Flatten the OpenSSH vendor tree for 3.x and newer.

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 671 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 61faad1..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,671 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.80 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
- * Functions for connecting the local authentication agent.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- * SSH2 implementation,
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/un.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "authfd.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-static int agent_present = 0;
-
-/* helper */
-int	decode_reply(int type);
-
-/* macro to check for "agent failure" message */
-#define agent_failed(x) \
-    ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \
-    (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE))
-
-int
-ssh_agent_present(void)
-{
-	int authfd;
-
-	if (agent_present)
-		return 1;
-	if ((authfd = ssh_get_authentication_socket()) == -1)
-		return 0;
-	else {
-		ssh_close_authentication_socket(authfd);
-		return 1;
-	}
-}
-
-/* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */
-
-int
-ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
-{
-	const char *authsocket;
-	int sock;
-	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
-
-	authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
-	if (!authsocket)
-		return -1;
-
-	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
-	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
-
-	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
-	if (sock < 0)
-		return -1;
-
-	/* close on exec */
-	if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
-		close(sock);
-		return -1;
-	}
-	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
-		close(sock);
-		return -1;
-	}
-	agent_present = 1;
-	return sock;
-}
-
-static int
-ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply)
-{
-	u_int l, len;
-	char buf[1024];
-
-	/* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
-	len = buffer_len(request);
-	put_u32(buf, len);
-
-	/* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
-	if (atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
-	    atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buffer_ptr(request),
-	    buffer_len(request)) != buffer_len(request)) {
-		error("Error writing to authentication socket.");
-		return 0;
-	}
-	/*
-	 * Wait for response from the agent.  First read the length of the
-	 * response packet.
-	 */
-	if (atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4) {
-	    error("Error reading response length from authentication socket.");
-	    return 0;
-	}
-
-	/* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
-	len = get_u32(buf);
-	if (len > 256 * 1024)
-		fatal("Authentication response too long: %u", len);
-
-	/* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */
-	buffer_clear(reply);
-	while (len > 0) {
-		l = len;
-		if (l > sizeof(buf))
-			l = sizeof(buf);
-		if (atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, l) != l) {
-			error("Error reading response from authentication socket.");
-			return 0;
-		}
-		buffer_append(reply, buf, l);
-		len -= l;
-	}
-	return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was
- * obtained).  The argument must have been returned by
- * ssh_get_authentication_socket().
- */
-
-void
-ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock)
-{
-	if (getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
-		close(sock);
-}
-
-/*
- * Opens and connects a private socket for communication with the
- * authentication agent.  Returns the file descriptor (which must be
- * shut down and closed by the caller when no longer needed).
- * Returns NULL if an error occurred and the connection could not be
- * opened.
- */
-
-AuthenticationConnection *
-ssh_get_authentication_connection(void)
-{
-	AuthenticationConnection *auth;
-	int sock;
-
-	sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
-
-	/*
-	 * Fail if we couldn't obtain a connection.  This happens if we
-	 * exited due to a timeout.
-	 */
-	if (sock < 0)
-		return NULL;
-
-	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
-	auth->fd = sock;
-	buffer_init(&auth->identities);
-	auth->howmany = 0;
-
-	return auth;
-}
-
-/*
- * Closes the connection to the authentication agent and frees any associated
- * memory.
- */
-
-void
-ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth)
-{
-	buffer_free(&auth->identities);
-	close(auth->fd);
-	xfree(auth);
-}
-
-/* Lock/unlock agent */
-int
-ssh_lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int lock, const char *password)
-{
-	int type;
-	Buffer msg;
-
-	buffer_init(&msg);
-	buffer_put_char(&msg, lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, password);
-
-	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
-		buffer_free(&msg);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
-	buffer_free(&msg);
-	return decode_reply(type);
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent.
- */
-
-int
-ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
-{
-	int type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0;
-	Buffer request;
-
-	switch (version) {
-	case 1:
-		code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
-		code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
-		break;
-	case 2:
-		code1 = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
-		code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
-		break;
-	default:
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the
-	 * identities it can represent.
