diff options
author | des <des@FreeBSD.org> | 2013-03-22 17:55:38 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | des <des@FreeBSD.org> | 2013-03-22 17:55:38 +0000 |
commit | b291eafe8d40c45b908e0f6481f471ca44a0a2f8 (patch) | |
tree | dd7d7e2bece2a6008e83b0bf90e7410032c4be13 /crypto/openssh/auth.c | |
parent | 19db167f418891cf677735a56370ffbcbdb37d67 (diff) | |
parent | 5a4dbb83324b0cc6594abbb5fcaa8fe0415febc5 (diff) | |
download | FreeBSD-src-b291eafe8d40c45b908e0f6481f471ca44a0a2f8.zip FreeBSD-src-b291eafe8d40c45b908e0f6481f471ca44a0a2f8.tar.gz |
Upgrade to OpenSSH 6.2p1. The most important new features are support
for a key revocation list and more fine-grained authentication control.
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssh/auth.c')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssh/auth.c | 77 |
1 files changed, 57 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.c b/crypto/openssh/auth.c index 7fb1068..2ebbb9e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.96 2012/05/13 01:42:32 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.101 2013/02/06 00:22:21 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #endif #include "authfile.h" #include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "krl.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; @@ -252,7 +253,8 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw) } void -auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info) +auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial, + const char *method, const char *submethod, const char *info) { void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose; char *authmsg; @@ -269,12 +271,15 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info) if (authctxt->postponed) authmsg = "Postponed"; + else if (partial) + authmsg = "Partial"; else authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed"; - authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s", + authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s", authmsg, method, + submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod, authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user, get_remote_ipaddr(), @@ -304,7 +309,7 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info) * Check whether root logins are disallowed. */ int -auth_root_allowed(char *method) +auth_root_allowed(const char *method) { switch (options.permit_root_login) { case PERMIT_YES: @@ -410,41 +415,42 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host, return host_status; } - /* - * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components + * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable. * * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ? * - * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and + * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to + * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an * error buffer plus max size as arguments. * * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure */ -static int -secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, - char *err, size_t errlen) +int +auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir, + uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen) { - uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid; char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN]; char *cp; int comparehome = 0; struct stat st; - if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) { - snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file, + if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name, strerror(errno)); return -1; } - if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) + if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) comparehome = 1; - /* check the open file to avoid races */ - if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 || - (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) || - (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { + if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf); + return -1; + } + if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) || + (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) { snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s", buf); return -1; @@ -459,7 +465,7 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 || - (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) || + (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf); @@ -480,6 +486,27 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, return 0; } +/* + * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to + * avoid races. + * + * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure + */ +static int +secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, + char *err, size_t errlen) +{ + struct stat st; + + /* check the open file to avoid races */ + if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s", + file, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen); +} + static FILE * auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes, int log_missing, char *file_type) @@ -615,7 +642,16 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key) if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL) return 0; - + switch (ssh_krl_file_contains_key(options.revoked_keys_file, key)) { + case 0: + return 0; /* Not revoked */ + case -2: + break; /* Not a KRL */ + default: + goto revoked; + } + debug3("%s: treating %s as a key list", __func__, + options.revoked_keys_file); switch (key_in_file(key, options.revoked_keys_file, 0)) { case 0: /* key not revoked */ @@ -626,6 +662,7 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key) "authentication"); return 1; case 1: + revoked: /* Key revoked */ key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked " |