o Introduce group subset test, which limits the ability of a process to

  debug another process based on their respective {effective,additional,
  saved,real} gid's.  p1 is only permitted to debug p2 if its effective
  gids (egid + additional groups) are a strict superset of the gids of
  p2.  This implements properly the security test previously incorrectly
  implemented in kern_ktrace.c, and is consistent with the kernel
  security policy (although might be slightly confusing for those more
  familiar with the userland policy).
o Restructure p_candebug() logic so that various results are generated
  comparing uids, gids, credential changes, and then composed in a
  single check before testing for privilege.  These tests encapsulate
  the "BSD" inter-process debugging policy.  Other non-BSD checks remain
  seperate.  Additional comments are added.

Submitted by:   tmm, rwatson
Obtained from:  TrustedBSD Project
Reviewed by:    petef, tmm, rwatson

0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions