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authormarkm <markm@FreeBSD.org>2000-02-24 11:07:16 +0000
committermarkm <markm@FreeBSD.org>2000-02-24 11:07:16 +0000
commitfa8b1a96d3a4e7cb6123f48b6c27b717a5ed86fe (patch)
tree2e1873a5f9196289affc301c4d3c862d04a3f4c8 /crypto/heimdal/appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.c
parent4ecbd6db44d79348bc815f31096e53104f50838b (diff)
downloadFreeBSD-src-fa8b1a96d3a4e7cb6123f48b6c27b717a5ed86fe.zip
FreeBSD-src-fa8b1a96d3a4e7cb6123f48b6c27b717a5ed86fe.tar.gz
Vendor import of Heimdal 0.2n
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/heimdal/appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/heimdal/appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.c1355
1 files changed, 1355 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..678b508
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1355 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by the University of
+ * California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "telnetd.h"
+
+RCSID("$Id: telnetd.c,v 1.60 1999/12/05 10:59:52 assar Exp $");
+
+#ifdef _SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS
+#include <sys/sysv.h>
+#include <sys/secdev.h>
+#include <sys/secparm.h>
+#include <sys/usrv.h>
+int secflag;
+char tty_dev[16];
+struct secdev dv;
+struct sysv sysv;
+struct socksec ss;
+#endif /* _SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS */
+
+#ifdef AUTHENTICATION
+int auth_level = 0;
+#endif
+
+extern int utmp_len;
+int registerd_host_only = 0;
+
+#ifdef STREAMSPTY
+# include <stropts.h>
+# include <termios.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UIO_H
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#endif /* HAVE_SYS_UIO_H */
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H
+#include <sys/stream.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef _AIX
+#include <sys/termio.h>
+#endif
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_STRTTY_H
+# include <sys/strtty.h>
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_STR_TTY_H
+# include <sys/str_tty.h>
+# endif
+/* make sure we don't get the bsd version */
+/* what is this here for? solaris? /joda */
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_TTY_H
+# include "/usr/include/sys/tty.h"
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_PTYVAR_H
+# include <sys/ptyvar.h>
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Because of the way ptyibuf is used with streams messages, we need
+ * ptyibuf+1 to be on a full-word boundary. The following wierdness
+ * is simply to make that happen.
+ */
+long ptyibufbuf[BUFSIZ/sizeof(long)+1];
+char *ptyibuf = ((char *)&ptyibufbuf[1])-1;
+char *ptyip = ((char *)&ptyibufbuf[1])-1;
+char ptyibuf2[BUFSIZ];
+unsigned char ctlbuf[BUFSIZ];
+struct strbuf strbufc, strbufd;
+
+int readstream(int, char*, int);
+
+#else /* ! STREAMPTY */
+
+/*
+ * I/O data buffers,
+ * pointers, and counters.
+ */
+char ptyibuf[BUFSIZ], *ptyip = ptyibuf;
+char ptyibuf2[BUFSIZ];
+
+#endif /* ! STREAMPTY */
+
+int hostinfo = 1; /* do we print login banner? */
+
+#ifdef _CRAY
+extern int newmap; /* nonzero if \n maps to ^M^J */
+int lowpty = 0, highpty; /* low, high pty numbers */
+#endif /* CRAY */
+
+int debug = 0;
+int keepalive = 1;
+char *progname;
+
+static void usage (void);
+
+/*
+ * The string to pass to getopt(). We do it this way so
+ * that only the actual options that we support will be
+ * passed off to getopt().
+ */
+char valid_opts[] = "Bd:hklnS:u:UL:y"
+#ifdef AUTHENTICATION
+ "a:X:z"
+#endif
+#ifdef DIAGNOSTICS
+ "D:"
+#endif
+#ifdef _CRAY
+ "r:"
+#endif
+ ;
+
+static void doit(struct sockaddr*, int);
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage __ss;
+ struct sockaddr *sa = (struct sockaddr *)&__ss;
+ int on = 1, sa_size;
+ int ch;
+#if defined(IPPROTO_IP) && defined(IP_TOS)
+ int tos = -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef ENCRYPTION
+ extern int des_check_key;
+ des_check_key = 1; /* Kludge for Mac NCSA telnet 2.6 /bg */
+#endif
+ pfrontp = pbackp = ptyobuf;
+ netip = netibuf;
+ nfrontp = nbackp = netobuf;
+
+ progname = *argv;
+#ifdef ENCRYPTION
+ nclearto = 0;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef _CRAY
+ /*
+ * Get number of pty's before trying to process options,
+ * which may include changing pty range.
