* Path that unprivileged child will chroot() to in privep mode */ #undef PRIVSEP_PATH -/* Define if you have the `mmap' function that supports MAP_ANON|SHARED */ -#undef HAVE_MMAP_ANON_SHARED - -/* Define if sendmsg()/recvmsg() has problems passing file descriptors */ -#undef BROKEN_FD_PASSING +/* Define if your platform needs to skip post auth file descriptor passing */ +#undef DISABLE_FD_PASSING @BOTTOM@ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c index 4f1b452..2ac27a7 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.4 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.5 2002/06/30 21:59:45 deraadt Exp $"); #ifdef BSD_AUTH #include "xmalloc.h" @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, *name = xstrdup(""); *infotxt = xstrdup(""); *numprompts = 1; - *prompts = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(char*)); + *prompts = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(char *)); *echo_on = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(u_int)); (*echo_on)[0] = 0; (*prompts)[0] = xstrdup(challenge); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-krb4.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-krb4.c index 1cc528a..b86ce7e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth-krb4.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-krb4.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb4.c,v 1.27 2002/06/11 05:46:20 mpech Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb4.c,v 1.28 2002/09/26 11:38:43 markus Exp $"); #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" @@ -210,10 +210,9 @@ krb4_cleanup_proc(void *context) } int -auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, KTEXT auth, char **client) +auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, KTEXT auth, char **client, KTEXT reply) { AUTH_DAT adat = {0}; - KTEXT_ST reply; Key_schedule schedule; struct sockaddr_in local, foreign; char instance[INST_SZ]; @@ -263,21 +262,16 @@ auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, KTEXT auth, char **client) /* If we can't successfully encrypt the checksum, we send back an empty message, admitting our failure. */ - if ((r = krb_mk_priv((u_char *) & cksum, reply.dat, sizeof(cksum) + 1, + if ((r = krb_mk_priv((u_char *) & cksum, reply->dat, sizeof(cksum) + 1, schedule, &adat.session, &local, &foreign)) < 0) { debug("Kerberos v4 mk_priv: (%d) %s", r, krb_err_txt[r]); - reply.dat[0] = 0; - reply.length = 0; + reply->dat[0] = 0; + reply->length = 0; } else - reply.length = r; + reply->length = r; /* Clear session key. */ memset(&adat.session, 0, sizeof(&adat.session)); - - packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE); - packet_put_string((char *) reply.dat, reply.length); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); return (1); } #endif /* KRB4 */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c index e982020..5278b56 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.8 2002/03/19 10:49:35 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.9 2002/09/09 06:48:06 itojun Exp $"); #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" @@ -73,18 +73,17 @@ krb5_init(void *context) * from the ticket */ int -auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client) +auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *reply) { krb5_error_code problem; krb5_principal server; - krb5_data reply; krb5_ticket *ticket; int fd, ret; ret = 0; server = NULL; ticket = NULL; - reply.length = 0; + reply->length = 0; problem = krb5_init(authctxt); if (problem) @@ -131,7 +130,7 @@ auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client) /* if client wants mutual auth */ problem = krb5_mk_rep(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx, - &reply); + reply); if (problem) goto err; @@ -144,19 +143,16 @@ auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client) krb5_unparse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, client); - packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE); - packet_put_string((char *) reply.data, reply.length); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - ret = 1; err: if (server) krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, server); if (ticket) krb5_free_ticket(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ticket); - if (reply.length) - xfree(reply.data); + if (!ret && reply->length) { + xfree(reply->data); + memset(reply, 0, sizeof(*reply)); + } if (problem) { if (authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c index 2787d29..8595fdc 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c @@ -10,9 +10,8 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.24 2002/05/13 20:44:58 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.26 2002/07/30 17:03:55 markus Exp $"); -#include "packet.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "match.h" #include "log.h" @@ -20,7 +19,6 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.24 2002/05/13 20:44:58 markus Exp $"); #include "channels.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "servconf.h" -#include "bufaux.h" #include "misc.h" #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "auth.h" @@ -135,7 +133,8 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum) goto next_option; } cp = "environment=\""; - if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { + if (options.permit_user_env && + strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { char *s; struct envstring *new_envstring; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-options.h b/crypto/openssh/auth-options.h index aa6270fd..15fb212 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth-options.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-options.h @@ -1,10 +1,9 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.11 2002/03/04 17:27:39 stevesk Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.12 2002/07/21 18:34:43 stevesk Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved - * Functions to interface with the SSH_AUTHENTICATION_FD socket. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c index 490990d..99b03f4 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c @@ -25,10 +25,10 @@ #include "includes.h" #ifdef USE_PAM -#include "ssh.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #include "auth.h" +#include "auth-options.h" #include "auth-pam.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "canohost.h" @@ -36,17 +36,21 @@ extern char *__progname; -RCSID("$Id: auth-pam.c,v 1.46 2002/05/08 02:27:56 djm Exp $"); +extern int use_privsep; + +RCSID("$Id: auth-pam.c,v 1.54 2002/07/28 20:24:08 stevesk Exp $"); #define NEW_AUTHTOK_MSG \ - "Warning: Your password has expired, please change it now" + "Warning: Your password has expired, please change it now." +#define NEW_AUTHTOK_MSG_PRIVSEP \ + "Your password has expired, the session cannot proceed." static int do_pam_conversation(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata_ptr); /* module-local variables */ static struct pam_conv conv = { - do_pam_conversation, + (int (*)())do_pam_conversation, NULL }; static char *__pam_msg = NULL; @@ -55,7 +59,7 @@ static const char *__pampasswd = NULL; /* states for do_pam_conversation() */ enum { INITIAL_LOGIN, OTHER } pamstate = INITIAL_LOGIN; -/* remember whether pam_acct_mgmt() returned PAM_NEWAUTHTOK_REQD */ +/* remember whether pam_acct_mgmt() returned PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD */ static int password_change_required = 0; /* remember whether the last pam_authenticate() succeeded or not */ static int was_authenticated = 0; @@ -100,9 +104,7 @@ static int do_pam_conversation(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg, char buf[1024]; /* PAM will free this later */ - reply = malloc(num_msg * sizeof(*reply)); - if (reply == NULL) - return PAM_CONV_ERR; + reply = xmalloc(num_msg * sizeof(*reply)); for (count = 0; count < num_msg; count++) { if (pamstate == INITIAL_LOGIN) { @@ -112,11 +114,11 @@ static int do_pam_conversation(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg, */ switch(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg_style)) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: - free(reply); + xfree(reply); return PAM_CONV_ERR; case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: if (__pampasswd == NULL) { - free(reply); + xfree(reply); return PAM_CONV_ERR; } reply[count].resp = xstrdup(__pampasswd); @@ -124,7 +126,7 @@ static int do_pam_conversation(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg, break; case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: - if ((*msg)[count].msg != NULL) { + if (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg) != NULL) { message_cat(&__pam_msg, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg)); } @@ -132,7 +134,7 @@ static int do_pam_conversation(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg, reply[count].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; default: - free(reply); + xfree(reply); return PAM_CONV_ERR; } } else { @@ -154,14 +156,14 @@ static int do_pam_conversation(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg, break; case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: - if ((*msg)[count].msg != NULL) + if (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg) != NULL) fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg)); reply[count].resp = xstrdup(""); reply[count].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; default: - free(reply); + xfree(reply); return PAM_CONV_ERR; } } @@ -256,9 +258,14 @@ int do_pam_account(char *username, char *remote_user) break; #if 0 case PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD: - message_cat(&__pam_msg, NEW_AUTHTOK_MSG); + message_cat(&__pam_msg, use_privsep ? + NEW_AUTHTOK_MSG_PRIVSEP : NEW_AUTHTOK_MSG); /* flag that password change is necessary */ password_change_required = 1; + /* disallow other functionality for now */ + no_port_forwarding_flag |= 2; + no_agent_forwarding_flag |= 2; + no_x11_forwarding_flag |= 2; break; #endif default: @@ -328,7 +335,7 @@ int is_pam_password_change_required(void) * Have user change authentication token if pam_acct_mgmt() indicated * it was expired. This needs to be called after an interactive * session is established and the user's pty is connected to - * stdin/stout/stderr. + * stdin/stdout/stderr. */ void do_pam_chauthtok(void) { @@ -337,11 +344,23 @@ void do_pam_chauthtok(void) do_pam_set_conv(&conv); if (password_change_required) { + if (use_privsep) + fatal("Password changing is currently unsupported" + " with privilege separation"); pamstate = OTHER; pam_retval = pam_chauthtok(__pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM pam_chauthtok failed[%d]: %.200s", pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval)); +#if 0 + /* XXX: This would need to be done in the parent process, + * but there's currently no way to pass such request. */ + no_port_forwarding_flag &= ~2; + no_agent_forwarding_flag &= ~2; + no_x11_forwarding_flag &= ~2; + if (!no_port_forwarding_flag && options.allow_tcp_forwarding) + channel_permit_all_opens(); +#endif } } @@ -392,7 +411,7 @@ void start_pam(const char *user) fatal_add_cleanup(&do_pam_cleanup_proc, NULL); } -/* Return list of PAM enviornment strings */ +/* Return list of PAM environment strings */ char **fetch_pam_environment(void) { #ifdef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST @@ -402,6 +421,16 @@ char **fetch_pam_environment(void) #endif /* HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST */ } +void free_pam_environment(char **env) +{ + int i; + + if (env != NULL) { + for (i = 0; env[i] != NULL; i++) + xfree(env[i]); + } +} + /* Print any messages that have been generated during authentication */ /* or account checking to stderr */ void print_pam_messages(void) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.h b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.h index 6b1f35ad..7881b6b 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.h @@ -1,14 +1,41 @@ -/* $Id: auth-pam.h,v 1.12 2002/04/04 19:02:28 stevesk Exp $ */ +/* $Id: auth-pam.h,v 1.16 2002/07/23 00:44:07 stevesk Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef USE_PAM -#include <pwd.h> /* For struct passwd */ +#if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE) +# define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE __progname +#endif void start_pam(const char *user); void finish_pam(void); int auth_pam_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password); char **fetch_pam_environment(void); +void free_pam_environment(char **env); int do_pam_authenticate(int flags); int do_pam_account(char *username, char *remote_user); void do_pam_session(char *username, const char *ttyname); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c index 17bbd2c..185db7d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c @@ -81,6 +81,9 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.27 2002/05/24 16:45:16 stevesk Exp $"); #endif /* !USE_PAM && !HAVE_OSF_SIA */ extern ServerOptions options; +#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE +extern char *aixloginmsg; +#endif /* * Tries to authenticate the user using password. Returns true if @@ -113,7 +116,7 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) #endif #ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE char *authmsg; - char *loginmsg; + int authsuccess; int reenter = 1; #endif @@ -145,7 +148,16 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) } #endif #ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE - return (authenticate(pw->pw_name,password,&reenter,&authmsg) == 0); + authsuccess = (authenticate(pw->pw_name,password,&reenter,&authmsg) == 0); + + if (authsuccess) + /* We don't have a pty yet, so just label the line as "ssh" */ + if (loginsuccess(authctxt->user, + get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping), + "ssh", &aixloginmsg) < 0) + aixloginmsg = NULL; + + return(authsuccess); #endif #ifdef KRB4 if (options.kerberos_authentication == 1) { diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-skey.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-skey.c index eb13c5c..f9ea03f 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth-skey.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-skey.c @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-skey.c,v 1.19 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-skey.c,v 1.20 2002/06/30 21:59:45 deraadt Exp $"); #ifdef SKEY @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, *name = xstrdup(""); *infotxt = xstrdup(""); *numprompts = 1; - *prompts = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(char*)); + *prompts = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(char *)); *echo_on = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(u_int)); (*echo_on)[0] = 0; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.c b/crypto/openssh/auth.c index 066b50d..48720da 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.43 2002/05/17 14:27:55 millert Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.45 2002/09/20 18:41:29 stevesk Exp $"); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H #include <login.h> @@ -256,6 +256,14 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info) get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), info); + +#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE + if (authenticated == 0 && strcmp(method, "password") == 0) + loginfailed(authctxt->user, + get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping), + "ssh"); +#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */ + } /* @@ -392,7 +400,7 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host, /* * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components - * of the path to the file must either be owned by either the owner of + * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable. * * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ? @@ -476,7 +484,12 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user) struct passwd *pw; pw = getpwnam(user); - if (pw == NULL || !allowed_user(pw)) + if (pw == NULL) { + log("Illegal user %.100s from %.100s", + user, get_remote_ipaddr()); + return (NULL); + } + if (!allowed_user(pw)) return (NULL); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) { diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.h b/crypto/openssh/auth.h index d98547d..c75d753 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.39 2002/05/31 11:35:15 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.41 2002/09/26 11:38:43 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *); #ifdef KRB4 #include <krb.h> -int auth_krb4(Authctxt *, KTEXT, char **); +int auth_krb4(Authctxt *, KTEXT, char **, KTEXT); int auth_krb4_password(Authctxt *, const char *); void krb4_cleanup_proc(void *); @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ int auth_afs_token(Authctxt *, const char *); #endif /* KRB4 */ #ifdef KRB5 -int auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client); +int auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *); int auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt); int auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password); void krb5_cleanup_proc(void *authctxt); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth1.c b/crypto/openssh/auth1.c index 2ebc8d0..9527ba0 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth1.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth1.c @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.41 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.44 2002/09/26 11:38:43 markus Exp $"); #include "xmalloc.h" #include "rsa.h" @@ -118,30 +118,49 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt) if (kdata[0] == 4) { /* KRB_PROT_VERSION */ #ifdef KRB4 - KTEXT_ST tkt; - + KTEXT_ST tkt, reply; tkt.length = dlen; if (tkt.length < MAX_KTXT_LEN) memcpy(tkt.dat, kdata, tkt.length); - if (auth_krb4(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user)) { + if (PRIVSEP(auth_krb4(authctxt, &tkt, + &client_user, &reply))) { authenticated = 1; snprintf(info, sizeof(info), " tktuser %.100s", client_user); + + packet_start( + SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE); + packet_put_string((char *) + reply.dat, reply.length); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); } #endif /* KRB4 */ } else { #ifdef KRB5 - krb5_data tkt; + krb5_data tkt, reply; tkt.length = dlen; tkt.data = kdata; - if (auth_krb5(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user)) { + if (PRIVSEP(auth_krb5(authctxt, &tkt, + &client_user, &reply))) { authenticated = 1; snprintf(info, sizeof(info), " tktuser %.100s", client_user); + + /* Send response to client */ + packet_start( + SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE); + packet_put_string((char *) + reply.data, reply.length); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + if (reply.length) + xfree(reply.data); } #endif /* KRB5 */ } @@ -292,6 +311,15 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt) fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s", authctxt->user); +#ifdef _UNICOS + if (type == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD && !authenticated) + cray_login_failure(authctxt->user, IA_UDBERR); + if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) { + authenticated = 0; + fatal("Access denied for user %s.",authctxt->user); + } +#endif /* _UNICOS */ + #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN if (authenticated && !check_nt_auth(type == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD, pw)) { @@ -301,7 +329,8 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt) } #else /* Special handling for root */ - if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && + if (!use_privsep && + authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && !auth_root_allowed(get_authname(type))) authenticated = 0; #endif @@ -323,12 +352,6 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt) return; if (authctxt->failures++ > AUTH_FAIL_MAX) { -#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE - /* XXX: privsep */ - loginfailed(authctxt->user, - get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping), - "ssh"); -#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */ packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c index e1440f4..0d17093 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.19 2002/06/26 13:55:37 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.20 2002/06/30 21:59:45 deraadt Exp $"); #include "ssh2.h" #include "auth.h" @@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) if (nresp > 100) fatal("input_userauth_info_response: too many replies"); if (nresp > 0) { - response = xmalloc(nresp * sizeof(char*)); + response = xmalloc(nresp * sizeof(char *)); for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) response[i] = packet_get_string(NULL); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c index 720d3c1..c07b2dd 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.3 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.4 2002/06/27 10:35:47 deraadt Exp $"); #include "auth.h" #include "xmalloc.h" @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ auth2_read_banner(void) close(fd); if (n != len) { - free(banner); + xfree(banner); return (NULL); } banner[n] = '\0'; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam.c index 99aedea..a2daf96 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$Id: auth2-pam.c,v 1.13 2002/06/26 13:58:00 djm Exp $"); +RCSID("$Id: auth2-pam.c,v 1.14 2002/06/28 16:48:12 mouring Exp $"); #ifdef USE_PAM #include <security/pam_appl.h> @@ -116,11 +116,11 @@ do_pam_conversation_kbd_int(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg, while(context_pam2.finished == 0) { done = 1; dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &done, appdata_ptr); - if(context_pam2.finished == 0) + if (context_pam2.finished == 0) debug("extra packet during conversation"); } - if(context_pam2.num_received == context_pam2.num_expected) { + if (context_pam2.num_received == context_pam2.num_expected) { *resp = context_pam2.responses; return PAM_SUCCESS; } else @@ -143,8 +143,8 @@ input_userauth_info_response_pam(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt) if (nresp != context_pam2.num_expected) fatal("%s: Received incorrect number of responses " - "(expected %u, received %u)", __func__, nresp, - context_pam2.num_expected); + "(expected %d, received %u)", __func__, + context_pam2.num_expected, nresp); if (nresp > 100) fatal("%s: too many replies", __func__); @@ -163,5 +163,4 @@ input_userauth_info_response_pam(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt) packet_check_eom(); } - #endif diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2.c index 6dfd91f..17c5855 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth2.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.93 2002/05/31 11:35:15 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.95 2002/08/22 21:33:58 markus Exp $"); #include "ssh2.h" #include "xmalloc.h" @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; u_int len; - int accept = 0; + int acceptit = 0; char *service = packet_get_string(&len); packet_check_eom(); @@ -111,14 +111,14 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) if (strcmp(service, "ssh-userauth") == 0) { if (!authctxt->success) { - accept = 1; + acceptit = 1; /* now we can handle user-auth requests */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &input_userauth_request); } } /* XXX all other service requests are denied */ - if (accept) { + if (acceptit) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT); packet_put_cstring(service); packet_send(); @@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method) authctxt->user); /* Special handling for root */ - if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && + if (!use_privsep && + authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && !auth_root_allowed(method)) authenticated = 0; @@ -215,6 +216,13 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method) authenticated = 0; #endif /* USE_PAM */ +#ifdef _UNICOS + if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) { + authenticated = 0; + fatal("Access denied for user %s.",authctxt->user); + } +#endif /* _UNICOS */ + /* Log before sending the reply */ auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, method, " ssh2"); @@ -232,14 +240,12 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method) authctxt->success = 1; } else { if (authctxt->failures++ > AUTH_FAIL_MAX) { -#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE - /* XXX: privsep */ - loginfailed(authctxt->user, - get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping), - "ssh"); -#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */ packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user); } +#ifdef _UNICOS + if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0) + cray_login_failure(authctxt->user, IA_UDBERR); +#endif /* _UNICOS */ methods = authmethods_get(); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE); packet_put_cstring(methods); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c index 4c4552d5..f04e085 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.56 2002/06/25 16:22:42 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.57 2002/09/11 18:27:26 stevesk Exp $"); #include <openssl/evp.h> @@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.56 2002/06/25 16:22:42 markus Exp $"); #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" +static int agent_present = 0; + /* helper */ int decode_reply(int type); @@ -61,6 +63,21 @@ int decode_reply(int type); ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \ (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE)) +int +ssh_agent_present(void) +{ + int authfd; + + if (agent_present) + return 1; + if ((authfd = ssh_get_authentication_socket()) == -1) + return 0; + else { + ssh_close_authentication_socket(authfd); + return 1; + } +} + /* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */ int @@ -90,6 +107,7 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket(void) close(sock); return -1; } + agent_present = 1; return sock; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfd.h b/crypto/openssh/authfd.h index b2767e5..38ee49e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/authfd.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/authfd.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.30 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.31 2002/09/11 18:27:25 stevesk Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ typedef struct { int howmany; } AuthenticationConnection; +int ssh_agent_present(void); int ssh_get_authentication_socket(void); void ssh_close_authentication_socket(int); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/canohost.c b/crypto/openssh/canohost.c index 00c499c..a457d3c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/canohost.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/canohost.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.32 2002/06/11 08:11:45 itojun Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.34 2002/09/23 20:46:27 stevesk Exp $"); #include "packet.h" #include "xmalloc.h" @@ -77,7 +77,9 @@ get_remote_hostname(int socket, int verify_reverse_mapping) if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ +#if 0 log("Could not reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); +#endif return xstrdup(ntop); } @@ -216,18 +218,12 @@ get_socket_address(int socket, int remote, int flags) if (remote) { if (getpeername(socket, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) - < 0) { - debug("get_socket_ipaddr: getpeername failed: %.100s", - strerror(errno)); + < 0) return NULL; - } } else { if (getsockname(socket, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) - < 0) { - debug("get_socket_ipaddr: getsockname failed: %.100s", - strerror(errno)); + < 0) return NULL; - } } /* Get the address in ascii. */ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), @@ -241,13 +237,21 @@ get_socket_address(int socket, int remote, int flags) char * get_peer_ipaddr(int socket) { - return get_socket_address(socket, 1, NI_NUMERICHOST); + char *p; + + if ((p = get_socket_address(socket, 1, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL) + return p; + return xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); } char * get_local_ipaddr(int socket) { - return get_socket_address(socket, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST); + char *p; + + if ((p = get_socket_address(socket, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL) + return p; + return xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); } char * diff --git a/crypto/openssh/channels.c b/crypto/openssh/channels.c index 29eaee7..6ff9e25 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/channels.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.c @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.179 2002/06/26 08:55:02 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.183 2002/09/17 07:47:02 itojun Exp $"); #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" @@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, } else { c->isatty = 0; } + c->wfd_isatty = isatty(c->wfd); /* enable nonblocking mode */ if (nonblock) { @@ -572,6 +573,7 @@ void channel_send_open(int id) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL) { log("channel_send_open: %d: bad id", id); return; @@ -589,6 +591,7 @@ void channel_request_start(int local_id, char *service, int wantconfirm) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(local_id); + if (c == NULL) { log("channel_request_start: %d: unknown channel id", local_id); return; @@ -603,6 +606,7 @@ void channel_register_confirm(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL) { log("channel_register_comfirm: %d: bad id", id); return; @@ -613,6 +617,7 @@ void channel_register_cleanup(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL) { log("channel_register_cleanup: %d: bad id", id); return; @@ -623,6 +628,7 @@ void channel_cancel_cleanup(int id) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL) { log("channel_cancel_cleanup: %d: bad id", id); return; @@ -633,6 +639,7 @@ void channel_register_filter(int id, channel_filter_fn *fn) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL) { log("channel_register_filter: %d: bad id", id); return; @@ -645,6 +652,7 @@ channel_set_fds(int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, int extusage, int nonblock, u_int window_max) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) fatal("channel_activate for non-larval channel %d.", id); channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock); @@ -815,6 +823,7 @@ static void channel_pre_x11_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) { int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output); + if (ret == 1) { /* Start normal processing for the channel. */ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; @@ -866,7 +875,7 @@ channel_pre_x11_open(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) static int channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) { - u_char *p, *host; + char *p, *host; int len, have, i, found; char username[256]; struct { @@ -1278,6 +1287,11 @@ channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { data = buffer_ptr(&c->output); dlen = buffer_len(&c->output); +#ifdef _AIX + /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */ + if (compat20 && c->wfd_isatty && dlen > 8*1024) + dlen = 8*1024; +#endif len = write(c->wfd, data, dlen); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) return 1; @@ -1395,6 +1409,7 @@ static void channel_post_output_drain_13(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) { int len; + /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */ if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset) && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { len = write(c->sock, buffer_ptr(&c->output), @@ -1472,6 +1487,7 @@ static void channel_handler_init(void) { int i; + for (i = 0; i < SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE; i++) { channel_pre[i] = NULL; channel_post[i] = NULL; @@ -2006,7 +2022,6 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener(int type, const char *listen_addr, u_short listen_por struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; const char *host; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; - struct linger linger; success = 0; host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ? @@ -2049,13 +2064,13 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener(int type, const char *listen_addr, u_short listen_por continue; } /* - * Set socket options. We would like the socket to disappear - * as soon as it has been closed for whatever reason. + * Set socket options. + * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT. */ - setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)); - linger.l_onoff = 1; - linger.l_linger = 5; - setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, &linger, sizeof(linger)); + if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, + sizeof(on)) == -1) + error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno)); + debug("Local forwarding listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport); /* Bind the socket to the address. */ @@ -2605,6 +2620,7 @@ void deny_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int rchan = packet_get_int(); + switch (type) { case SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN: error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding."); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/channels.h b/crypto/openssh/channels.h index dd54114..bd2e925 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/channels.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.h @@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ struct Channel { int efd; /* extended fd */ int sock; /* sock fd */ int isatty; /* rfd is a tty */ + int wfd_isatty; /* wfd is a tty */ int force_drain; /* force close on iEOF */ int delayed; /* fdset hack */ Buffer input; /* data read from socket, to be sent over diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher.c index 6db340d..1933d3e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/cipher.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher.c @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.60 2002/06/23 03:26:52 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.61 2002/07/12 15:50:17 markus Exp $"); #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" @@ -437,6 +437,18 @@ swap_bytes(const u_char *src, u_char *dst, int n) } } +#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP +static void bf_ssh1_init (EVP_CIPHER_CTX * ctx, const unsigned char *key, + const unsigned char *iv, int enc) +{ + if (iv != NULL) + memcpy (&(ctx->oiv[0]), iv, 8); + memcpy (&(ctx->iv[0]), &(ctx->oiv[0]), 8); + if (key != NULL) + BF_set_key (&(ctx->c.bf_ks), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length (ctx), + key); +} +#endif static int (*orig_bf)(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int) = NULL; static int @@ -458,6 +470,9 @@ evp_ssh1_bf(void) memcpy(&ssh1_bf, EVP_bf_cbc(), sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); orig_bf = ssh1_bf.do_cipher; ssh1_bf.nid = NID_undef; +#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP + ssh1_bf.init = bf_ssh1_init; +#endif ssh1_bf.do_cipher = bf_ssh1_cipher; ssh1_bf.key_len = 32; return (&ssh1_bf); @@ -567,7 +582,7 @@ evp_rijndael(void) rijndal_cbc.do_cipher = ssh_rijndael_cbc; #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP rijndal_cbc.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | - EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT; + EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV; #endif return (&rijndal_cbc); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c index cd2eab7..2c030e7 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.102 2002/06/24 14:33:27 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.104 2002/08/22 19:38:42 stevesk Exp $"); #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" @@ -635,16 +635,18 @@ process_escapes(Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, char *buf, int len) snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c?\r\n\ Supported escape sequences:\r\n\ -~. - terminate connection\r\n\ -~C - open a command line\r\n\ -~R - Request rekey (SSH protocol 2 only)\r\n\ -~^Z - suspend ssh\r\n\ -~# - list forwarded connections\r\n\ -~& - background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)\r\n\ -~? - this message\r\n\ -~~ - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n\ +%c. - terminate connection\r\n\ +%cC - open a command line\r\n\ +%cR - Request rekey (SSH protocol 2 only)\r\n\ +%c^Z - suspend ssh\r\n\ +%c# - list forwarded connections\r\n\ +%c& - background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)\r\n\ +%c? - this message\r\n\ +%c%c - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n\ (Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after newline.)\r\n", - escape_char); + escape_char, escape_char, escape_char, escape_char, + escape_char, escape_char, escape_char, escape_char, + escape_char, escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); continue; @@ -1114,7 +1116,7 @@ client_input_exit_status(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) static Channel * client_request_forwarded_tcpip(const char *request_type, int rchan) { - Channel* c = NULL; + Channel *c = NULL; char *listen_address, *originator_address; int listen_port, originator_port; int sock; @@ -1144,7 +1146,7 @@ client_request_forwarded_tcpip(const char *request_type, int rchan) return c; } -static Channel* +static Channel * client_request_x11(const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; @@ -1180,7 +1182,7 @@ client_request_x11(const char *request_type, int rchan) return c; } -static Channel* +static Channel * client_request_agent(const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compat.c b/crypto/openssh/compat.c index 406b47c..757b0e6 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/compat.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/compat.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.63 2002/04/10 08:21:47 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.65 2002/09/27 10:42:09 mickey Exp $"); #include "buffer.h" #include "packet.h" @@ -39,13 +39,13 @@ int datafellows = 0; void enable_compat20(void) { - verbose("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 2.0"); + debug("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 2.0"); compat20 = 1; } void enable_compat13(void) { - verbose("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 1.3"); + debug("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 1.3"); compat13 = 1; } /* datafellows bug compatibility */ @@ -146,6 +146,8 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version) "OSU_1.5alpha3*", SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD }, { "*SSH_Version_Mapper*", SSH_BUG_SCANNER }, + { "Probe-*", + SSH_BUG_PROBE }, { NULL, 0 } }; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compat.h b/crypto/openssh/compat.h index 7afca04..9299805 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/compat.