-	 */
-	buffer_init(&request);
-	buffer_put_char(&request, code1);
-
-	buffer_clear(&auth->identities);
-	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &request, &auth->identities) == 0) {
-		buffer_free(&request);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	buffer_free(&request);
-
-	/* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */
-	type = buffer_get_char(&auth->identities);
-	if (agent_failed(type)) {
-		return 0;
-	} else if (type != code2) {
-		fatal("Bad authentication reply message type: %d", type);
-	}
-
-	/* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
-	auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
-	if ((u_int)auth->howmany > 1024)
-		fatal("Too many identities in authentication reply: %d",
-		    auth->howmany);
-
-	return auth->howmany;
-}
-
-Key *
-ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
-{
-	/* get number of identities and return the first entry (if any). */
-	if (ssh_get_num_identities(auth, version) > 0)
-		return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, comment, version);
-	return NULL;
-}
-
-Key *
-ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
-{
-	int keybits;
-	u_int bits;
-	u_char *blob;
-	u_int blen;
-	Key *key = NULL;
-
-	/* Return failure if no more entries. */
-	if (auth->howmany <= 0)
-		return NULL;
-
-	/*
-	 * Get the next entry from the packet.  These will abort with a fatal
-	 * error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data.
-	 */
-	switch (version) {
-	case 1:
-		key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
-		bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
-		buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e);
-		buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n);
-		*comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
-		keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
-		if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits)
-			logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
-			    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
-		break;
-	case 2:
-		blob = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen);
-		*comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
-		key = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
-		xfree(blob);
-		break;
-	default:
-		return NULL;
-	}
-	/* Decrement the number of remaining entries. */
-	auth->howmany--;
-	return key;
-}
-
-/*
- * Generates a random challenge, sends it to the agent, and waits for
- * response from the agent.  Returns true (non-zero) if the agent gave the
- * correct answer, zero otherwise.  Response type selects the style of
- * response desired, with 0 corresponding to protocol version 1.0 (no longer
- * supported) and 1 corresponding to protocol version 1.1.
- */
-
-int
-ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
-    Key* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
-    u_char session_id[16],
-    u_int response_type,
-    u_char response[16])
-{
-	Buffer buffer;
-	int success = 0;
-	int i;
-	int type;
-
-	if (key->type != KEY_RSA1)
-		return 0;
-	if (response_type == 0) {
-		logit("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported.");
-		return 0;
-	}
-	buffer_init(&buffer);
-	buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE);
-	buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
-	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e);
-	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n);
-	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge);
-	buffer_append(&buffer, session_id, 16);
-	buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type);
-
-	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) {
-		buffer_free(&buffer);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
-
-	if (agent_failed(type)) {
-		logit("Agent admitted failure to authenticate using the key.");
-	} else if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
-		fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
-	} else {
-		success = 1;
-		/*
-		 * Get the response from the packet.  This will abort with a
-		 * fatal error if the packet is corrupt.
-		 */
-		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-			response[i] = (u_char)buffer_get_char(&buffer);
-	}
-	buffer_free(&buffer);
-	return success;
-}
-
-/* ask agent to sign data, returns -1 on error, 0 on success */
-int
-ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
-    Key *key,
-    u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
-    u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
-	extern int datafellows;
-	Buffer msg;
-	u_char *blob;
-	u_int blen;
-	int type, flags = 0;
-	int ret = -1;
-
-	if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
-		return -1;
-
-	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB)
-		flags = SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE;
-
-	buffer_init(&msg);
-	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST);
-	buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
-	buffer_put_string(&msg, data, datalen);
-	buffer_put_int(&msg, flags);
-	xfree(blob);
-
-	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
-		buffer_free(&msg);
-		return -1;
-	}
-	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
-	if (agent_failed(type)) {
-		logit("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key.");
-	} else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
-		fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
-	} else {
-		ret = 0;
-		*sigp = buffer_get_string(&msg, lenp);
-	}
-	buffer_free(&msg);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/* Encode key for a message to the agent. */
-
-static void
-ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
-{
-	buffer_put_int(b, BN_num_bits(key->n));
-	buffer_put_bignum(b, key->n);
-	buffer_put_bignum(b, key->e);
-	buffer_put_bignum(b, key->d);
-	/* To keep within the protocol: p < q for ssh. in SSL p > q */
-	buffer_put_bignum(b, key->iqmp);	/* ssh key->u */
-	buffer_put_bignum(b, key->q);	/* ssh key->p, SSL key->q */
-	buffer_put_bignum(b, key->p);	/* ssh key->q, SSL key->p */
-	buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
-}
-
-static void
-ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
-{
-	buffer_put_cstring(b, key_ssh_name(key));
-	switch (key->type) {
-	case KEY_RSA:
-		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q);
-		break;
-	case KEY_DSA:
-		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key);
-		break;
-	}
-	buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
-}
-
-/*
- * Adds an identity to the authentication server.  This call is not meant to
- * be used by normal applications.