+ */
+ highpty = getnpty();
+#endif /* CRAY */
+
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, valid_opts)) != -1) {
+ switch(ch) {
+
+#ifdef AUTHENTICATION
+ case 'a':
+ /*
+ * Check for required authentication level
+ */
+ if (strcmp(optarg, "debug") == 0) {
+ auth_debug_mode = 1;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "none") == 0) {
+ auth_level = 0;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "otp") == 0) {
+ auth_level = 0;
+ require_otp = 1;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "other") == 0) {
+ auth_level = AUTH_OTHER;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "user") == 0) {
+ auth_level = AUTH_USER;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "valid") == 0) {
+ auth_level = AUTH_VALID;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "off") == 0) {
+ /*
+ * This hack turns off authentication
+ */
+ auth_level = -1;
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "telnetd: unknown authorization level for -a\n");
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* AUTHENTICATION */
+
+ case 'B': /* BFTP mode is not supported any more */
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ if (strcmp(optarg, "ebug") == 0) {
+ debug++;
+ break;
+ }
+ usage();
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ break;
+
+#ifdef DIAGNOSTICS
+ case 'D':
+ /*
+ * Check for desired diagnostics capabilities.
+ */
+ if (!strcmp(optarg, "report")) {
+ diagnostic |= TD_REPORT|TD_OPTIONS;
+ } else if (!strcmp(optarg, "exercise")) {
+ diagnostic |= TD_EXERCISE;
+ } else if (!strcmp(optarg, "netdata")) {
+ diagnostic |= TD_NETDATA;
+ } else if (!strcmp(optarg, "ptydata")) {
+ diagnostic |= TD_PTYDATA;
+ } else if (!strcmp(optarg, "options")) {
+ diagnostic |= TD_OPTIONS;
+ } else {
+ usage();
+ /* NOT REACHED */
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* DIAGNOSTICS */
+
+
+ case 'h':
+ hostinfo = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case 'k': /* Linemode is not supported any more */
+ case 'l':
+ break;
+
+ case 'n':
+ keepalive = 0;
+ break;
+
+#ifdef _CRAY
+ case 'r':
+ {
+ char *strchr();
+ char *c;
+
+ /*
+ * Allow the specification of alterations
+ * to the pty search range. It is legal to
+ * specify only one, and not change the
+ * other from its default.
+ */
+ c = strchr(optarg, '-');
+ if (c) {
+ *c++ = '\0';
+ highpty = atoi(c);
+ }
+ if (*optarg != '\0')
+ lowpty = atoi(optarg);
+ if ((lowpty > highpty) || (lowpty < 0) ||
+ (highpty > 32767)) {
+ usage();
+ /* NOT REACHED */
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+#endif /* CRAY */
+
+ case 'S':
+#ifdef HAVE_PARSETOS
+ if ((tos = parsetos(optarg, "tcp")) < 0)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s%s%s\n",
+ "telnetd: Bad TOS argument '", optarg,
+ "'; will try to use default TOS");
+#else
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s%s\n", "TOS option unavailable; ",
+ "-S flag not supported\n");
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ case 'u':
+ utmp_len = atoi(optarg);
+ break;
+
+ case 'U':
+ registerd_host_only = 1;
+ break;
+
+#ifdef AUTHENTICATION
+ case 'X':
+ /*
+ * Check for invalid authentication types
+ */
+ auth_disable_name(optarg);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case 'y':
+ no_warn = 1;
+ break;
+#ifdef AUTHENTICATION
+ case 'z':
+ log_unauth = 1;
+ break;
+
+#endif /* AUTHENTICATION */
+
+ case 'L':
+ new_login = optarg;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr, "telnetd: %c: unknown option\n", ch);
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case '?':
+ usage();
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+ }
+
+ argc -= optind;
+ argv += optind;
+
+ if (debug) {
+ int port = 0;
+ struct servent *sp;
+
+ if (argc > 1) {
+ usage ();
+ } else if (argc == 1) {
+ sp = roken_getservbyname (*argv, "tcp");
+ if (sp)
+ port = sp->s_port;
+ else
+ port = htons(atoi(*argv));
+ } else {
+#ifdef KRB5
+ port = krb5_getportbyname (NULL, "telnet", "tcp", 23);
+#else
+ port = k_getportbyname("telnet", "tcp", htons(23));
+#endif
+ }
+ mini_inetd (port);
+ } else if (argc > 0) {
+ usage();
+ /* NOT REACHED */
+ }
+
+#ifdef _SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS
+ secflag = sysconf(_SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS);
+
+ /*
+ * Get socket's security label
+ */
+ if (secflag) {
+ int szss = sizeof(ss);
+ int sock_multi;
+ int szi = sizeof(int);
+
+ memset(&dv, 0, sizeof(dv));
+
+ if (getsysv(&sysv, sizeof(struct sysv)) != 0)
+ fatalperror(net, "getsysv");
+
+ /*
+ * Get socket security label and set device values
+ * {security label to be set on ttyp device}
+ */
+#ifdef SO_SEC_MULTI /* 8.0 code */
+ if ((getsockopt(0, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SECURITY,