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/compat.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.32 2002/04/10 08:21:47 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.33 2002/09/27 10:42:09 mickey Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ #define SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN 0x00100000 #define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF 0x00200000 #define SSH_BUG_K5USER 0x00400000 +#define SSH_BUG_PROBE 0x00800000 void enable_compat13(void); void enable_compat20(void); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/config.guess b/crypto/openssh/config.guess index 83c544d..fd30ab0 100755 --- a/crypto/openssh/config.guess +++ b/crypto/openssh/config.guess @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ # Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, # 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc. -timestamp='2002-01-30' +timestamp='2002-07-23' # This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it # under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by @@ -88,30 +88,40 @@ if test $# != 0; then exit 1 fi +trap 'exit 1' 1 2 15 -dummy=dummy-$$ -trap 'rm -f $dummy.c $dummy.o $dummy.rel $dummy; exit 1' 1 2 15 +# CC_FOR_BUILD -- compiler used by this script. Note that the use of a +# compiler to aid in system detection is discouraged as it requires +# temporary files to be created and, as you can see below, it is a +# headache to deal with in a portable fashion. -# CC_FOR_BUILD -- compiler used by this script. # Historically, `CC_FOR_BUILD' used to be named `HOST_CC'. We still # use `HOST_CC' if defined, but it is deprecated. -set_cc_for_build='case $CC_FOR_BUILD,$HOST_CC,$CC in - ,,) echo "int dummy(){}" > $dummy.c ; - for c in cc gcc c89 ; do - ($c $dummy.c -c -o $dummy.o) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; - if test $? = 0 ; then +# This shell variable is my proudest work .. or something. --bje + +set_cc_for_build='tmpdir=${TMPDIR-/tmp}/config-guess-$$ ; +(old=`umask` && umask 077 && mkdir $tmpdir && umask $old && unset old) + || (echo "$me: cannot create $tmpdir" >&2 && exit 1) ; +dummy=$tmpdir/dummy ; +files="$dummy.c $dummy.o $dummy.rel $dummy" ; +trap '"'"'rm -f $files; rmdir $tmpdir; exit 1'"'"' 1 2 15 ; +case $CC_FOR_BUILD,$HOST_CC,$CC in + ,,) echo "int x;" > $dummy.c ; + for c in cc gcc c89 c99 ; do + if ($c $dummy.c -c -o $dummy.o) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then CC_FOR_BUILD="$c"; break ; fi ; done ; - rm -f $dummy.c $dummy.o $dummy.rel ; + rm -f $files ; if test x"$CC_FOR_BUILD" = x ; then CC_FOR_BUILD=no_compiler_found ; fi ;; ,,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$CC ;; ,*,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$HOST_CC ;; -esac' +esac ; +unset files' # This is needed to find uname on a Pyramid OSx when run in the BSD universe. # (ghazi@noc.rutgers.edu 1994-08-24) @@ -138,9 +148,11 @@ case "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" in # # Note: NetBSD doesn't particularly care about the vendor # portion of the name. We always set it to "unknown". - UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null` || \ - UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=unknown + sysctl="sysctl -n hw.machine_arch" + UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`(/sbin/$sysctl 2>/dev/null || \ + /usr/sbin/$sysctl 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)` case "${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}" in + armeb) machine=armeb-unknown ;; arm*) machine=arm-unknown ;; sh3el) machine=shl-unknown ;; sh3eb) machine=sh-unknown ;; @@ -219,6 +231,7 @@ case "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" in # A Tn.n version is a released field test version. # A Xn.n version is an unreleased experimental baselevel. # 1.2 uses "1.2" for uname -r. + eval $set_cc_for_build cat <<EOF >$dummy.s .data \$Lformat: @@ -244,10 +257,9 @@ main: jsr \$26,exit .end main EOF - eval $set_cc_for_build $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.s -o $dummy 2>/dev/null if test "$?" = 0 ; then - case `./$dummy` in + case `$dummy` in 0-0) UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" ;; @@ -269,9 +281,12 @@ EOF 2-1307) UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev68" ;; + 3-1307) + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev7" + ;; esac fi - rm -f $dummy.s $dummy + rm -f $dummy.s $dummy && rmdir $tmpdir echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-dec-osf`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/^[VTX]//' | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'` exit 0 ;; Alpha\ *:Windows_NT*:*) @@ -312,6 +327,10 @@ EOF NILE*:*:*:dcosx) echo pyramid-pyramid-svr4 exit 0 ;; + DRS?6000:UNIX_SV:4.2*:7*) + case `/usr/bin/uname -p` in + sparc) echo sparc-icl-nx7 && exit 0 ;; + esac ;; sun4H:SunOS:5.*:*) echo sparc-hal-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` exit 0 ;; @@ -340,7 +359,7 @@ EOF echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} exit 0 ;; sun*:*:4.2BSD:*) - UNAME_RELEASE=`(head -1 /etc/motd | awk '{print substr($5,1,3)}') 2>/dev/null` + UNAME_RELEASE=`(sed 1q /etc/motd | awk '{print substr($5,1,3)}') 2>/dev/null` test "x${UNAME_RELEASE}" = "x" && UNAME_RELEASE=3 case "`/bin/arch`" in sun3) @@ -419,14 +438,17 @@ EOF } EOF $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy \ - && ./$dummy `echo "${UNAME_RELEASE}" | sed -n 's/\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p'` \ - && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0 - rm -f $dummy.c $dummy + && $dummy `echo "${UNAME_RELEASE}" | sed -n 's/\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p'` \ + && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && rmdir $tmpdir && exit 0 + rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && rmdir $tmpdir echo mips-mips-riscos${UNAME_RELEASE} exit 0 ;; Motorola:PowerMAX_OS:*:*) echo powerpc-motorola-powermax exit 0 ;; + Night_Hawk:*:*:PowerMAX_OS) + echo powerpc-harris-powermax + exit 0 ;; Night_Hawk:Power_UNIX:*:*) echo powerpc-harris-powerunix exit 0 ;; @@ -499,8 +521,8 @@ EOF exit(0); } EOF - $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy && ./$dummy && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0 - rm -f $dummy.c $dummy + $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy && $dummy && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && rmdir $tmpdir && exit 0 + rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && rmdir $tmpdir echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.5 elif grep bos324 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.4 @@ -509,7 +531,7 @@ EOF fi exit 0 ;; *:AIX:*:[45]) - IBM_CPU_ID=`/usr/sbin/lsdev -C -c processor -S available | head -1 | awk '{ print $1 }'` + IBM_CPU_ID=`/usr/sbin/lsdev -C -c processor -S available | sed 1q | awk '{ print $1 }'` if /usr/sbin/lsattr -El ${IBM_CPU_ID} | grep ' POWER' >/dev/null 2>&1; then IBM_ARCH=rs6000 else @@ -598,9 +620,9 @@ EOF exit (0); } EOF - (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy 2>/dev/null) && HP_ARCH=`./$dummy` + (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy 2>/dev/null) && HP_ARCH=`$dummy` if test -z "$HP_ARCH"; then HP_ARCH=hppa; fi - rm -f $dummy.c $dummy + rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && rmdir $tmpdir fi ;; esac echo ${HP_ARCH}-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV} @@ -636,8 +658,8 @@ EOF exit (0); } EOF - $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy && ./$dummy && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0 - rm -f $dummy.c $dummy + $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy && $dummy && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && rmdir $tmpdir && exit 0 + rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && rmdir $tmpdir echo unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2 exit 0 ;; 9000/7??:4.3bsd:*:* | 9000/8?[79]:4.3bsd:*:* ) @@ -683,9 +705,6 @@ EOF C4*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C4*:*) echo c4-convex-bsd exit 0 ;; - CRAY*X-MP:*:*:*) - echo xmp-cray-unicos - exit 0 ;; CRAY*Y-MP:*:*:*) echo ymp-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' exit 0 ;; @@ -707,9 +726,6 @@ EOF CRAY*SV1:*:*:*) echo sv1-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' exit 0 ;; - CRAY-2:*:*:*) - echo cray2-cray-unicos - exit 0 ;; F30[01]:UNIX_System_V:*:* | F700:UNIX_System_V:*:*) FUJITSU_PROC=`uname -m | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'` FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' | sed -e 's/\///'` @@ -726,7 +742,19 @@ EOF echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE} exit 0 ;; *:FreeBSD:*:*) - echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` + # Determine whether the default compiler uses glibc. + eval $set_cc_for_build + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c + #include <features.h> + #if __GLIBC__ >= 2 + LIBC=gnu + #else + LIBC= + #endif +EOF + eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep ^LIBC=` + rm -f $dummy.c && rmdir $tmpdir + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`${LIBC:+-$LIBC} exit 0 ;; i*:CYGWIN*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-cygwin @@ -765,7 +793,7 @@ EOF echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu exit 0 ;; ia64:Linux:*:*) - echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu exit 0 ;; m68*:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu @@ -776,18 +804,18 @@ EOF #undef CPU #undef mips #undef mipsel - #if defined(__MIPSEL__) || defined(__MIPSEL) || defined(_MIPSEL) || defined(MIPSEL) - CPU=mipsel + #if defined(__MIPSEL__) || defined(__MIPSEL) || defined(_MIPSEL) || defined(MIPSEL) + CPU=mipsel #else - #if defined(__MIPSEB__) || defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(MIPSEB) + #if defined(__MIPSEB__) || defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(MIPSEB) CPU=mips #else CPU= #endif - #endif + #endif EOF eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep ^CPU=` - rm -f $dummy.c + rm -f $dummy.c && rmdir $tmpdir test x"${CPU}" != x && echo "${CPU}-pc-linux-gnu" && exit 0 ;; ppc:Linux:*:*) @@ -837,9 +865,8 @@ EOF # The BFD linker knows what the default object file format is, so # first see if it will tell us. cd to the root directory to prevent # problems with other programs or directories called `ld' in the path. - # Export LANG=C to prevent ld from outputting information in other - # languages. - ld_supported_targets=`LANG=C; export LANG; cd /; ld --help 2>&1 \ + # Set LC_ALL=C to ensure ld outputs messages in English. + ld_supported_targets=`cd /; LC_ALL=C ld --help 2>&1 \ | sed -ne '/supported targets:/!d s/[ ][ ]*/ /g s/.*supported targets: *// @@ -851,7 +878,7 @@ EOF ;; a.out-i386-linux) echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnuaout" - exit 0 ;; + exit 0 ;; coff-i386) echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnucoff" exit 0 ;; @@ -884,7 +911,7 @@ EOF #endif EOF eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep ^LIBC=` - rm -f $dummy.c + rm -f $dummy.c && rmdir $tmpdir test x"${LIBC}" != x && echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-${LIBC}" && exit 0 test x"${TENTATIVE}" != x && echo "${TENTATIVE}" && exit 0 ;; @@ -923,13 +950,13 @@ EOF UNAME_REL=`sed -n 's/.*Version //p' </usr/options/cb.name` echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-isc$UNAME_REL elif /bin/uname -X 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then - UNAME_REL=`(/bin/uname -X|egrep Release|sed -e 's/.*= //')` - (/bin/uname -X|egrep i80486 >/dev/null) && UNAME_MACHINE=i486 - (/bin/uname -X|egrep '^Machine.*Pentium' >/dev/null) \ + UNAME_REL=`(/bin/uname -X|grep Release|sed -e 's/.*= //')` + (/bin/uname -X|grep i80486 >/dev/null) && UNAME_MACHINE=i486 + (/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pentium' >/dev/null) \ && UNAME_MACHINE=i586 - (/bin/uname -X|egrep '^Machine.*Pent ?II' >/dev/null) \ + (/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pent *II' >/dev/null) \ && UNAME_MACHINE=i686 - (/bin/uname -X|egrep '^Machine.*Pentium Pro' >/dev/null) \ + (/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pentium Pro' >/dev/null) \ && UNAME_MACHINE=i686 echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sco$UNAME_REL else @@ -964,7 +991,7 @@ EOF exit 0 ;; M68*:*:R3V[567]*:*) test -r /sysV68 && echo 'm68k-motorola-sysv' && exit 0 ;; - 3[34]??:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??A:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??/*:*:4.0:3.0 | 4850:*:4.0:3.0 | SKA40:*:4.0:3.0) + 3[34]??:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??A:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??/*:*:4.0:3.0 | 4400:*:4.0:3.0 | 4850:*:4.0:3.0 | SKA40:*:4.0:3.0) OS_REL='' test -r /etc/.relid \ && OS_REL=.`sed -n 's/[^ ]* [^ ]* \([0-9][0-9]\).*/\1/p' < /etc/.relid` @@ -1065,12 +1092,12 @@ EOF echo `uname -p`-apple-darwin${UNAME_RELEASE} exit 0 ;; *:procnto*:*:* | *:QNX:[0123456789]*:*) - if test "${UNAME_MACHINE}" = "x86pc"; then + UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p` + if test "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = "x86"; then + UNAME_PROCESSOR=i386 UNAME_MACHINE=pc - echo i386-${UNAME_MACHINE}-nto-qnx - else - echo `uname -p`-${UNAME_MACHINE}-nto-qnx fi + echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-${UNAME_MACHINE}-nto-qnx${UNAME_RELEASE} exit 0 ;; *:QNX:*:4*) echo i386-pc-qnx @@ -1247,8 +1274,8 @@ main () } EOF -$CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy 2>/dev/null && ./$dummy && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0 -rm -f $dummy.c $dummy +$CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy 2>/dev/null && $dummy && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && rmdir $tmpdir && exit 0 +rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && rmdir $tmpdir # Apollos put the system type in the environment. diff --git a/crypto/openssh/config.sub b/crypto/openssh/config.sub index a06a480..9ff085e 100755 --- a/crypto/openssh/config.sub +++ b/crypto/openssh/config.sub @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ #! /bin/sh # Configuration validation subroutine script. -# Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 -# Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, +# 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc. -timestamp='2001-04-20' +timestamp='2002-07-03' # This file is (in principle) common to ALL GNU software. # The presence of a machine in this file suggests that SOME GNU software @@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ timestamp='2001-04-20' # configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under # the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program. -# Please send patches to <config-patches@gnu.org>. +# Please send patches to <config-patches@gnu.org>. Submit a context +# diff and a properly formatted ChangeLog entry. # # Configuration subroutine to validate and canonicalize a configuration type. # Supply the specified configuration type as an argument. @@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ esac # Here we must recognize all the valid KERNEL-OS combinations. maybe_os=`echo $1 | sed 's/^\(.*\)-\([^-]*-[^-]*\)$/\2/'` case $maybe_os in - nto-qnx* | linux-gnu* | storm-chaos* | os2-emx*) + nto-qnx* | linux-gnu* | freebsd*-gnu* | storm-chaos* | os2-emx* | windows32-* | rtmk-nova*) os=-$maybe_os basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed 's/^\(.*\)-\([^-]*-[^-]*\)$/\1/'` ;; @@ -157,6 +158,14 @@ case $os in os=-vxworks basic_machine=$1 ;; + -chorusos*) + os=-chorusos + basic_machine=$1 + ;; + -chorusrdb) + os=-chorusrdb + basic_machine=$1 + ;; -hiux*) os=-hiuxwe2 ;; @@ -215,26 +224,44 @@ esac case $basic_machine in # Recognize the basic CPU types without company name. # Some are omitted here because they have special meanings below. - tahoe | i860 | ia64 | m32r | m68k | m68000 | m88k | ns32k | arc \ - | arm | arme[lb] | arm[bl]e | armv[2345] | armv[345][lb] | strongarm | xscale \ - | pyramid | mn10200 | mn10300 | tron | a29k \ - | 580 | i960 | h8300 \ - | x86 | ppcbe | mipsbe | mipsle | shbe | shle \ - | hppa | hppa1.0 | hppa1.1 | hppa2.0 | hppa2.0w | hppa2.0n \ - | hppa64 \ - | alpha | alphaev[4-8] | alphaev56 | alphapca5[67] \ - | alphaev6[78] \ - | we32k | ns16k | clipper | i370 | sh | sh[34] \ - | powerpc | powerpcle \ - | 1750a | dsp16xx | pdp10 | pdp11 \ - | mips16 | mips64 | mipsel | mips64el \ - | mips64orion | mips64orionel | mipstx39 | mipstx39el \ - | mips64vr4300 | mips64vr4300el | mips64vr4100 | mips64vr4100el \ - | mips64vr5000 | miprs64vr5000el | mcore | s390 | s390x \ - | sparc | sparclet | sparclite | sparc64 | sparcv9 | sparcv9b \ - | v850 | c4x \ - | thumb | d10v | d30v | fr30 | avr | openrisc | tic80 \ - | pj | pjl | h8500) + 1750a | 580 \ + | a29k \ + | alpha | alphaev[4-8] | alphaev56 | alphaev6[78] | alphapca5[67] \ + | alpha64 | alpha64ev[4-8] | alpha64ev56 | alpha64ev6[78] | alpha64pca5[67] \ + | arc | arm | arm[bl]e | arme[lb] | armv[2345] | armv[345][lb] | avr \ + | c4x | clipper \ + | d10v | d30v | dlx | dsp16xx \ + | fr30 | frv \ + | h8300 | h8500 | hppa | hppa1.[01] | hppa2.0 | hppa2.0[nw] | hppa64 \ + | i370 | i860 | i960 | ia64 \ + | ip2k \ + | m32r | m68000 | m68k | m88k | mcore \ + | mips | mipsbe | mipseb | mipsel | mipsle \ + | mips16 \ + | mips64 | mips64el \ + | mips64orion | mips64orionel \ + | mips64vr4100 | mips64vr4100el \ + | mips64vr4300 | mips64vr4300el \ + | mips64vr5000 | mips64vr5000el \ + | mipsisa32 | mipsisa32el \ + | mipsisa64 | mipsisa64el \ + | mipsisa64sb1 | mipsisa64sb1el \ + | mipstx39 | mipstx39el \ + | mn10200 | mn10300 \ + | ns16k | ns32k \ + | openrisc | or32 \ + | pdp10 | pdp11 | pj | pjl \ + | powerpc | powerpc64 | powerpc64le | powerpcle | ppcbe \ + | pyramid \ + | sh | sh[1234] | sh3e | sh[34]eb | shbe | shle | sh[1234]le | sh3ele \ + | sh64 | sh64le \ + | sparc | sparc64 | sparc86x | sparclet | sparclite | sparcv9 | sparcv9b \ + | strongarm \ + | tahoe | thumb | tic80 | tron \ + | v850 | v850e \ + | we32k \ + | x86 | xscale | xstormy16 | xtensa \ + | z8k) basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown ;; m6811 | m68hc11 | m6812 | m68hc12) @@ -242,7 +269,7 @@ case $basic_machine in basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown os=-none ;; - m88110 | m680[12346]0 | m683?2 | m68360 | m5200 | z8k | v70 | w65) + m88110 | m680[12346]0 | m683?2 | m68360 | m5200 | v70 | w65 | z8k) ;; # We use `pc' rather than `unknown' @@ -257,31 +284,54 @@ case $basic_machine in exit 1 ;; # Recognize the basic CPU types with company name. - # FIXME: clean up the formatting here. - vax-* | tahoe-* | i*86-* | i860-* | ia64-* | m32r-* | m68k-* | m68000-* \ - | m88k-* | sparc-* | ns32k-* | fx80-* | arc-* | c[123]* \ - | arm-* | armbe-* | armle-* | armv*-* | strongarm-* | xscale-* \ - | mips-* | pyramid-* | tron-* | a29k-* | romp-* | rs6000-* \ - | power-* | none-* | 580-* | cray2-* | h8300-* | h8500-* | i960-* \ - | xmp-* | ymp-* \ - | x86-* | ppcbe-* | mipsbe-* | mipsle-* | shbe-* | shle-* \ - | hppa-* | hppa1.0-* | hppa1.1-* | hppa2.0-* | hppa2.0w-* \ - | hppa2.0n-* | hppa64-* \ - | alpha-* | alphaev[4-8]-* | alphaev56-* | alphapca5[67]-* \ - | alphaev6[78]-* \ - | we32k-* | cydra-* | ns16k-* | pn-* | np1-* | xps100-* \ - | clipper-* | orion-* \ - | sparclite-* | pdp10-* | pdp11-* | sh-* | powerpc-* | powerpcle-* \ - | sparc64-* | sparcv9-* | sparcv9b-* | sparc86x-* \ - | mips16-* | mips64-* | mipsel-* \ - | mips64el-* | mips64orion-* | mips64orionel-* \ - | mips64vr4100-* | mips64vr4100el-* | mips64vr4300-* | mips64vr4300el-* \ - | mipstx39-* | mipstx39el-* | mcore-* \ - | f30[01]-* | f700-* | s390-* | s390x-* | sv1-* | t3e-* \ - | [cjt]90-* \ - | m88110-* | m680[01234]0-* | m683?2-* | m68360-* | z8k-* | d10v-* \ - | thumb-* | v850-* | d30v-* | tic30-* | tic80-* | c30-* | fr30-* \ - | bs2000-* | tic54x-* | c54x-* | x86_64-* | pj-* | pjl-*) + 580-* \ + | a29k-* \ + | alpha-* | alphaev[4-8]-* | alphaev56-* | alphaev6[78]-* \ + | alpha64-* | alpha64ev[4-8]-* | alpha64ev56-* | alpha64ev6[78]-* \ + | alphapca5[67]-* | alpha64pca5[67]-* | arc-* \ + | arm-* | armbe-* | armle-* | armeb-* | armv*-* \ + | avr-* \ + | bs2000-* \ + | c[123]* | c30-* | [cjt]90-* | c54x-* \ + | clipper-* | cydra-* \ + | d10v-* | d30v-* | dlx-* \ + | elxsi-* \ + | f30[01]-* | f700-* | fr30-* | frv-* | fx80-* \ + | h8300-* | h8500-* \ + | hppa-* | hppa1.[01]-* | hppa2.0-* | hppa2.0[nw]-* | hppa64-* \ + | i*86-* | i860-* | i960-* | ia64-* \ + | ip2k-* \ + | m32r-* \ + | m68000-* | m680[012346]0-* | m68360-* | m683?2-* | m68k-* \ + | m88110-* | m88k-* | mcore-* \ + | mips-* | mipsbe-* | mipseb-* | mipsel-* | mipsle-* \ + | mips16-* \ + | mips64-* | mips64el-* \ + | mips64orion-* | mips64orionel-* \ + | mips64vr4100-* | mips64vr4100el-* \ + | mips64vr4300-* | mips64vr4300el-* \ + | mips64vr5000-* | mips64vr5000el-* \ + | mipsisa32-* | mipsisa32el-* \ + | mipsisa64-* | mipsisa64el-* \ + | mipsisa64sb1-* | mipsisa64sb1el-* \ + | mipstx39 | mipstx39el \ + | none-* | np1-* | ns16k-* | ns32k-* \ + | orion-* \ + | pdp10-* | pdp11-* | pj-* | pjl-* | pn-* | power-* \ + | powerpc-* | powerpc64-* | powerpc64le-* | powerpcle-* | ppcbe-* \ + | pyramid-* \ + | romp-* | rs6000-* \ + | sh-* | sh[1234]-* | sh3e-* | sh[34]eb-* | shbe-* \ + | shle-* | sh[1234]le-* | sh3ele-* | sh64-* | sh64le-* \ + | sparc-* | sparc64-* | sparc86x-* | sparclet-* | sparclite-* \ + | sparcv9-* | sparcv9b-* | strongarm-* | sv1-* | sx?-* \ + | tahoe-* | thumb-* | tic30-* | tic54x-* | tic80-* | tron-* \ + | v850-* | v850e-* | vax-* \ + | we32k-* \ + | x86-* | x86_64-* | xps100-* | xscale-* | xstormy16-* \ + | xtensa-* \ + | ymp-* \ + | z8k-*) ;; # Recognize the various machine names and aliases which stand # for a CPU type and a company and sometimes even an OS. @@ -344,6 +394,10 @@ case $basic_machine in basic_machine=ns32k-sequent os=-dynix ;; + c90) + basic_machine=c90-cray + os=-unicos + ;; convex-c1) basic_machine=c1-convex os=-bsd @@ -364,16 +418,8 @@ case $basic_machine in basic_machine=c38-convex os=-bsd ;; - cray | ymp) - basic_machine=ymp-cray - os=-unicos - ;; - cray2) - basic_machine=cray2-cray - os=-unicos - ;; - [cjt]90) - basic_machine=${basic_machine}-cray + cray | j90) + basic_machine=j90-cray os=-unicos ;; crds | unos) @@ -388,6 +434,14 @@ case $basic_machine in decstation | decstation-3100 | pmax | pmax-* | pmin | dec3100 | decstatn) basic_machine=mips-dec ;; + decsystem10* | dec10*) + basic_machine=pdp10-dec + os=-tops10 + ;; + decsystem20* | dec20*) + basic_machine=pdp10-dec + os=-tops20 + ;; delta | 3300 | motorola-3300 | motorola-delta \ | 3300-motorola | delta-motorola) basic_machine=m68k-motorola @@ -568,14 +622,6 @@ case $basic_machine in basic_machine=m68k-atari os=-mint ;; - mipsel*-linux*) - basic_machine=mipsel-unknown - os=-linux-gnu - ;; - mips*-linux*) - basic_machine=mips-unknown - os=-linux-gnu - ;; mips3*-*) basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed -e 's/mips3/mips64/'` ;; @@ -590,6 +636,10 @@ case $basic_machine in basic_machine=m68k-rom68k os=-coff ;; + morphos) + basic_machine=powerpc-unknown + os=-morphos + ;; msdos) basic_machine=i386-pc os=-msdos @@ -669,6 +719,10 @@ case $basic_machine in basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki os=-proelf ;; + or32 | or32-*) + basic_machine=or32-unknown + os=-coff + ;; OSE68000 | ose68000) basic_machine=m68000-ericsson os=-ose @@ -694,7 +748,7 @@ case $basic_machine in pc532 | pc532-*) basic_machine=ns32k-pc532 ;; - pentium | p5 | k5 | k6 | nexgen) + pentium | p5 | k5 | k6 | nexgen | viac3) basic_machine=i586-pc ;; pentiumpro | p6 | 6x86 | athlon) @@ -703,7 +757,7 @@ case $basic_machine in pentiumii | pentium2) basic_machine=i686-pc ;; - pentium-* | p5-* | k5-* | k6-* | nexgen-*) + pentium-* | p5-* | k5-* | k6-* | nexgen-* | viac3-*) basic_machine=i586-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` ;; pentiumpro-* | p6-* | 6x86-* | athlon-*) @@ -727,6 +781,16 @@ case $basic_machine in ppcle-* | powerpclittle-*) basic_machine=powerpcle-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` ;; + ppc64) basic_machine=powerpc64-unknown + ;; + ppc64-*) basic_machine=powerpc64-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + ppc64le | powerpc64little | ppc64-le | powerpc64-little) + basic_machine=powerpc64le-unknown + ;; + ppc64le-* | powerpc64little-*) + basic_machine=powerpc64le-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; ps2) basic_machine=i386-ibm ;; @@ -744,6 +808,12 @@ case $basic_machine in rtpc | rtpc-*) basic_machine=romp-ibm ;; + s390 | s390-*) + basic_machine=s390-ibm + ;; + s390x | s390x-*) + basic_machine=s390x-ibm + ;; sa29200) basic_machine=a29k-amd os=-udi @@ -755,7 +825,7 @@ case $basic_machine in basic_machine=sh-hitachi os=-hms ;; - sparclite-wrs) + sparclite-wrs | simso-wrs) basic_machine=sparclite-wrs os=-vxworks ;; @@ -813,7 +883,7 @@ case $basic_machine in sun386 | sun386i | roadrunner) basic_machine=i386-sun ;; - sv1) + sv1) basic_machine=sv1-cray os=-unicos ;; @@ -821,8 +891,16 @@ case $basic_machine in basic_machine=i386-sequent os=-dynix ;; + t3d) + basic_machine=alpha-cray + os=-unicos + ;; t3e) - basic_machine=t3e-cray + basic_machine=alphaev5-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + t90) + basic_machine=t90-cray os=-unicos ;; tic54x | c54x*) @@ -835,6 +913,10 @@ case $basic_machine in tx39el) basic_machine=mipstx39el-unknown ;; + toad1) + basic_machine=pdp10-xkl + os=-tops20 + ;; tower | tower-32) basic_machine=m68k-ncr ;; @@ -881,13 +963,17 @@ case $basic_machine in basic_machine=hppa1.1-winbond os=-proelf ;; - xmp) - basic_machine=xmp-cray - os=-unicos + windows32) + basic_machine=i386-pc + os=-windows32-msvcrt ;; xps | xps100) basic_machine=xps100-honeywell ;; + ymp) + basic_machine=ymp-cray + os=-unicos + ;; z8k-*-coff) basic_machine=z8k-unknown os=-sim @@ -908,13 +994,6 @@ case $basic_machine in op60c) basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki ;; - mips) - if [ x$os = x-linux-gnu ]; then - basic_machine=mips-unknown - else - basic_machine=mips-mips - fi - ;; romp) basic_machine=romp-ibm ;; @@ -934,9 +1013,12 @@ case $basic_machine in we32k) basic_machine=we32k-att ;; - sh3 | sh4) + sh3 | sh4 | sh3eb | sh4eb | sh[1234]le | sh3ele) basic_machine=sh-unknown ;; + sh64) + basic_machine=sh64-unknown + ;; sparc | sparcv9 | sparcv9b) basic_machine=sparc-sun ;; @@ -1018,11 +1100,14 @@ case $os in | -lynxos* | -bosx* | -nextstep* | -cxux* | -aout* | -elf* | -oabi* \ | -ptx* | -coff* | -ecoff* | -winnt* | -domain* | -vsta* \ | -udi* | -eabi* | -lites* | -ieee* | -go32* | -aux* \ + | -chorusos* | -chorusrdb* \ | -cygwin* | -pe* | -psos* | -moss* | -proelf* | -rtems* \ | -mingw32* | -linux-gnu* | -uxpv* | -beos* | -mpeix* | -udk* \ | -interix* | -uwin* | -rhapsody* | -darwin* | -opened* \ | -openstep* | -oskit* | -conix* | -pw32* | -nonstopux* \ - | -storm-chaos* | -tops10* | -tenex* | -tops20* | -its* | -os2*) + | -storm-chaos* | -tops10* | -tenex* | -tops20* | -its* \ + | -os2* | -vos* | -palmos* | -uclinux* | -nucleus* \ + | -morphos* | -superux* | -rtmk* | -rtmk-nova* | -windiss* | -powermax*) # Remember, each alternative MUST END IN *, to match a version number. ;; -qnx*) @@ -1074,12 +1159,18 @@ case $os in -acis*) os=-aos ;; + -atheos*) + os=-atheos + ;; -386bsd) os=-bsd ;; -ctix* | -uts*) os=-sysv ;; + -nova*) + os=-rtmk-nova + ;; -ns2 ) os=-nextstep2 ;; @@ -1154,6 +1245,7 @@ case $basic_machine in arm*-semi) os=-aout ;; + # This must come before the *-dec entry. pdp10-*) os=-tops20 ;; @@ -1184,6 +1276,9 @@ case $basic_machine in mips*-*) os=-elf ;; + or32-*) + os=-coff + ;; *-tti) # must be before sparc entry or we get the wrong os. os=-sysv3 ;; @@ -1331,7 +1426,7 @@ case $basic_machine in -ptx*) vendor=sequent ;; - -vxsim* | -vxworks*) + -vxsim* | -vxworks* | -windiss*) vendor=wrs ;; -aux*) @@ -1346,6 +1441,9 @@ case $basic_machine in -*mint | -mint[0-9]* | -*MiNT | -MiNT[0-9]*) vendor=atari ;; + -vos*) + vendor=stratus + ;; esac basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed "s/unknown/$vendor/"` ;; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/configure.ac b/crypto/openssh/configure.ac index ad5d5cd..5fe50e5 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/configure.ac +++ b/crypto/openssh/configure.ac @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.72 2002/06/25 22:35:16 tim Exp $ +# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.89 2002/09/26 00:38:47 tim Exp $ AC_INIT AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c]) @@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ AC_PATH_PROGS(PERL, perl5 perl) AC_SUBST(PERL) AC_PATH_PROG(ENT, ent) AC_SUBST(ENT) -AC_PATH_PROGS(FILEPRIV, filepriv, true, /sbin:/usr/sbin) AC_PATH_PROG(TEST_MINUS_S_SH, bash) AC_PATH_PROG(TEST_MINUS_S_SH, ksh) AC_PATH_PROG(TEST_MINUS_S_SH, sh) @@ -71,7 +70,12 @@ case "$host" in ) LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" fi - AC_CHECK_FUNC(authenticate, [AC_DEFINE(WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE)]) + AC_CHECK_FUNC(authenticate, [AC_DEFINE(WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE)], + [AC_CHECK_LIB(s,authenticate, + [ AC_DEFINE(WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE) + LIBS="$LIBS -ls" + ]) + ]) AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_REALPATH) dnl AIX handles lastlog as part of its login message @@ -86,14 +90,24 @@ case "$host" in AC_DEFINE(IPV4_DEFAULT) AC_DEFINE(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN) AC_DEFINE(NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS) - AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_FD_PASSING) + AC_DEFINE(NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT) + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) AC_DEFINE(SETGROUPS_NOOP) ;; *-*-dgux*) AC_DEFINE(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN) ;; *-*-darwin*) - AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) + AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have working getaddrinfo) + AC_TRY_RUN([#include <mach-o/dyld.h> +main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16)) + exit(0); + else + exit(1); +}], [AC_MSG_RESULT(working)], + [AC_MSG_RESULT(buggy) + AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO)], + [AC_MSG_RESULT(assume it is working)]) ;; *-*-hpux10.26) if test -z "$GCC"; then @@ -108,7 +122,8 @@ case "$host" in AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW) AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP) AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_PSTAT) - LIBS="$LIBS -lxnet -lsec -lsecpw" + LIBS="$LIBS -lsec -lsecpw" + AC_CHECK_LIB(xnet, t_error, ,AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***])) disable_ptmx_check=yes ;; *-*-hpux10*) @@ -123,7 +138,8 @@ case "$host" in AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW) AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP) AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_PSTAT) - LIBS="$LIBS -lxnet -lsec" + LIBS="$LIBS -lsec" + AC_CHECK_LIB(xnet, t_error, ,AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***])) ;; *-*-hpux11*) CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1" @@ -135,7 +151,8 @@ case "$host" in AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW) AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP) AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_PSTAT) - LIBS="$LIBS -lxnet -lsec" + LIBS="$LIBS -lsec" + AC_CHECK_LIB(xnet, t_error, ,AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***])) ;; *-*-irix5*) CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include" @@ -167,6 +184,7 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4) SONY=1 ;; *-*-netbsd*) + check_for_libcrypt_before=1 need_dash_r=1 ;; *-*-freebsd*) @@ -267,17 +285,28 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4) AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES) AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SECUREWARE) AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW) - AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_FD_PASSING) + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getluid setluid) MANTYPE=man ;; +*-*-unicosmk*) + no_libsocket=1 + no_libnsl=1 + AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES) + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc -lshare -luex -lacm" + MANTYPE=cat + ;; *-*-unicos*) no_libsocket=1 no_libnsl=1 AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES) - AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_FD_PASSING) - LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -Wl,-Dmsglevel=334:fatal,-L/usr/local/lib" - LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc" + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) + AC_DEFINE(NO_SSH_LASTLOG) + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -Wl,-Dmsglevel=334:fatal" + LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc -lshare -luex -lacm" + MANTYPE=cat ;; *-dec-osf*) AC_MSG_CHECKING(for Digital Unix SIA) @@ -348,14 +377,14 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(libs, # Checks for header files. AC_CHECK_HEADERS(bstring.h crypt.h endian.h floatingpoint.h \ - getopt.h glob.h lastlog.h limits.h login.h \ + getopt.h glob.h ia.h lastlog.h limits.h login.h \ login_cap.h maillock.h netdb.h netgroup.h \ netinet/in_systm.h paths.h pty.h readpassphrase.h \ rpc/types.h security/pam_appl.h shadow.h stddef.h stdint.h \ strings.h sys/bitypes.h sys/bsdtty.h sys/cdefs.h \ sys/mman.h sys/select.h sys/stat.h \ sys/stropts.h sys/sysmacros.h sys/time.h \ - sys/un.h time.h ttyent.h usersec.h \ + sys/un.h time.h tmpdir.h ttyent.h usersec.h \ util.h utime.h utmp.h utmpx.h) # Checks for libraries. @@ -419,7 +448,8 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNC(strcasecmp, [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB(resolv, strcasecmp, LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv") ] ) AC_CHECK_FUNC(utimes, - [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB(c89, utimes, LIBS="$LIBS -lc89") ] + [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB(c89, utimes, [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_UTIMES) + LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"]) ] ) dnl Checks for libutil functions @@ -468,7 +498,7 @@ AC_TRY_RUN( [ #include <sys/types.h> #include <dirent.h> -int main(void){struct dirent d;return(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char));} +int main(void){struct dirent d;exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char));} ], [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], [ @@ -499,7 +529,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(skey, [ #include <stdio.h> #include <skey.h> -int main() { char *ff = skey_keyinfo(""); ff=""; return 0; } +int main() { char *ff = skey_keyinfo(""); ff=""; exit(0); } ], [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], [ @@ -567,7 +597,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(tcp-wrappers, dnl Checks for library functions. AC_CHECK_FUNCS(arc4random b64_ntop bcopy bindresvport_sa \ clock fchmod fchown freeaddrinfo futimes gai_strerror \ - getaddrinfo getcwd getgrouplist getnameinfo getopt \ + getaddrinfo getcwd getgrouplist getnameinfo getopt getpeereid\ getrlimit getrusage getttyent glob inet_aton inet_ntoa \ inet_ntop innetgr login_getcapbool md5_crypt memmove \ mkdtemp mmap ngetaddrinfo openpty ogetaddrinfo readpassphrase \ @@ -577,30 +607,6 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(arc4random b64_ntop bcopy bindresvport_sa \ socketpair strerror strlcat strlcpy strmode strsep sysconf tcgetpgrp \ truncate utimes vhangup vsnprintf waitpid __b64_ntop _getpty) -if test $ac_cv_func_mmap = yes ; then -AC_MSG_CHECKING([for mmap anon shared]) -AC_TRY_RUN( - [ -#include <stdio.h> -#include <sys/mman.h> -#if !defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(MAP_ANONYMOUS) -#define MAP_ANON MAP_ANONYMOUS -#endif -main() { char *p; -p = (char *) mmap(NULL, 10, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_ANON|MAP_SHARED, -1, 0); -if (p == (char *)-1) - exit(1); -exit(0); -} - ], - [ - AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) - AC_DEFINE(HAVE_MMAP_ANON_SHARED) - ], - [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ] -) -fi - dnl IRIX and Solaris 2.5.1 have dirname() in libgen AC_CHECK_FUNCS(dirname, [AC_CHECK_HEADERS(libgen.h)] ,[ AC_CHECK_LIB(gen, dirname,[ @@ -663,7 +669,7 @@ if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then AC_TRY_RUN( [ #include <stdio.h> -int main(void){char b[5];snprintf(b,5,"123456789");return(b[4]!='\0');} +int main(void){char b[5];snprintf(b,5,"123456789");exit(b[4]!='\0');} ], [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], [ @@ -723,6 +729,12 @@ if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then ) fi +# Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL, +# because the system crypt() is more featureful. +if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then + AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt) +fi + # Search for OpenSSL saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" @@ -769,6 +781,70 @@ AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC(RAND_add, AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OPENSSL), ] ) +# Determine OpenSSL header version +AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL header version]) +AC_TRY_RUN( + [ +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <openssl/opensslv.h> +#define DATA "conftest.sslincver" +int main(void) { + FILE *fd; + int rc; + + fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); + if(fd == NULL) + exit(1); + + if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%x (%s)\n", OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) <0) + exit(1); + + exit(0); +} + ], + [ + ssl_header_ver=`cat conftest.sslincver` + AC_MSG_RESULT($ssl_header_ver) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT(not found) + AC_MSG_ERROR(OpenSSL version header not found.) + ] +) + +# Determine OpenSSL library version +AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL library version]) +AC_TRY_RUN( + [ +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <openssl/opensslv.h> +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#define DATA "conftest.ssllibver" +int main(void) { + FILE *fd; + int rc; + + fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); + if(fd == NULL) + exit(1); + + if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%x (%s)\n", SSLeay(), SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION))) <0) + exit(1); + + exit(0); +} + ], + [ + ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver` + AC_MSG_RESULT($ssl_library_ver) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT(not found) + AC_MSG_ERROR(OpenSSL library not found.) + ] +) # Sanity check OpenSSL headers AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's headers match the library]) @@ -776,7 +852,7 @@ AC_TRY_RUN( [ #include <string.h> #include <openssl/opensslv.h> -int main(void) { return(SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1); } +int main(void) { exit(SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1); } ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) @@ -802,7 +878,7 @@ AC_TRY_RUN( [ #include <string.h> #include <openssl/rand.h> -int main(void) { return(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1); } +int main(void) { exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1); } ], [ OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes @@ -1056,7 +1132,16 @@ fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for int64_t type], ac_cv_have_int64_t, [ AC_TRY_COMPILE( - [ #include <sys/types.h> ], + [ +#include <sys/types.h> +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include <stdint.h> +#endif +#include <sys/socket.h> +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H +# include <sys/bitypes.h> +#endif + ], [ int64_t a; a = 1;], [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="no" ] @@ -1064,33 +1149,6 @@ AC_CACHE_CHECK([for int64_t type], ac_cv_have_int64_t, [ ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE(HAVE_INT64_T) - have_int64_t=1 -fi - -if test -z "$have_int64_t" ; then - AC_MSG_CHECKING([for int64_t type in sys/socket.h]) - AC_TRY_COMPILE( - [ #include <sys/socket.h> ], - [ int64_t a; a = 1], - [ - AC_DEFINE(HAVE_INT64_T) - AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) - ], - [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ] - ) -fi - -if test -z "$have_int64_t" ; then - AC_MSG_CHECKING([for int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h]) - AC_TRY_COMPILE( - [ #include <sys/bitypes.h> ], - [ int64_t a; a = 1], - [ - AC_DEFINE(HAVE_INT64_T) - AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) - ], - [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ] - ) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t, [ @@ -1819,7 +1877,7 @@ LIBS="$LIBS $KLIBS $K5LIBS" PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty AC_ARG_WITH(privsep-path, - [ --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot ], + [ --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot (default=/var/empty)], [ if test "x$withval" != "$no" ; then PRIVSEP_PATH=$withval @@ -1836,7 +1894,12 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(xauth, fi ], [ - AC_PATH_PROG(xauth_path, xauth,,$PATH:/usr/X/bin:/usr/bin/X11:/usr/X11R6/bin:/usr/openwin/bin) + TestPath="$PATH" + TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X/bin" + TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/bin/X11" + TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X11R6/bin" + TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/openwin/bin" + AC_PATH_PROG(xauth_path, xauth, , $TestPath) if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth" fi @@ -1890,7 +1953,8 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(mantype, ] ) if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then - AC_PATH_PROGS(NROFF, nroff awf, /bin/false, /usr/bin:/usr/ucb) + TestPath="/usr/bin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/ucb" + AC_PATH_PROGS(NROFF, nroff awf, /bin/false, $TestPath) if ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then MANTYPE=doc elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then diff --git a/crypto/openssh/defines.h b/crypto/openssh/defines.h index b87dbc5..ab19a07 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/defines.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/defines.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ #ifndef _DEFINES_H #define _DEFINES_H -/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.92 2002/06/24 16:26:49 stevesk Exp $ */ +/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.96 2002/09/26 00:38:48 tim Exp $ */ /* Constants */ @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ SCO Open Server 3 has INADDR_LOOPBACK defined in rpc/rpc.h but including rpc/rpc.h breaks Solaris 6 */ #ifndef INADDR_LOOPBACK -#define INADDR_LOOPBACK ((ulong)0x7f000001) +#define INADDR_LOOPBACK ((u_long)0x7f000001) #endif /* Types */ @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ typedef char int8_t; # if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2) typedef short int int16_t; # else -# ifdef _CRAY +# ifdef _UNICOS # if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 4) typedef short int16_t; # else @@ -132,16 +132,16 @@ typedef long int16_t; # endif # else # error "16 bit int type not found." -# endif /* _CRAY */ +# endif /* _UNICOS */ # endif # if (SIZEOF_INT == 4) typedef int int32_t; # else -# ifdef _CRAY +# ifdef _UNICOS typedef long int32_t; # else # error "32 bit int type not found." -# endif /* _CRAY */ +# endif /* _UNICOS */ # endif #endif @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ typedef unsigned char u_int8_t; # if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2) typedef unsigned short int u_int16_t; # else -# ifdef _CRAY +# ifdef _UNICOS # if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 4) typedef unsigned short u_int16_t; # else @@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ typedef unsigned long u_int16_t; # if (SIZEOF_INT == 4) typedef unsigned int u_int32_t; # else -# ifdef _CRAY +# ifdef _UNICOS typedef unsigned long u_int32_t; # else # error "32 bit int type not found." @@ -216,6 +216,10 @@ typedef unsigned char u_char; # define HAVE_U_CHAR #endif /* HAVE_U_CHAR */ +#ifndef SIZE_T_MAX +#define SIZE_T_MAX ULONG_MAX +#endif /* SIZE_T_MAX */ + #ifndef HAVE_SIZE_T typedef unsigned int size_t; # define HAVE_SIZE_T diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dh.c b/crypto/openssh/dh.c index 33187e0..6ec3786 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/dh.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/dh.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.21 2002/03/06 00:23:27 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.22 2002/06/27 08:49:44 markus Exp $"); #include "xmalloc.h" @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg) /* Ignore leading whitespace */ if (*arg == '\0') arg = strdelim(&cp); - if (!*arg || *arg == '#') + if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#') return 0; /* time */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c index cefff8d..dcee034 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.29 2001/12/18 10:04:21 jakob Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.30 2002/07/24 16:11:18 markus Exp $"); #include "packet.h" #include "match.h" @@ -91,11 +91,14 @@ hostfile_check_key(int bits, Key *key, const char *host, const char *filename, i * in the list of our known hosts. Returns HOST_OK if the host is known and * has the specified key, HOST_NEW if the host is not known, and HOST_CHANGED * if the host is known but used to have a different host key. + * + * If no 'key' has been specified and a key of type 'keytype' is known + * for the specified host, then HOST_FOUND is returned. */ -HostStatus -check_host_in_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, Key *key, - Key *found, int *numret) +static HostStatus +check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(const char *filename, + const char *host, Key *key, int keytype, Key *found, int *numret) { FILE *f; char line[8192]; @@ -105,8 +108,7 @@ check_host_in_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, Key *key, HostStatus end_return; debug3("check_host_in_hostfile: filename %s", filename); - if (key == NULL) - fatal("no key to look up"); + /* Open the file containing the list of known hosts. */ f = fopen(filename, "r"); if (!f) @@ -147,12 +149,20 @@ check_host_in_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, Key *key, */ if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, found)) continue; - if (!hostfile_check_key(kbits, found, host, filename, linenum)) - continue; if (numret != NULL) *numret = linenum; + if (key == NULL) { + /* we found a key of the requested type */ + if (found->type == keytype) + return HOST_FOUND; + continue; + } + + if (!hostfile_check_key(kbits, found, host, filename, linenum)) + continue; + /* Check if the current key is the same as the given key. */ if (key_equal(key, found)) { /* Ok, they match. */ @@ -177,6 +187,24 @@ check_host_in_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, Key *key, return end_return; } +HostStatus +check_host_in_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, Key *key, + Key *found, int *numret) +{ + if (key == NULL) + fatal("no key to look up"); + return (check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(filename, host, key, 0, + found, numret)); +} + +int +lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(const char *filename, const char *host, + int keytype, Key *found, int *numret) +{ + return (check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(filename, host, NULL, + keytype, found, numret) == HOST_FOUND); +} + /* * Appends an entry to the host file. Returns false if the entry could not * be appended. diff --git a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.h b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.h index 0244fdb..1df7a22 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.10 2001/12/18 10:04:21 jakob Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.12 2002/09/08 20:24:08 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> @@ -15,12 +15,14 @@ #define HOSTFILE_H typedef enum { - HOST_OK, HOST_NEW, HOST_CHANGED + HOST_OK, HOST_NEW, HOST_CHANGED, HOST_FOUND } HostStatus; int hostfile_read_key(char **, u_int *, Key *); HostStatus check_host_in_hostfile(const char *, const char *, Key *, Key *, int *); int add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *, Key *); +int +lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(const char *, const char *, int , Key *, int *); #endif diff --git a/crypto/openssh/includes.h b/crypto/openssh/includes.h index e20d7a5..d7b875c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/includes.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/includes.h @@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (char *)rcsid, "\100(#)" msg } #ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H # include <sys/un.h> /* For sockaddr_un */ #endif +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include <stdint.h> +#endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H # include <sys/bitypes.h> /* For u_intXX_t */ #endif @@ -146,6 +149,14 @@ static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (char *)rcsid, "\100(#)" msg } # include <readpassphrase.h> #endif +#ifdef HAVE_IA_H +# include <ia.h> +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_TMPDIR_H +# include <tmpdir.h> +#endif + #include <openssl/opensslv.h> /* For OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ #include "defines.h" diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kex.h b/crypto/openssh/kex.h index 12edcdc..93a529e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/kex.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/kex.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.31 2002/05/16 22:02:50 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.32 2002/09/09 14:54:14 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ struct Newkeys { }; struct Kex { u_char *session_id; - int session_id_len; + u_int session_id_len; Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX]; int we_need; int server; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/key.c b/crypto/openssh/key.c index fb1f841..9806a72 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/key.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/key.c @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.45 2002/06/23 03:26:19 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.49 2002/09/09 14:54:14 markus Exp $"); #include <openssl/evp.h> @@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ key_equal(Key *a, Key *b) return 0; } -static u_char* +static u_char * key_fingerprint_raw(Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, u_int *dgst_raw_length) { const EVP_MD *md = NULL; @@ -227,8 +227,8 @@ key_fingerprint_raw(Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, u_int *dgst_raw_length) return retval; } -static char* -key_fingerprint_hex(u_char* dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len) +static char * +key_fingerprint_hex(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len) { char *retval; int i; @@ -244,8 +244,8 @@ key_fingerprint_hex(u_char* dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len) return retval; } -static char* -key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char* dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len) +static char * +key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len) { char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' }; char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm', @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char* dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len) return retval; } -char* +char * key_fingerprint(Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, enum fp_rep dgst_rep) { char *retval = NULL; @@ -494,7 +494,8 @@ key_write(Key *key, FILE *f) { int n, success = 0; u_int len, bits = 0; - u_char *blob, *uu; + u_char *blob; + char *uu; if (key->type == KEY_RSA1 && key->rsa != NULL) { /* size of modulus 'n' */ @@ -729,7 +730,6 @@ key_to_blob(Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp) { Buffer b; int len; - u_char *buf; if (key == NULL) { error("key_to_blob: key == NULL"); @@ -755,14 +755,14 @@ key_to_blob(Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp) return 0; } len = buffer_len(&b); - buf = xmalloc(len); - memcpy(buf, buffer_ptr(&b), len); - memset(buffer_ptr(&b), 0, len); - buffer_free(&b); if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; - if (blobp != NULL) - *blobp = buf; + if (blobp != NULL) { + *blobp = xmalloc(len); + memcpy(*blobp, buffer_ptr(&b), len); + } + memset(buffer_ptr(&b), 0, len); + buffer_free(&b); return len; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/log.c b/crypto/openssh/log.c index c88f632..96626d7 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/log.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/log.c @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.22 2002/02/22 12:20:34 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.24 2002/07/19 15:43:33 markus Exp $"); #include "log.h" #include "xmalloc.h" @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ SyslogFacility log_facility_number(char *name) { int i; + if (name != NULL) for (i = 0; log_facilities[i].name; i++) if (strcasecmp(log_facilities[i].name, name) == 0) @@ -103,6 +104,7 @@ LogLevel log_level_number(char *name) { int i; + if (name != NULL) for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name; i++) if (strcasecmp(log_levels[i].name, name) == 0) @@ -116,6 +118,7 @@ void error(const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; + va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, fmt, args); va_end(args); @@ -127,6 +130,7 @@ void log(const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; + va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, fmt, args); va_end(args); @@ -138,6 +142,7 @@ void verbose(const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; + va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, fmt, args); va_end(args); @@ -149,6 +154,7 @@ void debug(const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; + va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, fmt, args); va_end(args); @@ -158,6 +164,7 @@ void debug2(const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; + va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, fmt, args); va_end(args); @@ -167,6 +174,7 @@ void debug3(const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; + va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, fmt, args); va_end(args); @@ -215,6 +223,18 @@ fatal_remove_cleanup(void (*proc) (void *context), void *context) (u_long) proc, (u_long) context); } +/* Remove all cleanups, to be called after fork() */ +void +fatal_remove_all_cleanups(void) +{ + struct fatal_cleanup *cu, *next_cu; + + for (cu = fatal_cleanups; cu; cu = next_cu) { + next_cu = cu->next; + xfree(cu); + } +} + /* Cleanup and exit */ void fatal_cleanup(void) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/log.h b/crypto/openssh/log.h index 3e4c3c3..917fafa 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/log.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/log.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.7 2002/05/19 20:54:52 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.8 2002/07/19 15:43:33 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ void debug3(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); void fatal_cleanup(void); void fatal_add_cleanup(void (*) (void *), void *); void fatal_remove_cleanup(void (*) (void *), void *); +void fatal_remove_all_cleanups(void); void do_log(LogLevel, const char *, va_list); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c b/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c index 609e847..02c3106 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" -RCSID("$Id: loginrec.c,v 1.40 2002/04/23 13:09:19 djm Exp $"); +RCSID("$Id: loginrec.c,v 1.44 2002/09/26 00:38:49 tim Exp $"); #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include <util.h> @@ -622,13 +622,13 @@ construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li, switch (li->type) { case LTYPE_LOGIN: ut->ut_type = USER_PROCESS; -#ifdef _CRAY +#ifdef _UNICOS cray_set_tmpdir(ut); #endif break; case LTYPE_LOGOUT: ut->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS; -#ifdef _CRAY +#ifdef _UNICOS cray_retain_utmp(ut, li->pid); #endif break; @@ -1249,7 +1249,7 @@ wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) } if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) { log("wtmpx_get_entry: couldn't stat %s: %s", - WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); + WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return 0; } @@ -1271,6 +1271,7 @@ wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) /* Logouts are recorded as a blank username on a particular line. * So, we just need to find the username in struct utmpx */ if ( wtmpx_islogin(li, &utx) ) { + found = 1; # ifdef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX li->tv_sec = utx.ut_tv.tv_sec; # else diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c index 89b712f..4ad3f3d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.18 2002/06/26 13:20:57 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.29 2002/09/26 11:38:43 markus Exp $"); #include <openssl/dh.h> @@ -120,6 +120,13 @@ int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *); #endif +#ifdef KRB4 +int mm_answer_krb4(int, Buffer *); +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 +int mm_answer_krb5(int, Buffer *); +#endif + static Authctxt *authctxt; static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */ @@ -127,8 +134,8 @@ static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */ static u_char *key_blob = NULL; static u_int key_bloblen = 0; static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY; -static u_char *hostbased_cuser = NULL; -static u_char *hostbased_chost = NULL; +static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL; +static char *hostbased_chost = NULL; static char *auth_method = "unknown"; static int session_id2_len = 0; static u_char *session_id2 = NULL; @@ -199,6 +206,12 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = { #ifdef USE_PAM {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start}, #endif +#ifdef KRB4 + {MONITOR_REQ_KRB4, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTH, mm_answer_krb4}, +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + {MONITOR_REQ_KRB5, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTH, mm_answer_krb5}, +#endif {0, 0, NULL} }; @@ -455,7 +468,7 @@ mm_answer_sign(int socket, Buffer *m) p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen); if (datlen != 20) - fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, datlen); + fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen); /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */ if (session_id2_len == 0) { @@ -469,7 +482,7 @@ mm_answer_sign(int socket, Buffer *m) if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0) fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__); - debug3("%s: signature %p(%d)", __func__, signature, siglen); + debug3("%s: signature %p(%u)", __func__, signature, siglen); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen); @@ -559,7 +572,7 @@ int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int socket, Buffer *m) mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m); if (banner != NULL) - free(banner); + xfree(banner); return (0); } @@ -587,7 +600,8 @@ mm_answer_authpassword(int socket, Buffer *m) { static int call_count; char *passwd; - int authenticated, plen; + int authenticated; + u_int plen; passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen); /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */ @@ -750,7 +764,8 @@ int mm_answer_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m) { Key *key; - u_char *cuser, *chost, *blob; + char *cuser, *chost; + u_char *blob; u_int bloblen; enum mm_keytype type = 0; int allowed = 0; @@ -826,7 +841,7 @@ static int monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen) { Buffer b; - u_char *p; + char *p; u_int len; int fail = 0; @@ -879,11 +894,11 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen) } static int -monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, u_char *cuser, - u_char *chost) +monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser, + char *chost) { Buffer b; - u_char *p; + char *p; u_int len; int fail = 0; @@ -1001,8 +1016,8 @@ mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw) * the address be 0.0.0.0. */ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); + fromlen = sizeof(from); if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { - fromlen = sizeof(from); if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) { debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); @@ -1012,7 +1027,7 @@ mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw) /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */ record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.verify_reverse_mapping), - (struct sockaddr *)&from); + (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen); } static void @@ -1276,6 +1291,89 @@ mm_answer_rsa_response(int socket, Buffer *m) return (success); } +#ifdef KRB4 +int +mm_answer_krb4(int socket, Buffer *m) +{ + KTEXT_ST auth, reply; + char *client, *p; + int success; + u_int alen; + + reply.length = auth.length = 0; + + p = buffer_get_string(m, &alen); + if (alen >= MAX_KTXT_LEN) + fatal("%s: auth too large", __func__); + memcpy(auth.dat, p, alen); + auth.length = alen; + memset(p, 0, alen); + xfree(p); + + success = options.kerberos_authentication && + authctxt->valid && + auth_krb4(authctxt, &auth, &client, &reply); + + memset(auth.dat, 0, alen); + buffer_clear(m); + buffer_put_int(m, success); + + if (success) { + buffer_put_cstring(m, client); + buffer_put_string(m, reply.dat, reply.length); + if (client) + xfree(client); + if (reply.length) + memset(reply.dat, 0, reply.length); + } + + debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, success); + mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KRB4, m); + + auth_method = "kerberos"; + + /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */ + return (success); +} +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5 +int +mm_answer_krb5(int socket, Buffer *m) +{ + krb5_data tkt, reply; + char *client_user; + u_int len; + int success; + + /* use temporary var to avoid size issues on 64bit arch */ + tkt.data = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + tkt.length = len; + + success = options.kerberos_authentication && + authctxt->valid && + auth_krb5(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user, &reply); + + if (tkt.length) + xfree(tkt.data); + + buffer_clear(m); + buffer_put_int(m, success); + + if (success) { + buffer_put_cstring(m, client_user); + buffer_put_string(m, reply.data, reply.length); + if (client_user) + xfree(client_user); + if (reply.length) + xfree(reply.data); + } + mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KRB5, m); + + return success; +} +#endif + int mm_answer_term(int socket, Buffer *req) { @@ -1453,10 +1551,10 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) void * mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size) { - int len = size * ncount; + size_t len = size * ncount; void *address; - if (len <= 0) + if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_T_MAX / size) fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size); address = mm_malloc(mm, len); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor.h index 69114b5..668ac98 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/monitor.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.6 2002/06/11 05:46:20 mpech Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.8 2002/09/26 11:38:43 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu> @@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, + MONITOR_REQ_KRB4, MONITOR_ANS_KRB4, + MONITOR_REQ_KRB5, MONITOR_ANS_KRB5, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MONITOR_REQ_TERM }; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.c index 0d7628f..641ce72 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.c @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.3 2002/06/04 23:05:49 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.4 2002/06/26 14:50:04 deraadt Exp $"); #include <sys/uio.h> @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ mm_send_fd(int socket, int fd) struct msghdr msg; struct iovec vec; char ch = '\0'; - int n; + ssize_t n; #ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR char tmp[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))]; struct cmsghdr *cmsg; @@ -67,8 +67,8 @@ mm_send_fd(int socket, int fd) fatal("%s: sendmsg(%d): %s", __func__, fd, strerror(errno)); if (n != 1) - fatal("%s: sendmsg: expected sent 1 got %d", - __func__, n); + fatal("%s: sendmsg: expected sent 1 got %ld", + __func__, (long)n); #else fatal("%s: UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes not supported", __func__); @@ -81,8 +81,9 @@ mm_receive_fd(int socket) #if defined(HAVE_RECVMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR)) struct msghdr msg; struct iovec vec; + ssize_t n; char ch; - int fd, n; + int fd; #ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR char tmp[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))]; struct cmsghdr *cmsg; @@ -104,8 +105,8 @@ mm_receive_fd(int socket) if ((n = recvmsg(socket, &msg, 0)) == -1) fatal("%s: recvmsg: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (n != 1) - fatal("%s: recvmsg: expected received 1 got %d", - __func__, n); + fatal("%s: recvmsg: expected received 1 got %ld", + __func__, (long)n); #ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR if (msg.msg_accrightslen != sizeof(fd)) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.c index c363036..b4a6e40 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.c @@ -24,12 +24,13 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_mm.c,v 1.6 2002/06/04 23:05:49 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_mm.c,v 1.8 2002/08/02 14:43:15 millert Exp $"); #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H #include <sys/mman.h> #endif +#include "openbsd-compat/xmmap.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" @@ -38,7 +39,14 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_mm.c,v 1.6 2002/06/04 23:05:49 markus Exp $"); static int mm_compare(struct mm_share *a, struct mm_share *b) { - return ((char *)a->address - (char *)b->address); + long diff = (char *)a->address - (char *)b->address; + + if (diff == 0) + return (0); + else if (diff < 0) + return (-1); + else + return (1); } RB_GENERATE(mmtree, mm_share, next, mm_compare) @@ -84,15 +92,9 @@ mm_create(struct mm_master *mmalloc, size_t size) */ mm->mmalloc = mmalloc; -#ifdef HAVE_MMAP_ANON_SHARED - address = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_ANON|MAP_SHARED, - -1, 0); + address = xmmap(size); if (address == MAP_FAILED) fatal("mmap(%lu): %s", (u_long)size, strerror(errno)); -#else - fatal("%s: UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes and Compression=yes not supported", - __func__); -#endif mm->address = address; mm->size = size; @@ -130,7 +132,7 @@ mm_destroy(struct mm_master *mm) mm_freelist(mm->mmalloc, &mm->rb_free); mm_freelist(mm->mmalloc, &mm->rb_allocated); -#ifdef HAVE_MMAP_ANON_SHARED +#ifdef HAVE_MMAP if (munmap(mm->address, mm->size) == -1) fatal("munmap(%p, %lu): %s", mm->address, (u_long)mm->size, strerror(errno)); @@ -165,8 +167,10 @@ mm_malloc(struct mm_master *mm, size_t size) if (size == 0) fatal("mm_malloc: try to allocate 0 space"); + if (size > SIZE_T_MAX - MM_MINSIZE + 1) + fatal("mm_malloc: size too big"); - size = ((size + MM_MINSIZE - 1) / MM_MINSIZE) * MM_MINSIZE; + size = ((size + (MM_MINSIZE - 1)) / MM_MINSIZE) * MM_MINSIZE; RB_FOREACH(mms, mmtree, &mm->rb_free) { if (mms->size >= size) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.h index c0a66d5..a1323b9 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.h @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ #ifndef _MM_H_ #define _MM_H_ -#include "openbsd-compat/tree.h" +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h" struct mm_share { RB_ENTRY(mm_share) next; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c index f7e332d..4c53bfd 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.11 2002/06/19 18:01:00 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.19 2002/09/26 11:38:43 markus Exp $"); #include <openssl/bn.h> #include <openssl/dh.h> @@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ extern Buffer input, output; void mm_request_send(int socket, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m) { - u_char buf[5]; u_int mlen = buffer_len(m); + u_char buf[5]; debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type); @@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ void mm_request_receive(int socket, Buffer *m) { u_char buf[4]; - ssize_t res; u_int msg_len; + ssize_t res; debug3("%s entering", __func__); @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ mm_getpwnamallow(const char *login) return (pw); } -char* mm_auth2_read_banner(void) +char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void) { Buffer m; char *banner; @@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen) enc->key = buffer_get_string(&b, &enc->key_len); enc->iv = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); if (len != enc->block_size) - fatal("%s: bad ivlen: expected %d != %d", __func__, + fatal("%s: bad ivlen: expected %u != %u", __func__, enc->block_size, len); if (enc->name == NULL || cipher_by_name(enc->name) != enc->cipher) @@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen) mac->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b); mac->key = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); if (len > mac->key_len) - fatal("%s: bad mac key length: %d > %d", __func__, len, + fatal("%s: bad mac key length: %u > %d", __func__, len, mac->key_len); mac->key_len = len; @@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen) len = buffer_len(&b); if (len != 0) - error("newkeys_from_blob: remaining bytes in blob %d", len); + error("newkeys_from_blob: remaining bytes in blob %u", len); buffer_free(&b); return (newkey); } @@ -446,7 +446,6 @@ mm_newkeys_to_blob(int mode, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp) { Buffer b; int len; - u_char *buf; Enc *enc; Mac *mac; Comp *comp; @@ -484,14 +483,14 @@ mm_newkeys_to_blob(int mode, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp) buffer_put_cstring(&b, comp->name); len = buffer_len(&b); - buf = xmalloc(len); - memcpy(buf, buffer_ptr(&b), len); - memset(buffer_ptr(&b), 0, len); - buffer_free(&b); if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; - if (blobp != NULL) - *blobp = buf; + if (blobp != NULL) { + *blobp = xmalloc(len); + memcpy(*blobp, buffer_ptr(&b), len); + } + memset(buffer_ptr(&b), 0, len); + buffer_free(&b); return len; } @@ -600,7 +599,7 @@ int mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, int namebuflen) { Buffer m; - u_char *p; + char *p; int success = 0; buffer_init(&m); @@ -705,7 +704,7 @@ mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, *name = xstrdup(""); *infotxt = xstrdup(""); *numprompts = 1; - *prompts = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(char*)); + *prompts = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(char *)); *echo_on = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(u_int)); (*echo_on)[0] = 0; } @@ -937,3 +936,74 @@ mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16]) return (success); } + +#ifdef KRB4 +int +mm_auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, void *_auth, char **client, void *_reply) +{ + KTEXT auth, reply; + Buffer m; + u_int rlen; + int success = 0; + char *p; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + auth = _auth; + reply = _reply; + + buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_string(&m, auth->dat, auth->length); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KRB4, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KRB4, &m); + + success = buffer_get_int(&m); + if (success) { + *client = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); + p = buffer_get_string(&m, &rlen); + if (rlen >= MAX_KTXT_LEN) + fatal("%s: reply from monitor too large", __func__); + reply->length = rlen; + memcpy(reply->dat, p, rlen); + memset(p, 0, rlen); + xfree(p); + } + buffer_free(&m); + return (success); +} +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5 +int +mm_auth_krb5(void *ctx, void *argp, char **userp, void *resp) +{ + krb5_data *tkt, *reply; + Buffer m; + int success; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + tkt = (krb5_data *) argp; + reply = (krb5_data *) resp; + + buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_string(&m, tkt->data, tkt->length); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KRB5, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KRB5, &m); + + success = buffer_get_int(&m); + if (success) { + u_int len; + + *userp = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); + reply->data = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); + reply->length = len; + } else { + memset(reply, 0, sizeof(*reply)); + *userp = NULL; + } + + buffer_free(&m); + return (success); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h index ce72124..d960a3d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.5 2002/05/12 23:53:45 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.8 2002/09/26 11:38:43 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu> @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int); int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int); void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *); struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *); -char* mm_auth2_read_banner(void); +char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void); int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *); int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *); int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *); @@ -83,6 +83,16 @@ int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **); int mm_skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); int mm_skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **); +/* auth_krb */ +#ifdef KRB4 +int mm_auth_krb4(struct Authctxt *, void *, char **, void *); +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 +/* auth and reply are really krb5_data objects, but we don't want to + * include all of the krb5 headers here */ +int mm_auth_krb5(void *authctxt, void *auth, char **client, void *reply); +#endif + /* zlib allocation hooks */ void *mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *, u_int, u_int); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/msg.c b/crypto/openssh/msg.c index 7275c84..107a376 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/msg.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/msg.c @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.3 2002/06/24 15:49:22 itojun Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.4 2002/07/01 16:15:25 deraadt Exp $"); #include "buffer.h" #include "getput.h" @@ -31,43 +31,43 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.3 2002/06/24 15:49:22 itojun Exp $"); #include "msg.h" void -msg_send(int fd, u_char type, Buffer *m) +ssh_msg_send(int fd, u_char type, Buffer *m) { u_char buf[5]; u_int mlen = buffer_len(m); - debug3("msg_send: type %u", (unsigned int)type & 0xff); + debug3("ssh_msg_send: type %u", (unsigned int)type & 0xff); PUT_32BIT(buf, mlen + 1); buf[4] = type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */ if (atomicio(write, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) - fatal("msg_send: write"); + fatal("ssh_msg_send: write"); if (atomicio(write, fd, buffer_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen) - fatal("msg_send: write"); + fatal("ssh_msg_send: write"); } int -msg_recv(int fd, Buffer *m) +ssh_msg_recv(int fd, Buffer *m) { u_char buf[4]; ssize_t res; u_int msg_len; - debug3("msg_recv entering"); + debug3("ssh_msg_recv entering"); res = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (res != sizeof(buf)) { if (res == 0) return -1; - fatal("msg_recv: read: header %ld", (long)res); + fatal("ssh_msg_recv: read: header %ld", (long)res); } msg_len = GET_32BIT(buf); if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) - fatal("msg_recv: read: bad msg_len %d", msg_len); + fatal("ssh_msg_recv: read: bad msg_len %u", msg_len); buffer_clear(m); buffer_append_space(m, msg_len); res = atomicio(read, fd, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len); if (res != msg_len) - fatal("msg_recv: read: %ld != msg_len", (long)res); + fatal("ssh_msg_recv: read: %ld != msg_len", (long)res); return 0; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/msg.h b/crypto/openssh/msg.h index 13fa95b..8980e25 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/msg.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/msg.h @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ #ifndef SSH_MSG_H #define SSH_MSG_H -void msg_send(int, u_char, Buffer *); -int msg_recv(int, Buffer *); +void ssh_msg_send(int, u_char, Buffer *); +int ssh_msg_recv(int, Buffer *); #endif diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in index 3e09cfe..5229e7e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.21 2002/02/19 20:27:57 mouring Exp $ +# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.23 2002/09/12 00:33:02 djm Exp $ sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@ piddir=@piddir@ @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@ OPENBSD=base64.o bindresvport.o daemon.o dirname.