- */
-
-int
-ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key,
-    const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm)
-{
-	Buffer msg;
-	int type, constrained = (life || confirm);
-
-	buffer_init(&msg);
-
-	switch (key->type) {
-	case KEY_RSA1:
-		type = constrained ?
-		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED :
-		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY;
-		buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
-		ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(&msg, key->rsa, comment);
-		break;
-	case KEY_RSA:
-	case KEY_DSA:
-		type = constrained ?
-		    SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED :
-		    SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY;
-		buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
-		ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(&msg, key, comment);
-		break;
-	default:
-		buffer_free(&msg);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	if (constrained) {
-		if (life != 0) {
-			buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME);
-			buffer_put_int(&msg, life);
-		}
-		if (confirm != 0)
-			buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM);
-	}
-	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
-		buffer_free(&msg);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
-	buffer_free(&msg);
-	return decode_reply(type);
-}
-
-int
-ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
-{
-	return ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth, key, comment, 0, 0);
-}
-
-/*
- * Removes an identity from the authentication server.  This call is not
- * meant to be used by normal applications.
- */
-
-int
-ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key)
-{
-	Buffer msg;
-	int type;
-	u_char *blob;
-	u_int blen;
-
-	buffer_init(&msg);
-
-	if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
-		buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY);
-		buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
-		buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e);
-		buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n);
-	} else if (key->type == KEY_DSA || key->type == KEY_RSA) {
-		key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen);
-		buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY);
-		buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
-		xfree(blob);
-	} else {
-		buffer_free(&msg);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
-		buffer_free(&msg);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
-	buffer_free(&msg);
-	return decode_reply(type);
-}
-
-int
-ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add,
-    const char *reader_id, const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm)
-{
-	Buffer msg;
-	int type, constrained = (life || confirm);
-
-	if (add) {
-		type = constrained ?
-		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED :
-		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY;
-	} else
-		type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY;
-
-	buffer_init(&msg);
-	buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, reader_id);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, pin);
-
-	if (constrained) {
-		if (life != 0) {
-			buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME);
-			buffer_put_int(&msg, life);
-		}
-		if (confirm != 0)
-			buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM);
-	}
-
-	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
-		buffer_free(&msg);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
-	buffer_free(&msg);
-	return decode_reply(type);
-}
-
-/*
- * Removes all identities from the agent.  This call is not meant to be used
- * by normal applications.
- */
-
-int
-ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
-{
-	Buffer msg;
-	int type;
-	int code = (version==1) ?
-		SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES :
-		SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES;
-
-	buffer_init(&msg);
-	buffer_put_char(&msg, code);
-
-	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
-		buffer_free(&msg);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
-	buffer_free(&msg);
-	return decode_reply(type);
-}
-
-int
-decode_reply(int type)
-{
-	switch (type) {
-	case SSH_AGENT_FAILURE:
-	case SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE:
-	case SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE:
-		logit("SSH_AGENT_FAILURE");
-		return 0;
-	case SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS:
-		return 1;
-	default:
-		fatal("Bad response from authentication agent: %d", type);
-	}
-	/* NOTREACHED */
-	return 0;
-}