+ (void *)&ss, &szss) < 0) ||
+ (getsockopt(0, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SEC_MULTI,
+ (void *)&sock_multi, &szi) < 0))
+ fatalperror(net, "getsockopt");
+ else {
+ dv.dv_actlvl = ss.ss_actlabel.lt_level;
+ dv.dv_actcmp = ss.ss_actlabel.lt_compart;
+ if (!sock_multi) {
+ dv.dv_minlvl = dv.dv_maxlvl = dv.dv_actlvl;
+ dv.dv_valcmp = dv.dv_actcmp;
+ } else {
+ dv.dv_minlvl = ss.ss_minlabel.lt_level;
+ dv.dv_maxlvl = ss.ss_maxlabel.lt_level;
+ dv.dv_valcmp = ss.ss_maxlabel.lt_compart;
+ }
+ dv.dv_devflg = 0;
+ }
+#else /* SO_SEC_MULTI */ /* 7.0 code */
+ if (getsockopt(0, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SECURITY,
+ (void *)&ss, &szss) >= 0) {
+ dv.dv_actlvl = ss.ss_slevel;
+ dv.dv_actcmp = ss.ss_compart;
+ dv.dv_minlvl = ss.ss_minlvl;
+ dv.dv_maxlvl = ss.ss_maxlvl;
+ dv.dv_valcmp = ss.ss_maxcmp;
+ }
+#endif /* SO_SEC_MULTI */
+ }
+#endif /* _SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS */
+
+ roken_openlog("telnetd", LOG_PID | LOG_ODELAY, LOG_DAEMON);
+ sa_size = sizeof (__ss);
+ if (getpeername(STDIN_FILENO, sa, &sa_size) < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", progname);
+ perror("getpeername");
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ if (keepalive &&
+ setsockopt(STDIN_FILENO, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE,
+ (void *)&on, sizeof (on)) < 0) {
+ syslog(LOG_WARNING, "setsockopt (SO_KEEPALIVE): %m");
+ }
+
+#if defined(IPPROTO_IP) && defined(IP_TOS) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT)
+ {
+# ifdef HAVE_GETTOSBYNAME
+ struct tosent *tp;
+ if (tos < 0 && (tp = gettosbyname("telnet", "tcp")))
+ tos = tp->t_tos;
+# endif
+ if (tos < 0)
+ tos = 020; /* Low Delay bit */
+ if (tos
+ && sa->sa_family == AF_INET
+ && (setsockopt(STDIN_FILENO, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS,
+ (void *)&tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0)
+ && (errno != ENOPROTOOPT) )
+ syslog(LOG_WARNING, "setsockopt (IP_TOS): %m");
+ }
+#endif /* defined(IPPROTO_IP) && defined(IP_TOS) */
+ net = STDIN_FILENO;
+ doit(sa, sa_size);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ return 0;
+} /* end of main */
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: telnetd");
+#ifdef AUTHENTICATION
+ fprintf(stderr, " [-a (debug|other|otp|user|valid|off|none)]\n\t");
+#endif
+ fprintf(stderr, " [-debug]");
+#ifdef DIAGNOSTICS
+ fprintf(stderr, " [-D (options|report|exercise|netdata|ptydata)]\n\t");
+#endif
+#ifdef AUTHENTICATION
+ fprintf(stderr, " [-edebug]");
+#endif
+ fprintf(stderr, " [-h]");
+ fprintf(stderr, " [-L login]");
+ fprintf(stderr, " [-n]");
+#ifdef _CRAY
+ fprintf(stderr, " [-r[lowpty]-[highpty]]");
+#endif
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n\t");
+#ifdef HAVE_GETTOSBYNAME
+ fprintf(stderr, " [-S tos]");
+#endif
+#ifdef AUTHENTICATION
+ fprintf(stderr, " [-X auth-type] [-y] [-z]");
+#endif
+ fprintf(stderr, " [-u utmp_hostname_length] [-U]");
+ fprintf(stderr, " [port]\n");
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * getterminaltype
+ *
+ * Ask the other end to send along its terminal type and speed.
+ * Output is the variable terminaltype filled in.
+ */
+static unsigned char ttytype_sbbuf[] = {
+ IAC, SB, TELOPT_TTYPE, TELQUAL_SEND, IAC, SE
+};
+
+int
+getterminaltype(char *name, size_t name_sz)
+{
+ int retval = -1;
+ void _gettermname();
+
+ settimer(baseline);
+#ifdef AUTHENTICATION
+ /*
+ * Handle the Authentication option before we do anything else.
+ */
+ send_do(TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION, 1);
+ while (his_will_wont_is_changing(TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION))
+ ttloop();
+ if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION)) {
+ retval = auth_wait(name, name_sz);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ENCRYPTION
+ send_will(TELOPT_ENCRYPT, 1);
+ send_do(TELOPT_ENCRYPT, 1); /* esc@magic.fi */
+#endif
+ send_do(TELOPT_TTYPE, 1);
+ send_do(TELOPT_TSPEED, 1);
+ send_do(TELOPT_XDISPLOC, 1);
+ send_do(TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON, 1);
+ send_do(TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON, 1);
+ while (
+#ifdef ENCRYPTION
+ his_do_dont_is_changing(TELOPT_ENCRYPT) ||
+#endif
+ his_will_wont_is_changing(TELOPT_TTYPE) ||
+ his_will_wont_is_changing(TELOPT_TSPEED) ||
+ his_will_wont_is_changing(TELOPT_XDISPLOC) ||
+ his_will_wont_is_changing(TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON) ||
+ his_will_wont_is_changing(TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON)) {
+ ttloop();
+ }
+#ifdef ENCRYPTION
+ /*
+ * Wait for the negotiation of what type of encryption we can
+ * send with. If autoencrypt is not set, this will just return.
+ */
+ if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_ENCRYPT)) {
+ encrypt_wait();
+ }
+#endif
+ if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_TSPEED)) {
+ static unsigned char sb[] =
+ { IAC, SB, TELOPT_TSPEED, TELQUAL_SEND, IAC, SE };
+
+ telnet_net_write (sb, sizeof sb);
+ DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printsub('>', sb + 2, sizeof sb - 2););
+ }
+ if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_XDISPLOC)) {
+ static unsigned char sb[] =
+ { IAC, SB, TELOPT_XDISPLOC, TELQUAL_SEND, IAC, SE };
+
+ telnet_net_write (sb, sizeof sb);
+ DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printsub('>', sb + 2, sizeof sb - 2););
+ }
+ if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON)) {
+ static unsigned char sb[] =
+ { IAC, SB, TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON, TELQUAL_SEND, IAC, SE };
+
+ telnet_net_write (sb, sizeof sb);
+ DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printsub('>', sb + 2, sizeof sb - 2););
+ }
+ else if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON)) {
+ static unsigned char sb[] =
+ { IAC, SB, TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON, TELQUAL_SEND, IAC, SE };
+
+ telnet_net_write (sb, sizeof sb);
+ DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printsub('>', sb + 2, sizeof sb - 2););
+ }
+ if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_TTYPE)) {
+
+ telnet_net_write (ttytype_sbbuf, sizeof ttytype_sbbuf);
+ DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printsub('>', ttytype_sbbuf + 2,
+ sizeof ttytype_sbbuf - 2););
+ }
+ if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_TSPEED)) {
+ while (sequenceIs(tspeedsubopt, baseline))
+ ttloop();
+ }
+ if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_XDISPLOC)) {
+ while (sequenceIs(xdisplocsubopt, baseline))
+ ttloop();
+ }
+ if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON)) {
+ while (sequenceIs(environsubopt, baseline))
+ ttloop();
+ }
+ if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON)) {
+ while (sequenceIs(oenvironsubopt, baseline))
+ ttloop();
+ }
+ if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_TTYPE)) {
+ char first[256], last[256];
+
+ while (sequenceIs(ttypesubopt, baseline))
+ ttloop();
+
+ /*
+ * If the other side has already disabled the option, then
+ * we have to just go with what we (might) have already gotten.
+ */
+ if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_TTYPE) && !terminaltypeok(terminaltype)) {
+ strlcpy(first, terminaltype, sizeof(first));
+ for(;;) {
+ /*
+ * Save the unknown name, and request the next name.
+ */
+ strlcpy(last, terminaltype, sizeof(last));
+ _gettermname();
+ if (terminaltypeok(terminaltype))
+ break;
+ if ((strncmp(last, terminaltype, sizeof(last)) == 0) ||
+ his_state_is_wont(TELOPT_TTYPE)) {
+ /*
+ * We've hit the end. If this is the same as
+ * the first name, just go with it.
+ */
+ if (strncmp(first, terminaltype, sizeof(first)) == 0)
+ break;
+ /*
+ * Get the terminal name one more time, so that
+ * RFC1091 compliant telnets will cycle back to
+ * the start of the list.
+ */
+ _gettermname();
+ if (strncmp(first, terminaltype, sizeof(first)) != 0)
+ strcpy(terminaltype, first);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return(retval);
+} /* end of getterminaltype */
+
+void
+_gettermname()
+{
+ /*
+ * If the client turned off the option,
+ * we can't send another request, so we
+ * just return.
+ */
+ if (his_state_is_wont(TELOPT_TTYPE))
+ return;
+ settimer(baseline);
+ telnet_net_write (ttytype_sbbuf, sizeof ttytype_sbbuf);
+ DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printsub('>', ttytype_sbbuf + 2,
+ sizeof ttytype_sbbuf - 2););
+ while (sequenceIs(ttypesubopt, baseline))
+ ttloop();
+}
+
+int
+terminaltypeok(char *s)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+char *hostname;
+char host_name[MaxHostNameLen];
+char remote_host_name[MaxHostNameLen];
+
+/*
+ * Get a pty, scan input lines.
+ */
+static void
+doit(struct sockaddr *who, int who_len)
+{
+ char *host = NULL;
+ int level;
+ int ptynum;
+ char user_name[256];
+ int error;
+ char host_addr[256];
+
+ /*
+ * Find an available pty to use.
+ */
+ ourpty = getpty(&ptynum);
+ if (ourpty < 0)
+ fatal(net, "All network ports in use");
+
+#ifdef _SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS
+ /*
+ * set ttyp line security label
+ */
+ if (secflag) {
+ char slave_dev[16];
+
+ snprintf(tty_dev, sizeof(tty_dev), "/dev/pty/%03d", ptynum);
+ if (setdevs(tty_dev, &dv) < 0)
+ fatal(net, "cannot set pty security");
+ snprintf(slave_dev, sizeof(slave_dev), "/dev/ttyp%03d", ptynum);
+ if (setdevs(slave_dev, &dv) < 0)
+ fatal(net, "cannot set tty security");
+ }
+#endif /* _SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS */
+
+ error = getnameinfo_verified (who, who_len, host_addr, sizeof(host_addr),
+ NULL, 0,
+ registerd_host_only ? NI_NAMEREQD : 0);
+ if (error)
+ fatal(net, "Couldn't resolve your address into a host name.\r\n\
+Please contact your net administrator");
+
+ /*
+ * We must make a copy because Kerberos is probably going
+ * to also do a gethost* and overwrite the static data...