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strsep.o -COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-getaddrinfo.o fake-getnameinfo.o +COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-getaddrinfo.o fake-getnameinfo.o xmmap.o PORTS=port-irix.o port-aix.o diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.c index d12b993..005170b 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: base64.c,v 1.3 1997/11/08 20:46:55 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: base64.c,v 1.4 2002/01/02 23:00:10 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium. @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ * IF IBM IS APPRISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. */ -#include "config.h" +#include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP) @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ #include "base64.h" +/* XXX abort illegal in library */ #define Assert(Cond) if (!(Cond)) abort() static const char Base64[] = diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c index 332bcb0..620f980 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ * Mountain View, California 94043 */ -#include "config.h" +#include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c index 9bab75b..edb3112 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * $Id: bsd-cray.c,v 1.6 2002/05/15 16:39:51 mouring Exp $ + * $Id: bsd-cray.c,v 1.8 2002/09/26 00:38:51 tim Exp $ * * bsd-cray.c * @@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ * on UNICOS systems. * */ +#ifdef _UNICOS -#ifdef _CRAY #include <udb.h> #include <tmpdir.h> #include <unistd.h> @@ -45,19 +45,33 @@ #include <signal.h> #include <sys/priv.h> #include <sys/secparm.h> +#include <sys/tfm.h> #include <sys/usrv.h> #include <sys/sysv.h> #include <sys/sectab.h> +#include <sys/secstat.h> #include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/session.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <pwd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <errno.h> - +#include <ia.h> +#include <urm.h> +#include "ssh.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "servconf.h" #include "bsd-cray.h" +#define MAXACID 80 + +extern ServerOptions options; + char cray_tmpdir[TPATHSIZ+1]; /* job TMPDIR path */ +struct sysv sysv; /* system security structure */ +struct usrv usrv; /* user security structure */ + /* * Functions. */ @@ -65,68 +79,538 @@ void cray_retain_utmp(struct utmp *, int); void cray_delete_tmpdir(char *, int, uid_t); void cray_init_job(struct passwd *); void cray_set_tmpdir(struct utmp *); +void cray_login_failure(char *, int); +int cray_setup(uid_t, char *, const char *); +int cray_access_denied(char *); + +void +cray_login_failure(char *username, int errcode) +{ + struct udb *ueptr; /* UDB pointer for username */ + ia_failure_t fsent; /* ia_failure structure */ + ia_failure_ret_t fret; /* ia_failure return stuff */ + struct jtab jtab; /* job table structure */ + int jid = 0; /* job id */ + + if ((jid = getjtab(&jtab)) < 0) { + debug("cray_login_failure(): getjtab error"); + } + getsysudb(); + if ((ueptr = getudbnam(username)) == UDB_NULL) { + debug("cray_login_failure(): getudbname() returned NULL"); + } + endudb(); + fsent.revision = 0; + fsent.uname = username; + fsent.host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping); + fsent.ttyn = "sshd"; + fsent.caller = IA_SSHD; + fsent.flags = IA_INTERACTIVE; + fsent.ueptr = ueptr; + fsent.jid = jid; + fsent.errcode = errcode; + fsent.pwdp = NULL; + fsent.exitcode = 0; /* dont exit in ia_failure() */ + + fret.revision = 0; + fret.normal = 0; + /* + * Call ia_failure because of an login failure. + */ + ia_failure(&fsent,&fret); +} /* - * Orignal written by: - * Wayne Schroeder - * San Diego Supercomputer Center - * schroeder@sdsc.edu -*/ -void -cray_setup(uid_t uid, char *username) + * Cray access denied + */ +int +cray_access_denied(char *username) { - struct udb *p; + struct udb *ueptr; /* UDB pointer for username */ + int errcode; /* IA errorcode */ + + errcode = 0; + getsysudb(); + if ((ueptr = getudbnam(username)) == UDB_NULL) { + debug("cray_login_failure(): getudbname() returned NULL"); + } + endudb(); + if (ueptr && ueptr->ue_disabled) + errcode = IA_DISABLED; + if (errcode) + cray_login_failure(username, errcode); + return (errcode); +} + +int +cray_setup (uid_t uid, char *username, const char *command) +{ + extern struct udb *getudb(); extern char *setlimits(); - int i, j; - int accts[MAXVIDS]; - int naccts; - int err; - char *sr; - int pid; - struct jtab jbuf; - int jid; - if ((jid = getjtab(&jbuf)) < 0) - fatal("getjtab: no jid"); - - err = setudb(); /* open and rewind the Cray User DataBase */ - if (err != 0) - fatal("UDB open failure"); - naccts = 0; - p = getudbnam(username); - if (p == NULL) - fatal("No UDB entry for %.100s", username); - if (uid != p->ue_uid) - fatal("UDB entry %.100s uid(%d) does not match uid %d", - username, (int) p->ue_uid, (int) uid); - for (j = 0; p->ue_acids[j] != -1 && j < MAXVIDS; j++) { - accts[naccts] = p->ue_acids[j]; - naccts++; + int err; /* error return */ + time_t system_time; /* current system clock */ + time_t expiration_time; /* password expiration time */ + int maxattempts; /* maximum no. of failed login attempts */ + int SecureSys; /* unicos security flag */ + int minslevel = 0; /* system minimum security level */ + int i, j; + int valid_acct = -1; /* flag for reading valid acct */ + char acct_name[MAXACID] = { "" }; /* used to read acct name */ + struct jtab jtab; /* Job table struct */ + struct udb ue; /* udb entry for logging-in user */ + struct udb *up; /* pointer to UDB entry */ + struct secstat secinfo; /* file security attributes */ + struct servprov init_info; /* used for sesscntl() call */ + int jid; /* job ID */ + int pid; /* process ID */ + char *sr; /* status return from setlimits() */ + char *ttyn = NULL; /* ttyname or command name*/ + char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + passwd_t pwdacm, + pwddialup, + pwdudb, + pwdwal, + pwddce; /* passwd stuff for ia_user */ + ia_user_ret_t uret; /* stuff returned from ia_user */ + ia_user_t usent; /* ia_user main structure */ + int ia_rcode; /* ia_user return code */ + ia_failure_t fsent; /* ia_failure structure */ + ia_failure_ret_t fret; /* ia_failure return stuff */ + ia_success_t ssent; /* ia_success structure */ + ia_success_ret_t sret; /* ia_success return stuff */ + int ia_mlsrcode; /* ia_mlsuser return code */ + int secstatrc; /* [f]secstat return code */ + + if (SecureSys = (int)sysconf(_SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS)) { + getsysv(&sysv, sizeof(struct sysv)); + minslevel = sysv.sy_minlvl; + if (getusrv(&usrv) < 0) { + debug("getusrv() failed, errno = %d",errno); + exit(1); + } } - endudb(); /* close the udb */ - - if (naccts != 0) { - /* Perhaps someday we'll prompt users who have multiple accounts - to let them pick one (like CRI's login does), but for now just set - the account to the first entry. */ - if (acctid(0, accts[0]) < 0) - fatal("System call acctid failed, accts[0]=%d", accts[0]); + hostname[0] = '\0'; + strncpy(hostname, + (char *)get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping), + MAXHOSTNAMELEN); + /* + * Fetch user's UDB entry. + */ + getsysudb(); + if ((up = getudbnam(username)) == UDB_NULL) { + debug("cannot fetch user's UDB entry"); + exit(1); + } + + /* + * Prevent any possible fudging so perform a data + * safety check and compare the supplied uid against + * the udb's uid. + */ + if (up->ue_uid != uid) { + debug("IA uid missmatch"); + exit(1); + } + endudb(); + + if ((jid = getjtab (&jtab)) < 0) { + debug("getjtab"); + return -1; + } + pid = getpid(); + ttyn = ttyname(0); + if (SecureSys) { + if (ttyn) { + secstatrc = secstat(ttyn, &secinfo); + } else { + secstatrc = fsecstat(1, &secinfo); + } + if (secstatrc == 0) { + debug("[f]secstat() successful"); + } else { + debug("[f]secstat() error, rc = %d", secstatrc); + exit(1); + } + } + if ((ttyn == NULL) && ((char *)command != NULL)) + ttyn = (char *)command; + /* + * Initialize all structures to call ia_user + */ + usent.revision = 0; + usent.uname = username; + usent.host = hostname; + usent.ttyn = ttyn; + usent.caller = IA_SSHD; + usent.pswdlist = &pwdacm; + usent.ueptr = &ue; + usent.flags = IA_INTERACTIVE | IA_FFLAG; + pwdacm.atype = IA_SECURID; + pwdacm.pwdp = NULL; + pwdacm.next = &pwdudb; + + pwdudb.atype = IA_UDB; + pwdudb.pwdp = NULL; + pwdudb.next = &pwddce; + + pwddce.atype = IA_DCE; + pwddce.pwdp = NULL; + pwddce.next = &pwddialup; + + pwddialup.atype = IA_DIALUP; + pwddialup.pwdp = NULL; + /* pwddialup.next = &pwdwal; */ + pwddialup.next = NULL; + + pwdwal.atype = IA_WAL; + pwdwal.pwdp = NULL; + pwdwal.next = NULL; + + uret.revision = 0; + uret.pswd = NULL; + uret.normal = 0; + + ia_rcode = ia_user(&usent, &uret); + + switch (ia_rcode) { + /* + * These are acceptable return codes from ia_user() + */ + case IA_UDBWEEK: /* Password Expires in 1 week */ + expiration_time = ue.ue_pwage.time + ue.ue_pwage.maxage; + printf ("WARNING - your current password will expire %s\n", + ctime((const time_t *)&expiration_time)); + break; + case IA_UDBEXPIRED: + if (ttyname(0) != NULL) { + /* Force a password change */ + printf("Your password has expired; Choose a new one.\n"); + execl("/bin/passwd", "passwd", username, 0); + exit(9); + } + + break; + case IA_NORMAL: /* Normal Return Code */ + break; + case IA_BACKDOOR: + strcpy(ue.ue_name, "root"); + strcpy(ue.ue_passwd, ""); + strcpy(ue.ue_dir, "/"); + strcpy(ue.ue_shell, "/bin/sh"); + strcpy(ue.ue_age, ""); + strcpy(ue.ue_comment, ""); + strcpy(ue.ue_loghost, ""); + strcpy(ue.ue_logline, ""); + ue.ue_uid=-1; + ue.ue_nice[UDBRC_INTER]=0; + for (i=0;i<MAXVIDS;i++) + ue.ue_gids[i]=0; + ue.ue_logfails=0; + ue.ue_minlvl=minslevel; + ue.ue_maxlvl=minslevel; + ue.ue_deflvl=minslevel; + ue.ue_defcomps=0; + ue.ue_comparts=0; + ue.ue_permits=0; + ue.ue_trap=0; + ue.ue_disabled=0; + ue.ue_logtime=0; + break; + case IA_CONSOLE: /* Superuser not from Console */ + case IA_TRUSTED: /* Trusted user */ + if (options.permit_root_login > PERMIT_NO) + break; /* Accept root login */ + default: + /* + * These are failed return codes from ia_user() + */ + switch (ia_rcode) + { + case IA_BADAUTH: + printf ("Bad authorization, access denied.\n"); + break; + case IA_DIALUPERR: + break; + case IA_DISABLED: + printf ("Your login has been disabled. Contact the system "); + printf ("administrator for assistance.\n"); + break; + case IA_GETSYSV: + printf ("getsysv() failed - errno = %d\n", errno); + break; + case IA_LOCALHOST: + break; + case IA_MAXLOGS: + printf ("Maximum number of failed login attempts exceeded.\n"); + printf ("Access denied.\n"); + break; + case IA_NOPASS: + break; + case IA_PUBLIC: + break; + case IA_SECURIDERR: + break; + case IA_CONSOLE: + break; + case IA_TRUSTED: + break; + case IA_UDBERR: + break; + case IA_UDBPWDNULL: + /* + * NULL password not allowed on MLS systems + */ + if (SecureSys) { + printf("NULL Password not allowed on MLS systems.\n"); + } + break; + case IA_UNKNOWN: + break; + case IA_UNKNOWNYP: + break; + case IA_WALERR: + break; + default: + /* nothing special */ + ; + } /* 2. switch (ia_rcode) */ + /* + * Authentication failed. + */ + printf("sshd: Login incorrect, (0%o)\n", + ia_rcode-IA_ERRORCODE); + + /* + * Initialize structure for ia_failure + * which will exit. + */ + fsent.revision = 0; + fsent.uname = username; + fsent.host = hostname; + fsent.ttyn = ttyn; + fsent.caller = IA_SSHD; + fsent.flags = IA_INTERACTIVE; + fsent.ueptr = &ue; + fsent.jid = jid; + fsent.errcode = ia_rcode; + fsent.pwdp = uret.pswd; + fsent.exitcode = 1; + + fret.revision = 0; + fret.normal = 0; + + /* + * Call ia_failure because of an IA failure. + * There is no return because ia_failure exits. + */ + + ia_failure(&fsent,&fret); + + exit(1); + } /* 1. switch (ia_rcode) */ + ia_mlsrcode = IA_NORMAL; + if (SecureSys) { + debug("calling ia_mlsuser()"); + ia_mlsrcode = ia_mlsuser (&ue, &secinfo, &usrv, NULL, 0); + } + if (ia_mlsrcode != IA_NORMAL) { + printf("sshd: Login incorrect, (0%o)\n", + ia_mlsrcode-IA_ERRORCODE); + /* + * Initialize structure for ia_failure + * which will exit. + */ + fsent.revision = 0; + fsent.uname = username; + fsent.host = hostname; + fsent.ttyn = ttyn; + fsent.caller = IA_SSHD; + fsent.flags = IA_INTERACTIVE; + fsent.ueptr = &ue; + fsent.jid = jid; + fsent.errcode = ia_mlsrcode; + fsent.pwdp = uret.pswd; + fsent.exitcode = 1; + fret.revision = 0; + fret.normal = 0; + + /* + * Call ia_failure because of an IA failure. + * There is no return because ia_failure exits. + */ + ia_failure(&fsent,&fret); + exit(1); } - /* Now set limits, including CPU time for the (interactive) job and process, - and set up permissions (for chown etc), etc. This is via an internal CRI - routine, setlimits, used by CRI's login. */ + /* Provide login status information */ + if (options.print_lastlog && ue.ue_logtime != 0) { + printf("Last successful login was : %.*s ", + 19, (char *)ctime(&ue.ue_logtime)); + + if (*ue.ue_loghost != '\0') + printf("from %.*s\n", sizeof(ue.ue_loghost), ue.ue_loghost); + + else printf("on %.*s\n", sizeof(ue.ue_logline), ue.ue_logline); + + if ( SecureSys && (ue.ue_logfails != 0)) + printf(" followed by %d failed attempts\n", ue.ue_logfails); + } + + + /* + * Call ia_success to process successful I/A. + */ + ssent.revision = 0; + ssent.uname = username; + ssent.host = hostname; + ssent.ttyn = ttyn; + ssent.caller = IA_SSHD; + ssent.flags = IA_INTERACTIVE; + ssent.ueptr = &ue; + ssent.jid = jid; + ssent.errcode = ia_rcode; + ssent.us = NULL; + ssent.time = 1; /* Set ue_logtime */ + + sret.revision = 0; + sret.normal = 0; + + ia_success(&ssent,&sret); + + /* + * Query for account, iff > 1 valid acid & askacid permbit + */ + if (((ue.ue_permbits & PERMBITS_ACCTID) || + (ue.ue_acids[0] >= 0) && (ue.ue_acids[1] >= 0)) && + ue.ue_permbits & PERMBITS_ASKACID) { + if (ttyname(0) != NULL) { + debug("cray_setup: ttyname true case, %.100s", ttyname); + while (valid_acct == -1) { + printf("Account (? for available accounts)" + " [%s]: ", acid2nam(ue.ue_acids[0])); + gets(acct_name); + switch (acct_name[0]) { + case EOF: + exit(0); + break; + case '\0': + valid_acct = ue.ue_acids[0]; + strcpy(acct_name, acid2nam(valid_acct)); + break; + case '?': + /* Print the list 3 wide */ + for (i = 0, j = 0; i < MAXVIDS; i++) { + if (ue.ue_acids[i] == -1) { + printf("\n"); + break; + } + if (++j == 4) { + j = 1; + printf("\n"); + } + printf(" %s", + acid2nam(ue.ue_acids[i])); + } + if (ue.ue_permbits & PERMBITS_ACCTID) + printf("\"acctid\" permbit also allows" + " you to select any valid " + "account name.\n"); + printf("\n"); + break; + default: + if ((valid_acct = nam2acid(acct_name)) == -1) printf("Account id not found for" + " account name \"%s\"\n\n", + acct_name); + break; + } + /* + * If an account was given, search the user's + * acids array to verify they can use this account. + */ + if ((valid_acct != -1) && + !(ue.ue_permbits & PERMBITS_ACCTID)) { + for (i = 0; i < MAXVIDS; i++) { + if (ue.ue_acids[i] == -1) + break; + if (valid_acct == ue.ue_acids[i]) + break; + } + if (i == MAXVIDS || + ue.ue_acids[i] == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "Cannot set" + " account name to " + "\"%s\", permission " + "denied\n\n", acct_name); + valid_acct = -1; + } + } + } + } else { + /* + * The client isn't connected to a terminal and can't + * respond to an acid prompt. Use default acid. + */ + debug("cray_setup: ttyname false case, %.100s", ttyname); + valid_acct = ue.ue_acids[0]; + } + } else { + /* + * The user doesn't have the askacid permbit set or + * only has one valid account to use. + */ + valid_acct = ue.ue_acids[0]; + } + if (acctid(0, valid_acct) < 0) { + printf ("Bad account id: %d\n", valid_acct); + exit(1); + } + +/* set up shares and quotas */ +/* Now set shares, quotas, limits, including CPU time for the (interactive) + * job and process, and set up permissions (for chown etc), etc. + */ + if (setshares(ue.ue_uid, valid_acct, printf, 0, 0)) { + printf("Unable to give %d shares to <%s>(%d/%d)\n", ue.ue_shares, ue.ue_name, ue.ue_uid, valid_acct); + exit(1); + } - pid = getpid(); sr = setlimits(username, C_PROC, pid, UDBRC_INTER); - if (sr != NULL) - fatal("%.200s", sr); - + if (sr != NULL) { + debug("%.200s", sr); + exit(1); + } sr = setlimits(username, C_JOB, jid, UDBRC_INTER); - if (sr != NULL) - fatal("%.200s", sr); + if (sr != NULL) { + debug("%.200s", sr); + exit(1); + } + /* + * Place the service provider information into + * the session table (Unicos) or job table (Unicos/mk). + * There exist double defines for the job/session table in + * unicos/mk (jtab.h) so no need for a compile time switch. + */ + bzero((char *)&init_info, sizeof(struct servprov)); + init_info.s_sessinit.si_id = URM_SPT_LOGIN; + init_info.s_sessinit.si_pid = getpid(); + init_info.s_sessinit.si_sid = jid; + init_info.s_routing.seqno = 0; + init_info.s_routing.iadrs = 0; + sesscntl(0, S_SETSERVPO, (int)&init_info); + /* + * Set user and controlling tty security attributes. + */ + if (SecureSys) { + if (setusrv(&usrv) == -1) { + debug("setusrv() failed, errno = %d",errno); + exit(1); + } + } + + return(0); } /* @@ -143,7 +627,6 @@ drop_cray_privs() int result; extern int priv_set_proc(); extern priv_proc_t* priv_init_proc(); - struct usrv usrv; /* * If ether of theses two flags are not set @@ -154,9 +637,23 @@ drop_cray_privs() if (!sysconf(_SC_CRAY_POSIX_PRIV)) fatal("Not POSIX_PRIV."); - debug("Dropping privileges."); + debug("Setting MLS labels.");; + + if (sysconf(_SC_CRAY_SECURE_MAC)) { + usrv.sv_minlvl = SYSLOW; + usrv.sv_actlvl = SYSHIGH; + usrv.sv_maxlvl = SYSHIGH; + } else { + usrv.sv_minlvl = sysv.sy_minlvl; + usrv.sv_actlvl = sysv.sy_minlvl; + usrv.sv_maxlvl = sysv.sy_maxlvl; + } + usrv.sv_actcmp = 0; + usrv.sv_valcmp = sysv.sy_valcmp; + + usrv.sv_intcat = TFM_SYSTEM; + usrv.sv_valcat |= (TFM_SYSTEM | TFM_SYSFILE); - memset(&usrv, 0, sizeof(usrv)); if (setusrv(&usrv) < 0) fatal("%s(%d): setusrv(): %s", __FILE__, __LINE__, strerror(errno)); @@ -189,7 +686,6 @@ cray_retain_utmp(struct utmp *ut, int pid) while (read(fd, (char *)&utmp, sizeof(utmp)) == sizeof(utmp)) { if (pid == utmp.ut_pid) { ut->ut_jid = utmp.ut_jid; - /* XXX: MIN_SIZEOF here? can this go in loginrec? */ strncpy(ut->ut_tpath, utmp.ut_tpath, sizeof(utmp.ut_tpath)); strncpy(ut->ut_host, utmp.ut_host, sizeof(utmp.ut_host)); strncpy(ut->ut_name, utmp.ut_name, sizeof(utmp.ut_name)); @@ -198,7 +694,8 @@ cray_retain_utmp(struct utmp *ut, int pid) } close(fd); } - /* XXX: error message? */ + else + fatal("Unable to open utmp file"); } /* @@ -245,7 +742,7 @@ cray_job_termination_handler(int sig) char *login = NULL; struct jtab jtab; - debug("Received SIG JOB."); + debug("received signal %d",sig); if ((jid = waitjob(&jtab)) == -1 || (login = uid2nam(jtab.j_uid)) == NULL) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h index 9067a38..8868b43 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * $Id: bsd-cray.h,v 1.3 2002/05/15 16:39:52 mouring Exp $ + * $Id: bsd-cray.h,v 1.5 2002/09/26 00:38:51 tim Exp $ * * bsd-cray.h * @@ -37,11 +37,18 @@ #ifndef _BSD_CRAY_H #define _BSD_CRAY_H -#ifdef _CRAY -void cray_init_job(struct passwd *); /* init cray job */ -void cray_job_termination_handler(int); /* process end of job signal */ -void cray_setup(uid_t, char *); /* set cray limits */ +#ifdef _UNICOS +void cray_init_job(struct passwd *); /* init cray job */ +void cray_job_termination_handler(int); /* process end of job signal */ +void cray_login_failure(char *username, int errcode); +int cray_access_denied(char *username); extern char cray_tmpdir[]; /* cray tmpdir */ +#ifndef IA_SSHD +#define IA_SSHD IA_LOGIN +#endif +#ifndef MAXHOSTNAMELEN +#define MAXHOSTNAMELEN 64 +#endif #endif #endif /* _BSD_CRAY_H */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c787682 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +RCSID("$Id: bsd-getpeereid.c,v 1.1 2002/09/12 00:33:02 djm Exp $"); + +#if !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID) + +#if defined(SO_PEERCRED) +int +getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid) +{ + struct ucred cred; + size_t len = sizeof(cred); + + if (getsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cred, &len) < 0) + return (-1); + *euid = cred.uid; + *gid = cred.gid; + + return (0); +} +#else +int +getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid) +{ + *euid = geteuid(); + *gid = getgid(); + + return (0); +} +#endif /* defined(SO_PEERCRED) */ + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID) */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2e9f077 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.h @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +/* $Id: bsd-getpeereid.h,v 1.1 2002/09/12 00:33:02 djm Exp $ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_GETPEEREID_H +#define _BSD_GETPEEREID_H + +#include "config.h" + +#include <sys/types.h> /* For uid_t, gid_t */ + +#ifndef HAVE_GETPEEREID +int getpeereid(int , uid_t *, gid_t *); +#endif /* HAVE_GETPEEREID */ + +#endif /* _BSD_GETPEEREID_H */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c index fa48afe..1c1e43a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$Id: bsd-misc.c,v 1.8 2002/06/13 21:34:58 mouring Exp $"); +RCSID("$Id: bsd-misc.c,v 1.10 2002/07/08 21:09:41 mouring Exp $"); char *get_progname(char *argv0) { @@ -93,8 +93,8 @@ int utimes(char *filename, struct timeval *tvp) { struct utimbuf ub; - ub.actime = tvp->tv_sec; - ub.modtime = tvp->tv_usec; + ub.actime = tvp[0].tv_sec; + ub.modtime = tvp[1].tv_sec; return(utime(filename, &ub)); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.c index 391b2dd..35c7d8e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dirname.c,v 1.6 2001/06/28 04:27:19 pjanzen Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dirname.c,v 1.7 2002/05/24 21:22:37 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1997 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com> @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ #ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME #if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) -static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: dirname.c,v 1.6 2001/06/28 04:27:19 pjanzen Exp $"; +static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: dirname.c,v 1.7 2002/05/24 21:22:37 deraadt Exp $"; #endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ #include <errno.h> @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ dirname(path) /* Empty or NULL string gets treated as "." */ if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') { - (void)strcpy(bname, "."); + (void)strlcpy(bname, ".", sizeof bname); return(bname); } @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ dirname(path) /* Either the dir is "/" or there are no slashes */ if (endp == path) { - (void)strcpy(bname, *endp == '/' ? "/" : "."); + (void)strlcpy(bname, *endp == '/' ? "/" : ".", sizeof bname); return(bname); } else { do { diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c index de3bacc..6fd8543 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ * SUCH DAMAGE. */ -#include "config.h" +#include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_GETCWD) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.c index f4fbc9b..4a5cfe5 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.c @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ * SUCH DAMAGE. */ -#include "config.h" +#include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET) #if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c index 365d433..e928a22 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ get_arg_max(void) #if 0 static char sccsid[] = "@(#)glob.c 8.3 (Berkeley) 10/13/93"; #else -static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: glob.c,v 1.16 2001/04/05 18:36:12 deraadt Exp $"; +static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: glob.c,v 1.20 2002/06/14 21:34:58 todd Exp $"; #endif #endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ @@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: glob.c,v 1.16 2001/04/05 18:36:12 deraadt Exp $ #define RBRACKET ']' #define SEP '/' #define STAR '*' +#undef TILDE /* Some platforms may already define it */ #define TILDE '~' #define UNDERSCORE '_' #define LBRACE '{' @@ -136,32 +137,32 @@ typedef char Char; #define ismeta(c) (((c)&M_QUOTE) != 0) -static int compare __P((const void *, const void *)); -static int g_Ctoc __P((const Char *, char *, u_int)); -static int g_lstat __P((Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *)); -static DIR *g_opendir __P((Char *, glob_t *)); -static Char *g_strchr __P((Char *, int)); -static int g_stat __P((Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *)); -static int glob0 __P((const Char *, glob_t *)); -static int glob1 __P((Char *, Char *, glob_t *, size_t *)); -static int glob2 __P((Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, - glob_t *, size_t *)); -static int glob3 __P((Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, - Char *, Char *, glob_t *, size_t *)); -static int globextend __P((const Char *, glob_t *, size_t *)); +static int compare(const void *, const void *); +static int g_Ctoc(const Char *, char *, u_int); +static int g_lstat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *); +static DIR *g_opendir(Char *, glob_t *); +static Char *g_strchr(Char *, int); +static int g_stat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *); +static int glob0(const Char *, glob_t *); +static int glob1(Char *, Char *, glob_t *, size_t *); +static int glob2(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, + glob_t *, size_t *); +static int glob3(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, + Char *, Char *, glob_t *, size_t *); +static int globextend(const Char *, glob_t *, size_t *); static const Char * - globtilde __P((const Char *, Char *, size_t, glob_t *)); -static int globexp1 __P((const Char *, glob_t *)); -static int globexp2 __P((const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *, int *)); -static int match __P((Char *, Char *, Char *)); + globtilde(const Char *, Char *, size_t, glob_t *); +static int globexp1(const Char *, glob_t *); +static int globexp2(const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *, int *); +static int match(Char *, Char *, Char *); #ifdef DEBUG -static void qprintf __P((const char *, Char *)); +static void qprintf(const char *, Char *); #endif int glob(pattern, flags, errfunc, pglob) const char *pattern; - int flags, (*errfunc) __P((const char *, int)); + int flags, (*errfunc)(const char *, int); glob_t *pglob; { const u_char *patnext; @@ -676,7 +677,7 @@ glob3(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, pathend, pathend_last, pattern, pattern_last, /* - * Extend the gl_pathv member of a glob_t structure to accomodate a new item, + * Extend the gl_pathv member of a glob_t structure to accommodate a new item, * add the new item, and update gl_pathc. * * This assumes the BSD realloc, which only copies the block when its size @@ -821,7 +822,7 @@ g_opendir(str, pglob) char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; if (!*str) - strcpy(buf, "."); + strlcpy(buf, ".", sizeof buf); else { if (g_Ctoc(str, buf, sizeof(buf))) return(NULL); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h index b4c8f7a..6421f70 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: glob.h,v 1.5 2001/03/18 17:18:58 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: glob.h,v 1.7 2002/02/17 19:42:21 millert Exp $ */ /* $NetBSD: glob.h,v 1.5 1994/10/26 00:55:56 cgd Exp $ */ /* @@ -53,18 +53,18 @@ typedef struct { int gl_flags; /* Copy of flags parameter to glob. */ char **gl_pathv; /* List of paths matching pattern. */ /* Copy of errfunc parameter to glob. */ - int (*gl_errfunc) __P((const char *, int)); + int (*gl_errfunc)(const char *, int); /* * Alternate filesystem access methods for glob; replacement * versions of closedir(3), readdir(3), opendir(3), stat(2) * and lstat(2). */ - void (*gl_closedir) __P((void *)); - struct dirent *(*gl_readdir) __P((void *)); - void *(*gl_opendir) __P((const char *)); - int (*gl_lstat) __P((const char *, struct stat *)); - int (*gl_stat) __P((const char *, struct stat *)); + void (*gl_closedir)(void *); + struct dirent *(*gl_readdir)(void *); + void *(*gl_opendir)(const char *); + int (*gl_lstat)(const char *, struct stat *); + int (*gl_stat)(const char *, struct stat *); } glob_t; /* Flags */ @@ -91,8 +91,8 @@ typedef struct { #define GLOB_NOSYS (-4) /* Function not supported. */ #define GLOB_ABEND GLOB_ABORTED -int glob __P((const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *)); -void globfree __P((glob_t *)); +int glob(const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); +void globfree(glob_t *); #endif /* !_GLOB_H_ */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c index 8a8b3c8..ac5f567 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c @@ -31,12 +31,12 @@ * SUCH DAMAGE. */ -#include "config.h" +#include "includes.h" #if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) #if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) -static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: inet_ntoa.c,v 1.2 1996/08/19 08:29:16 tholo Exp $"; +static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: inet_ntoa.c,v 1.3 2002/06/27 10:14:01 itojun Exp $"; #endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ /* @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ char *inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in) p = (char *)∈ #define UC(b) (((int)b)&0xff) (void)snprintf(b, sizeof(b), - "%d.%d.%d.%d", UC(p[0]), UC(p[1]), UC(p[2]), UC(p[3])); + "%u.%u.%u.%u", UC(p[0]), UC(p[1]), UC(p[2]), UC(p[3])); return (b); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c index 2b8d31f..3bea519 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: inet_ntop.c,v 1.1 1997/03/13 19:07:32 downsj Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: inet_ntop.c,v 1.5 2002/08/23 16:27:31 itojun Exp $ */ /* Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium. * @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ * SOFTWARE. */ -#include "config.h" +#include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ #if 0 static char rcsid[] = "$From: inet_ntop.c,v 8.7 1996/08/05 08:41:18 vixie Exp $"; #else -static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: inet_ntop.c,v 1.1 1997/03/13 19:07:32 downsj Exp $"; +static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: inet_ntop.c,v 1.5 2002/08/23 16:27:31 itojun Exp $"; #endif #endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ @@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: inet_ntop.c,v 1.1 1997/03/13 19:07:32 downsj Ex * sizeof(int) < 4. sizeof(int) > 4 is fine; all the world's not a VAX. */ -static const char *inet_ntop4 __P((const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size)); -static const char *inet_ntop6 __P((const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size)); +static const char *inet_ntop4(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size); +static const char *inet_ntop6(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size); /* char * * inet_ntop(af, src, dst, size) @@ -103,13 +103,14 @@ inet_ntop4(src, dst, size) { static const char fmt[] = "%u.%u.%u.%u"; char tmp[sizeof "255.255.255.255"]; + int l; - if (snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), fmt, src[0], src[1], src[2], - src[3]) > size) { + l = snprintf(tmp, size, fmt, src[0], src[1], src[2], src[3]); + if (l <= 0 || l >= size) { errno = ENOSPC; return (NULL); } - strcpy(dst, tmp); + strlcpy(dst, tmp, size); return (dst); } @@ -132,10 +133,12 @@ inet_ntop6(src, dst, size) * Keep this in mind if you think this function should have been coded * to use pointer overlays. All the world's not a VAX. */ - char tmp[sizeof "ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:255.255.255.255"], *tp; + char tmp[sizeof "ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:255.255.255.255"]; + char *tp, *ep; struct { int base, len; } best, cur; u_int words[IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ]; int i; + int advance; /* * Preprocess: @@ -172,31 +175,45 @@ inet_ntop6(src, dst, size) * Format the result. */ tp = tmp; - for (i = 0; i < (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ); i++) { + ep = tmp + sizeof(tmp); + for (i = 0; i < (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ) && tp < ep; i++) { /* Are we inside the best run of 0x00's? */ if (best.base != -1 && i >= best.base && i < (best.base + best.len)) { - if (i == best.base) + if (i == best.base) { + if (tp + 1 >= ep) + return (NULL); *tp++ = ':'; + } continue; } /* Are we following an initial run of 0x00s or any real hex? */ - if (i != 0) + if (i != 0) { + if (tp + 1 >= ep) + return (NULL); *tp++ = ':'; + } /* Is this address an encapsulated IPv4? */ if (i == 6 && best.base == 0 && (best.len == 6 || (best.len == 5 && words[5] == 0xffff))) { - if (!inet_ntop4(src+12, tp, sizeof tmp - (tp - tmp))) + if (!inet_ntop4(src+12, tp, (size_t)(ep - tp))) return (NULL); tp += strlen(tp); break; } - snprintf(tp, sizeof(tmp - (tp - tmp)), "%x", words[i]); - tp += strlen(tp); + advance = snprintf(tp, ep - tp, "%x", words[i]); + if (advance <= 0 || advance >= ep - tp) + return (NULL); + tp += advance; } /* Was it a trailing run of 0x00's? */ - if (best.base != -1 && (best.base + best.len) == (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ)) + if (best.base != -1 && (best.base + best.len) == (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ)) { + if (tp + 1 >= ep) + return (NULL); *tp++ = ':'; + } + if (tp + 1 >= ep) + return (NULL); *tp++ = '\0'; /* @@ -206,7 +223,7 @@ inet_ntop6(src, dst, size) errno = ENOSPC; return (NULL); } - strcpy(dst, tmp); + strlcpy(dst, tmp, size); return (dst); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c index d69dc5c..d256ee4 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ #ifndef HAVE_MKDTEMP #if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) -static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: mktemp.c,v 1.14 2002/01/02 20:18:32 deraadt Exp $"; +static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: mktemp.c,v 1.16 2002/05/27 18:20:45 millert Exp $"; #endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN @@ -102,11 +102,11 @@ _gettemp(path, doopen, domkdir, slen) return (0); } pid = getpid(); - while (*trv == 'X' && pid != 0) { + while (trv >= path && *trv == 'X' && pid != 0) { *trv-- = (pid % 10) + '0'; pid /= 10; } - while (*trv == 'X') { + while (trv >= path && *trv == 'X') { char c; pid = (arc4random() & 0xffff) % (26+26); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h index 1191844..ae18afd 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.16 2002/02/19 20:27:57 mouring Exp $ */ +/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.17 2002/09/12 00:33:02 djm Exp $ */ #ifndef _OPENBSD_H #define _OPENBSD_H @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ /* Home grown routines */ #include "bsd-arc4random.h" +#include "bsd-getpeereid.h" #include "bsd-misc.h" #include "bsd-snprintf.h" #include "bsd-waitpid.h" diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c index ca0a88e..4c96a31 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c @@ -1,3 +1,28 @@ +/* + * + * Copyright (c) 2001 Gert Doering. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef _AIX @@ -6,21 +31,21 @@ #include <../xmalloc.h> /* - * AIX has a "usrinfo" area where logname and - * other stuff is stored - a few applications - * actually use this and die if it's not set + * AIX has a "usrinfo" area where logname and other stuff is stored - + * a few applications actually use this and die if it's not set + * + * NOTE: TTY= should be set, but since no one uses it and it's hard to + * acquire due to privsep code. We will just drop support. */ void -aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *pw, char *tty, int ttyfd) +aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *pw) { u_int i; - char *cp=NULL; + char *cp; - if (ttyfd == -1) - tty[0] = '\0'; - cp = xmalloc(22 + strlen(tty) + 2 * strlen(pw->pw_name)); - i = sprintf(cp, "LOGNAME=%s%cNAME=%s%cTTY=%s%c%c", pw->pw_name, 0, - pw->pw_name, 0, tty, 0, 0); + cp = xmalloc(16 + 2 * strlen(pw->pw_name)); + i = sprintf(cp, "LOGNAME=%s%cNAME=%s%c", pw->pw_name, 0, + pw->pw_name, 0); if (usrinfo(SETUINFO, cp, i) == -1) fatal("Couldn't set usrinfo: %s", strerror(errno)); debug3("AIX/UsrInfo: set len %d", i); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h index e4d14f4..79570a2 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h @@ -1,5 +1,29 @@ -#ifdef _AIX - -void aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *pw, char *tty, int ttyfd); +/* + * + * Copyright (c) 2001 Gert Doering. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ +#ifdef _AIX +void aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *pw); #endif /* _AIX */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c index 8c2f5f8..4e549b6 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readpassphrase.c,v 1.12 2001/12/15 05:41:00 millert Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readpassphrase.c,v 1.14 2002/06/28 01:43:58 millert Exp $ */ /* - * Copyright (c) 2000 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com> + * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com> * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ */ #if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) -static const char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: readpassphrase.c,v 1.12 2001/12/15 05:41:00 millert Exp $"; +static const char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: readpassphrase.c,v 1.14 2002/06/28 01:43:58 millert Exp $"; #endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ #include "includes.h" @@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ readpassphrase(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t bufsiz, int flags) int input, output, save_errno; char ch, *p, *end; struct termios term, oterm; - struct sigaction sa, saveint, savehup, savequit, saveterm; - struct sigaction savetstp, savettin, savettou; + struct sigaction sa, savealrm, saveint, savehup, savequit, saveterm; + struct sigaction savetstp, savettin, savettou, savepipe; /* I suppose we could alloc on demand in this case (XXX). */ if (bufsiz == 0) { @@ -70,11 +70,13 @@ readpassphrase(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t bufsiz, int flags) } restart: + signo = 0; /* * Read and write to /dev/tty if available. If not, read from * stdin and write to stderr unless a tty is required. */ - if ((input = output = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR)) == -1) { + if ((flags & RPP_STDIN) || + (input = output = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR)) == -1) { if (flags & RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) { errno = ENOTTY; return(NULL); @@ -86,13 +88,15 @@ restart: /* * Catch signals that would otherwise cause the user to end * up with echo turned off in the shell. Don't worry about - * things like SIGALRM and SIGPIPE for now. + * things like SIGXCPU and SIGVTALRM for now. */ sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); sa.sa_flags = 0; /* don't restart system calls */ sa.sa_handler = handler; - (void)sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, &saveint); + (void)sigaction(SIGALRM, &sa, &savealrm); (void)sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa, &savehup); + (void)sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, &saveint); + (void)sigaction(SIGPIPE, &sa, &savepipe); (void)sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, &savequit); (void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, &saveterm); (void)sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, &savetstp); @@ -100,7 +104,7 @@ restart: (void)sigaction(SIGTTOU, &sa, &savettou); /* Turn off echo if possible. */ - if (tcgetattr(input, &oterm) == 0) { + if (input != STDIN_FILENO && tcgetattr(input, &oterm) == 0) { memcpy(&term, &oterm, sizeof(term)); if (!