Upgrade to OpenSSH 5.1p1.

I have worked hard to reduce diffs against the vendor branch.  One
notable change in that respect is that we no longer prefer DSA over
RSA - the reasons for doing so went away years ago.  This may cause
some surprises, as ssh will warn about unknown host keys even for
hosts whose keys haven't changed.

MFC after:	6 weeks

1 files changed, 28 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
index dd971a9..389bec9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.162 2006/08/30 00:06:51 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.166 2008/07/17 08:48:00 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -31,12 +31,16 @@
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 
 #include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H)
+#include <vis.h>
+#endif
 
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 
@@ -129,7 +133,7 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 		    options.hostkeyalgorithms;
 
 	if (options.rekey_limit)
-		packet_set_rekey_limit(options.rekey_limit);
+		packet_set_rekey_limit((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit);
 
 	/* start key exchange */
 	kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
@@ -373,14 +377,21 @@ input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 void
 input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
-	char *msg, *lang;
+	char *msg, *raw, *lang;
+	u_int len;
 
 	debug3("input_userauth_banner");
-	msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	raw = packet_get_string(&len);
 	lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
-	if (options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
+	if (options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) {
+		if (len > 65536)
+			len = 65536;
+		msg = xmalloc(len * 4); /* max expansion from strnvis() */
+		strnvis(msg, raw, len * 4, VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL);
 		fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
-	xfree(msg);
+		xfree(msg);
+	}
+	xfree(raw);
 	xfree(lang);
 }
 
@@ -1307,7 +1318,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	Sensitive *sensitive = authctxt->sensitive;
 	Buffer b;
 	u_char *signature, *blob;
-	char *chost, *pkalg, *p;
+	char *chost, *pkalg, *p, myname[NI_MAXHOST];
 	const char *service;
 	u_int blen, slen;
 	int ok, i, len, found = 0;
@@ -1331,7 +1342,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		return 0;
 	}
 	/* figure out a name for the client host */
-	p = get_local_name(packet_get_connection_in());
+	p = NULL;
+	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket())
+		p = get_local_name(packet_get_connection_in());
+	if (p == NULL) {
+		if (gethostname(myname, sizeof(myname)) == -1) {
+			verbose("userauth_hostbased: gethostname: %s", 
+			    strerror(errno));
+		} else
+			p = xstrdup(myname);
+	}
 	if (p == NULL) {
 		error("userauth_hostbased: cannot get local ipaddr/name");
 		key_free(private);