+ */
+ strlcpy(remote_host_name, host_addr, sizeof(remote_host_name));
+ host = remote_host_name;
+
+ /* XXX - should be k_gethostname? */
+ gethostname(host_name, sizeof (host_name));
+ hostname = host_name;
+
+ /* Only trim if too long (and possible) */
+ if (strlen(remote_host_name) > abs(utmp_len)) {
+ char *domain = strchr(host_name, '.');
+ char *p = strchr(remote_host_name, '.');
+ if (domain && p && (strcmp(p, domain) == 0))
+ *p = 0; /* remove domain part */
+ }
+
+
+ /*
+ * If hostname still doesn't fit utmp, use ipaddr.
+ */
+ if (strlen(remote_host_name) > abs(utmp_len))
+ strlcpy(remote_host_name,
+ host_addr,
+ sizeof(remote_host_name));
+
+#ifdef AUTHENTICATION
+ auth_encrypt_init(hostname, host, "TELNETD", 1);
+#endif
+
+ init_env();
+ /*
+ * get terminal type.
+ */
+ *user_name = 0;
+ level = getterminaltype(user_name, sizeof(user_name));
+ setenv("TERM", terminaltype ? terminaltype : "network", 1);
+
+#ifdef _SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS
+ if (secflag) {
+ if (setulvl(dv.dv_actlvl) < 0)
+ fatal(net,"cannot setulvl()");
+ if (setucmp(dv.dv_actcmp) < 0)
+ fatal(net, "cannot setucmp()");
+ }
+#endif /* _SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS */
+
+ /* begin server processing */
+ my_telnet(net, ourpty, host, level, user_name);
+ /*NOTREACHED*/
+} /* end of doit */
+
+/* output contents of /etc/issue.net, or /etc/issue */
+static void
+show_issue(void)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char buf[128];
+ f = fopen("/etc/issue.net", "r");
+ if(f == NULL)
+ f = fopen("/etc/issue", "r");
+ if(f){
+ while(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf)-2, f)){
+ strcpy(buf + strcspn(buf, "\r\n"), "\r\n");
+ writenet((unsigned char*)buf, strlen(buf));
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Main loop. Select from pty and network, and
+ * hand data to telnet receiver finite state machine.
+ */
+void
+my_telnet(int f, int p, char *host, int level, char *autoname)
+{
+ int on = 1;
+ char *he;
+ char *IM;
+ int nfd;
+ int startslave_called = 0;
+ time_t timeout;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the slc mapping table.
+ */
+ get_slc_defaults();
+
+ /*
+ * Do some tests where it is desireable to wait for a response.
+ * Rather than doing them slowly, one at a time, do them all
+ * at once.
+ */
+ if (my_state_is_wont(TELOPT_SGA))
+ send_will(TELOPT_SGA, 1);
+ /*
+ * Is the client side a 4.2 (NOT 4.3) system? We need to know this
+ * because 4.2 clients are unable to deal with TCP urgent data.
+ *
+ * To find out, we send out a "DO ECHO". If the remote system
+ * answers "WILL ECHO" it is probably a 4.2 client, and we note
+ * that fact ("WILL ECHO" ==> that the client will echo what
+ * WE, the server, sends it; it does NOT mean that the client will
+ * echo the terminal input).
+ */
+ send_do(TELOPT_ECHO, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Send along a couple of other options that we wish to negotiate.
+ */
+ send_do(TELOPT_NAWS, 1);
+ send_will(TELOPT_STATUS, 1);
+ flowmode = 1; /* default flow control state */
+ restartany = -1; /* uninitialized... */
+ send_do(TELOPT_LFLOW, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Spin, waiting for a response from the DO ECHO. However,
+ * some REALLY DUMB telnets out there might not respond
+ * to the DO ECHO. So, we spin looking for NAWS, (most dumb
+ * telnets so far seem to respond with WONT for a DO that
+ * they don't understand...) because by the time we get the
+ * response, it will already have processed the DO ECHO.
+ * Kludge upon kludge.
+ */
+ while (his_will_wont_is_changing(TELOPT_NAWS))
+ ttloop();
+
+ /*
+ * But...
+ * The client might have sent a WILL NAWS as part of its
+ * startup code; if so, we'll be here before we get the
+ * response to the DO ECHO. We'll make the assumption
+ * that any implementation that understands about NAWS
+ * is a modern enough implementation that it will respond
+ * to our DO ECHO request; hence we'll do another spin
+ * waiting for the ECHO option to settle down, which is
+ * what we wanted to do in the first place...