(flags & RPP_ECHO_ON)) term.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHONL); @@ -111,10 +115,13 @@ restart: (void)tcsetattr(input, _T_FLUSH, &term); } else { memset(&term, 0, sizeof(term)); + term.c_lflag |= ECHO; memset(&oterm, 0, sizeof(oterm)); + oterm.c_lflag |= ECHO; } - (void)write(output, prompt, strlen(prompt)); + if (!(flags & RPP_STDIN)) + (void)write(output, prompt, strlen(prompt)); end = buf + bufsiz - 1; for (p = buf; (nr = read(input, &ch, 1)) == 1 && ch != '\n' && ch != '\r';) { if (p < end) { @@ -137,13 +144,14 @@ restart: /* Restore old terminal settings and signals. */ if (memcmp(&term, &oterm, sizeof(term)) != 0) (void)tcsetattr(input, _T_FLUSH, &oterm); - (void)sigaction(SIGINT, &saveint, NULL); + (void)sigaction(SIGALRM, &savealrm, NULL); (void)sigaction(SIGHUP, &savehup, NULL); + (void)sigaction(SIGINT, &saveint, NULL); (void)sigaction(SIGQUIT, &savequit, NULL); + (void)sigaction(SIGPIPE, &savepipe, NULL); (void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &saveterm, NULL); (void)sigaction(SIGTSTP, &savetstp, NULL); (void)sigaction(SIGTTIN, &savettin, NULL); - (void)sigaction(SIGTTOU, &savettou, NULL); if (input != STDIN_FILENO) (void)close(input); @@ -152,12 +160,11 @@ restart: * now that we have restored the signal handlers. */ if (signo) { - kill(getpid(), signo); + kill(getpid(), signo); switch (signo) { case SIGTSTP: case SIGTTIN: case SIGTTOU: - signo = 0; goto restart; } } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h index 9077b6e..92908a4 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readpassphrase.h,v 1.1 2000/11/21 00:48:38 millert Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readpassphrase.h,v 1.3 2002/06/28 12:32:22 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com> @@ -40,8 +40,9 @@ #define RPP_FORCELOWER 0x04 /* Force input to lower case. */ #define RPP_FORCEUPPER 0x08 /* Force input to upper case. */ #define RPP_SEVENBIT 0x10 /* Strip the high bit from input. */ +#define RPP_STDIN 0x20 /* Read from stdin, not /dev/tty */ -char *readpassphrase(const char *, char *, size_t, int); +char * readpassphrase(const char *, char *, size_t, int); #endif /* HAVE_READPASSPHRASE */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.c index b4a05db..b9035ca 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.c @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ #if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) #if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) -static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: realpath.c,v 1.6 2002/01/12 16:24:35 millert Exp $"; +static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: realpath.c,v 1.7 2002/05/24 21:22:37 deraadt Exp $"; #endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ #include <sys/param.h> @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ realpath(const char *path, char *resolved) /* Save the starting point. */ getcwd(start,MAXPATHLEN); if ((fd = open(".", O_RDONLY)) < 0) { - (void)strcpy(resolved, "."); + (void)strlcpy(resolved, ".", MAXPATHLEN); return (NULL); } close(fd); @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ loop: * Save the last component name and get the full pathname of * the current directory. */ - (void)strcpy(wbuf, p); + (void)strlcpy(wbuf, p, sizeof wbuf); if (getcwd(resolved, MAXPATHLEN) == 0) goto err1; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c index 44eac20..9f05896 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ * SUCH DAMAGE. */ -#include "config.h" +#include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.c index 6c2d5cd..1dff15c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.c @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ * SUCH DAMAGE. */ -#include "config.h" +#include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_SETENV #if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.c index 806eb02..35fbab0 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ * and: Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com> * ****************************************************************************/ -#include "config.h" +#include "includes.h" #include <signal.h> #include "sigact.h" diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c index 6ff65c1..3a9b5d1 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ -#include "config.h" +#include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT #if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c index b5e5a55..2f87eca 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ -#include "config.h" +#include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY #if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.c index c03649c..d0afc44 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ * SUCH DAMAGE. */ -#include "config.h" +#include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_STRSEP) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..176fe31 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h @@ -0,0 +1,584 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: queue.h,v 1.22 2001/06/23 04:39:35 angelos Exp $ */ +/* $NetBSD: queue.h,v 1.11 1996/05/16 05:17:14 mycroft Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)queue.h 8.5 (Berkeley) 8/20/94 + */ + +#ifndef _FAKE_QUEUE_H_ +#define _FAKE_QUEUE_H_ + +/* + * Ignore all <sys/queue.h> since older platforms have broken/incomplete + * <sys/queue.h> that are too hard to work around. + */ +#undef SLIST_HEAD +#undef SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER +#undef SLIST_ENTRY +#undef SLIST_FIRST +#undef SLIST_END +#undef SLIST_EMPTY +#undef SLIST_NEXT +#undef SLIST_FOREACH +#undef SLIST_INIT +#undef SLIST_INSERT_AFTER +#undef SLIST_INSERT_HEAD +#undef SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD +#undef SLIST_REMOVE +#undef LIST_HEAD +#undef LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER +#undef LIST_ENTRY +#undef LIST_FIRST +#undef LIST_END +#undef LIST_EMPTY +#undef LIST_NEXT +#undef LIST_FOREACH +#undef LIST_INIT +#undef LIST_INSERT_AFTER +#undef LIST_INSERT_BEFORE +#undef LIST_INSERT_HEAD +#undef LIST_REMOVE +#undef LIST_REPLACE +#undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD +#undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER +#undef SIMPLEQ_ENTRY +#undef SIMPLEQ_FIRST +#undef SIMPLEQ_END +#undef SIMPLEQ_EMPTY +#undef SIMPLEQ_NEXT +#undef SIMPLEQ_FOREACH +#undef SIMPLEQ_INIT +#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD +#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL +#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER +#undef SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD +#undef TAILQ_HEAD +#undef TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER +#undef TAILQ_ENTRY +#undef TAILQ_FIRST +#undef TAILQ_END +#undef TAILQ_NEXT +#undef TAILQ_LAST +#undef TAILQ_PREV +#undef TAILQ_EMPTY +#undef TAILQ_FOREACH +#undef TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE +#undef TAILQ_INIT +#undef TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD +#undef TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL +#undef TAILQ_INSERT_AFTER +#undef TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE +#undef TAILQ_REMOVE +#undef TAILQ_REPLACE +#undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD +#undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER +#undef CIRCLEQ_ENTRY +#undef CIRCLEQ_FIRST +#undef CIRCLEQ_LAST +#undef CIRCLEQ_END +#undef CIRCLEQ_NEXT +#undef CIRCLEQ_PREV +#undef CIRCLEQ_EMPTY +#undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH +#undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE +#undef CIRCLEQ_INIT +#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_AFTER +#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_BEFORE +#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD +#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_TAIL +#undef CIRCLEQ_REMOVE +#undef CIRCLEQ_REPLACE + +/* + * This file defines five types of data structures: singly-linked lists, + * lists, simple queues, tail queues, and circular queues. + * + * + * A singly-linked list is headed by a single forward pointer. The elements + * are singly linked for minimum space and pointer manipulation overhead at + * the expense of O(n) removal for arbitrary elements. New elements can be + * added to the list after an existing element or at the head of the list. + * Elements being removed from the head of the list should use the explicit + * macro for this purpose for optimum efficiency. A singly-linked list may + * only be traversed in the forward direction. Singly-linked lists are ideal + * for applications with large datasets and few or no removals or for + * implementing a LIFO queue. + * + * A list is headed by a single forward pointer (or an array of forward + * pointers for a hash table header). The elements are doubly linked + * so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to + * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before + * or after an existing element or at the head of the list. A list + * may only be traversed in the forward direction. + * + * A simple queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one the head of the + * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are singly + * linked to save space, so elements can only be removed from the + * head of the list. New elements can be added to the list before or after + * an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of the + * list. A simple queue may only be traversed in the forward direction. + * + * A tail queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the + * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly + * linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to + * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or + * after an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of + * the list. A tail queue may be traversed in either direction. + * + * A circle queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the + * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly + * linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to + * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or after + * an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of the list. + * A circle queue may be traversed in either direction, but has a more + * complex end of list detection. + * + * For details on the use of these macros, see the queue(3) manual page. + */ + +/* + * Singly-linked List definitions. + */ +#define SLIST_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *slh_first; /* first element */ \ +} + +#define SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ + { NULL } + +#define SLIST_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *sle_next; /* next element */ \ +} + +/* + * Singly-linked List access methods. + */ +#define SLIST_FIRST(head) ((head)->slh_first) +#define SLIST_END(head) NULL +#define SLIST_EMPTY(head) (SLIST_FIRST(head) == SLIST_END(head)) +#define SLIST_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.sle_next) + +#define SLIST_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ + for((var) = SLIST_FIRST(head); \ + (var) != SLIST_END(head); \ + (var) = SLIST_NEXT(var, field)) + +/* + * Singly-linked List functions. + */ +#define SLIST_INIT(head) { \ + SLIST_FIRST(head) = SLIST_END(head); \ +} + +#define SLIST_INSERT_AFTER(slistelm, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.sle_next = (slistelm)->field.sle_next; \ + (slistelm)->field.sle_next = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.sle_next = (head)->slh_first; \ + (head)->slh_first = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do { \ + (head)->slh_first = (head)->slh_first->field.sle_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define SLIST_REMOVE(head, elm, type, field) do { \ + if ((head)->slh_first == (elm)) { \ + SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD((head), field); \ + } \ + else { \ + struct type *curelm = (head)->slh_first; \ + while( curelm->field.sle_next != (elm) ) \ + curelm = curelm->field.sle_next; \ + curelm->field.sle_next = \ + curelm->field.sle_next->field.sle_next; \ + } \ +} while (0) + +/* + * List definitions. + */ +#define LIST_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *lh_first; /* first element */ \ +} + +#define LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ + { NULL } + +#define LIST_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *le_next; /* next element */ \ + struct type **le_prev; /* address of previous next element */ \ +} + +/* + * List access methods + */ +#define LIST_FIRST(head) ((head)->lh_first) +#define LIST_END(head) NULL +#define LIST_EMPTY(head) (LIST_FIRST(head) == LIST_END(head)) +#define LIST_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.le_next) + +#define LIST_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ + for((var) = LIST_FIRST(head); \ + (var)!= LIST_END(head); \ + (var) = LIST_NEXT(var, field)) + +/* + * List functions. + */ +#define LIST_INIT(head) do { \ + LIST_FIRST(head) = LIST_END(head); \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_INSERT_AFTER(listelm, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.le_next = (listelm)->field.le_next) != NULL) \ + (listelm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \ + &(elm)->field.le_next; \ + (listelm)->field.le_next = (elm); \ + (elm)->field.le_prev = &(listelm)->field.le_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.le_prev = (listelm)->field.le_prev; \ + (elm)->field.le_next = (listelm); \ + *(listelm)->field.le_prev = (elm); \ + (listelm)->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.le_next = (head)->lh_first) != NULL) \ + (head)->lh_first->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next;\ + (head)->lh_first = (elm); \ + (elm)->field.le_prev = &(head)->lh_first; \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_REMOVE(elm, field) do { \ + if ((elm)->field.le_next != NULL) \ + (elm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \ + (elm)->field.le_prev; \ + *(elm)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_REPLACE(elm, elm2, field) do { \ + if (((elm2)->field.le_next = (elm)->field.le_next) != NULL) \ + (elm2)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \ + &(elm2)->field.le_next; \ + (elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_prev; \ + *(elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm2); \ +} while (0) + +/* + * Simple queue definitions. + */ +#define SIMPLEQ_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *sqh_first; /* first element */ \ + struct type **sqh_last; /* addr of last next element */ \ +} + +#define SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ + { NULL, &(head).sqh_first } + +#define SIMPLEQ_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *sqe_next; /* next element */ \ +} + +/* + * Simple queue access methods. + */ +#define SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->sqh_first) +#define SIMPLEQ_END(head) NULL +#define SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(head) (SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) == SIMPLEQ_END(head)) +#define SIMPLEQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.sqe_next) + +#define SIMPLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ + for((var) = SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head); \ + (var) != SIMPLEQ_END(head); \ + (var) = SIMPLEQ_NEXT(var, field)) + +/* + * Simple queue functions. + */ +#define SIMPLEQ_INIT(head) do { \ + (head)->sqh_first = NULL; \ + (head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first; \ +} while (0) + +#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (head)->sqh_first) == NULL) \ + (head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \ + (head)->sqh_first = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.sqe_next = NULL; \ + *(head)->sqh_last = (elm); \ + (head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (listelm)->field.sqe_next) == NULL)\ + (head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \ + (listelm)->field.sqe_next = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + if (((head)->sqh_first = (elm)->field.sqe_next) == NULL) \ + (head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first; \ +} while (0) + +/* + * Tail queue definitions. + */ +#define TAILQ_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *tqh_first; /* first element */ \ + struct type **tqh_last; /* addr of last next element */ \ +} + +#define TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ + { NULL, &(head).tqh_first } + +#define TAILQ_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *tqe_next; /* next element */ \ + struct type **tqe_prev; /* address of previous next element */ \ +} + +/* + * tail queue access methods + */ +#define TAILQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->tqh_first) +#define TAILQ_END(head) NULL +#define TAILQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.tqe_next) +#define TAILQ_LAST(head, headname) \ + (*(((struct headname *)((head)->tqh_last))->tqh_last)) +/* XXX */ +#define TAILQ_PREV(elm, headname, field) \ + (*(((struct headname *)((elm)->field.tqe_prev))->tqh_last)) +#define TAILQ_EMPTY(head) \ + (TAILQ_FIRST(head) == TAILQ_END(head)) + +#define TAILQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ + for((var) = TAILQ_FIRST(head); \ + (var) != TAILQ_END(head); \ + (var) = TAILQ_NEXT(var, field)) + +#define TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, field, headname) \ + for((var) = TAILQ_LAST(head, headname); \ + (var) != TAILQ_END(head); \ + (var) = TAILQ_PREV(var, headname, field)) + +/* + * Tail queue functions. + */ +#define TAILQ_INIT(head) do { \ + (head)->tqh_first = NULL; \ + (head)->tqh_last = &(head)->tqh_first; \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (head)->tqh_first) != NULL) \ + (head)->tqh_first->field.tqe_prev = \ + &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ + else \ + (head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ + (head)->tqh_first = (elm); \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(head)->tqh_first; \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.tqe_next = NULL; \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev = (head)->tqh_last; \ + *(head)->tqh_last = (elm); \ + (head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL)\ + (elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \ + &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ + else \ + (head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ + (listelm)->field.tqe_next = (elm); \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(listelm)->field.tqe_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev = (listelm)->field.tqe_prev; \ + (elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm); \ + *(listelm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm); \ + (listelm)->field.tqe_prev = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL) \ + (elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \ + else \ + (head)->tqh_last = (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \ + *(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_REPLACE(head, elm, elm2, field) do { \ + if (((elm2)->field.tqe_next = (elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL) \ + (elm2)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \ + &(elm2)->field.tqe_next; \ + else \ + (head)->tqh_last = &(elm2)->field.tqe_next; \ + (elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \ + *(elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm2); \ +} while (0) + +/* + * Circular queue definitions. + */ +#define CIRCLEQ_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *cqh_first; /* first element */ \ + struct type *cqh_last; /* last element */ \ +} + +#define CIRCLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ + { CIRCLEQ_END(&head), CIRCLEQ_END(&head) } + +#define CIRCLEQ_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *cqe_next; /* next element */ \ + struct type *cqe_prev; /* previous element */ \ +} + +/* + * Circular queue access methods + */ +#define CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->cqh_first) +#define CIRCLEQ_LAST(head) ((head)->cqh_last) +#define CIRCLEQ_END(head) ((void *)(head)) +#define CIRCLEQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.cqe_next) +#define CIRCLEQ_PREV(elm, field) ((elm)->field.cqe_prev) +#define CIRCLEQ_EMPTY(head) \ + (CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head) == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) + +#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ + for((var) = CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head); \ + (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ + (var) = CIRCLEQ_NEXT(var, field)) + +#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, field) \ + for((var) = CIRCLEQ_LAST(head); \ + (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ + (var) = CIRCLEQ_PREV(var, field)) + +/* + * Circular queue functions. + */ +#define CIRCLEQ_INIT(head) do { \ + (head)->cqh_first = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ + (head)->cqh_last = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ +} while (0) + +#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.cqe_next = (listelm)->field.cqe_next; \ + (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (listelm); \ + if ((listelm)->field.cqe_next == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \ + else \ + (listelm)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \ + (listelm)->field.cqe_next = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_BEFORE(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.cqe_next = (listelm); \ + (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (listelm)->field.cqe_prev; \ + if ((listelm)->field.cqe_prev == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \ + else \ + (listelm)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = (elm); \ + (listelm)->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.cqe_next = (head)->cqh_first; \ + (elm)->field.cqe_prev = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ + if ((head)->cqh_last == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \ + else \ + (head)->cqh_first->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \ + (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.cqe_next = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ + (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (head)->cqh_last; \ + if ((head)->cqh_first == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \ + else \ + (head)->cqh_last->field.cqe_next = (elm); \ + (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define CIRCLEQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do { \ + if ((elm)->field.cqe_next == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head)->cqh_last = (elm)->field.cqe_prev; \ + else \ + (elm)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = \ + (elm)->field.cqe_prev; \ + if ((elm)->field.cqe_prev == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head)->cqh_first = (elm)->field.cqe_next; \ + else \ + (elm)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = \ + (elm)->field.cqe_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define CIRCLEQ_REPLACE(head, elm, elm2, field) do { \ + if (((elm2)->field.cqe_next = (elm)->field.cqe_next) == \ + CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head).cqh_last = (elm2); \ + else \ + (elm2)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = (elm2); \ + if (((elm2)->field.cqe_prev = (elm)->field.cqe_prev) == \ + CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head).cqh_first = (elm2); \ + else \ + (elm2)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = (elm2); \ +} while (0) + +#endif /* !_FAKE_QUEUE_H_ */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0a58710 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h @@ -0,0 +1,675 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: tree.h,v 1.6 2002/06/11 22:09:52 provos Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu> + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _SYS_TREE_H_ +#define _SYS_TREE_H_ + +/* + * This file defines data structures for different types of trees: + * splay trees and red-black trees. + * + * A splay tree is a self-organizing data structure. Every operation + * on the tree causes a splay to happen. The splay moves the requested + * node to the root of the tree and partly rebalances it. + * + * This has the benefit that request locality causes faster lookups as + * the requested nodes move to the top of the tree. On the other hand, + * every lookup causes memory writes. + * + * The Balance Theorem bounds the total access time for m operations + * and n inserts on an initially empty tree as O((m + n)lg n). The + * amortized cost for a sequence of m accesses to a splay tree is O(lg n); + * + * A red-black tree is a binary search tree with the node color as an + * extra attribute. It fulfills a set of conditions: + * - every search path from the root to a leaf consists of the + * same number of black nodes, + * - each red node (except for the root) has a black parent, + * - each leaf node is black. + * + * Every operation on a red-black tree is bounded as O(lg n). + * The maximum height of a red-black tree is 2lg (n+1). + */ + +#define SPLAY_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *sph_root; /* root of the tree */ \ +} + +#define SPLAY_INITIALIZER(root) \ + { NULL } + +#define SPLAY_INIT(root) do { \ + (root)->sph_root = NULL; \ +} while (0) + +#define SPLAY_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *spe_left; /* left element */ \ + struct type *spe_right; /* right element */ \ +} + +#define SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) (elm)->field.spe_left +#define SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) (elm)->field.spe_right +#define SPLAY_ROOT(head) (head)->sph_root +#define SPLAY_EMPTY(head) (SPLAY_ROOT(head) == NULL) + +/* SPLAY_ROTATE_{LEFT,RIGHT} expect that tmp hold SPLAY_{RIGHT,LEFT} */ +#define SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, tmp, field) do { \ + SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field); \ + SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ + (head)->sph_root = tmp; \ +} while (0) + +#define SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, tmp, field) do { \ + SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field); \ + SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ + (head)->sph_root = tmp; \ +} while (0) + +#define SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, tmp, field) do { \ + SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ + tmp = (head)->sph_root; \ + (head)->sph_root = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field); \ +} while (0) + +#define SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, tmp, field) do { \ + SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ + tmp = (head)->sph_root; \ + (head)->sph_root = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field); \ +} while (0) + +#define SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, node, left, right, field) do { \ + SPLAY_RIGHT(left, field) = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field); \ + SPLAY_LEFT(right, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\ + SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(node, field); \ + SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_LEFT(node, field); \ +} while (0) + +/* Generates prototypes and inline functions */ + +#define SPLAY_PROTOTYPE(name, type, field, cmp) \ +void name##_SPLAY(struct name *, struct type *); \ +void name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(struct name *, int); \ +struct type *name##_SPLAY_INSERT(struct name *, struct type *); \ +struct type *name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(struct name *, struct type *); \ + \ +/* Finds the node with the same key as elm */ \ +static __inline struct type * \ +name##_SPLAY_FIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head)) \ + return(NULL); \ + name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ + if ((cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root) == 0) \ + return (head->sph_root); \ + return (NULL); \ +} \ + \ +static __inline struct type * \ +name##_SPLAY_NEXT(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ + if (SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) != NULL) { \ + elm = SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field); \ + while (SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) != NULL) { \ + elm = SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field); \ + } \ + } else \ + elm = NULL; \ + return (elm); \ +} \ + \ +static __inline struct type * \ +name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(struct name *head, int val) \ +{ \ + name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(head, val); \ + return (SPLAY_ROOT(head)); \ +} + +/* Main splay operation. + * Moves node close to the key of elm to top + */ +#define SPLAY_GENERATE(name, type, field, cmp) \ +struct type * \ +name##_SPLAY_INSERT(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head)) { \ + SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = NULL; \ + } else { \ + int __comp; \ + name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ + __comp = (cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root); \ + if(__comp < 0) { \ + SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);\ + SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ + SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = NULL; \ + } else if (__comp > 0) { \ + SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\ + SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ + SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = NULL; \ + } else \ + return ((head)->sph_root); \ + } \ + (head)->sph_root = (elm); \ + return (NULL); \ +} \ + \ +struct type * \ +name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *__tmp; \ + if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head)) \ + return (NULL); \ + name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ + if ((cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root) == 0) { \ + if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL) { \ + (head)->sph_root = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\ + } else { \ + __tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field); \ + (head)->sph_root = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);\ + name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ + SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = __tmp; \ + } \ + return (elm); \ + } \ + return (NULL); \ +} \ + \ +void \ +name##_SPLAY(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type __node, *__left, *__right, *__tmp; \ + int __comp; \ +\ + SPLAY_LEFT(&__node, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(&__node, field) = NULL;\ + __left = __right = &__node; \ +\ + while ((__comp = (cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root))) { \ + if (__comp < 0) { \ + __tmp = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field); \ + if (__tmp == NULL) \ + break; \ + if ((cmp)(elm, __tmp) < 0){ \ + SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, __tmp, field); \ + if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\ + break; \ + } \ + SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, __right, field); \ + } else if (__comp > 0) { \ + __tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field); \ + if (__tmp == NULL) \ + break; \ + if ((cmp)(elm, __tmp) > 0){ \ + SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, __tmp, field); \ + if (SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\ + break; \ + } \ + SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, __left, field); \ + } \ + } \ + SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, &__node, __left, __right, field); \ +} \ + \ +/* Splay with either the minimum or the maximum element \ + * Used to find minimum or maximum element in tree. \ + */ \ +void name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(struct name *head, int __comp) \ +{ \ + struct type __node, *__left, *__right, *__tmp; \ +\ + SPLAY_LEFT(&__node, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(&__node, field) = NULL;\ + __left = __right = &__node; \ +\ + while (1) { \ + if (__comp < 0) { \ + __tmp = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field); \ + if (__tmp == NULL) \ + break; \ + if (__comp < 0){ \ + SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, __tmp, field); \ + if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\ + break; \ + } \ + SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, __right, field); \ + } else if (__comp > 0) { \ + __tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field); \ + if (__tmp == NULL) \ + break; \ + if (__comp > 0) { \ + SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, __tmp, field); \ + if (SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\ + break; \ + } \ + SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, __left, field); \ + } \ + } \ + SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, &__node, __left, __right, field); \ +} + +#define SPLAY_NEGINF -1 +#define SPLAY_INF 1 + +#define SPLAY_INSERT(name, x, y) name##_SPLAY_INSERT(x, y) +#define SPLAY_REMOVE(name, x, y) name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(x, y) +#define SPLAY_FIND(name, x, y) name##_SPLAY_FIND(x, y) +#define SPLAY_NEXT(name, x, y) name##_SPLAY_NEXT(x, y) +#define SPLAY_MIN(name, x) (SPLAY_EMPTY(x) ? NULL \ + : name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(x, SPLAY_NEGINF)) +#define SPLAY_MAX(name, x) (SPLAY_EMPTY(x) ? NULL \ + : name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(x, SPLAY_INF)) + +#define SPLAY_FOREACH(x, name, head) \ + for ((x) = SPLAY_MIN(name, head); \ + (x) != NULL; \ + (x) = SPLAY_NEXT(name, head, x)) + +/* Macros that define a red-back tree */ +#define RB_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *rbh_root; /* root of the tree */ \ +} + +#define RB_INITIALIZER(root) \ + { NULL } + +#define RB_INIT(root) do { \ + (root)->rbh_root = NULL; \ +} while (0) + +#define RB_BLACK 0 +#define RB_RED 1 +#define RB_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *rbe_left; /* left element */ \ + struct type *rbe_right; /* right element */ \ + struct type *rbe_parent; /* parent element */ \ + int rbe_color; /* node color */ \ +} + +#define RB_LEFT(elm, field) (elm)->field.rbe_left +#define RB_RIGHT(elm, field) (elm)->field.rbe_right +#define RB_PARENT(elm, field) (elm)->field.rbe_parent +#define RB_COLOR(elm, field) (elm)->field.rbe_color +#define RB_ROOT(head) (head)->rbh_root +#define RB_EMPTY(head) (RB_ROOT(head) == NULL) + +#define RB_SET(elm, parent, field) do { \ + RB_PARENT(elm, field) = parent; \ + RB_LEFT(elm, field) = RB_RIGHT(elm, field) = NULL; \ + RB_COLOR(elm, field) = RB_RED; \ +} while (0) + +#define RB_SET_BLACKRED(black, red, field) do { \ + RB_COLOR(black, field) = RB_BLACK; \ + RB_COLOR(red, field) = RB_RED; \ +} while (0) + +#ifndef RB_AUGMENT +#define RB_AUGMENT(x) +#endif + +#define RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, elm, tmp, field) do { \ + (tmp) = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ + if ((RB_RIGHT(elm, field) = RB_LEFT(tmp, field))) { \ + RB_PARENT(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) = (elm); \ + } \ + RB_AUGMENT(elm); \ + if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field) = RB_PARENT(elm, field))) { \ + if ((elm) == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)) \ + RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp); \ + else \ + RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp); \ + RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(elm, field)); \ + } else \ + (head)->rbh_root = (tmp); \ + RB_LEFT(tmp, field) = (elm); \ + RB_PARENT(elm, field) = (tmp); \ + RB_AUGMENT(tmp); \ +} while (0) + +#define RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, elm, tmp, field) do { \ + (tmp) = RB_LEFT(elm, field); \ + if ((RB_LEFT(elm, field) = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field))) { \ + RB_PARENT(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) = (elm); \ + } \ + RB_AUGMENT(elm); \ + if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field) = RB_PARENT(elm, field))) { \ + if ((elm) == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)) \ + RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp); \ + else \ + RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp); \ + RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(elm, field)); \ + } else \ + (head)->rbh_root = (tmp); \ + RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (elm); \ + RB_PARENT(elm, field) = (tmp); \ + RB_AUGMENT(tmp); \ +} while (0) + +/* Generates prototypes and inline functions */ +#define RB_PROTOTYPE(name, type, field, cmp) \ +void name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(struct name *, struct type *); \ +void name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(struct name *, struct type *, struct type *);\ +struct type *name##_RB_REMOVE(struct name *, struct type *); \ +struct type *name##_RB_INSERT(struct name *, struct type *); \ +struct type *name##_RB_FIND(struct name *, struct type *); \ +struct type *name##_RB_NEXT(struct name *, struct type *); \ +struct type *name##_RB_MINMAX(struct name *, int); \ + \ + +/* Main rb operation. + * Moves node close to the key of elm to top + */ +#define RB_GENERATE(name, type, field, cmp) \ +void \ +name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *parent, *gparent, *tmp; \ + while ((parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field)) && \ + RB_COLOR(parent, field) == RB_RED) { \ + gparent = RB_PARENT(parent, field); \ + if (parent == RB_LEFT(gparent, field)) { \ + tmp = RB_RIGHT(gparent, field); \ + if (tmp && RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) { \ + RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_BLACK; \ + RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field);\ + elm = gparent; \ + continue; \ + } \ + if (RB_RIGHT(parent, field) == elm) { \ + RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, parent, tmp, field);\ + tmp = parent; \ + parent = elm; \ + elm = tmp; \ + } \ + RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field); \ + RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, gparent, tmp, field); \ + } else { \ + tmp = RB_LEFT(gparent, field); \ + if (tmp && RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) { \ + RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_BLACK; \ + RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field);\ + elm = gparent; \ + continue; \ + } \ + if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm) { \ + RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, parent, tmp, field);\ + tmp = parent; \ + parent = elm; \ + elm = tmp; \ + } \ + RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field); \ + RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, gparent, tmp, field); \ + } \ + } \ + RB_COLOR(head->rbh_root, field) = RB_BLACK; \ +} \ + \ +void \ +name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(struct name *head, struct type *parent, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *tmp; \ + while ((elm == NULL || RB_COLOR(elm, field) == RB_BLACK) && \ + elm != RB_ROOT(head)) { \ + if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm) { \ + tmp = RB_RIGHT(parent, field); \ + if (RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) { \ + RB_SET_BLACKRED(tmp, parent, field); \ + RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, parent, tmp, field);\ + tmp = RB_RIGHT(parent, field); \ + } \ + if ((RB_LEFT(tmp, field) == NULL || \ + RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) &&\ + (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) == NULL || \ + RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK)) {\ + RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED; \ + elm = parent; \ + parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + } else { \ + if (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) == NULL || \ + RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) {\ + struct type *oleft; \ + if ((oleft = RB_LEFT(tmp, field)))\ + RB_COLOR(oleft, field) = RB_BLACK;\ + RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED; \ + RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, tmp, oleft, field);\ + tmp = RB_RIGHT(parent, field); \ + } \ + RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_COLOR(parent, field);\ + RB_COLOR(parent, field) = RB_BLACK; \ + if (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field)) \ + RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) = RB_BLACK;\ + RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, parent, tmp, field);\ + elm = RB_ROOT(head); \ + break; \ + } \ + } else { \ + tmp = RB_LEFT(parent, field); \ + if (RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) { \ + RB_SET_BLACKRED(tmp, parent, field); \ + RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, parent, tmp, field);\ + tmp = RB_LEFT(parent, field); \ + } \ + if ((RB_LEFT(tmp, field) == NULL || \ + RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) &&\ + (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) == NULL || \ + RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK)) {\ + RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED; \ + elm = parent; \ + parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + } else { \ + if (RB_LEFT(tmp, field) == NULL || \ + RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) {\ + struct type *oright; \ + if ((oright = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field)))\ + RB_COLOR(oright, field) = RB_BLACK;\ + RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED; \ + RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, tmp, oright, field);\ + tmp = RB_LEFT(parent, field); \ + } \ + RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_COLOR(parent, field);\ + RB_COLOR(parent, field) = RB_BLACK; \ + if (RB_LEFT(tmp, field)) \ + RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) = RB_BLACK;\ + RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, parent, tmp, field);\ + elm = RB_ROOT(head); \ + break; \ + } \ + } \ + } \ + if (elm) \ + RB_COLOR(elm, field) = RB_BLACK; \ +} \ + \ +struct type * \ +name##_RB_REMOVE(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *child, *parent, *old = elm; \ + int color; \ + if (RB_LEFT(elm, field) == NULL) \ + child = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ + else if (RB_RIGHT(elm, field) == NULL) \ + child = RB_LEFT(elm, field); \ + else { \ + struct type *left; \ + elm = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ + while ((left = RB_LEFT(elm, field))) \ + elm = left; \ + child = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ + parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + color = RB_COLOR(elm, field); \ + if (child) \ + RB_PARENT(child, field) = parent; \ + if (parent) { \ + if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm) \ + RB_LEFT(parent, field) = child; \ + else \ + RB_RIGHT(parent, field) = child; \ + RB_AUGMENT(parent); \ + } else \ + RB_ROOT(head) = child; \ + if (RB_PARENT(elm, field) == old) \ + parent = elm; \ + (elm)->field = (old)->field; \ + if (RB_PARENT(old, field)) { \ + if (RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(old, field), field) == old)\ + RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(old, field), field) = elm;\ + else \ + RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(old, field), field) = elm;\ + RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(old, field)); \ + } else \ + RB_ROOT(head) = elm; \ + RB_PARENT(RB_LEFT(old, field), field) = elm; \ + if (RB_RIGHT(old, field)) \ + RB_PARENT(RB_RIGHT(old, field), field) = elm; \ + if (parent) { \ + left = parent; \ + do { \ + RB_AUGMENT(left); \ + } while ((left = RB_PARENT(left, field))); \ + } \ + goto color; \ + } \ + parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + color = RB_COLOR(elm, field); \ + if (child) \ + RB_PARENT(child, field) = parent; \ + if (parent) { \ + if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm) \ + RB_LEFT(parent, field) = child; \ + else \ + RB_RIGHT(parent, field) = child; \ + RB_AUGMENT(parent); \ + } else \ + RB_ROOT(head) = child; \ +color: \ + if (color == RB_BLACK) \ + name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(head, parent, child); \ + return (old); \ +} \ + \ +/* Inserts a node into the RB tree */ \ +struct type * \ +name##_RB_INSERT(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *tmp; \ + struct type *parent = NULL; \ + int comp = 0; \ + tmp = RB_ROOT(head); \ + while (tmp) { \ + parent = tmp; \ + comp = (cmp)(elm, parent); \ + if (comp < 0) \ + tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field); \ + else if (comp > 0) \ + tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field); \ + else \ + return (tmp); \ + } \ + RB_SET(elm, parent, field); \ + if (parent != NULL) { \ + if (comp < 0) \ + RB_LEFT(parent, field) = elm; \ + else \ + RB_RIGHT(parent, field) = elm; \ + RB_AUGMENT(parent); \ + } else \ + RB_ROOT(head) = elm; \ + name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(head, elm); \ + return (NULL); \ +} \ + \ +/* Finds the node with the same key as elm */ \ +struct type * \ +name##_RB_FIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head); \ + int comp; \ + while (tmp) { \ + comp = cmp(elm, tmp); \ + if (comp < 0) \ + tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field); \ + else if (comp > 0) \ + tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field); \ + else \ + return (tmp); \ + } \ + return (NULL); \ +} \ + \ +struct type * \ +name##_RB_NEXT(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + if (RB_RIGHT(elm, field)) { \ + elm = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ + while (RB_LEFT(elm, field)) \ + elm = RB_LEFT(elm, field); \ + } else { \ + if (RB_PARENT(elm, field) && \ + (elm == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field))) \ + elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + else { \ + while (RB_PARENT(elm, field) && \ + (elm == RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)))\ + elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + } \ + } \ + return (elm); \ +} \ + \ +struct type * \ +name##_RB_MINMAX(struct name *head, int val) \ +{ \ + struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head); \ + struct type *parent = NULL; \ + while (tmp) { \ + parent = tmp; \ + if (val < 0) \ + tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field); \ + else \ + tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field); \ + } \ + return (parent); \ +} + +#define RB_NEGINF -1 +#define RB_INF 1 + +#define RB_INSERT(name, x, y) name##_RB_INSERT(x, y) +#define RB_REMOVE(name, x, y) name##_RB_REMOVE(x, y) +#define RB_FIND(name, x, y) name##_RB_FIND(x, y) +#define RB_NEXT(name, x, y) name##_RB_NEXT(x, y) +#define RB_MIN(name, x) name##_RB_MINMAX(x, RB_NEGINF) +#define RB_MAX(name, x) name##_RB_MINMAX(x, RB_INF) + +#define RB_FOREACH(x, name, head) \ + for ((x) = RB_MIN(name, head); \ + (x) != NULL; \ + (x) = name##_RB_NEXT(head, x)) + +#endif /* _SYS_TREE_H_ */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xmmap.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xmmap.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8f1d202 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xmmap.c @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H +#include <sys/mman.h> +#endif + +#include "log.h" + +void *xmmap(size_t size) +{ + void *address; + +#ifdef HAVE_MMAP +# ifdef MAP_ANON + address = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_ANON|MAP_SHARED, + -1, 0); +# else + address = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, + open("/dev/zero", O_RDWR), 0); +# endif + +#define MM_SWAP_TEMPLATE "/var/run/sshd.mm.XXXXXXXX" + if (address == MAP_FAILED) { + char tmpname[sizeof(MM_SWAP_TEMPLATE)] = MM_SWAP_TEMPLATE; + int tmpfd; + + tmpfd = mkstemp(tmpname); + if (tmpfd == -1) + fatal("mkstemp(\"%s\"): %s", + MM_SWAP_TEMPLATE, strerror(errno)); + unlink(tmpname); + ftruncate(tmpfd, size); + address = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, + tmpfd, 0); + close(tmpfd); + } + + return (address); +#else + fatal("%s: UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes and Compression=yes not supported", + __func__); +#endif /* HAVE_MMAP */ + +} + diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xmmap.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xmmap.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c0fa04a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xmmap.h @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +void *xmmap(size_t size); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/packet.c b/crypto/openssh/packet.c index a5b2ab6..bd347ef 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/packet.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/packet.c @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.96 2002/06/23 21:10:02 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.97 2002/07/04 08:12:15 deraadt Exp $"); #include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" @@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ void packet_set_connection(int fd_in, int fd_out) { Cipher *none = cipher_by_name("none"); + if (none == NULL) fatal("packet_set_connection: cannot load cipher 'none'"); connection_in = fd_in; @@ -402,6 +403,7 @@ packet_set_encryption_key(const u_char *key, u_int keylen, int number) { Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_number(number); + if (cipher == NULL) fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: unknown cipher number %d", number); if (keylen < 20) @@ -443,6 +445,7 @@ void packet_put_char(int value) { char ch = value; + buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, &ch, 1); } void @@ -994,7 +997,8 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p) buffer_clear(&incoming_packet); buffer_append(&incoming_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer), buffer_len(&compression_buffer)); - DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %d", buffer_len(&incoming_packet))); + DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %d", + buffer_len(&incoming_packet))); } /* * get packet type, implies consume. @@ -1102,6 +1106,7 @@ u_int packet_get_char(void) { char ch; + buffer_get(&incoming_packet, &ch, 1); return (u_char) ch; } @@ -1135,6 +1140,7 @@ void * packet_get_raw(int *length_ptr) { int bytes = buffer_len(&incoming_packet); + if (length_ptr != NULL) *length_ptr = bytes; return buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet); @@ -1207,6 +1213,7 @@ packet_disconnect(const char *fmt,...) char buf[1024]; va_list args; static int disconnecting = 0; + if (disconnecting) /* Guard against recursive invocations. */ fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively."); disconnecting = 1; @@ -1249,6 +1256,7 @@ void packet_write_poll(void) { int len = buffer_len(&output); + if (len > 0) { len = write(connection_out, buffer_ptr(&output), len); if (len <= 0) { @@ -1368,6 +1376,7 @@ int packet_set_maxsize(int s) { static int called = 0; + if (called) { log("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d", max_packet_size, s); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/radix.c b/crypto/openssh/radix.c index 580e7e0..c680d6b 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/radix.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/radix.c @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ #include "includes.h" #include "uuencode.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: radix.c,v 1.21 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: radix.c,v 1.22 2002/09/09 14:54:15 markus Exp $"); #ifdef AFS #include <krb.h> @@ -93,9 +93,10 @@ int radix_to_creds(const char *buf, CREDENTIALS *creds) { Buffer b; - char c, version, *space, *p; - u_int endTime; - int len, blen, ret; + u_char *space; + char c, version, *p; + u_int endTime, len; + int blen, ret; ret = 0; blen = strlen(buf); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c index 80d99fe..bae06be 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ add_local_forward(Options *options, u_short port, const char *host, u_short host_port) { Forward *fwd; -#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN +#ifndef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT extern uid_t original_real_uid; if (port < IPPORT_RESERVED && original_real_uid != 0) fatal("Privileged ports can only be forwarded by root."); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/rijndael.c b/crypto/openssh/rijndael.c index 448048e..6965ca3 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/rijndael.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/rijndael.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.c,v 1.13 2001/12/19 07:18:56 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.c,v 1.14 2002/07/10 17:53:54 deraadt Exp $ */ /** * rijndael-alg-fst.c @@ -1226,7 +1226,7 @@ rijndael_set_key(rijndael_ctx *ctx, u_char *key, int bits, int encrypt) memset(ctx->dk, 0, sizeof(ctx->dk)); } else { ctx->decrypt = 1; - memcpy(ctx->dk, ctx->ek, sizeof(ctx->ek)); + memcpy(ctx->dk, ctx->ek, sizeof(ctx->dk)); rijndaelKeySetupDec(ctx->dk, key, bits, ctx->Nr); } } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scard.h b/crypto/openssh/scard.h index c0aa9ed..00999cb 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/scard.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/scard.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: scard.h,v 1.10 2002/03/25 17:34:27 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: scard.h,v 1.11 2002/06/30 21:59:45 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ #define SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD -2 #define SCARD_ERROR_APPLET -3 -Key **sc_get_keys(const char*, const char*); +Key **sc_get_keys(const char *, const char *); void sc_close(void); -int sc_put_key(Key *, const char*); +int sc_put_key(Key *, const char *); #endif diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c index f311ae4..e3939df 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.112 2002/06/23 09:46:51 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.115 2002/09/04 18:52:42 stevesk Exp $"); #if defined(KRB4) #include <krb.h> @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; options->permit_empty_passwd = -1; + options->permit_user_env = -1; options->use_login = -1; options->compression = -1; options->allow_tcp_forwarding = -1; @@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) if (options->server_key_bits == -1) options->server_key_bits = 768; if (options->login_grace_time == -1) - options->login_grace_time = 600; + options->login_grace_time = 120; if (options->key_regeneration_time == -1) options->key_regeneration_time = 3600; if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET) @@ -223,6 +224,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1) options->permit_empty_passwd = 0; + if (options->permit_user_env == -1) + options->permit_user_env = 0; if (options->use_login == -1) options->use_login = 0; if (options->compression == -1) @@ -257,7 +260,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) if (use_privsep == -1) use_privsep = 1; -#if !defined(HAVE_MMAP_ANON_SHARED) +#ifndef HAVE_MMAP if (use_privsep && options->compression == 1) { error("This platform does not support both privilege " "separation and compression"); @@ -291,7 +294,7 @@ typedef enum { sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts, sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sKeepAlives, - sUseLogin, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression, + sPermitUserEnvironment, sUseLogin, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups, sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile, sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, @@ -354,6 +357,7 @@ static struct { { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation }, { "strictmodes", sStrictModes }, { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd }, + { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment }, { "uselogin", sUseLogin }, { "compression", sCompression }, { "keepalive", sKeepAlives }, @@ -713,6 +717,10 @@ parse_flag: intptr = &options->permit_empty_passwd; goto parse_flag; + case sPermitUserEnvironment: + intptr = &options->permit_user_env; + goto parse_flag; + case sUseLogin: intptr = &options->use_login; goto parse_flag; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.h b/crypto/openssh/servconf.h index c94f541..024987d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/servconf.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.58 2002/06/20 23:05:55 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.59 2002/07/30 17:03:55 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> @@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ typedef struct { int challenge_response_authentication; int permit_empty_passwd; /* If false, do not permit empty * passwords. */ + int permit_user_env; /* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */ int use_login; /* If true, login(1) is used */ int compression; /* If true, compression is allowed */ int allow_tcp_forwarding; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c index 1349213..58e20df 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c @@ -35,13 +35,14 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.103 2002/06/24 14:33:27 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.104 2002/09/19 16:03:15 stevesk Exp $"); #include "xmalloc.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" #include "servconf.h" +#include "canohost.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "channels.h" #include "compat.h" @@ -143,7 +144,9 @@ sigchld_handler(int sig) int save_errno = errno; debug("Received SIGCHLD."); child_terminated = 1; +#ifndef _UNICOS mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); +#endif notify_parent(); errno = save_errno; } @@ -347,14 +350,17 @@ process_input(fd_set * readset) if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) { len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len == 0) { - verbose("Connection closed by remote host."); + verbose("Connection closed by %.100s", + get_remote_ipaddr()); connection_closed = 1; if (compat20) return; fatal_cleanup(); } else if (len < 0) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN) { - verbose("Read error from remote host: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + verbose("Read error from remote host " + "%.100s: %.100s", + get_remote_ipaddr(), strerror(errno)); fatal_cleanup(); } } else { @@ -972,8 +978,11 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) /* check permissions */ if (!options.allow_tcp_forwarding || - no_port_forwarding_flag || - (listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && pw->pw_uid != 0)) { + no_port_forwarding_flag +#ifndef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT + || (listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && pw->pw_uid != 0) +#endif + ) { success = 0; packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding."); } else { diff --git a/crypto/openssh/session.c b/crypto/openssh/session.c index 747a00a..9074525 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/session.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/session.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.142 2002/06/26 13:49:26 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.150 2002/09/16 19:55:33 stevesk Exp $"); #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" @@ -210,13 +210,6 @@ do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt) close(startup_pipe); startup_pipe = -1; } -#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE - /* We don't have a pty yet, so just label the line as "ssh" */ - if (loginsuccess(authctxt->user, - get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping), - "ssh", &aixloginmsg) < 0) - aixloginmsg = NULL; -#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */ /* setup the channel layer */ if (!no_port_forwarding_flag && options.allow_tcp_forwarding) @@ -470,6 +463,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command) /* Fork the child. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { + fatal_remove_all_cleanups(); + /* Child. Reinitialize the log since the pid has changed. */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); @@ -517,10 +512,17 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command) perror("dup2 stderr"); #endif /* USE_PIPES */ +#ifdef _UNICOS + cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */ +#endif + /* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */ do_child(s, command); /* NOTREACHED */ } +#ifdef _UNICOS + signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler); +#endif /* _UNICOS */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN if (is_winnt) cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); @@ -585,6 +587,7 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command) /* Fork the child. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { + fatal_remove_all_cleanups(); /* Child. Reinitialize the log because the pid has changed. */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); @@ -607,8 +610,12 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command) /* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */ #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA - if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL)) + if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL)) { +#ifdef _UNICOS + cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */ +#endif /* _UNICOS */ do_login(s, command); + } # ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX else do_pre_login(s); @@ -619,6 +626,9 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command) do_child(s, command); /* NOTREACHED */ } +#ifdef _UNICOS + signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler); +#endif /* _UNICOS */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN if (is_winnt) cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); @@ -668,8 +678,8 @@ do_pre_login(Session *s) * the address be 0.0.0.0. */ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); + fromlen = sizeof(from); if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { - fromlen = sizeof(from); if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) { debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); @@ -734,7 +744,7 @@ do_login(Session *s, const char *command) record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.verify_reverse_mapping), - (struct sockaddr *)&from); + (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen); #ifdef USE_PAM /* @@ -759,6 +769,7 @@ do_login(Session *s, const char *command) printf("%s\n", aixloginmsg); #endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */ +#ifndef NO_SSH_LASTLOG if (options.print_lastlog && s->last_login_time != 0) { time_string = ctime(&s->last_login_time); if (strchr(time_string, '\n')) @@ -769,6 +780,7 @@ do_login(Session *s, const char *command) printf("Last login: %s from %s\r\n", time_string, s->hostname); } +#endif /* NO_SSH_LASTLOG */ do_motd(); } @@ -959,8 +971,10 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP - (void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH); - child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH")); + if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH) < 0) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); + else + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH")); #else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ # ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN /* @@ -992,13 +1006,13 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell) if (!options.use_login) { while (custom_environment) { struct envstring *ce = custom_environment; - char *s = ce->s; + char *str = ce->s; - for (i = 0; s[i] != '=' && s[i]; i++) + for (i = 0; str[i] != '=' && str[i]; i++) ; - if (s[i] == '=') { - s[i] = 0; - child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s, s + i + 1); + if (str[i] == '=') { + str[i] = 0; + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, str, str + i + 1); } custom_environment = ce->next; xfree(ce->s); @@ -1006,10 +1020,16 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell) } } + /* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d", get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), get_local_port()); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf); + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d", + get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), + get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in()), get_local_port()); + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf); + if (s->ttyfd != -1) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty); if (s->term) @@ -1020,6 +1040,11 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND", original_command); +#ifdef _UNICOS + if (cray_tmpdir[0] != '\0') + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TMPDIR", cray_tmpdir); +#endif /* _UNICOS */ + #ifdef _AIX { char *cp; @@ -1042,8 +1067,17 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell) s->authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); #endif #ifdef USE_PAM - /* Pull in any environment variables that may have been set by PAM. */ - copy_environment(fetch_pam_environment(), &env, &envsize); + /* + * Pull in any environment variables that may have + * been set by PAM. + */ + { + char **p; + + p = fetch_pam_environment(); + copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize); + free_pam_environment(p); + } #endif /* USE_PAM */ if (auth_sock_name != NULL) @@ -1051,9 +1085,9 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell) auth_sock_name); /* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */ - if (!options.use_login) { + if (options.permit_user_env && !options.use_login) { snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment", - pw->pw_dir); + strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? pw->pw_dir : ""); read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf); } if (debug_flag) { @@ -1148,6 +1182,8 @@ do_nologin(struct passwd *pw) #endif if (f) { /* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents and exit. */ + log("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", + pw->pw_name, _PATH_NOLOGIN); while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) fputs(buf, stderr); fclose(f); @@ -1159,8 +1195,6 @@ do_nologin(struct passwd *pw) void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) { - char tty='\0'; - #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN if (is_winnt) { #else /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ @@ -1170,9 +1204,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) setpcred(pw->pw_name); #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP -#ifdef __bsdi__ +# ifdef __bsdi__ setpgid(0, 0); -#endif +# endif if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, (LOGIN_SETALL & ~LOGIN_SETPATH)) < 0) { perror("unable to set user context"); @@ -1209,8 +1243,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) irix_setusercontext(pw); # endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */ # ifdef _AIX - /* XXX: Disable tty setting. Enabled if required later */ - aix_usrinfo(pw, &tty, -1); + aix_usrinfo(pw); # endif /* _AIX */ /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */ permanently_set_uid(pw); @@ -1263,6 +1296,10 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command) if (options.use_login && command != NULL) options.use_login = 0; +#ifdef _UNICOS + cray_setup(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name, command); +#endif /* _UNICOS */ + /* * Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h" * switch, so we let login(1) to this for us. @@ -1798,6 +1835,27 @@ session_pty_cleanup(void *session) PRIVSEP(session_pty_cleanup2(session)); } +static char * +sig2name(int sig) +{ +#define SSH_SIG(x) if (sig == SIG ## x) return #x + SSH_SIG(ABRT); + SSH_SIG(ALRM); + SSH_SIG(FPE); + SSH_SIG(HUP); + SSH_SIG(ILL); + SSH_SIG(INT); + SSH_SIG(KILL); + SSH_SIG(PIPE); + SSH_SIG(QUIT); + SSH_SIG(SEGV); + SSH_SIG(TERM); + SSH_SIG(USR1); + SSH_SIG(USR2); +#undef SSH_SIG + return "SIG@openssh.com"; +} + static void session_exit_message(Session *s, int status) { @@ -1815,7 +1873,7 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int status) packet_send(); } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { channel_request_start(s->chanid, "exit-signal", 0); - packet_put_int(WTERMSIG(status)); + packet_put_cstring(sig2name(WTERMSIG(status))); #ifdef WCOREDUMP packet_put_char(WCOREDUMP(status)); #else /* WCOREDUMP */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/session.h b/crypto/openssh/session.h index 3bce978..d3ddfab 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/session.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/session.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.18 2002/06/23 21:06:41 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.19 2002/06/30 21:59:45 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ struct Session { void do_authenticated(Authctxt *); -int session_open(Authctxt*, int); +int session_open(Authctxt *, int); int session_input_channel_req(Channel *, const char *); void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int); void session_close_by_channel(int, void *); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c index 10b7992..f6a73f3 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c @@ -28,9 +28,9 @@ /* XXX: copy between two remote sites */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.33 2002/06/23 09:30:14 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.35 2002/09/11 22:41:49 djm Exp $"); -#include "openbsd-compat/fake-queue.h" +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "bufaux.h" @@ -415,12 +415,6 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int printflag, } int -do_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) -{ - return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 1, NULL)); -} - -int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) { return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir)); @@ -1095,7 +1089,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path, debug3("In write loop, ack for %u %u bytes at %llu", ack->id, ack->len, (unsigned long long)ack->offset); ++ackid; - free(ack); + xfree(ack); } offset += len; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h index b061711..98e08ff 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.10 2002/06/23 09:30:14 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.11 2002/09/11 22:41:50 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001,2002 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. @@ -48,9 +48,6 @@ u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *); /* Close file referred to by 'handle' */ int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int); -/* List contents of directory 'path' to stdout */ -int do_ls(struct sftp_conn *, char *); - /* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */ int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.c index 6bed0ab..0823454 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.c @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-common.c,v 1.6 2002/06/23 09:30:14 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-common.c,v 1.7 2002/09/11 22:41:50 djm Exp $"); #include "buffer.h" #include "bufaux.h" @@ -65,6 +65,26 @@ stat_to_attrib(struct stat *st, Attrib *a) a->mtime = st->st_mtime; } +/* Convert from filexfer attribs to struct stat */ +void +attrib_to_stat(Attrib *a, struct stat *st) +{ + memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st)); + + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) + st->st_size = a->size; + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { + st->st_uid = a->uid; + st->st_gid = a->gid; + } + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) + st->st_mode = a->perm; + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { + st->st_atime = a->atime; + st->st_mtime = a->mtime; + } +} + /* Decode attributes in buffer */ Attrib * decode_attrib(Buffer *b) @@ -149,3 +169,45 @@ fx2txt(int status) } /* NOTREACHED */ } + +/* + * drwxr-xr-x 5 markus markus 1024 Jan 13 18:39 .ssh + */ +char * +ls_file(char *name, struct stat *st, int remote) +{ + int ulen, glen, sz = 0; + struct passwd *pw; + struct group *gr; + struct tm *ltime = localtime(&st->st_mtime); + char *user, *group; + char buf[1024], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1]; + + strmode(st->st_mode, mode); + if (!remote && (pw = getpwuid(st->st_uid)) != NULL) { + user = pw->pw_name; + } else { + snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_uid); + user = ubuf; + } + if (!remote && (gr = getgrgid(st->st_gid)) != NULL) { + group = gr->gr_name; + } else { + snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_gid); + group = gbuf; + } + if (ltime != NULL) { + if (time(NULL) - st->st_mtime < (365*24*60*60)/2) + sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %H:%M", ltime); + else + sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %Y", ltime); + } + if (sz == 0) + tbuf[0] = '\0'; + ulen = MAX(strlen(user), 8); + glen = MAX(strlen(group), 8); + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3d %-*s %-*s %8llu %s %s", mode, + st->st_nlink, ulen, user, glen, group, + (u_int64_t)st->st_size, tbuf, name); + return xstrdup(buf); +} diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.h b/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.h index 4c126bf..201611c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.h,v 1.3 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.h,v 1.4 2002/09/11 22:41:50 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -40,7 +40,9 @@ struct Attrib { void attrib_clear(Attrib *); void stat_to_attrib(struct stat *, Attrib *); +void attrib_to_stat(Attrib *, struct stat *); Attrib *decode_attrib(Buffer *); void encode_attrib(Buffer *, Attrib *); +char *ls_file(char *, struct stat *, int); const char *fx2txt(int); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-glob.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-glob.c index 1234074..ee122a2 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-glob.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-glob.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-glob.c,v 1.10 2002/02/13 00:59:23 djm Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-glob.c,v 1.13 2002/09/11 22:41:50 djm Exp $"); #include "buffer.h" #include "bufaux.h" @@ -51,12 +51,14 @@ fudge_opendir(const char *path) r = xmalloc(sizeof(*r)); - if (do_readdir(cur.conn, (char*)path, &r->dir)) + if (do_readdir(cur.conn, (char *)path, &r->dir)) { + xfree(r); return(NULL); + } r->offset = 0; - return((void*)r); + return((void *)r); } static struct dirent * @@ -105,31 +107,12 @@ fudge_closedir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od) xfree(od); } -static void -attrib_to_stat(Attrib *a, struct stat *st) -{ - memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st)); - - if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) - st->st_size = a->size; - if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { - st->st_uid = a->uid; - st->st_gid = a->gid; - } - if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) - st->st_mode = a->perm; - if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { - st->st_atime = a->atime; - st->st_mtime = a->mtime; - } -} - static int fudge_lstat(const char *path, struct stat *st) { Attrib *a; - if (!(a = do_lstat(cur.conn, (char*)path, 0))) + if (!(a = do_lstat(cur.conn, (char *)path, 0))) return(-1); attrib_to_stat(a, st); @@ -142,7 +125,7 @@ fudge_stat(const char *path, struct stat *st) { Attrib *a; - if (!(a = do_stat(cur.conn, (char*)path, 0))) + if (!(a = do_stat(cur.conn, (char *)path, 0))) return(-1); attrib_to_stat(a, st); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-glob.h b/crypto/openssh/sftp-glob.h index 9c75491..f879e87 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-glob.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-glob.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-glob.h,v 1.7 2002/03/19 10:49:35 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-glob.h,v 1.8 2002/09/11 22:41:50 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001,2002 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. @@ -31,8 +31,7 @@ #include "sftp-client.h" -int -remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int, +int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); #endif diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-int.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-int.c index b13e5da..6a20129 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-int.