Fix multiple OpenSSL vulnerabilities.

Security:	FreeBSD-SA-15:06.openssl
Security:	CVE-2015-0209
Security:	CVE-2015-0286
Security:	CVE-2015-0287
Security:	CVE-2015-0288
Security:	CVE-2015-0289
Security:	CVE-2015-0293
Approved by:	so

8 files changed, 181 insertions, 42 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
index 5e1bc76..7591f4a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
@@ -124,6 +124,9 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
 	case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
 		result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object);
 		break;
+	case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
+		result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean;
+		break;
 	case V_ASN1_NULL:
 		result = 0;	/* They do not have content. */
 		break;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
index 2cbfa81..33249ab 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
@@ -127,16 +127,22 @@ unsigned long ASN1_tag2bit(int tag)
 
 ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
 		const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
-	{
+{
 	ASN1_TLC c;
 	ASN1_VALUE *ptmpval = NULL;
-	if (!pval)
-		pval = &ptmpval;
 	asn1_tlc_clear_nc(&c);
-	if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0) 
-		return *pval;
-	return NULL;
+	if (pval && *pval && it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE)
+		ptmpval = *pval;
+	if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(&ptmpval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0) {
+		if (pval && it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) {
+			if (*pval)
+				ASN1_item_free(*pval, it);
+			*pval = ptmpval;
+		}
+		return ptmpval;
 	}
+	return NULL;
+}
 
 int ASN1_template_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
 		const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
@@ -311,13 +317,20 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
 		if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
 				goto auxerr;
 
-		/* Allocate structure */
-		if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it))
-			{
+		if (*pval) {
+			/* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */
+			i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
+			if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) {
+				tt = it->templates + i;
+				pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
+				ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt);
+				asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it);
+			}
+		} else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
 			ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I,
 						ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
 			goto err;
-			}
+		}
 		/* CHOICE type, try each possibility in turn */
 		p = *in;
 		for (i = 0, tt=it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++)
@@ -407,6 +420,17 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
 		if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
 				goto auxerr;
 
+		/* Free up and zero any ADB found */
+		for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
+			if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) {
+				const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
+				ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
+				seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
+				pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
+				ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
+			}
+		}
+
 		/* Get each field entry */
 		for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++)
 			{
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
index d91aa11..5eb2a5b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
@@ -272,6 +272,25 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
 	PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri=NULL;
 	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os=NULL;
 
+	if (p7 == NULL) {
+		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * The content field in the PKCS7 ContentInfo is optional, but that really
+	 * only applies to inner content (precisely, detached signatures).
+	 *
+	 * When reading content, missing outer content is therefore treated as an
+	 * error.
+	 *
+	 * When creating content, PKCS7_content_new() must be called before
+	 * calling this method, so a NULL p7->d is always an error.
+	 */
+	if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
 	i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
 	p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
 
@@ -433,6 +452,16 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
        unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL;
        int eklen = 0, tkeylen = 0;
 
+	if (p7 == NULL) {
+		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
 	i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
 	p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
 
@@ -752,6 +781,16 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
 	STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *si_sk=NULL;
 	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os=NULL;
 
+	if (p7 == NULL) {
+		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
 	i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
 	p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
@@ -796,6 +835,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
 		/* If detached data then the content is excluded */
 		if(PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents) && p7->detached) {
 			M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+			os = NULL;
 			p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL;
 		}
 		break;
@@ -806,6 +846,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
 		if(PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.digest->contents) && p7->detached)
 			{
 			M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+			os = NULL;
 			p7->d.digest->contents->d.data = NULL;
 			}
 		break;
@@ -866,8 +907,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
 				}
 			}
 		}
-	else if (i == NID_pkcs7_digest)
-		{
+	else if (i == NID_pkcs7_digest) {
 		unsigned char md_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 		unsigned int md_len;
 		if (!PKCS7_find_digest(&mdc, bio,
@@ -878,24 +918,31 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
 		M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(p7->d.digest->digest, md_data, md_len);
 		}
 
-	if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && !(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF))
-		{
-		char *cont;
-		long contlen;
-		btmp=BIO_find_type(bio,BIO_TYPE_MEM);
-		if (btmp == NULL)
-			{
-			PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL,PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO);
-			goto err;
+		if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7)) {
+			/*
+			 * NOTE(emilia): I think we only reach os == NULL here because detached
+			 * digested data support is broken.
+			 */
+			if (os == NULL)
+				goto err;
+			if (!(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) {
+				char *cont;
+				long contlen;
+				btmp = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MEM);
+				if (btmp == NULL) {
+					PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO);
+				goto err;
 			}
-		contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont);
-		/* Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data
-		 * instead of making an extra copy.
-		 */
-		BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
-		BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0);
-		ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen);
+			contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont);
+			/*
+			 * Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data
+			 * instead of making an extra copy.
+			 */
+			BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
+			BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0);
+			ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen);
 		}
+	}
 	ret=1;
 err:
 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
@@ -971,6 +1018,16 @@ int PKCS7_dataVerify(X509_STORE *cert_store, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bio,
 	STACK_OF(X509) *cert;
 	X509 *x509;
 
+	if (p7 == NULL) {
+		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7))
 		{
 		cert=p7->d.sign->cert;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
index d411269..e2fc802 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ long PKCS7_ctrl(PKCS7 *p7, int cmd, long larg, char *parg)
 
 	switch (cmd)
 		{
+	/* NOTE(emilia): does not support detached digested data. */
 	case PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE:
 		if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed)
 			{
@@ -459,6 +460,8 @@ int PKCS7_set_digest(PKCS7 *p7, const EVP_MD *md)
 
 STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *PKCS7_get_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7)
 	{
+	if (p7 == NULL || p7->d.ptr == NULL)
+		return NULL;
 	if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7))
 		{
 		return(p7->d.sign->signer_info);
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod
index 298ec54..6fed4b1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod
+++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod
@@ -199,6 +199,12 @@ B<*px> is valid is broken and some parts of the reused structure may
 persist if they are not present in the new one. As a result the use
 of this "reuse" behaviour is strongly discouraged.
 