+ */
+ if (his_want_state_is_will(TELOPT_ECHO) &&
+ his_state_is_will(TELOPT_NAWS)) {
+ while (his_will_wont_is_changing(TELOPT_ECHO))
+ ttloop();
+ }
+ /*
+ * On the off chance that the telnet client is broken and does not
+ * respond to the DO ECHO we sent, (after all, we did send the
+ * DO NAWS negotiation after the DO ECHO, and we won't get here
+ * until a response to the DO NAWS comes back) simulate the
+ * receipt of a will echo. This will also send a WONT ECHO
+ * to the client, since we assume that the client failed to
+ * respond because it believes that it is already in DO ECHO
+ * mode, which we do not want.
+ */
+ if (his_want_state_is_will(TELOPT_ECHO)) {
+ DIAG(TD_OPTIONS,
+ {output_data("td: simulating recv\r\n");
+ });
+ willoption(TELOPT_ECHO);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally, to clean things up, we turn on our echo. This
+ * will break stupid 4.2 telnets out of local terminal echo.
+ */
+
+ if (my_state_is_wont(TELOPT_ECHO))
+ send_will(TELOPT_ECHO, 1);
+
+#ifdef TIOCPKT
+#ifdef STREAMSPTY
+ if (!really_stream)
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Turn on packet mode
+ */
+ ioctl(p, TIOCPKT, (char *)&on);
+#endif
+
+
+ /*
+ * Call telrcv() once to pick up anything received during
+ * terminal type negotiation, 4.2/4.3 determination, and
+ * linemode negotiation.
+ */
+ telrcv();
+
+ ioctl(f, FIONBIO, (char *)&on);
+ ioctl(p, FIONBIO, (char *)&on);
+
+#if defined(SO_OOBINLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT)
+ setsockopt(net, SOL_SOCKET, SO_OOBINLINE,
+ (void *)&on, sizeof on);
+#endif /* defined(SO_OOBINLINE) */
+
+#ifdef SIGTSTP
+ signal(SIGTSTP, SIG_IGN);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGTTOU
+ /*
+ * Ignoring SIGTTOU keeps the kernel from blocking us
+ * in ttioct() in /sys/tty.c.
+ */
+ signal(SIGTTOU, SIG_IGN);
+#endif
+
+ signal(SIGCHLD, cleanup);
+
+#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
+ {
+ int t;
+ t = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR);
+ if (t >= 0) {
+ ioctl(t, TIOCNOTTY, (char *)0);
+ close(t);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ show_issue();
+ /*
+ * Show banner that getty never gave.
+ *
+ * We put the banner in the pty input buffer. This way, it
+ * gets carriage return null processing, etc., just like all
+ * other pty --> client data.
+ */
+
+ if (getenv("USER"))
+ hostinfo = 0;
+
+ IM = DEFAULT_IM;
+ he = 0;
+ edithost(he, host_name);
+ if (hostinfo && *IM)
+ putf(IM, ptyibuf2);
+
+ if (pcc)
+ strncat(ptyibuf2, ptyip, pcc+1);
+ ptyip = ptyibuf2;
+ pcc = strlen(ptyip);
+
+ DIAG(TD_REPORT, {
+ output_data("td: Entering processing loop\r\n");
+ });
+
+
+ nfd = ((f > p) ? f : p) + 1;
+ timeout = time(NULL) + 5;
+ for (;;) {
+ fd_set ibits, obits, xbits;
+ int c;
+
+ /* wait for encryption to be turned on, but don't wait
+ indefinitely */
+ if(!startslave_called && (!encrypt_delay() || timeout > time(NULL))){
+ startslave_called = 1;
+ startslave(host, level, autoname);
+ }
+
+ if (ncc < 0 && pcc < 0)
+ break;
+
+ FD_ZERO(&ibits);
+ FD_ZERO(&obits);
+ FD_ZERO(&xbits);
+ /*
+ * Never look for input if there's still
+ * stuff in the corresponding output buffer
+ */
+ if (nfrontp - nbackp || pcc > 0) {
+ FD_SET(f, &obits);
+ } else {
+ FD_SET(p, &ibits);
+ }
+ if (pfrontp - pbackp || ncc > 0) {
+ FD_SET(p, &obits);
+ } else {
+ FD_SET(f, &ibits);
+ }
+ if (!SYNCHing) {
+ FD_SET(f, &xbits);
+ }
+ if ((c = select(nfd, &ibits, &obits, &xbits,
+ (struct timeval *)0)) < 1) {
+ if (c == -1) {
+ if (errno == EINTR) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ sleep(5);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Any urgent data?
+ */
+ if (FD_ISSET(net, &xbits)) {
+ SYNCHing = 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Something to read from the network...
+ */
+ if (FD_ISSET(net, &ibits)) {
+#ifndef SO_OOBINLINE
+ /*
+ * In 4.2 (and 4.3 beta) systems, the
+ * OOB indication and data handling in the kernel
+ * is such that if two separate TCP Urgent requests
+ * come in, one byte of TCP data will be overlaid.
+ * This is fatal for Telnet, but we try to live
+ * with it.
+ *
+ * In addition, in 4.2 (and...), a special protocol
+ * is needed to pick up the TCP Urgent data in
+ * the correct sequence.
+ *
+ * What we do is: if we think we are in urgent
+ * mode, we look to see if we are "at the mark".