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-int.c @@ -22,11 +22,10 @@ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ -/* XXX: globbed ls */ /* XXX: recursive operations */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-int.c,v 1.47 2002/06/23 09:30:14 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-int.c,v 1.49 2002/09/12 00:13:06 djm Exp $"); #include "buffer.h" #include "xmalloc.h" @@ -201,6 +200,25 @@ local_do_ls(const char *args) } } +/* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */ +static char * +path_strip(char *path, char *strip) +{ + size_t len; + + if (strip == NULL) + return (xstrdup(path)); + + len = strlen(strip); + if (strip != NULL && strncmp(path, strip, len) == 0) { + if (strip[len - 1] != '/' && path[len] == '/') + len++; + return (xstrdup(path + len)); + } + + return (xstrdup(path)); +} + static char * path_append(char *p1, char *p2) { @@ -209,7 +227,7 @@ path_append(char *p1, char *p2) ret = xmalloc(len); strlcpy(ret, p1, len); - if (strcmp(p1, "/") != 0) + if (p1[strlen(p1) - 1] != '/') strlcat(ret, "/", len); strlcat(ret, p2, len); @@ -274,6 +292,29 @@ parse_getput_flags(const char **cpp, int *pflag) } static int +parse_ls_flags(const char **cpp, int *lflag) +{ + const char *cp = *cpp; + + /* Check for flags */ + if (cp++[0] == '-') { + for(; strchr(WHITESPACE, *cp) == NULL; cp++) { + switch (*cp) { + case 'l': + *lflag = 1; + break; + default: + error("Invalid flag -%c", *cp); + return(-1); + } + } + *cpp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); + } + + return(0); +} + +static int get_pathname(const char **cpp, char **path) { const char *cp = *cpp, *end; @@ -504,8 +545,129 @@ out: } static int -parse_args(const char **cpp, int *pflag, unsigned long *n_arg, - char **path1, char **path2) +sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb) +{ + SFTP_DIRENT *a = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)aa; + SFTP_DIRENT *b = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)bb; + + return (strcmp(a->filename, b->filename)); +} + +/* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */ +static int +do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag) +{ + int n; + SFTP_DIRENT **d; + + if ((n = do_readdir(conn, path, &d)) != 0) + return (n); + + /* Count entries for sort */ + for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) + ; + + qsort(d, n, sizeof(*d), sdirent_comp); + + for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) { + char *tmp, *fname; + + tmp = path_append(path, d[n]->filename); + fname = path_strip(tmp, strip_path); + xfree(tmp); + + if (lflag) { + char *lname; + struct stat sb; + + memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb)); + attrib_to_stat(&d[n]->a, &sb); + lname = ls_file(fname, &sb, 1); + printf("%s\n", lname); + xfree(lname); + } else { + /* XXX - multicolumn display would be nice here */ + printf("%s\n", fname); + } + + xfree(fname); + } + + free_sftp_dirents(d); + return (0); +} + +/* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */ +static int +do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, + int lflag) +{ + glob_t g; + int i; + Attrib *a; + struct stat sb; + + memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); + + if (remote_glob(conn, path, GLOB_MARK|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_BRACE, + NULL, &g)) { + error("Can't ls: \"%s\" not found", path); + return (-1); + } + + /* + * If the glob returns a single match, which is the same as the + * input glob, and it is a directory, then just list its contents + */ + if (g.gl_pathc == 1 && + strncmp(path, g.gl_pathv[0], strlen(g.gl_pathv[0]) - 1) == 0) { + if ((a = do_lstat(conn, path, 1)) == NULL) { + globfree(&g); + return (-1); + } + if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) && + S_ISDIR(a->perm)) { + globfree(&g); + return (do_ls_dir(conn, path, strip_path, lflag)); + } + } + + for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++) { + char *fname, *lname; + + fname = path_strip(g.gl_pathv[i], strip_path); + + if (lflag) { + /* + * XXX: this is slow - 1 roundtrip per path + * A solution to this is to fork glob() and + * build a sftp specific version which keeps the + * attribs (which currently get thrown away) + * that the server returns as well as the filenames. + */ + memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb)); + a = do_lstat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], 1); + if (a != NULL) + attrib_to_stat(a, &sb); + lname = ls_file(fname, &sb, 1); + printf("%s\n", lname); + xfree(lname); + } else { + /* XXX - multicolumn display would be nice here */ + printf("%s\n", fname); + } + xfree(fname); + } + + if (g.gl_pathc) + globfree(&g); + + return (0); +} + +static int +parse_args(const char **cpp, int *pflag, int *lflag, + unsigned long *n_arg, char **path1, char **path2) { const char *cmd, *cp = *cpp; char *cp2; @@ -545,7 +707,7 @@ parse_args(const char **cpp, int *pflag, unsigned long *n_arg, } /* Get arguments and parse flags */ - *pflag = *n_arg = 0; + *lflag = *pflag = *n_arg = 0; *path1 = *path2 = NULL; switch (cmdnum) { case I_GET: @@ -592,6 +754,8 @@ parse_args(const char **cpp, int *pflag, unsigned long *n_arg, } break; case I_LS: + if (parse_ls_flags(&cp, lflag)) + return(-1); /* Path is optional */ if (get_pathname(&cp, path1)) return(-1); @@ -652,7 +816,7 @@ static int parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd) { char *path1, *path2, *tmp; - int pflag, cmdnum, i; + int pflag, lflag, cmdnum, i; unsigned long n_arg; Attrib a, *aa; char path_buf[MAXPATHLEN]; @@ -660,7 +824,8 @@ parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd) glob_t g; path1 = path2 = NULL; - cmdnum = parse_args(&cmd, &pflag, &n_arg, &path1, &path2); + cmdnum = parse_args(&cmd, &pflag, &lflag, &n_arg, + &path1, &path2); memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); @@ -732,22 +897,18 @@ parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd) break; case I_LS: if (!path1) { - do_ls(conn, *pwd); + do_globbed_ls(conn, *pwd, *pwd, lflag); break; } + + /* Strip pwd off beginning of non-absolute paths */ + tmp = NULL; + if (*path1 != '/') + tmp = *pwd; + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); - if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) - break; - xfree(path1); - path1 = tmp; - if ((aa = do_stat(conn, path1, 0)) == NULL) - break; - if ((aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) && - !S_ISDIR(aa->perm)) { - error("Can't ls: \"%s\" is not a directory", path1); - break; - } - do_ls(conn, path1); + + do_globbed_ls(conn, path1, tmp, lflag); break; case I_LCHDIR: if (chdir(path1) == -1) { diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c index a5c3255..8426469 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.37 2002/06/24 17:57:20 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.38 2002/09/11 22:41:50 djm Exp $"); #include "buffer.h" #include "bufaux.h" @@ -695,48 +695,6 @@ process_opendir(void) xfree(path); } -/* - * drwxr-xr-x 5 markus markus 1024 Jan 13 18:39 .ssh - */ -static char * -ls_file(char *name, struct stat *st) -{ - int ulen, glen, sz = 0; - struct passwd *pw; - struct group *gr; - struct tm *ltime = localtime(&st->st_mtime); - char *user, *group; - char buf[1024], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1]; - - strmode(st->st_mode, mode); - if ((pw = getpwuid(st->st_uid)) != NULL) { - user = pw->pw_name; - } else { - snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_uid); - user = ubuf; - } - if ((gr = getgrgid(st->st_gid)) != NULL) { - group = gr->gr_name; - } else { - snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_gid); - group = gbuf; - } - if (ltime != NULL) { - if (time(NULL) - st->st_mtime < (365*24*60*60)/2) - sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %H:%M", ltime); - else - sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %Y", ltime); - } - if (sz == 0) - tbuf[0] = '\0'; - ulen = MAX(strlen(user), 8); - glen = MAX(strlen(group), 8); - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3d %-*s %-*s %8llu %s %s", mode, - st->st_nlink, ulen, user, glen, group, - (u_int64_t)st->st_size, tbuf, name); - return xstrdup(buf); -} - static void process_readdir(void) { @@ -772,7 +730,7 @@ process_readdir(void) continue; stat_to_attrib(&st, &(stats[count].attrib)); stats[count].name = xstrdup(dp->d_name); - stats[count].long_name = ls_file(dp->d_name, &st); + stats[count].long_name = ls_file(dp->d_name, &st, 0); count++; /* send up to 100 entries in one message */ /* XXX check packet size instead */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp.1 b/crypto/openssh/sftp.1 index 0e6d741..33ceb65 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sftp.1 +++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp.1 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.35 2002/06/20 20:00:05 stevesk Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.36 2002/09/11 22:41:50 djm Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. .\" @@ -203,12 +203,18 @@ to .Ar newpath . .It Ic lpwd Print local working directory. -.It Ic ls Op Ar path +.It Xo Ic ls +.Op Ar flags +.Op Ar path +.Xc Display remote directory listing of either .Ar path or current directory if .Ar path -is not specified. +is not specified. If the +.Fl l +flag is specified, then display additional details including permissions +and ownership information. .It Ic lumask Ar umask Set local umask to .Ar umask . diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp.c index fac2564..c4055b9 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sftp.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp.c @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.30 2002/06/23 09:30:14 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.31 2002/07/25 01:16:59 mouring Exp $"); /* XXX: short-form remote directory listings (like 'ls -C') */ @@ -122,7 +122,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) __progname = get_progname(argv[0]); args.list = NULL; addargs(&args, "ssh"); /* overwritten with ssh_program */ - addargs(&args, "-oFallBackToRsh no"); addargs(&args, "-oForwardX11 no"); addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no"); addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes"); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c index 176fd85..9c72975 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.61 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.63 2002/09/19 15:51:23 markus Exp $"); #include <openssl/evp.h> @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int lock) fprintf(stderr, "Failed to %slock agent.\n", lock ? "" : "un"); memset(p1, 0, strlen(p1)); xfree(p1); - return -1; + return (ret); } static int @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ usage(void) fprintf(stderr, " -d Delete identity.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -D Delete all identities.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -x Lock agent.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -x Unlock agent.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -X Unlock agent.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -t life Set lifetime (in seconds) when adding identities.\n"); #ifdef SMARTCARD fprintf(stderr, " -s reader Add key in smartcard reader.\n"); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c index ac16bae..cca720e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c @@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -#include "openbsd-compat/fake-queue.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.97 2002/06/24 14:55:38 markus Exp $"); +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.105 2002/10/01 20:34:12 markus Exp $"); #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/md5.h> @@ -107,6 +107,17 @@ char *__progname; #endif static void +close_socket(SocketEntry *e) +{ + close(e->fd); + e->fd = -1; + e->type = AUTH_UNUSED; + buffer_free(&e->input); + buffer_free(&e->output); + buffer_free(&e->request); +} + +static void idtab_init(void) { int i; @@ -617,13 +628,7 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e) cp = buffer_ptr(&e->input); msg_len = GET_32BIT(cp); if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) { - shutdown(e->fd, SHUT_RDWR); - close(e->fd); - e->fd = -1; - e->type = AUTH_UNUSED; - buffer_free(&e->input); - buffer_free(&e->output); - buffer_free(&e->request); + close_socket(e); return; } if (buffer_len(&e->input) < msg_len + 4) @@ -805,6 +810,8 @@ after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) char buf[1024]; int len, sock; u_int i; + uid_t euid; + gid_t egid; for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) switch (sockets[i].type) { @@ -820,6 +827,19 @@ after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) strerror(errno)); break; } + if (getpeereid(sock, &euid, &egid) < 0) { + error("getpeereid %d failed: %s", + sock, strerror(errno)); + close(sock); + break; + } + if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) { + error("uid mismatch: " + "peer euid %u != uid %u", + (u_int) euid, (u_int) getuid()); + close(sock); + break; + } new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, sock); } break; @@ -836,13 +856,7 @@ after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) break; } while (1); if (len <= 0) { - shutdown(sockets[i].fd, SHUT_RDWR); - close(sockets[i].fd); - sockets[i].fd = -1; - sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED; - buffer_free(&sockets[i].input); - buffer_free(&sockets[i].output); - buffer_free(&sockets[i].request); + close_socket(&sockets[i]); break; } buffer_consume(&sockets[i].output, len); @@ -856,13 +870,7 @@ after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) break; } while (1); if (len <= 0) { - shutdown(sockets[i].fd, SHUT_RDWR); - close(sockets[i].fd); - sockets[i].fd = -1; - sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED; - buffer_free(&sockets[i].input); - buffer_free(&sockets[i].output); - buffer_free(&sockets[i].request); + close_socket(&sockets[i]); break; } buffer_append(&sockets[i].input, buf, len); @@ -943,6 +951,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) pid_t pid; char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid]; + /* drop */ + setegid(getgid()); + setgid(getgid()); + SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); __progname = get_progname(av[0]); @@ -1052,7 +1064,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN umask(prev_mask); #endif - if (listen(sock, 5) < 0) { + if (listen(sock, 128) < 0) { perror("listen"); cleanup_exit(1); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c index dbf8465..9ba2584 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.15 2002/06/23 03:30:17 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.17 2002/07/04 10:41:47 markus Exp $"); #include <openssl/bn.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, DSA_SIG *sig; const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1(); EVP_MD_CTX md; - u_char *ret, digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN]; + u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN]; u_int rlen, slen, len, dlen; Buffer b; @@ -79,25 +79,25 @@ ssh_dss_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, DSA_SIG_free(sig); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) { - ret = xmalloc(SIGBLOB_LEN); - memcpy(ret, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN); if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = SIGBLOB_LEN; - if (sigp != NULL) - *sigp = ret; + if (sigp != NULL) { + *sigp = xmalloc(SIGBLOB_LEN); + memcpy(*sigp, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN); + } } else { /* ietf-drafts */ buffer_init(&b); buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-dss"); buffer_put_string(&b, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN); len = buffer_len(&b); - ret = xmalloc(len); - memcpy(ret, buffer_ptr(&b), len); - buffer_free(&b); if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; - if (sigp != NULL) - *sigp = ret; + if (sigp != NULL) { + *sigp = xmalloc(len); + memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len); + } + buffer_free(&b); } return 0; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c index 4273c11..3478e37 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c @@ -761,6 +761,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) __progname = get_progname(av[0]); SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); + init_rng(); + seed_rng(); /* we need this for the home * directory. */ pw = getpwuid(getuid()); @@ -855,10 +857,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av) do_fingerprint(pw); if (change_passphrase) do_change_passphrase(pw); - if (convert_to_ssh2) - do_convert_to_ssh2(pw); if (change_comment) do_change_comment(pw); + if (convert_to_ssh2) + do_convert_to_ssh2(pw); + if (convert_from_ssh2) + do_convert_from_ssh2(pw); if (print_public) do_print_public(pw); if (reader_id != NULL) { @@ -872,13 +876,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) #endif /* SMARTCARD */ } - init_rng(); - seed_rng(); arc4random_stir(); - if (convert_from_ssh2) - do_convert_from_ssh2(pw); - if (key_type_name == NULL) { printf("You must specify a key type (-t).\n"); usage(); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c index 333a38e..8c14d6d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c @@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.36 2002/06/16 21:30:58 itojun Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.40 2002/07/06 17:47:58 stevesk Exp $"); -#include "openbsd-compat/fake-queue.h" +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include <openssl/bn.h> @@ -116,7 +116,8 @@ Linebuf_alloc(const char *filename, void (*errfun) (const char *,...)) if (!(lb = malloc(sizeof(*lb)))) { if (errfun) - (*errfun) ("linebuf (%s): malloc failed\n", lb->filename); + (*errfun) ("linebuf (%s): malloc failed\n", + filename ? filename : "(stdin)"); return (NULL); } if (filename) { @@ -171,13 +172,14 @@ static char * Linebuf_getline(Linebuf * lb) { int n = 0; + void *p; lb->lineno++; for (;;) { /* Read a line */ if (!fgets(&lb->buf[n], lb->size - n, lb->stream)) { if (ferror(lb->stream) && lb->errfun) - (*lb->errfun) ("%s: %s\n", lb->filename, + (*lb->errfun)("%s: %s\n", lb->filename, strerror(errno)); return (NULL); } @@ -190,17 +192,20 @@ Linebuf_getline(Linebuf * lb) } if (n != lb->size - 1) { if (lb->errfun) - (*lb->errfun) ("%s: skipping incomplete last line\n", + (*lb->errfun)("%s: skipping incomplete last line\n", lb->filename); return (NULL); } /* Double the buffer if we need more space */ - if (!(lb->buf = realloc(lb->buf, (lb->size *= 2)))) { + lb->size *= 2; + if ((p = realloc(lb->buf, lb->size)) == NULL) { + lb->size /= 2; if (lb->errfun) - (*lb->errfun) ("linebuf (%s): realloc failed\n", + (*lb->errfun)("linebuf (%s): realloc failed\n", lb->filename); return (NULL); } + lb->buf = p; } } @@ -229,6 +234,7 @@ fdlim_set(int lim) #if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) struct rlimit rlfd; #endif + if (lim <= 0) return (-1); #if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) @@ -411,8 +417,8 @@ tcpconnect(char *host) static int conalloc(char *iname, char *oname, int keytype) { - int s; char *namebase, *name, *namelist; + int s; namebase = namelist = xstrdup(iname); @@ -476,8 +482,8 @@ contouch(int s) static int conrecycle(int s) { - int ret; con *c = &fdcon[s]; + int ret; ret = conalloc(c->c_namelist, c->c_output_name, c->c_keytype); confree(s); @@ -487,10 +493,10 @@ conrecycle(int s) static void congreet(int s) { + int remote_major, remote_minor, n = 0; char buf[256], *cp; char remote_version[sizeof buf]; size_t bufsiz; - int remote_major, remote_minor, n = 0; con *c = &fdcon[s]; bufsiz = sizeof(buf); @@ -554,8 +560,8 @@ congreet(int s) static void conread(int s) { - int n; con *c = &fdcon[s]; + int n; if (c->c_status == CS_CON) { congreet(s); @@ -594,10 +600,10 @@ conread(int s) static void conloop(void) { - fd_set *r, *e; struct timeval seltime, now; - int i; + fd_set *r, *e; con *c; + int i; gettimeofday(&now, NULL); c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq); @@ -664,6 +670,7 @@ void fatal(const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; + va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args); va_end(args); @@ -676,16 +683,9 @@ fatal(const char *fmt,...) static void usage(void) { - fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options] host ...\n", + fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-v46] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-f file]\n" + "\t\t [host | addrlist namelist] [...]\n", __progname); - fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -f file Read hosts or addresses from file.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -p port Connect to the specified port.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -t keytype Specify the host key type.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -T timeout Set connection timeout.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -v Verbose; display verbose debugging messages.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -4 Use IPv4 only.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -6 Use IPv6 only.\n"); exit(1); } @@ -717,9 +717,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) } break; case 'T': - timeout = atoi(optarg); - if (timeout <= 0) + timeout = convtime(optarg); + if (timeout == -1 || timeout == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Bad timeout '%s'\n", optarg); usage(); + } break; case 'v': if (!debug_flag) { diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.8 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.8 index ab2cf21..cea4a82 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.8 +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.8 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.2 2002/06/10 16:56:30 stevesk Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.3 2002/07/03 14:21:05 markus Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" @@ -36,6 +36,16 @@ is used by .Xr ssh 1 to access the local host keys and generate the digital signature required during hostbased authentication with SSH protocol version 2. +.Pp +.Nm +is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the +the global client configuration file +.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config +by setting +.Cm HostbasedAuthentication +to +.Dq yes . +.Pp .Nm is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from .Xr ssh 1 . @@ -46,6 +56,10 @@ and for more information about hostbased authentication. .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config +Controls whether +.Nm +is enabled. .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to generate the digital signature. They @@ -58,6 +72,7 @@ must be set-uid root if hostbased authentication is used. .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , +.Xr ssh_config 5 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh AUTHORS Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org> diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c index 7f1d25d..79aee17 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c @@ -22,12 +22,15 @@ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.4 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.7 2002/07/03 14:21:05 markus Exp $"); #include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/rsa.h> #include "log.h" #include "key.h" +#include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "misc.h" #include "xmalloc.h" @@ -37,6 +40,9 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.4 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $"); #include "msg.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "pathnames.h" +#include "readconf.h" + +uid_t original_real_uid; /* XXX readconf.c needs this */ #ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME extern char *__progname; @@ -134,12 +140,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { Buffer b; + Options options; Key *keys[2], *key; struct passwd *pw; int key_fd[2], i, found, version = 2, fd; u_char *signature, *data; char *host; u_int slen, dlen; + u_int32_t rnd[256]; key_fd[0] = open(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); key_fd[1] = open(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); @@ -155,6 +163,15 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) log_init("ssh-keysign", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); #endif + /* verify that ssh-keysign is enabled by the admin */ + original_real_uid = getuid(); /* XXX readconf.c needs this */ + initialize_options(&options); + (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, "", &options); + fill_default_options(&options); + if (options.hostbased_authentication != 1) + fatal("Hostbased authentication not enabled in %s", + _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE); + if (key_fd[0] == -1 && key_fd[1] == -1) fatal("could not open any host key"); @@ -163,6 +180,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) pw = pwcopy(pw); SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); + for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) + rnd[i] = arc4random(); + RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); found = 0; for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { @@ -172,6 +192,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) keys[i] = key_load_private_pem(key_fd[i], KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL); close(key_fd[i]); + if (keys[i] != NULL && keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA) { + if (RSA_blinding_on(keys[i]->rsa, NULL) != 1) { + error("RSA_blinding_on failed"); + key_free(keys[i]); + keys[i] = NULL; + } + } if (keys[i] != NULL) found = 1; } @@ -179,8 +206,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) fatal("no hostkey found"); buffer_init(&b); - if (msg_recv(STDIN_FILENO, &b) < 0) - fatal("msg_recv failed"); + if (ssh_msg_recv(STDIN_FILENO, &b) < 0) + fatal("ssh_msg_recv failed"); if (buffer_get_char(&b) != version) fatal("bad version"); fd = buffer_get_int(&b); @@ -192,7 +219,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) data = buffer_get_string(&b, &dlen); if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, data, dlen) < 0) fatal("not a valid request"); - xfree(data); xfree(host); found = 0; @@ -208,11 +234,12 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) if (key_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen) != 0) fatal("key_sign failed"); + xfree(data); /* send reply */ buffer_clear(&b); buffer_put_string(&b, signature, slen); - msg_send(STDOUT_FILENO, version, &b); + ssh_msg_send(STDOUT_FILENO, version, &b); return (0); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rand-helper.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rand-helper.c index 364d5d2..e6c52b5 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rand-helper.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rand-helper.c @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" -RCSID("$Id: ssh-rand-helper.c,v 1.7 2002/06/09 19:41:49 mouring Exp $"); +RCSID("$Id: ssh-rand-helper.c,v 1.8 2002/07/28 20:42:24 stevesk Exp $"); /* Number of bytes we write out */ #define OUTPUT_SEED_SIZE 48 @@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ RCSID("$Id: ssh-rand-helper.c,v 1.7 2002/06/09 19:41:49 mouring Exp $"); # define SSH_PRNG_COMMAND_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_prng_cmds" #endif - #ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME extern char *__progname; #else @@ -115,7 +114,7 @@ double stir_from_programs(void); double stir_gettimeofday(double entropy_estimate); double stir_clock(double entropy_estimate); double stir_rusage(int who, double entropy_estimate); -double hash_command_output(entropy_cmd_t *src, char *hash); +double hash_command_output(entropy_cmd_t *src, unsigned char *hash); int get_random_bytes_prngd(unsigned char *buf, int len, unsigned short tcp_port, char *socket_path); @@ -274,7 +273,7 @@ timeval_diff(struct timeval *t1, struct timeval *t2) } double -hash_command_output(entropy_cmd_t *src, char *hash) +hash_command_output(entropy_cmd_t *src, unsigned char *hash) { char buf[8192]; fd_set rdset; @@ -460,7 +459,7 @@ stir_from_programs(void) { int c; double entropy, total_entropy; - char hash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + unsigned char hash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; total_entropy = 0; for(c = 0; entropy_cmds[c].path != NULL; c++) { @@ -543,7 +542,8 @@ void prng_write_seedfile(void) { int fd; - char seed[SEED_FILE_SIZE], filename[MAXPATHLEN]; + unsigned char seed[SEED_FILE_SIZE]; + char filename[MAXPATHLEN]; struct passwd *pw; pw = getpwuid(getuid()); @@ -862,4 +862,3 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) return ret == bytes ? 0 : 1; } - diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c index 782279b..d7b2918 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.21 2002/06/23 03:30:17 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.26 2002/08/27 17:13:56 stevesk Exp $"); #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/err.h> @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.21 2002/06/23 03:30:17 deraadt Exp $"); #include "compat.h" #include "ssh.h" +static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int , RSA *); + /* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v2.0 signature) with SHA1 */ int ssh_rsa_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, @@ -44,7 +46,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, { const EVP_MD *evp_md; EVP_MD_CTX md; - u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *sig, *ret; + u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *sig; u_int slen, dlen, len; int ok, nid; Buffer b; @@ -76,7 +78,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, return -1; } if (len < slen) { - int diff = slen - len; + u_int diff = slen - len; debug("slen %u > len %u", slen, len); memmove(sig + diff, sig, len); memset(sig, 0, diff); @@ -90,16 +92,16 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-rsa"); buffer_put_string(&b, sig, slen); len = buffer_len(&b); - ret = xmalloc(len); - memcpy(ret, buffer_ptr(&b), len); + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + if (sigp != NULL) { + *sigp = xmalloc(len); + memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len); + } buffer_free(&b); memset(sig, 's', slen); xfree(sig); - if (lenp != NULL) - *lenp = len; - if (sigp != NULL) - *sigp = ret; return 0; } @@ -149,7 +151,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(Key *key, u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen, xfree(sigblob); return -1; } else if (len < modlen) { - int diff = modlen - len; + u_int diff = modlen - len; debug("ssh_rsa_verify: add padding: modlen %u > len %u", modlen, len); sigblob = xrealloc(sigblob, modlen); @@ -167,15 +169,100 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(Key *key, u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen, EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen); EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen); - ret = RSA_verify(nid, digest, dlen, sigblob, len, key->rsa); + ret = openssh_RSA_verify(nid, digest, dlen, sigblob, len, key->rsa); memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest)); memset(sigblob, 's', len); xfree(sigblob); - if (ret == 0) { - int ecode = ERR_get_error(); - error("ssh_rsa_verify: RSA_verify failed: %s", - ERR_error_string(ecode, NULL)); - } debug("ssh_rsa_verify: signature %scorrect", (ret==0) ? "in" : ""); return ret; } + +/* + * See: + * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/ + * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn + */ +/* + * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) + * oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 } + */ +static const u_char id_sha1[] = { + 0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */ + 0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */ + 0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */ + 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */ + 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ + 0x04, 0x14 /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */ +}; +/* + * id-md5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) + * rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 5 } + */ +static const u_char id_md5[] = { + 0x30, 0x20, /* type Sequence, length 0x20 (32) */ + 0x30, 0x0c, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */ + 0x06, 0x08, /* type OID, length 0x05 */ + 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, /* id-md5 */ + 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ + 0x04, 0x10 /* Octet string, length 0x10 (16), followed by md5 hash */ +}; + +static int +openssh_RSA_verify(int type, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, + u_char *sigbuf, u_int siglen, RSA *rsa) +{ + u_int ret, rsasize, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0; + int len; + const u_char *oid = NULL; + u_char *decrypted = NULL; + + ret = 0; + switch (type) { + case NID_sha1: + oid = id_sha1; + oidlen = sizeof(id_sha1); + hlen = 20; + break; + case NID_md5: + oid = id_md5; + oidlen = sizeof(id_md5); + hlen = 16; + break; + default: + goto done; + break; + } + if (hashlen != hlen) { + error("bad hashlen"); + goto done; + } + rsasize = RSA_size(rsa); + if (siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) { + error("bad siglen"); + goto done; + } + decrypted = xmalloc(rsasize); + if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa, + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) { + error("RSA_public_decrypt failed: %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + goto done; + } + if (len != hlen + oidlen) { + error("bad decrypted len: %d != %d + %d", len, hlen, oidlen); + goto done; + } + if (memcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) != 0) { + error("oid mismatch"); + goto done; + } + if (memcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) != 0) { + error("hash mismatch"); + goto done; + } + ret = 1; +done: + if (decrypted) + xfree(decrypted); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 index 1f3efca..27808b1 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.160 2002/06/22 11:51:39 naddy Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.167 2002/09/27 15:46:21 stevesk Exp $ .Dd September 25, 1999 .Dt SSH 1 .Os @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ .Op Ar command .Pp .Nm ssh -.Op Fl afgknqstvxACNPTX1246 +.Op Fl afgknqstvxACNTX1246 .Op Fl b Ar bind_address .Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec .Op Fl e Ar escape_char @@ -353,9 +353,17 @@ the connection is opened. The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain). .Pp -If the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent -is automatically forwarded to the remote side unless disabled on -the command line or in a configuration file. +If the +.Cm ForwardAgent +variable is set to +.Dq yes +(or, see the description of the +.Fl A +and +.Fl a +options described later) and +the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent +is automatically forwarded to the remote side. .Pp Forwarding of arbitrary TCP/IP connections over the secure channel can be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. @@ -394,6 +402,13 @@ Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. .It Fl A Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. +.Pp +Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the +ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's +Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded +connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, +however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to +authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. .It Fl b Ar bind_address Specify the interface to transmit from on machines with multiple interfaces or aliased addresses. @@ -515,15 +530,6 @@ command-line flag. Port to connect to on the remote host. This can be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. -.It Fl P -Use a non-privileged port for outgoing connections. -This can be used if a firewall does -not permit connections from privileged ports. -Note that this option turns off -.Cm RhostsAuthentication -and -.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication -for older servers. .It Fl q Quiet mode. Causes all warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed. @@ -559,6 +565,12 @@ Disables X11 forwarding. .It Fl X Enables X11 forwarding. This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. +.Pp +X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability +to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X +authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the +forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform +activities such as keystroke monitoring. .It Fl C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and data for forwarded X11 and TCP/IP connections). @@ -568,7 +580,7 @@ and the .Dq level can be controlled by the .Cm CompressionLevel -option. +option for protocol version 1. Compression is desirable on modem lines and other slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks. The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the @@ -714,11 +726,11 @@ to make this work.) .It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a unix-domain socket used to communicate with the agent. -.It Ev SSH_CLIENT -Identifies the client end of the connection. +.It Ev SSH_CONNECTION +Identifies the client and server ends of the connection. The variable contains -three space-separated values: client ip-address, client port number, -and server port number. +four space-separated values: client ip-address, client port number, +server ip-address and server port number. .It Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND The variable contains the original command line if a forced command is executed. @@ -742,7 +754,12 @@ reads .Pa $HOME/.ssh/environment , and adds lines of the format .Dq VARNAME=value -to the environment. +to the environment if the file exists and if users are allowed to +change their environment. +See the +.Cm PermitUserEnvironment +option in +.Xr sshd_config 5 . .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c index 24ee541..2c589de 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.179 2002/06/12 01:09:52 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.186 2002/09/19 01:58:18 djm Exp $"); #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/err.h> @@ -146,6 +146,9 @@ int subsystem_flag = 0; /* # of replies received for global requests */ static int client_global_request_id = 0; +/* pid of proxycommand child process */ +pid_t proxy_command_pid = 0; + /* Prints a help message to the user. This function never returns. */ static void @@ -174,7 +177,6 @@ usage(void) fprintf(stderr, " -v Verbose; display verbose debugging messages.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " Multiple -v increases verbosity.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -V Display version number only.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -P Don't allocate a privileged port.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet; don't display any warning messages.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -f Fork into background after authentication.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -e char Set escape character; ``none'' = disable (default: ~).\n"); @@ -229,6 +231,15 @@ main(int ac, char **av) */ original_real_uid = getuid(); original_effective_uid = geteuid(); + + /* + * Use uid-swapping to give up root privileges for the duration of + * option processing. We will re-instantiate the rights when we are + * ready to create the privileged port, and will permanently drop + * them when the port has been created (actually, when the connection + * has been made, as we may need to create the port several times). + */ + PRIV_END; #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT /* If we are installed setuid root be careful to not drop core. */ @@ -249,15 +260,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av) pw = pwcopy(pw); /* - * Use uid-swapping to give up root privileges for the duration of - * option processing. We will re-instantiate the rights when we are - * ready to create the privileged port, and will permanently drop - * them when the port has been created (actually, when the connection - * has been made, as we may need to create the port several times). - */ - PRIV_END; - - /* * Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created * with the default umask. This will make them world-readable but * writable only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we @@ -303,7 +305,7 @@ again: case 'g': options.gateway_ports = 1; break; - case 'P': + case 'P': /* deprecated */ options.use_privileged_port = 0; break; case 'a': @@ -552,7 +554,7 @@ again: if (buffer_len(&command) == 0) tty_flag = 1; - /* Force no tty*/ + /* Force no tty */ if (no_tty_flag) tty_flag = 0; /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */ @@ -637,7 +639,8 @@ again: if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication || options.hostbased_authentication) { sensitive_data.nkeys = 3; - sensitive_data.keys = xmalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys*sizeof(Key)); + sensitive_data.keys = xmalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys * + sizeof(Key)); PRIV_START; sensitive_data.keys[0] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, @@ -648,7 +651,8 @@ again: _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL); PRIV_END; - if (sensitive_data.keys[0] == NULL && + if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1 && + sensitive_data.keys[0] == NULL && sensitive_data.keys[1] == NULL && sensitive_data.keys[2] == NULL) { sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_public( @@ -721,6 +725,14 @@ again: exit_status = compat20 ? ssh_session2() : ssh_session(); packet_close(); + + /* + * Send SIGHUP to proxy command if used. We don't wait() in + * case it hangs and instead rely on init to reap the child + */ + if (proxy_command_pid > 1) + kill(proxy_command_pid, SIGHUP); + return exit_status; } @@ -732,11 +744,19 @@ x11_get_proto(char **_proto, char **_data) FILE *f; int got_data = 0, i; char *display; + struct stat st; *_proto = proto; *_data = data; proto[0] = data[0] = '\0'; - if (options.xauth_location && (display = getenv("DISPLAY"))) { + if (!options.xauth_location || + (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) { + debug("No xauth program."); + } else { + if ((display = getenv("DISPLAY")) == NULL) { + debug("x11_get_proto: DISPLAY not set"); + return; + } /* Try to get Xauthority information for the display. */ if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) /* @@ -751,7 +771,7 @@ x11_get_proto(char **_proto, char **_data) else snprintf(line, sizeof line, "%s list %.200s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL, options.xauth_location, display); - debug2("x11_get_proto %s", line); + debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", line); f = popen(line, "r"); if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) && sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2) @@ -770,6 +790,7 @@ x11_get_proto(char **_proto, char **_data) if (!got_data) { u_int32_t rand = 0; + log("Warning: No xauth data; using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding."); strlcpy(proto, "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1", sizeof proto); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) @@ -819,11 +840,8 @@ check_agent_present(void) { if (options.forward_agent) { /* Clear agent forwarding if we don\'t have an agent. */ - int authfd = ssh_get_authentication_socket(); - if (authfd < 0) + if (!ssh_agent_present()) options.forward_agent = 0; - else - ssh_close_authentication_socket(authfd); } } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh.h index 07eee78..0a6ad13 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.h @@ -60,10 +60,6 @@ */ #define SSH_SERVICE_NAME "ssh" -#if defined(USE_PAM) && !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE) -# define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE __progname -#endif - /* * Name of the environment variable containing the process ID of the * authentication agent. diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config index ef31d43..94cffbf 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.15 2002/06/20 20:03:34 stevesk Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.16 2002/07/03 14:21:05 markus Exp $ # This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file. See # ssh_config(5) for more information. This file provides defaults for @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ # RhostsRSAAuthentication no # RSAAuthentication yes # PasswordAuthentication yes +# HostbasedAuthentication no # BatchMode no # CheckHostIP yes # StrictHostKeyChecking ask diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 index 53cb0fe..ac05a0c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.1 2002/06/20 19:56:07 stevesk Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.5 2002/08/29 22:54:10 stevesk Exp $ .Dd September 25, 1999 .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os @@ -50,10 +50,16 @@ .Nm ssh obtains configuration data from the following sources in the following order: -command line options, user's configuration file -.Pq Pa $HOME/.ssh/config , -and system-wide configuration file -.Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config . +.Bl -enum -offset indent -compact +.It +command-line options +.It +user's configuration file +.Pq Pa $HOME/.ssh/config +.It +system-wide configuration file +.Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config +.El .Pp For each parameter, the first obtained value will be used. @@ -252,6 +258,13 @@ or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . +.Pp +Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the +ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's +Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded +connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, +however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to +authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. .It Cm ForwardX11 Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected over the secure channel and @@ -263,6 +276,12 @@ or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . +.Pp +X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability +to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X +authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the +forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform +activities such as keystroke monitoring. .It Cm GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local forwarded ports. @@ -492,7 +511,12 @@ or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . -This option applies to protocol version 1 only. +This option applies to protocol version 1 only and requires +.Nm ssh +to be setuid root and +.Cm UsePrivilegedPort +to be set to +.Dq yes . .It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with RSA host authentication. @@ -567,6 +591,10 @@ or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . +If set to +.Dq yes +.Nm ssh +must be setuid root. Note that this option must be set to .Dq yes if @@ -584,7 +612,7 @@ Specifies a file to use for the user host key database instead of .Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts . .It Cm XAuthLocation -Specifies the location of the +Specifies the full pathname of the .Xr xauth 1 program. The default is diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_prng_cmds.in b/crypto/openssh/ssh_prng_cmds.in index 03fa540..50e7771 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_prng_cmds.in +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_prng_cmds.in @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ # The "rate" represents the number of bits of usuable entropy per # byte of command output. Be conservative. # -# $Id: ssh_prng_cmds.in,v 1.7 2001/07/22 19:32:01 mouring Exp $ +# $Id: ssh_prng_cmds.in,v 1.8 2002/07/14 21:43:58 tim Exp $ "ls -alni /var/log" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 "ls -alni /var/adm" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ "netstat -s" @PROG_NETSTAT@ 0.02 "netstat -is" @PROG_NETSTAT@ 0.07 -"arp -a -n" @PROG_ARP@ 0.02 +"arp -n -a" @PROG_ARP@ 0.02 "ifconfig -a" @PROG_IFCONFIG@ 0.02 diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c index b89321f..776d720 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.126 2002/06/23 03:30:17 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.135 2002/09/19 01:58:18 djm Exp $"); #include <openssl/bn.h> @@ -41,21 +41,13 @@ extern Options options; extern char *__progname; extern uid_t original_real_uid; extern uid_t original_effective_uid; +extern pid_t proxy_command_pid; #ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN /* for non IPv6 machines */ #define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46 #endif -static const char * -sockaddr_ntop(struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen) -{ - static char addrbuf[NI_MAXHOST]; - - if (getnameinfo(sa, salen, addrbuf, sizeof(addrbuf), NULL, 0, - NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0) - fatal("sockaddr_ntop: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICHOST failed"); - return addrbuf; -} +static int show_other_keys(const char *, Key *); /* * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command. @@ -73,9 +65,16 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command) /* Convert the port number into a string. */ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%hu", port); - /* Build the final command string in the buffer by making the - appropriate substitutions to the given proxy command. */ + /* + * Build the final command string in the buffer by making the + * appropriate substitutions to the given proxy command. + * + * Use "exec" to avoid "sh -c" processes on some platforms + * (e.g. Solaris) + */ buffer_init(&command); + buffer_append(&command, "exec ", 5); + for (cp = proxy_command; *cp; cp++) { if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') { buffer_append(&command, "%", 1); @@ -143,6 +142,8 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command) /* Parent. */ if (pid < 0) fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + else + proxy_command_pid = pid; /* save pid to clean up later */ /* Close child side of the descriptors. */ close(pin[0]); @@ -238,7 +239,6 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr, int sock = -1, attempt; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; - struct linger linger; struct servent *sp; /* * Did we get only other errors than "Connection refused" (which @@ -307,9 +307,8 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr, } else { if (errno == ECONNREFUSED) full_failure = 0; - log("ssh: connect to address %s port %s: %s", - sockaddr_ntop(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen), - strport, strerror(errno)); + debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s", + ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); /* * Close the failed socket; there appear to * be some problems when reusing a socket for @@ -332,20 +331,14 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr, freeaddrinfo(aitop); /* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */ - if (attempt >= connection_attempts) + if (attempt >= connection_attempts) { + log("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s", + host, strport, strerror(errno)); return full_failure ? ECONNABORTED : ECONNREFUSED; + } debug("Connection established."); - /* - * Set socket options. We would like the socket to disappear as soon - * as it has been closed for whatever reason. - */ - /* setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */ - linger.l_onoff = 1; - linger.l_linger = 5; - setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (void *)&linger, sizeof(linger)); - /* Set keepalives if requested. */ if (options.keepalives && setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on, @@ -476,7 +469,7 @@ confirm(const char *prompt) (p[0] == '\0') || (p[0] == '\n') || strncasecmp(p, "no", 2) == 0) ret = 0; - if (strncasecmp(p, "yes", 3) == 0) + if (p && strncasecmp(p, "yes", 3) == 0) ret = 1; if (p) xfree(p); @@ -503,7 +496,7 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key, int salen; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; char msg[1024]; - int len, host_line, ip_line; + int len, host_line, ip_line, has_keys; const char *host_file = NULL, *ip_file = NULL; /* @@ -647,14 +640,19 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key, "have requested strict checking.", type, host); goto fail; } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) { + has_keys = show_other_keys(host, host_key); /* The default */ fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be " - "established.\n" + "established%s\n" "%s key fingerprint is %s.\n" "Are you sure you want to continue connecting " - "(yes/no)? ", host, ip, type, fp); + "(yes/no)? ", + host, ip, + has_keys ? ",\nbut keys of different type are already " + "known for this host." : ".", + type, fp); xfree(fp); if (!confirm(msg)) goto fail; @@ -757,6 +755,9 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key, * accept the authentication. */ break; + case HOST_FOUND: + fatal("internal error"); + break; } if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED && @@ -868,3 +869,58 @@ ssh_put_password(char *password) memset(padded, 0, size); xfree(padded); } + +static int +show_key_from_file(const char *file, const char *host, int keytype) +{ + Key *found; + char *fp; + int line, ret; + + found = key_new(keytype); + if ((ret = lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(file, host, + keytype, found, &line))) { + fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + log("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n" + "in %s:%d\n" + "%s key fingerprint %s.", + key_type(found), host, file, line, + key_type(found), fp); + xfree(fp); + } + key_free(found); + return (ret); +} + +/* print all known host keys for a given host, but skip keys of given type */ +static int +show_other_keys(const char *host, Key *key) +{ + int type[] = { KEY_RSA1, KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, -1}; + int i, found = 0; + + for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) { + if (type[i] == key->type) + continue; + if (type[i] != KEY_RSA1 && + show_key_from_file(options.user_hostfile2, host, type[i])) { + found = 1; + continue; + } + if (type[i] != KEY_RSA1 && + show_key_from_file(options.system_hostfile2, host, type[i])) { + found = 1; + continue; + } + if (show_key_from_file(options.user_hostfile, host, type[i])) { + found = 1; + continue; + } + if (show_key_from_file(options.system_hostfile, host, type[i])) { + found = 1; + continue; + } + debug2("no key of type %d for host %s", type[i], host); + } + return (found); +} diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c index e28b7fc..2fc9a98 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.51 2002/05/23 19:24:30 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.52 2002/08/08 13:50:23 aaron Exp $"); #include <openssl/bn.h> #include <openssl/md5.h> @@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ try_rsa_authentication(int idx) * load the private key. Try first with empty passphrase; if it * fails, ask for a passphrase. */ - if (public->flags && KEY_FLAG_EXT) + if (public->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT) private = public; else private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, authfile, "", NULL); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c index 215f76c..703d072 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.105 2002/06/23 03:30:17 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.107 2002/07/01 19:48:46 markus Exp $"); #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" @@ -95,10 +95,10 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr) compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]); if (options.compression) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "zlib"; + myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "zlib,none"; } else { myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none"; + myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib"; } if (options.macs != NULL) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = @@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) clear_auth_state(authctxt); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, NULL); - /* try another method if we did not send a packet*/ + /* try another method if we did not send a packet */ if (sent == 0) userauth(authctxt, NULL); @@ -947,9 +947,9 @@ ssh_keysign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, buffer_init(&b); buffer_put_int(&b, packet_get_connection_in()); /* send # of socket */ buffer_put_string(&b, data, datalen); - msg_send(to[1], version, &b); + ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, &b); - if (msg_recv(from[0], &b) < 0) { + if (ssh_msg_recv(from[0], &b) < 0) { error("ssh_keysign: no reply"); buffer_clear(&b); return -1; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 index 37a7b58..22ab70e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.186 2002/06/22 16:45:29 stevesk Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.193 2002/09/24 20:59:44 todd Exp $ .Dd September 25, 1999 .Dt SSHD 8 .Os @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ The default is refuses to start if there is no configuration file. .It Fl g Ar login_grace_time Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default -600 seconds). +120 seconds). If the client fails to authenticate the user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits. A value of zero indicates no limit. @@ -350,7 +350,11 @@ Sets up basic environment. .It Reads .Pa $HOME/.ssh/environment -if it exists. +if it exists and users are allowed to change their environment. +See the +.Cm PermitUserEnvironment +option in +.Xr sshd_config 5 . .It Changes to user's home directory. .It @@ -385,9 +389,9 @@ Each RSA public key consists of the following fields, separated by spaces: options, bits, exponent, modulus, comment. Each protocol version 2 public key consists of: options, keytype, base64 encoded key, comment. -The options fields -are optional; its presence is determined by whether the line starts -with a number or not (the option field never starts with a number). +The options field +is optional; its presence is determined by whether the line starts +with a number or not (the options field never starts with a number). The bits, exponent, modulus and comment fields give the RSA key for protocol version 1; the comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the @@ -398,7 +402,7 @@ or .Dq ssh-rsa . .Pp Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long -(because of the size of the RSA key modulus). +(because of the size of the public key encoding). You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the .Pa identity.pub , .Pa id_dsa.pub @@ -417,7 +421,7 @@ The following option specifications are supported (note that option keywords are case-insensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm from="pattern-list" -Specifies that in addition to RSA authentication, the canonical name +Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, the canonical name of the remote host must be present in the comma-separated list of patterns .Pf ( Ql * @@ -429,7 +433,7 @@ patterns negated by prefixing them with .Ql ! ; if the canonical host name matches a negated pattern, the key is not accepted. The purpose -of this option is to optionally increase security: RSA authentication +of this option is to optionally increase security: public key authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world. @@ -447,7 +451,7 @@ one must not request a pty or should specify .Cm no-pty . A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash. This option might be useful -to restrict certain RSA keys to perform just a specific operation. +to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation. An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else. Note that the client may specify TCP/IP and/or X11 forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited. @@ -458,6 +462,10 @@ logging in using this key. Environment variables set this way override other default environment values. Multiple options of this type are permitted. +Environment processing is disabled by default and is +controlled via the +.Cm PermitUserEnvironment +option. This option is automatically disabled if .Cm UseLogin is enabled. @@ -578,6 +586,8 @@ These files are created using .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Pa /etc/moduli Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange". +The file format is described in +.Xr moduli 5 . .It Pa /var/empty .Xr chroot 2 directory used by @@ -698,6 +708,10 @@ It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with and assignment lines of the form name=value. The file should be writable only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else. +Environment processing is disabled by default and is +controlled via the +.Cm PermitUserEnvironment +option. .It Pa $HOME/.ssh/rc If this file exists, it is run with /bin/sh after reading the environment files but before starting the user's shell or command. @@ -723,12 +737,12 @@ something similar to: if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then # X11UseLocalhost=yes - xauth add unix:`echo $DISPLAY | + echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY | cut -c11-` $proto $cookie else # X11UseLocalhost=no - xauth add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie - fi + echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie + fi | xauth -q - fi .Ed .Pp diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c index 851fad4..f8bd7ce 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.251 2002/06/25 18:51:04 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.260 2002/09/27 10:42:09 mickey Exp $"); #include <openssl/dh.h> #include <openssl/bn.h> @@ -303,11 +303,8 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig) { /* XXX no idea how fix this signal handler */ - /* Close the connection. */ - packet_close(); - /* Log error and exit. */ - fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s.", get_remote_ipaddr()); + fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr()); } /* @@ -320,7 +317,7 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig) static void generate_ephemeral_server_key(void) { - u_int32_t rand = 0; + u_int32_t rnd = 0; int i; verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.", @@ -333,9 +330,9 @@ generate_ephemeral_server_key(void) for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) - rand = arc4random(); - sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rand & 0xff; - rand >>= 8; + rnd = arc4random(); + sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff; + rnd >>= 8; } arc4random_stir(); } @@ -427,6 +424,12 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) compat_datafellows(remote_version); + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PROBE) { + log("probed from %s with %s. Don't panic.", + get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string); + fatal_cleanup(); + } + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) { log("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.", get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string); @@ -529,8 +532,8 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void) static void privsep_preauth_child(void) { - u_int32_t rand[256]; - gid_t gidset[2]; + u_int32_t rnd[256]; + gid_t gidset[1]; struct passwd *pw; int i; @@ -538,8 +541,8 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void) privsep_challenge_enable(); for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) - rand[i] = arc4random(); - RAND_seed(rand, sizeof(rand)); + rnd[i] = arc4random(); + RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ demote_sensitive_data(); @@ -550,7 +553,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void) memset(pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(pw->pw_passwd)); endpwent(); - /* Change our root directory*/ + /* Change our root directory */ if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1) fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, strerror(errno)); @@ -573,7 +576,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void) #endif } -static Authctxt* +static Authctxt * privsep_preauth(void) { Authctxt *authctxt = NULL; @@ -589,6 +592,8 @@ privsep_preauth(void) if (pid == -1) { fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); } else if (pid != 0) { + fatal_remove_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) packet_close, NULL); + debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid); close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); @@ -602,6 +607,10 @@ privsep_preauth(void) while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) if (errno != EINTR) break; + + /* Reinstall, since the child has finished */ + fatal_add_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) packet_close, NULL); + return (authctxt); } else { /* child */ @@ -624,7 +633,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) /* XXX - Remote port forwarding */ x_authctxt = authctxt; -#ifdef BROKEN_FD_PASSING +#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING if (1) { #else if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) { @@ -649,6 +658,8 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { + fatal_remove_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) packet_close, NULL); + debug2("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); @@ -801,7 +812,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av) const char *remote_ip; int remote_port; FILE *f; - struct linger linger; struct addrinfo *ai; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int listen_sock, maxfd; @@ -906,6 +916,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) break; case 'u': utmp_len = atoi(optarg); + if (utmp_len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) { + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n"); + exit(1); + } break; case 'o': if (process_server_config_line(&options, optarg, @@ -932,7 +946,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility, !inetd_flag); -#ifdef _CRAY +#ifdef _UNICOS /* Cray can define user privs drop all prives now! * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems! */ @@ -956,7 +970,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_VERSION); /* load private host keys */ - sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files*sizeof(Key*)); + sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files * + sizeof(Key *)); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; @@ -1035,7 +1050,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av) (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0)) fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) && + (st.st_uid != getuid () || + (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)) +#else if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0) +#endif fatal("Bad owner or mode for %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); } @@ -1135,17 +1157,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av) continue; } /* - * Set socket options. We try to make the port - * reusable and have it close as fast as possible - * without waiting in unnecessary wait states on - * close. + * Set socket options. + * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT. */ - setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, - &on, sizeof(on)); - linger.l_onoff = 1; - linger.l_linger = 5; - setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, - &linger, sizeof(linger)); + if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, + &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) + error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno)); debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); @@ -1394,16 +1411,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av) signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); - /* - * Set socket options for the connection. We want the socket to - * close as fast as possible without waiting for anything. If the - * connection is not a socket, these will do nothing. - */ - /* setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */ - linger.l_onoff = 1; - linger.l_linger = 5; - setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, &linger, sizeof(linger)); - /* Set keepalives if requested. */ if (options.keepalives && setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, @@ -1591,7 +1598,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; u_char cookie[8]; u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags; - u_int32_t rand = 0; + u_int32_t rnd = 0; /* * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user @@ -1604,9 +1611,9 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) - rand = arc4random(); - cookie[i] = rand & 0xff; - rand >>= 8; + rnd = arc4random(); + cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff; + rnd >>= 8; } /* diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config index d57346b..36429c9 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.56 2002/06/20 23:37:12 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.59 2002/09/25 11:17:16 markus Exp $ # This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See # sshd_config(5) for more information. @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ # Authentication: -#LoginGraceTime 600 +#LoginGraceTime 120 #PermitRootLogin yes #StrictModes yes @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM keyboard-interactive authentication # Warning: enabling this may bypass the setting of 'PasswordAuthentication' -#PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt yes +#PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt no #X11Forwarding no #X11DisplayOffset 10 @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ #KeepAlive yes #UseLogin no #UsePrivilegeSeparation yes +#PermitUserEnvironment no #Compression yes #MaxStartups 10 diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 index aa7b7c7..0944ba0 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.4 2002/06/22 16:45:29 stevesk Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.13 2002/09/16 20:12:11 stevesk Exp $ .Dd September 25, 1999 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5 .Os @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ options must precede this option for non port qualified addresses. The server disconnects after this time if the user has not successfully logged in. If the value is 0, there is no time limit. -The default is 600 (seconds). +The default is 120 seconds. .It Cm LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from .Nm sshd . @@ -465,6 +465,20 @@ for root. If this option is set to .Dq no root is not allowed to login. +.It Cm PermitUserEnvironment +Specifies whether +.Pa ~/.ssh/environment +and +.Cm environment= +options in +.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys +are processed by +.Nm sshd . +The default is +.Dq no . +Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access +restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such as +.Ev LD_PRELOAD . .It Cm PidFile Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the .Nm sshd @@ -499,7 +513,7 @@ The default is .It Cm Protocol Specifies the protocol versions .Nm sshd -should support. +supports. The possible values are .Dq 1 and @@ -507,6 +521,13 @@ and Multiple versions must be comma-separated. The default is .Dq 2,1 . +Note that the order of the protocol list does not indicate preference, +because the client selects among multiple protocol versions offered +by the server. +Specifying +.Dq 2,1 +is identical to +.Dq 1,2 . .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. The default is @@ -609,10 +630,35 @@ from interfering with real X11 servers. The default is 10. .It Cm X11Forwarding Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. +The argument must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . The default is .Dq no . -Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not improve security in any -way, as users can always install their own forwarders. +.Pp +When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to +the server and to client displays if the +.Nm sshd +proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see +.Cm X11UseLocalhost +below), however this is not the default. +Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data +verification and substitution occur on the client side. +The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11 +display server may be exposed to attack when the ssh client requests +forwarding (see the warnings for +.Cm ForwardX11 +in +.Xr ssh_config 5 ). +A system administrator may have a stance in which they want to +protect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly +requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a +.Dq no +setting. +.Pp +Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from +forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own forwarders. X11 forwarding is automatically disabled if .Cm UseLogin is enabled. @@ -627,7 +673,7 @@ hostname part of the .Ev DISPLAY environment variable to .Dq localhost . -This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the fake display. +This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display. However, some older X11 clients may not function with this configuration. .Cm X11UseLocalhost @@ -642,7 +688,7 @@ or The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm XAuthLocation -Specifies the location of the +Specifies the full pathname of the .Xr xauth 1 program. The default is @@ -654,7 +700,7 @@ The default is command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time may be expressed using a sequence of the form: .Sm off -.Ar time Oo Ar qualifier Oc , +.Ar time Op Ar qualifier , .Sm on where .Ar time diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c index e76f945..4cd1c00 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.4 2002/06/23 03:30:17 deraadt Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.5 2002/08/29 15:57:25 stevesk Exp $"); #include "loginrec.h" @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ get_last_login_time(uid_t uid, const char *logname, */ void record_login(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user, uid_t uid, - const char *host, struct sockaddr * addr) + const char *host, struct sockaddr * addr, socklen_t addrlen) { struct logininfo *li; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.h b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.h index bd30278..287c0d9 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.h,v 1.3 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.h,v 1.4 2002/08/29 15:57:25 stevesk Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ void record_login(pid_t, const char *, const char *, uid_t, - const char *, struct sockaddr *); + const char *, struct sockaddr *, socklen_t); void record_logout(pid_t, const char *, const char *); u_long get_last_login_time(uid_t, const char *, char *, u_int); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c b/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c index 64ac4e5..28d0e31 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, int namebuflen) } return 1; #else /* HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC */ -#ifdef _CRAY +#ifdef _UNICOS char buf[64]; int i; int highpty; @@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *ttyname) void *old; #endif /* USE_VHANGUP */ -#ifdef _CRAY +#ifdef _UNICOS if (setsid() < 0) error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *ttyname) error("%.100s: %.100s", ttyname, strerror(errno)); close(*ttyfd); *ttyfd = fd; -#else /* _CRAY */ +#else /* _UNICOS */ /* First disconnect from the old controlling tty. */ #ifdef TIOCNOTTY @@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *ttyname) strerror(errno)); else close(fd); -#endif /* _CRAY */ +#endif /* _UNICOS */ } /* Changes the window size associated with the pty. */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c b/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c index 0a772c7..86c61a4 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.22 2002/05/28 21:24:00 stevesk Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.23 2002/07/15 17:15:31 stevesk Exp $"); #include "log.h" #include "uidswap.h" @@ -52,8 +52,9 @@ temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw) #ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID saved_euid = geteuid(); saved_egid = getegid(); - debug("temporarily_use_uid: %u/%u (e=%u)", - (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, (u_int)saved_euid); + debug("temporarily_use_uid: %u/%u (e=%u/%u)", + (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, + (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid); if (saved_euid != 0) { privileged = 0; return; @@ -105,14 +106,16 @@ temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw) void restore_uid(void) { - debug("restore_uid"); /* it's a no-op unless privileged */ - if (!privileged) + if (!privileged) { + debug("restore_uid: (unprivileged)"); return; + } if (!temporarily_use_uid_effective) fatal("restore_uid: temporarily_use_uid not effective"); #ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID + debug("restore_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid); /* Set the effective uid back to the saved privileged uid. */ if (seteuid(saved_euid) < 0) fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_euid, strerror(errno)); @@ -142,6 +145,8 @@ permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *pw) { if (temporarily_use_uid_effective) fatal("permanently_set_uid: temporarily_use_uid effective"); + debug("permanently_set_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, + (u_int)pw->pw_gid); if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) fatal("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) < 0) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c b/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c index 89fcb08..21eaf4d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c @@ -23,9 +23,10 @@ */ #include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.16 2002/09/09 14:54:15 markus Exp $"); + #include "xmalloc.h" #include "uuencode.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.15 2002/03/04 17:27:39 stevesk Exp $"); int uuencode(u_char *src, u_int srclength, @@ -57,7 +58,7 @@ uudecode(const char *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize) void dump_base64(FILE *fp, u_char *data, u_int len) { - u_char *buf = xmalloc(2*len); + char *buf = xmalloc(2*len); int i, n; n = uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/version.h b/crypto/openssh/version.h index 1e9b431..1f11299 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/version.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/version.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.34 2002/06/26 13:56:27 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.35 2002/10/01 13:24:50 markus Exp $ */ -#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_3.4p1" +#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_3.5p1" |