+Current versions of OpenSSL will not modify B<*px> if an error occurs.
+If parsing succeeds then B<*px> is freed (if it is not NULL) and then
+set to the value of the newly decoded structure. As a result B<*px>
+B<must not> be allocated on the stack or an attempt will be made to
+free an invalid pointer.
+
 i2d_X509() will not return an error in many versions of OpenSSL,
 if mandatory fields are not initialized due to a programming error
 then the encoded structure may contain invalid data or omit the
@@ -210,7 +216,9 @@ always succeed.
 
 d2i_X509(), d2i_X509_bio() and d2i_X509_fp() return a valid B<X509> structure
 or B<NULL> if an error occurs. The error code that can be obtained by
-L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. 
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. If the "reuse" capability has been used
+with a valid X509 structure being passed in via B<px> then the object is not
+modified in the event of error.
 
 i2d_X509() returns the number of bytes successfully encoded or a negative
 value if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
index c63be30..3c0d6a5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s)
 
 		OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0
 		    && s->session->master_key_length
-		    < (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
+		    <= (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
 		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length);
 		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,&c,1);
 		c++;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
index 59ced3f..18e2813 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
@@ -454,9 +454,6 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY);
 		return(-1);
 		}
-	i=ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert,s->s2->tmp.enc,
-		&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
-		(s->s2->ssl2_rollback)?RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
 
 	is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
 	
@@ -475,23 +472,61 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
 	else
 		ek=5;
 
+	/*
+	 * The format of the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message is
+	 * 1 byte message type
+	 * 3 bytes cipher
+	 * 2-byte clear key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.clear)
+	 * 2-byte encrypted key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.enc)
+	 * 2-byte key args length (IV etc)
+	 * clear key
+	 * encrypted key
+	 * key args
+	 *
+	 * If the cipher is an export cipher, then the encrypted key bytes
+	 * are a fixed portion of the total key (5 or 8 bytes). The size of
+	 * this portion is in |ek|. If the cipher is not an export cipher,
+	 * then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear key length
+	 * must be zero).
+	 */
+	if ((!is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear != 0) ||
+	    (is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear + ek != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) {
+		ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * The encrypted blob must decrypt to the encrypted portion of the key.
+	 * Decryption can't be expanding, so if we don't have enough encrypted
+	 * bytes to fit the key in the buffer, stop now.
+	 */
+	if ((is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < ek) ||
+	    (!is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) {
+		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc,
+                                &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
+                                &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
+                                (s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING :
+                                RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+
 	/* bad decrypt */
 #if 1
 	/* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a
 	 * random master secret (Bleichenbacher attack) */
-	if ((i < 0) ||
-		((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
-		|| (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+(unsigned int)i !=
-			(unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))))))
-		{
+	if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))
+                    || (is_export && i != ek))) {
 		ERR_clear_error();
 		if (is_export)
 			i=ek;
 		else
 			i=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
-		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,i) <= 0)
+		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&p[s->s2->tmp.clear], i) <= 0)
 			return 0;
-		}
+	}
 #else
 	if (i < 0)
 		{
@@ -513,7 +548,8 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
 		}
 #endif
 
-	if (is_export) i+=s->s2->tmp.clear;
+	if (is_export)
+		i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
 
 	if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
 		{
diff --git a/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/d2i_X509.3 b/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/d2i_X509.3
index 4dfb31a..ead4c2b 100644
--- a/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/d2i_X509.3
+++ b/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/d2i_X509.3
@@ -342,6 +342,12 @@ In some versions of OpenSSL the \*(L"reuse\*(R" behaviour of \fId2i_X509()\fR wh
 persist if they are not present in the new one. As a result the use
 of this \*(L"reuse\*(R" behaviour is strongly discouraged.
 .PP
+Current versions of OpenSSL will not modify \fB*px\fR if an error occurs.
+If parsing succeeds then \fB*px\fR is freed (if it is not \s-1NULL\s0) and then
+set to the value of the newly decoded structure. As a result \fB*px\fR
+\&\fBmust not\fR be allocated on the stack or an attempt will be made to
+free an invalid pointer.
+.PP
 \&\fIi2d_X509()\fR will not return an error in many versions of OpenSSL,
 if mandatory fields are not initialized due to a programming error
 then the encoded structure may contain invalid data or omit the
@@ -352,7 +358,9 @@ always succeed.
 .IX Header "RETURN VALUES"
 \&\fId2i_X509()\fR, \fId2i_X509_bio()\fR and \fId2i_X509_fp()\fR return a valid \fBX509\fR structure
 or \fB\s-1NULL\s0\fR if an error occurs. The error code that can be obtained by
-\&\fIERR_get_error\fR\|(3).
+\&\fIERR_get_error\fR\|(3). If the \*(L"reuse\*(R" capability has been used
+with a valid X509 structure being passed in via \fBpx\fR then the object is not
+modified in the event of error.
 .PP
 \&\fIi2d_X509()\fR returns the number of bytes successfully encoded or a negative
 value if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by