+ * If we are, we do an OOB receive. If we run
+ * this twice, we will do the OOB receive twice,
+ * but the second will fail, since the second
+ * time we were "at the mark", but there wasn't
+ * any data there (the kernel doesn't reset
+ * "at the mark" until we do a normal read).
+ * Once we've read the OOB data, we go ahead
+ * and do normal reads.
+ *
+ * There is also another problem, which is that
+ * since the OOB byte we read doesn't put us
+ * out of OOB state, and since that byte is most
+ * likely the TELNET DM (data mark), we would
+ * stay in the TELNET SYNCH (SYNCHing) state.
+ * So, clocks to the rescue. If we've "just"
+ * received a DM, then we test for the
+ * presence of OOB data when the receive OOB
+ * fails (and AFTER we did the normal mode read
+ * to clear "at the mark").
+ */
+ if (SYNCHing) {
+ int atmark;
+
+ ioctl(net, SIOCATMARK, (char *)&atmark);
+ if (atmark) {
+ ncc = recv(net, netibuf, sizeof (netibuf), MSG_OOB);
+ if ((ncc == -1) && (errno == EINVAL)) {
+ ncc = read(net, netibuf, sizeof (netibuf));
+ if (sequenceIs(didnetreceive, gotDM)) {
+ SYNCHing = stilloob(net);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ ncc = read(net, netibuf, sizeof (netibuf));
+ }
+ } else {
+ ncc = read(net, netibuf, sizeof (netibuf));
+ }
+ settimer(didnetreceive);
+#else /* !defined(SO_OOBINLINE)) */
+ ncc = read(net, netibuf, sizeof (netibuf));
+#endif /* !defined(SO_OOBINLINE)) */
+ if (ncc < 0 && errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+ ncc = 0;
+ else {
+ if (ncc <= 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ netip = netibuf;
+ }
+ DIAG((TD_REPORT | TD_NETDATA), {
+ output_data("td: netread %d chars\r\n", ncc);
+ });
+ DIAG(TD_NETDATA, printdata("nd", netip, ncc));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Something to read from the pty...
+ */
+ if (FD_ISSET(p, &ibits)) {
+#ifdef STREAMSPTY
+ if (really_stream)
+ pcc = readstream(p, ptyibuf, BUFSIZ);
+ else
+#endif
+ pcc = read(p, ptyibuf, BUFSIZ);
+
+ /*
+ * On some systems, if we try to read something
+ * off the master side before the slave side is
+ * opened, we get EIO.
+ */
+ if (pcc < 0 && (errno == EWOULDBLOCK ||
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ errno == EAGAIN ||
+#endif
+ errno == EIO)) {
+ pcc = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (pcc <= 0)
+ break;
+ if (ptyibuf[0] & TIOCPKT_FLUSHWRITE) {
+ netclear(); /* clear buffer back */
+#ifndef NO_URGENT
+ /*
+ * There are client telnets on some
+ * operating systems get screwed up
+ * royally if we send them urgent
+ * mode data.
+ */
+ output_data ("%c%c", IAC, DM);
+
+ neturg = nfrontp-1; /* off by one XXX */
+ DIAG(TD_OPTIONS,
+ printoption("td: send IAC", DM));
+
+#endif
+ }
+ if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_LFLOW) &&
+ (ptyibuf[0] &
+ (TIOCPKT_NOSTOP|TIOCPKT_DOSTOP))) {
+ int newflow =
+ ptyibuf[0] & TIOCPKT_DOSTOP ? 1 : 0;
+ if (newflow != flowmode) {
+ flowmode = newflow;
+ output_data("%c%c%c%c%c%c",
+ IAC, SB, TELOPT_LFLOW,
+ flowmode ? LFLOW_ON
+ : LFLOW_OFF,
+ IAC, SE);
+ DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printsub('>',
+ (unsigned char *)nfrontp-4,
+ 4););
+ }
+ }
+ pcc--;
+ ptyip = ptyibuf+1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ while (pcc > 0) {
+ if ((&netobuf[BUFSIZ] - nfrontp) < 3)
+ break;
+ c = *ptyip++ & 0377, pcc--;
+ if (c == IAC)
+ *nfrontp++ = c;
+ *nfrontp++ = c;
+ if ((c == '\r') && (my_state_is_wont(TELOPT_BINARY))) {
+ if (pcc > 0 && ((*ptyip & 0377) == '\n')) {
+ *nfrontp++ = *ptyip++ & 0377;
+ pcc--;
+ } else
+ *nfrontp++ = '\0';
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (FD_ISSET(f, &obits) && (nfrontp - nbackp) > 0)
+ netflush();
+ if (ncc > 0)
+ telrcv();
+ if (FD_ISSET(p, &obits) && (pfrontp - pbackp) > 0)
+ ptyflush();
+ }
+ cleanup(0);
+}
+
+#ifndef TCSIG
+# ifdef TIOCSIG
+# define TCSIG TIOCSIG
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef STREAMSPTY
+
+ int flowison = -1; /* current state of flow: -1 is unknown */
+
+int
+readstream(int p, char *ibuf, int bufsize)
+{
+ int flags = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct termios *tsp;
+#if 0
+ struct termio *tp;
+#endif
+ struct iocblk *ip;
+ char vstop, vstart;
+ int ixon;
+ int newflow;
+
+ strbufc.maxlen = BUFSIZ;
+ strbufc.buf = (char *)ctlbuf;
+ strbufd.maxlen = bufsize-1;
+ strbufd.len = 0;
+ strbufd.buf = ibuf+1;
+ ibuf[0] = 0;
+
+ ret = getmsg(p, &strbufc, &strbufd, &flags);
+ if (ret < 0) /* error of some sort -- probably EAGAIN */
+ return(-1);
+
+ if (strbufc.len <= 0 || ctlbuf[0] == M_DATA) {
+ /* data message */
+ if (strbufd.len > 0) { /* real data */
+ return(strbufd.len + 1); /* count header char */
+ } else {
+ /* nothing there */
+ errno = EAGAIN;
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * It's a control message. Return 1, to look at the flag we set
+ */
+
+ switch (ctlbuf[0]) {
+ case M_FLUSH:
+ if (ibuf[1] & FLUSHW)
+ ibuf[0] = TIOCPKT_FLUSHWRITE;
+ return(1);
+
+ case M_IOCTL:
+ ip = (struct iocblk *) (ibuf+1);
+
+ switch (ip->ioc_cmd) {
+#ifdef TCSETS
+ case TCSETS:
+ case TCSETSW:
+ case TCSETSF:
+ tsp = (struct termios *)
+ (ibuf+1 + sizeof(struct iocblk));
+ vstop = tsp->c_cc[VSTOP];
+ vstart = tsp->c_cc[VSTART];
+ ixon = tsp->c_iflag & IXON;
+ break;
+#endif
+#if 0
+ case TCSETA:
+ case TCSETAW:
+ case TCSETAF:
+ tp = (struct termio *) (ibuf+1 + sizeof(struct iocblk));
+ vstop = tp->c_cc[VSTOP];
+ vstart = tp->c_cc[VSTART];
+ ixon = tp->c_iflag & IXON;
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ errno = EAGAIN;
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ newflow = (ixon && (vstart == 021) && (vstop == 023)) ? 1 : 0;
+ if (newflow != flowison) { /* it's a change */
+ flowison = newflow;
+ ibuf[0] = newflow ? TIOCPKT_DOSTOP : TIOCPKT_NOSTOP;
+ return(1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* nothing worth doing anything about */
+ errno = EAGAIN;
+ return(-1);
+}
+#endif /* STREAMSPTY */
+
+/*
+ * Send interrupt to process on other side of pty.
+ * If it is in raw mode, just write NULL;
+ * otherwise, write intr char.
+ */
+void
+interrupt()
+{
+ ptyflush(); /* half-hearted */
+
+#if defined(STREAMSPTY) && defined(TIOCSIGNAL)
+ /* Streams PTY style ioctl to post a signal */
+ if (really_stream)
+ {
+ int sig = SIGINT;
+ ioctl(ourpty, TIOCSIGNAL, &sig);
+ ioctl(ourpty, I_FLUSH, FLUSHR);
+ }
+#else
+#ifdef TCSIG
+ ioctl(ourpty, TCSIG, (char *)SIGINT);
+#else /* TCSIG */
+ init_termbuf();
+ *pfrontp++ = slctab[SLC_IP].sptr ?
+ (unsigned char)*slctab[SLC_IP].sptr : '\177';
+#endif /* TCSIG */
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send quit to process on other side of pty.
+ * If it is in raw mode, just write NULL;
+ * otherwise, write quit char.
+ */
+void
+sendbrk()
+{
+ ptyflush(); /* half-hearted */
+#ifdef TCSIG
+ ioctl(ourpty, TCSIG, (char *)SIGQUIT);
+#else /* TCSIG */
+ init_termbuf();
+ *pfrontp++ = slctab[SLC_ABORT].sptr ?
+ (unsigned char)*slctab[SLC_ABORT].sptr : '\034';
+#endif /* TCSIG */
+}
+
+void
+sendsusp()
+{
+#ifdef SIGTSTP
+ ptyflush(); /* half-hearted */
+# ifdef TCSIG
+ ioctl(ourpty, TCSIG, (char *)SIGTSTP);
+# else /* TCSIG */
+ *pfrontp++ = slctab[SLC_SUSP].sptr ?
+ (unsigned char)*slctab[SLC_SUSP].sptr : '\032';
+# endif /* TCSIG */
+#endif /* SIGTSTP */
+}
+
+/*
+ * When we get an AYT, if ^T is enabled, use that. Otherwise,
+ * just send back "[Yes]".
+ */
+void
+recv_ayt()
+{
+#if defined(SIGINFO) && defined(TCSIG)
+ if (slctab[SLC_AYT].sptr && *slctab[SLC_AYT].sptr != _POSIX_VDISABLE) {
+ ioctl(ourpty, TCSIG, (char *)SIGINFO);
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+ output_data("\r\n[Yes]\r\n");
+}
+
+void
+doeof()
+{
+ init_termbuf();
+
+ *pfrontp++ = slctab[SLC_EOF].sptr ?
+ (unsigned char)*slctab[SLC_EOF].sptr : '\004';
+}
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